FELTY v. N.C.C.F. SUPERINTENDENT

Filing 20

ENTRY Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - Felty's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. (SEE ENTRY). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 6/27/2012. (copy to Petitioner via US Mail)(JKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
MATTHEW FELTY,
Petitioner,
vs.
N.C.C.F. SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

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1:12-cv-0050-JMS-MJD

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Matthew Felty is a state prisoner who was disciplined in a proceeding
identified as No. NCF 11-07-0083, for violating prison rules on June 30, 2008,
at the New Castle Correctional Facility for trafficking. The evidence
favorable to the decision of the conduct board Henderson v. United States
Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1993) (a federal habeas court
Awill overturn the . . . [conduct board=s] decision only if no reasonable
adjudicator could have found . . . [the petitioner] guilty of the offense on the
basis of the evidence presented"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 314 (1994), as set
forth in the July 13, 2011, conduct report is that:
On 6/20/11, Felty was involved in an inappropriate relationship with a
female LPN employed with Corizan. During the investigation, a
handwritten letter detailing the relationship was found in Felty’s
property. During an interview, Felty admitted that the Corizan
employee had written the note and brought it into the facility and gave
it to him. During an interview, the Corizan employee admitted to
writing the note at home and bringing it into the facility and giving it
to Felty.
Contending that the proceeding was constitutionally infirm, Felty now seeks
a writ of habeas corpus. His specific contentions are that he was denied due
process because: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty
finding in his case; (2) he was coerced into admitting guilt; and (3) he was
excessively sanctioned.
The writ Felty seeks can be issued only if the court finds that he is Ais
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(a). Because he has not made such a showing, his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied. The reason for this
disposition is that the pleadings and the expanded record show that (1) the
procedural protections required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),
were provided, (2) there was at least Asome evidence@ to support the decision
of the conduct board as required by Superintendent of Walpole v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445 (1985), and (3) the proceedings were not otherwise tainted by
prejudicial error.
Felty=s arguments that he was denied the protections afforded by Wolff
and Hill are either refuted by the expanded record or based on assertions
which do not entitle him to relief.
!
As to his first claim, Felty=s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence fails. The "some evidence" standard is lenient, "requiring only
that the decision not be arbitrary or without support in the record."
McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). A conduct
report alone may suffice as Asome evidence.@ Id.; see also Webb v.
Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (even Ameager@ proof is
sufficient). Here, the conduct report is clear and provides a direct
account of Felty=s possession of the handwritten letter and a
reasonable adjudicator could readily have so concluded. Although the
evidence before the disciplinary board must "point to the accused's
guilt," Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1989), Aonly
evidence that was presented to the Adjustment Committee is relevant
to this analysis.@ Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir.
1992); see also Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 ("The Federal Constitution does
not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the
one reached by the disciplinary board."). The evidence here was
constitutionally sufficient.
!
Felty’s second claim is that he was coerced into admitting guilt
to protect his relationship with his fiancé. However, even if Felty did
not admit guilt, the “some evidence” required by Hill is satisfied by the
expanded record beyond his confession.
!
Felty contends that he was excessively sanctioned. The severity
of the sanctions imposed does not present a cognizable claim under 28
U.S.C. ' 2254(a) under the circumstances of this case. See Koo v.
McBride, 124 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 1997) (the issue of sentencing
within the parameters of state law is ordinarily outside the realm of
federal habeas review). Furthermore, Felty’s credit class demotion was
modified to a one grade demotion in conformity with Department of
Correction guidelines.

"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no
arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or
sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no
constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Felty to the relief he
seeks. Accordingly, Felty=s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be
denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall
now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

06/27/2012
Date: _________________________
_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana