STANFORD v. INDIANA PAROLE BOARD
Entry - Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability. The action is dismissed without prejudice. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. *** SEE ENTRY ***. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 1/25/2012.(CKM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TIMOTHES W. STANFORD,
Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability
AFederal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that
appears legally insufficient on its face.@ McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856
(1994). This authority is conferred by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in United States District Courts, which provides that upon preliminary
consideration by the district court judge, "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in
the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and
cause the petitioner to be notified." See Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 414 (7th
Cir. 1993). This is an appropriate case for such a disposition.
ABefore seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must
exhaust available state remedies.@ Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)(citing
28 U.S.C. '2254(b)(1)). In this action for habeas corpus relief, Stanford seeks his
release from the custody of the Indiana Department of Correction based on his
contention that his probation was unlawfully revoked. This is a claim which is
cognizable in an action for petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court. Mills
v. State, 840 N.E.2d 354, 357 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006)(noting that Ind. Post-Conviction
Rule 1(1)(a)(5) provides that "[a] person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for,
a crime by a court of this state, and who claims . . . that his sentence has expired,
his probation, parole or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise
unlawfully held in custody or other restraint . . . may institute at any time a
proceeding under this Rule to secure relief"). This procedure provides him a
meaningful remedy in the Indiana courts. Wallace v. Duckworth, 778 F.2d 1215,
1219 (7th Cir. 1985). Although Stanford has responded to the court’s December 28,
2011, Entry, he does not allege that he has filed an action for post-conviction relief
in the trial court.
"The purpose of exhaustion is not to create a procedural hurdle on the path to
federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an appropriate forum, where
meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation obviated before
resort to federal court." Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). The only
manner in which that purpose can be served is by dismissing this action, without
prejudice, and allowing Stanford to proceed with his claims in the Indiana courts, if
he elects to do so.
The action is dismissed without prejudice. Judgment consistent with this
Entry shall now issue.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the
Rules Governing ' 2254 proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c), the court finds that
Stanford has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find it Adebatable whether
[this court] was correct in its procedural ruling.@ Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000). The court therefore denies a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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