HUDSON v. (IDOC) PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al

Filing 8

ENTRY and ORDER DISMISSING ACTION - The plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis 2 is granted. The complaint fails to survive the screening required by § 1915A because it fails to contain a legally viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dismissal of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) is therefore mandatory. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. (copy to Plaintiff via US Mail). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 3/12/2012. (JKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
CHRISTOPHER HUDSON,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL
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FACILITY, et al.,
)
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Defendants. )

1:12-cv-092-JMS-DML

Entry and Order Dismissing Action
I.
The plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis [2] is granted. The
assessment of even an initial partial filing fee is not feasible at this time.
II.
The plaintiff is a prisoner and his complaint is subject to the screening
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624
(7th Cir. 2006). Pursuant to this statute, "[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show that plaintiff is not
entitled to relief." Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 921 (2007).
To satisfy the notice-pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” which is sufficient to provide the
defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and its basis. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) and quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face. . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotations omitted). Pro se complaints such as that
filed by Christopher Hudson here, are construed liberally and held to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at
94; Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008).
III.
A.
Hudson alleges that the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), Pendleton
Correctional Facility (PCF), PCF Superintendent Butts, Lt. Fox, and Officer Hurt
violated his Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, Hudson
alleges that he was found guilty of a frivolous conduct report which was later
overturned after he had served the sanctions imposed. Those sanctions consisted of
31 days of segregation, loss of visits for six months and placement in disciplinary
segregation for a year. Officer Hurt allegedly made false statements in the conduct
report and Lt. Fox denied Hudson a fair disciplinary hearing and found him guilty
of the violation alleged in the conduct report. The DOC and Superintendent Butts
were allegedly negligent in approving the “excessive sanctions” and in their
supervision of employees. Hudson seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
B.
This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[T]he first step in any [§
1983] claim is to identify the specific constitutional right infringed." Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). This is entirely sensible, because no action lies
under § 1983 unless a plaintiff has asserted the violation of a federal right. See
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19
(1981); Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 349 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (without a
predicate constitutional violation one cannot make out a prima facie case under §
1983).
In this case, the complaint makes reference to constitutional provisions but
does not allege a plausible violation of them. Two provisions are without any
conceivable basis.
•

The Eighth Amendment claim fails because Hudson does not allege that the
conditions of his confinement in disciplinary segregation resulted in a
deprivation sufficiently serious to constitute A>the denial of the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities.=@ Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364,
1369 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

•

The Fifth Amendment is not implicated by the plaintiff=s allegations, because
the defendants are state actors, not federal actors. Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d
1433 (7th Cir. 1984).

As to the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, there are no allegations
which could support a conclusion that sanctions imposed by Lt. Fox constituted an
Aatypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.@ Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-86 (1995); see also
Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005) (no federally protected liberty
interest in avoiding fabricated disciplinary conviction resulting in 60 days of
segregation). An inmate must identify a “grievous loss” in order for a liberty interest
to be found so that due process attaches in a disciplinary proceeding. See Wilkinson
v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 220 (2005). The sanctions imposed in the disciplinary
proceeding described in the complaint did not constitute the loss of a protected
liberty interest and thus are not actionable under § 1983, whether the imposition of
those sanctions was warranted by the evidence or not. Townsend v. Fuchs, 552 F.3d
765, 772 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221 (“[T]he Constitution itself
does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse
conditions of confinement.@)); see also Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644
(7th Cir. 2001)(when no recognized liberty or property interest has been taken, the
confining authority Ais free to use any procedures it chooses, or no procedures at
all@). Merely being placed in a disciplinary unit, or being confined under conditions
more onerous than conditions in other housing unit of the jail does not violate the
guarantee of due process. Miller v. Dobier, 2011 WL 477046, *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 11,
2011).
IV.
For the reasons explained above, even when liberally construed, the
complaint fails to survive the screening required by ' 1915A because it fails to
contain a legally viable claim under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Dismissal of the action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(b) is therefore mandatory. Gladney v. Pendleton
Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2002).
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

03/12/2012
Date: __________________
_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana