JOHNSON v. BUTTS

Filing 16

ENTRY - Johnson's petition for a writ of habeas is DENIED. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. The court DENIES a certificate of appealability. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 7/10/2012. Copy mailed to Petitioner via U.S. Mail.(JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
RANDY JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
KEITH BUTTS,
Respondent.

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1:12-cv-15-JMS-DML

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability
For the reasons explained in this Entry, the petition of Randy Johnson for a
writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In
addition, the court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Background
On July 30, 2003, Melissa Hanlon was murdered in the upstairs apartment
she shared with Candice Hoffman. Johnson lived in the adjoining upstairs
apartment.
During the evening of July 29, 2003, Hoffman and Hanlon met Johnson,
Johnson fixed their vacuum cleaner, and the three socialized for a period. At
approximately 12:45 a.m. on July 30, 2003, Hoffman left the apartment she shared
with Hanlon. Hoffman locked the door behind her. At that time, Hanlon was alone
inside the apartment.
When Hoffman returned to the apartment at around 6:00 a.m., she found
the apartment door unlocked, although it did not appear to have been forced open.
Once inside, Hoffman found Hanlon on Hanlon’s bed. Hanlon was dead.
On December 22, 2005, Johnson was charged with Hanlon’s murder. After
trial by jury in October 2006, Johnson was found guilty of felony murder. He
received a sentence of 65 years for this offense and is now serving that sentence.

Johnson’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal in Johnson v.
State, No. 49A05-0611-CR-664 (Ind.Ct.App. Oct. 19, 2007)(Johnson I), wherein his
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the appropriateness of his
sentence were rejected. The trial court then denied Johnson’s petition for postconviction relief. The denial of post-conviction relief was affirmed on appeal in
Johnson v. State, Cause No. 49A04-1104-PC-196 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 11,
2011)(Johnson II).
In Johnson II, Johnson argued that he had been denied the effective
assistance of counsel at trial when his attorney failed to object to certain testimony
presented by an investigating detective. Johnson’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus asserts the same claim presented in his petition for post-conviction relief.
Applicable Standard
A federal court may grant habeas relief only if the petitioner demonstrates
that he is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1996). Johnson filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition after
the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
His petition, therefore, is subject to the AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,
336 (1997).
Under the current regime governing federal habeas corpus for state prison
inmates, the inmate must show, so far as bears on this case, that the state court
which convicted him unreasonably applied a federal doctrine declared by the United
States Supreme Court.” Redmond v. Kingston, 240 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing
28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Morgan v.
Krenke, 232 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, “under AEDPA, federal courts do not
independently analyze the petitioner's claims; federal courts are limited to
reviewing the relevant state court ruling on the claims.” Rever v. Acevedo, 590 F.3d
533, 536 (7th Cir. 2010). “A state-court decision involves an unreasonable
application of this Court's clearly established precedents if the state court applies
this Court's precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Brown
v. Payton, 544 U.S. 131, 141 (2005) (internal citations omitted); see also Badelle v.
Correll, 452 F.3d 648, 653 ((7th Cir. 2006). “The habeas applicant has the burden of
proof to show that the application of federal law was unreasonable.” Harding v.
Sternes, 380 F.3d 1034, 1043 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S.
19, 25 (2002)).
The sole claim in this action is that Johnson was denied the effective
assistance of counsel at trial. Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 934 (7th Cir.
2009)(explaining that ineffective assistance of counsel is a single ground for relief
no matter how many failings the lawyer may have displayed)(citing Peoples v.
United States, 403 F.3d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 2005)). The Sixth Amendment

guarantees the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970). The Supreme Court framed the determinative question as “whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Under Strickland, [a defendant] must prove two elements: (1) that his
trial counsel's performance fell below “an objective standard of
reasonableness,” id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052; and (2) “that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 694. For the
first element, this court's review of the attorney's performance is
“highly deferential” and “reflects a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689. For the second element, the defendant
must show that “counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687.
Daniels v. Knight, 476 F.3d 426, 433-34 (7th Cir. 2007) (parallel citations omitted).
The foregoing outlines the straightforward features of Strickland=s twoprong test. In the context of a case such as Johnson presents, however, the AEDPA
raises the bar. “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly
deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington v.
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (internal and end citations omitted). “When §
2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The
question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied
Strickland's deferential standard.” Id. When the AEDPA standard is applied to a
Strickland claim the following calculus emerges:
The question is not whether a federal court believes the state court's
determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but
whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher
threshold. And, because the Strickland standard is a general standard,
a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a
defendant has not satisfied that standard.
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009)(internal citations and
quotations omitted).

Discussion
The Indiana Court of Appeals noted the Strickland standard. Johnson II,
at pp. 14-15. The Indiana Court of Appeals examined the circumstances associated
with each of Johnson’s specifications of ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewed
the strong evidence of Johnson’s guilt, reviewed in considerable detail the findings
of the trial court in denying the petition for post-conviction relief, found that the
trial court’s findings could not be set aside under the proper standard, and after
doing so concluded that Johnson had not met either the deficient performance prong
or the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. Johnson II, at pp. 17-20.
Specifically the Court found, among other things, that by failing to call his
trial counsel as a witness, the trial court was entitled to infer the counsel would not
support Johnson’s allegations, and that the decision not to object may well have
been strategic. The Indiana Court of Appeals also followed the Strickland standard
in determining that the ample record evidence supporting Johnson’s guilt – his
inconsistent statement concerning his presence at the murder scene, the presence of
his underwear at the scene despite his denial as having been there, his access to a
box cutter that fit the description of the murder weapon – negated any notion of
prejudice resulting from any alleged deficiency in performance.
In doing so, the Indiana Court of Appeals did not transgress the very
deferential AEDPA standards which has already been noted. Atkins v. Zenk, 2012
667 F.3d 939, 943-44 (7th Cir. 2012)(“Plainly stated, these are demanding
standards. This Court has recognized that federal courts should deny a habeas
corpus petition so long as the state court took the constitutional standard ‘seriously
and produce[d] an answer within the range of defensible positions.’”)(quoting
Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 591–92 (7th Cir. 2000)). Johnson is therefore
not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on his claim that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel at trial.
Conclusion
This court has carefully reviewed the state record in light of Johnson’s claim
and has given such consideration to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim
as the limited scope of its review in a habeas corpus proceeding permits. The
deference due to state court decisions “preserves authority to issue the writ in cases
where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's
decision conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.
Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Johnson’s habeas petition does not present such a situation.
Johnson’s petition for a writ of habeas is therefore denied. Judgment
consistent with this Entry shall now issue.

Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the
Rules Governing § 2254 proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the court finds that
Johnson has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find “it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The court therefore denies a certificate of
appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

07/10/2012
Date: __________________
Distribution:
Randy Johnson
DOC # 104669
Pendleton Correctional Facility
4490 West Reformatory Road
Pendleton, IN 46064
All Electronically Registered Counsel

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana