PACKER v. TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY / SCHOOL OF MEDICINE et al

Filing 47

ENTRY on Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss - Defendants' Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims (Dkt. 10 ) is GRANTED. Accordingly, Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint as against Defendant Dr. Michael Sturek is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 12/18/2012. (TRG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
DR. SUBAH PACKER, Ph.D.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TRUSTEES OF INDIANA
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
MEDICINE and DR. MICHAEL
STUREK, in his Official Capacity,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:12-CV-00008-TWP-DKL

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiff
Subah Packer’s, Ph.D. (“Dr. Packer”), Complaint against the Defendants, the Trustees of Indiana
University School of Medicine (“Trustees”) and Dr. Michael Sturek (“Dr. Sturek”) (collectively,
“Defendants”). Dr. Packer’s Complaint alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”) and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 29 U.S.C. §
206(d), et seq. Specifically, Dr. Packer alleges the Defendants engaged in gender discrimination
against her when she was working as the Associate Professor of Cellular & Integrative
Physiology at the Indiana University School of Medicine (“University”). Dr. Packer alleges the
Defendants failed to give her merit raises and institutional support because of her gender and
Defendants created a hostile work environment in the workplace. Furthermore, she claims the
Defendants compensated her at a lower rate than her male colleagues for equal work in violation
of the Equal Pay Act. Lastly, she alleges that the Defendants retaliated against her in violation of
Title VII for complaining about their allegedly discriminatory practices. For the reasons set forth
below, Defendants’ Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims (Dkt. 10) is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND
Dr. Packer is an Associate Professor in IU’s the University’s Department of Psychology
and Dr. Sturek is the chair of the Department of Psychology. Dr. Packer filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and thereafter, filed the
Complaint herein. After the filing of her Complaint, Defendants filed a motion to partially
dismiss Dr. Packer’s claims with respect to Count I. Specifically, Defendants argue that Dr.
Packer’s claim against Dr. Sturek under Title VII should be dismissed because the Seventh
Circuit has ruled that a supervisor cannot be held liable in his individual capacity under Title VII.
See Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995). Because the Defendants do not address
the factual allegations incorporated in Dr. Packer’s Complaint, the Court will focus its analysis
solely on the merits of the legal arguments presented in its Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court takes all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski v. County of Kane,
550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). However, the allegations must “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and the
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)). Stated differently, the complaint must include “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575,
580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow “the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citation omitted).

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III. DISCUSSION
Dr. Packer argues that it is permissible to name her supervisor, Dr. Sturek, as a defendant
in his individual capacity because he is the chief enforcer of her inequitable pay, gender bias and
ongoing retaliation for which she seeks injunctive relief. Therefore, Dr. Packer asserts under the
circumstances in this case, Dr. Sturek is personally liable for her damages under Title VII.
Defendants counter by arguing that the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that supervisors
cannot be found liable in their individual capacity under Title VII. As such, Defendants argue
that Dr. Packer’s Title VII claim against Dr. Sturek should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court agrees.
A covered entity under Title VII is an “employer,” which is defined as “a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees…and any agent of such a
person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). With respect to this definition, the Seventh Circuit has found
that “Congress intended only for employers to be liable for their agent’s actions under the
traditional respondeat superior doctrine, not for agents to be personally liable.” Gastineau v.
Fleet Mortg. Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1998). In particular, in Williams v. Banning, the
Seventh Circuit in affirming a lower court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s Title VII claims of sexual
harassment against her supervisor stated that “a supervisor does not, in his individual capacity,
fall within Title VII’s definition of employer.” 72 F.3d at 555. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit
reiterated a similar finding in Silk v. City of Chi., 194 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1999), when it stated
“[o]ur case law is clear that a supervisor cannot be held liable in his individual capacity
under…Title VII.” Id. at 797; see also Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir.
2012).

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In this case, Dr. Packer has not alleged facts in her Complaint that demonstrate that Dr.
Sturek can be held individually liable under Title VII. Dr. Packer argues that because she seeks
injunctive relief with respect to Dr. Sturek, he can be held individually liable in this matter.
However, this argument is misplaced because a remedy for injunctive relief imposed against an
employer will also be enforceable against its managerial employees. See Schanzer v. Rutgers
Univ., 934 F. Supp. 669, 677 (D.N.J. 1996) (“Certainly any injunctive relief against the employer
would be enforceable alike against the employer’s officers, directors, management, employees,
and others acting in concert with the employer, a concept embedded in the federal rule governing
injunctions and their effect.”) (internal citation omitted). In addition, the Court concludes that
Count I against Dr. Sturek in his official capacity should also be dismissed because the proper
defendants in this matter are the Trustees. See Collins v. Meike, 52 F. App’x 835, 836 (7th Cir.
2002) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of Title VII claims against an individual defendant
in her official capacity because it was redundant); Bryson v. Chi. State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 917
(7th Cir. 1996). Based on the binding precedent of the Seventh Circuit and the applicability of
injunctive relief against the Trustees, the Court concludes that Dr. Sturek may not be held
individually liable under Title VII. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Title VII claims under
Count I of the Complaint must be dismissed against Defendant Dr. Michael Sturek.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Claims (Dkt. 10) is GRANTED. Accordingly, Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint as against
Defendant Dr. Michael Sturek is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
12/18/2012
Date: __________________
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________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

DISTRIBUTION:
Ellen E. Boshkoff
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP - Indianapolis
[e-mail]
Edward E. Hollis
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP - Indianapolis
[e-mail]
John F. Ittenbach
ITTENBACH JOHNSON TRETTIN & KOELLER
[e-mail]
Amanda L. Shelby
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP - Indianapolis
[e-mail]

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