GOUDY v. CUMMINGS et al
ORDER - Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED. Final judgment shall be entered following the Court's resolution of the remaining sanctions issues. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 9/29/2017. (CKM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
RODNEY J. CUMMINGS in his individual )
capacities as an Anderson police detective
and as a Madison County prosecutor,
STEVE NAPIER in his individual capacity )
as an Anderson police detective,
CITY OF ANDERSON an Indiana
THE STATE OF INDIANA (for
indemnification purposes only),
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This cause is now before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket
No. 235] filed on September 16, 2016, by Defendants Rodney J. Cummings, in his
individual capacity as a police officer, and Steve Napier, in his individual capacity as a
police detective, (collectively, “the City Defendants”), 1 and the Motion for Summary
Judgment [Docket No. 269] filed on April 11, 2017, by Defendant Rodney J. Cummings,
in his individual capacity as a prosecutor. Plaintiff Walter Goudy’s cause of action stems
The City of Anderson is also a named defendant in this case. However, because Plaintiff has
abandoned his state law claims involving the City and has never asserted a Monell claim, the
City is entitled to judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the City
from his conviction for murder and attempted murder following a 1995 jury trial. After a
lengthy appeal process, the Seventh Circuit reversed his conviction in 2010, concluding
that three police reports implicating another suspect in the crime were not produced to
Mr. Goudy’s defense attorney. Goudy v. Basinger, 604 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 2010)
Mr. Goudy subsequently initiated this action against Defendants, alleging a
number of federal and state claims, many of which were based on the theory that
Detectives Napier and Cummings knew of the supplemental police reports, but
wrongfully withheld them from the deputy prosecutors assigned to the case, in violation
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that following Cummings’s election as
Madison County prosecutor, he continued to withhold the police reports. However, it has
since been established that the deputy prosecutors who prosecuted Mr. Goudy’s criminal
case did in fact have possession of those police reports before Mr. Goudy’s trial, and
thus, that those reports were not improperly withheld by Napier or Cummings. Mr.
Goudy concedes this fact and no longer pursues a due process claim based on the
withholding of the police reports. Mr. Goudy has also abandoned his § 1983 conspiracy
claim as well as his state law claims. Summary judgment is therefore granted in
Defendants’ favor on those claims.
Accordingly, the only remaining claim at issue is Mr. Goudy’s due process claim
premised upon his assertion that he was subjected to: (1) a Brady violation caused by the
withholding of newly discovered exculpatory materials; and (2) an improper show-up
procedure that denied him a fair trial. For the reasons detailed below, we GRANT
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment.
Background on Plaintiff’s Trial and Conviction
In the early morning hours of October 3, 1993, in Anderson, Indiana, two men
fired multiple shots into a car occupied by Marvin McCloud, Damon Nunn, and Jill
Barclay, killing Mr. McCloud and seriously injuring Mr. Nunn. The shooting occurred
while Mr. McCloud was in the driver’s seat and Mr. Nunn was in the passenger’s seat.
Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. 1997). On December 21, 1995, Plaintiff Walter
Goudy was convicted of the murder of Mr. McCloud and attempted murder of Mr. Nunn.
Because the underlying facts surrounding Mr. Goudy’s conviction were previously set
forth in detail in the Seventh Circuit’s 2010 habeas decision, we incorporate those
Goudy’s conviction was based on the testimony of five eye witnesses. The
five were Damon Nunn, Jill Barclay, Jackie Barclay, LaTonya Young and
Nunn and Jill Barclay were passengers in McCloud’s car. Nunn was in the
front seat and was shot several times. Jill Barclay was in the backseat, but
was not wounded. Both testified that McCloud pulled into a parking lot
near an after-hours hangout and picked up Jill Barclay. They told the jury
that as McCloud pulled out of the lot, Goudy and a shorter accomplice
approached on either side of the car and fired several shots, killing
McCloud; both testified that Goudy was the man on the passenger side of
the car. Nunn said Goudy wore a brown or beige corduroy jacket, was
around five feet eight to five feet ten inches tall, had an Afro hairstyle and
wore a cap on his head. Jill Barclay said Goudy wore a dark sweatshirt,
had a jeri-curl hairstyle that was partially covered by the hood from the
sweatshirt. Both witnesses said they saw Goudy and three other men
earlier in the evening at a nearby club called the Oasis.
Jackie Barclay, Jill’s sister, and LaTonya Young testified that they
witnessed the shooting from across the street. Jackie Barclay and Young
had also been at the Oasis that night and both said they saw Goudy and
three other men. After the Oasis closed, both went to the after-hours club.
Jackie Barclay testified that she was talking with some friends outside the
club when she saw Goudy and another man approach McCloud’s vehicle.
She said Goudy was around six feet tall and wore a dark jacket, dark pants
or jeans, and had braids in his hair that were partially covered by his hood.
The shooter on the driver’s side was shorter, wore a “brown uniform,” and
had no facial hair. LaTonya Young told the jury that Goudy was the
shooter on the driver’s side, that he was around five feet eight inches tall
with braids and a ponytail and wore no hat or hood. Young also testified in
court that a recording of Goudy’s car alarm was the same alarm she heard
in the Oasis parking lot that night.
A roommate of Goudy’s, Kaidi Harvell, was the state’s primary witness
and testified that he had been with Goudy in Anderson on the night of the
shooting. He told the jury that he, Goudy, and Goudy’s two brothers,
Romeo Lee and Lamont Thomas drove up from Indianapolis together that
night to go to some bars. Harvell said that Goudy and Lee coveted the tires
and rims on McCloud’s car and had been talking about “jacking” them.
After the group left the Oasis, they headed toward the after-hours club with
other locals, where Goudy and Lee planned to steal McCloud’s car.
According to Harvell, he and Thomas were instructed to drive around the
block while Goudy and Lee would steal the car. Harvell told the jury that
Goudy shot into the driver’s side of McCloud’s car, and that he wore a
brown “prison coat,” black cap and gloves. Lee shot into the passenger
In addition to the evidence produced at trial, the government possessed
three police reports that outlined statements by Jill and Jackie Barclay,
Young, Harvell, and another witness (who did not testify at trial) named
Donzetta Clay. The first report describes a phone call to police from Jill
Barclay in which she said she saw one of the gunmen at an Indianapolis
mall. She stated that she thought he kept looking at her “over his shoulder”
and that she later saw him outside “attempting to look at her license plate.”
She later identified this man as Harvell and said she was positive he was
one of the gunmen. The report additionally describes a photo lineup
viewed by the Barclay sisters and Young. All three “positively and without
hesitation” identified Harvell as the gunman on the driver’s side of
McCloud’s car and said he wore brown clothing. The second police report
details an in-person lineup viewed by Nunn, Jill and Jackie Barclay, and
Donzetta Clay. Clay and the Barclay sisters identified Harvell; Nunn
identified a non-suspect as the shooter. The third report contains a
statement from Harvell indicating that he had been in contact with one of
Goudy’s alibi witnesses. He says he “talked with” her and that she “wants
to change her story.”
The government did not disclose any of these statements to Goudy, even
though they implicate Harvell and conflict with Harvell’s version of events;
contradict Young’s statement at trial that Goudy was the driver’s side
shooter, and conflict with Nunn’s description of the gunmen.
Goudy, 604 F.3d at 396-97. 2
As noted above, the only claim remaining in this litigation is an alleged due
process violation based on Defendants’ failure to disclose certain exculpatory evidence
apart from the three police reports referenced in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion and the
City Defendants’ use of an improper show-up procedure. We outline the additional facts
relating to this claim in the following section:
The City Defendants’ Identification Procedures
On February 5, 1994, Mr. Goudy was picked up by the police at the Oasis after an
anonymous caller told the police that her boyfriend saw one of the shooters there. Exh. N
(Rodney Cummings Deposition, Part 1) at 112. Upon arrival at the Anderson Police
Department, Mr. Goudy was placed in a room with a one-way mirror. At this point, Mr.
Goudy was not free to leave the Anderson police station of his own will. Exh. Q at 253.
The Seventh Circuit also noted that, in addition to the undisclosed police reports, the jury did
not hear a tape-recorded confession given by Mr. Goudy’s brother, Romeo Lee, to Mr. Goudy’s
defense counsel and a private investigator on July 27, 1995. In that statement, Mr. Lee said that
he was the passenger-side shooter and Mr. Harvell was the driver-side shooter. Mr. Lee also
stated that he and Mr. Goudy were often confused for each other because of their distinct
resemblance. Exh. G (Romeo Lee Audio Statement). The reason Mr. Goudy’s counsel failed to
introduce this evidence at trial is unknown. As the Seventh Circuit recognized, Mr. Lee’s
confession was likely self-authenticating and thus admissible under Indiana Rule of Evidence
Thereafter, Defendant Cummings, in his role as Anderson Police Detective, contacted Jill
Barclay and asked her to come to the police department to make an identification. Exh. C
(Jill Barclay Trial Testimony) at 173-74; Exh. O (Jill Barclay Deposition) at 124-25. Ms.
Barclay testified that Defendant Cummings and his partner Defendant Napier informed
her before she was to make the identification that the person they wanted her to view was
a suspect in the shooting. Exh. C at 177; Exh. O at 124-26. Ms. Barclay identified Mr.
Goudy from the one-person show-up as one of the shooters. 3
Defendant Cummings testified in his deposition that he conducted the one-person
show-up both because Mr. Goudy requested it and because he did not believe that Ms.
Barclay would identify Mr. Goudy as one of the shooters and so it would not be an issue.
Exh. N at 62-63, 66-67. But he also acknowledged in his testimony that a one-person
show-up is an identification procedure that is less reliable than a normal lineup and can in
some cases make it more likely that the witness will later pick out that same suspect in
future lineup procedures. Id. at 60-61, 66-67.
After Ms. Barclay identified Mr. Goudy from the one-person show-up as one of
the shooters, Defendants Cummings and Napier showed her a lineup on that same day
wherein she knew four of the five “fillers” and she again identified Mr. Goudy. Exh. C at
1,152-1,155. Ten days later, on February 15, 1994, Ms. Barclay was asked to view
another lineup and she once again identified Mr. Goudy as one of the shooters. Mr.
In his complaint, Mr. Goudy challenged additional line-up procedures used by the City
Defendants that he contends were “suggestive.” However, he has since dropped those claims
and thus we need not address the subsequent line-up procedures used in this case.
Goudy was the only person in common in these three identification procedures. Exh. P
(Jill Barclay Suppression Hearing Testimony) at 178, 183-84, 187-88.
At some point in between the show-up and lineup on February 5, 1994 and the
second lineup on February 15, 1994, Jill Barclay spoke to her sister, Jackie Barclay,
about the identification she had made. Jill told Jackie that the person she identified
looked like “John Casey,” a local man from their neighborhood. Exh. O at 140-141; Exh.
P at 189-190. Jackie subsequently identified Mr. Goudy as one of the shooters.
Mr. Goudy was originally charged with Mr. McCloud’s murder and Mr. Nunn’s
attempted murder in February 1994 by then-Madison County Prosecutor William Lawler.
Those charges were dropped three months later on May 16, 1994. Exh. N at 93.
Defendant Cummings and Defendant Napier disagreed with Mr. Lawler’s decision to
drop the charges against Mr. Goudy. Thereafter, in the fall of 1994, Defendant
Cummings campaigned to replace Mr. Lawler as Madison County Prosecutor. 4 Exh. S
(Steve Napier Deposition, Part 1) at 21-25. During this time period, on September 6,
1994, Defendant Cummings signed out of the Anderson Police Department Property
Room a videotape recording of a September 1, 1994 lineup wherein Jill Barclay, Jackie
Barclay, and Donzetta Clay identified Kaidi Harvell as one of the two shooters; this
lineup was the subject of one of the three undisclosed police reports described above. Id.
Defendant Cummings began working as a police officer for the City of Anderson in 1979. In
1990, Defendant Cummings graduated from law school, passed the bar exam, and became a
licensed attorney, all while maintaining his employment as an Anderson police officer.
at 147. The property receipt for the videotape reflects Cummings’s signature. Exh. V
(Rodney Cummings Deposition, Part 2) at 313-14; Exh. V1 (Anderson Police
Department Property Tag).
Defendant Cummings was elected the Madison County Prosecutor and was sworn
in on January 1, 1995. Exh. N at 92. After he was elected, Defendant Cummings
selected Defendant Napier to be the liaison officer to the prosecutor’s office. Id. at 111.
The liaison officer is the conduit between the prosecutor’s office and the police
department and is responsible for ensuring that all police reports get to the prosecutor’s
file. Exh. S at 13-14. On April 7, 1995, Defendant Cummings personally decided to recharge Mr. Goudy with Mr. McCloud’s murder and Mr. Nunn’s attempted murder and
issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Goudy. Exh. N at 126-27.
Before Mr. Goudy’s trial, his criminal defense attorney, Mark Maynard, filed a
motion requesting the court conduct an in-camera inspection of the prosecution file
because he believed that police reports were being withheld from the defense. Exh. X
(Mark Maynard Deposition) at 49. On October 23, 1995, the trial court conducted a
hearing on Mr. Maynard’s motion and Maynard explained that he was seeking, among
other things, access to videotapes, including videotapes of lineups, and police reports.
Exh. Y (10/23/1995 Hearing Transcript) at 362-363. Madison County Deputy Prosecutor
David Puckett, who represented the State at the hearing, cited Indiana case law
exempting police reports from discovery under the work product doctrine. Id. at 365.
Mr. Puckett did not advance the same argument as to videos, however, instead proposing
that Mr. Maynard make arrangements to view the videos at the police station. Id. at 3648
65. The trial judge ruled that the videos were to be made available but that police reports
were not required to be produced. Id. at 367-68. Mr. Maynard filed a motion to
reconsider that ruling, which was heard on November 22, 1995. Madison County Deputy
Prosecutor Paula Maras-Roberts appeared for the State and made the same arguments as
Mr. Puckett had advanced at the previous hearing. Exh. Z1 (11/22/1995 Hearing
Transcript) at 389-91. The court affirmed its prior ruling. Id. at 392.
On that same day (November 22, 1995), Defendant Cummings, then the Madison
County Prosecutor, returned the video of the Kaidi Harvell lineup that he had retained
previously in his personal possession for more than fourteen months to the Anderson
Police Department Property Room. Exh. V at 313-314. At 3:36 p.m. that day, the police
identification badge number that Defendant Cummings was assigned when he was an
Anderson police detective was used to place the videotaped lineup back into evidence.
Id. at 325. While Defendant Cummings has acknowledged that it is his signature on the
November 22, 1995 property receipt, he has testified that he could not imagine he would
have returned evidence to the property room in 1995, and that, in fact, he was not
permitted to do so because by that time he was the Madison County Prosecutor and no
longer a police officer. However, he could not offer any explanation for the fact that it
was his badge number and signature on the property receipt. Id. at 317, 325.
There is a set of handwritten notes in the record consisting of a “to-do” list, dated
November 14, 1995 (approximately one week before the lineup videotape was returned to
the property room), which includes the following entry: “videos of lineup ?? still N/A.”
Exh. FF1 (Handwritten To-Do List). Ms. Maras-Roberts testified that she may have been
the author of those notes and that “N/A” would mean “not available.” Exh. FF (Paula
Maras-Roberts Dep., Part 2) at 27-28, 87-89. Ms. Maras-Roberts also testified that she is
not aware of any prosecutor ever removing evidence from a police evidence room
without a court order and that the removal of evidence from the property room is usually
the function of the police. Exh. EE (Maras-Roberts Dep., Part 1) at 57-58. Mr. Puckett
similarly testified that checking evidence in and out of a police evidence room is the
responsibility of a police officer. Exh. W (David Puckett Dep., Part 1) at 53-54.
It is undisputed that the lineup videotape and property receipts were not provided
to Mr. Goudy’s defense counsel at trial. Ms. Maras-Roberts and Mr. Puckett were the
prosecutors who tried Mr. Goudy’s case. Defendant Cummings was not involved in any
way in Mr. Goudy’s trial. Both Ms. Maras-Roberts and Mr. Puckett testified that they
did not recall ever receiving the videotape and that, had they been in possession of the
lineup videotape, they would have been required to tender it to Mr. Goudy’s defense
counsel. Exh. GG (Puckett Dep, Part 2) at 72-73; Exh. FF at 26-27, 110.
Hope Fey, Mr. Goudy’s post-conviction attorney, testified by affidavit that she
never received a copy of the Anderson Police Department property tag for the videotape
and that, had she received that evidence, she would have introduced the document and the
videotape into the record. Exh. KK (Hope Fey Aff.). Similarly, Mr. Goudy’s appointed
counsel for the proceedings before the Seventh Circuit, Andrew Caridas, testified by
affidavit that this evidence was not in the record when the Seventh Circuit decided Mr.
Goudy’s habeas case. Exh. LL (Andrew Caridas Aff.).
Additional Undisclosed Evidence
Mr. Goudy filed this lawsuit on February 6, 2012. Following our order in April
2015 directing Defendants to turn over to Plaintiff all documents listed on their privilege
log as a sanction for their failure to adequately complete and timely disclose the log, Mr.
Goudy learned of an additional item of evidence that he contends constitutes additional
Brady material. 5 Specifically, Mr. Goudy learned of the existence of a set of handwritten
notes written by Defendant Napier, and memorializing the first interview that Defendants
Napier and Cummings had with Mr. Harvell on June 22, 1994. Exh. HH (Notes from
June 22, 1994 Harvell Interview). These notes describe statements made by Mr. Harvell
(before he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent later in the interview) in
which he denied ever having been on the scene of the McCloud shooting or having any
involvement in Mr. McCloud’s murder. His denial contradicts testimony he subsequently
gave at Mr. Goudy’s trial. Id. These notes were never converted into a police report or
tendered in any form to Mr. Maynard. Mr. Maynard testified that he would have used the
notes to impeach Mr. Harvell’s testimony at trial, had they been disclosed. Exh. MM.
The Instant Litigation
In its May 3, 2010 opinion, the Seventh Circuit directed the State to refile charges
against Mr. Goudy within 120 days or release him from custody. Goudy, 604 F.3d at
In his statement of undisputed facts, Mr. Goudy also references discovery of a memorandum
written by Detective Cummings to then Madison County Prosecutor Lawler describing how Mr.
Harvell was growing a beard, in an apparent attempt to escape identification in an upcoming
lineup. Exh. M (August 16, 1994 Cummings Memo to Lawler). According to Mr. Goudy, this
memorandum is exculpatory evidence showing Mr. Harvell’s consciousness of guilt, which was
never disclosed to defense counsel before his criminal trial. However, beyond referencing this
memorandum in his statement of facts, Mr. Goudy has not put forth any Brady argument in this
litigation. Therefore, he has waived any such claim. See Wehrs v. Wells, 688 F.3d 886, 891 n.2
(7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that undeveloped and unsupported arguments are waived).
395-96. The State chose not to refile charges and Mr. Goudy was released from custody
on September 1, 2010. By this time, Mr. Goudy had been in custody for more than
fifteen years, ever since Defendant Cummings issued the arrest warrant for him in April
1995. A special prosecutor was appointed to determine whether Mr. Goudy should be
retried, and, on January 13, 2012, the special prosecutor decided not to retry Plaintiff, and
all charges against him were dismissed.
Mr. Goudy filed the complaint in this action on February 9, 2012. Defendants’
renewed motions for summary judgment were filed on September 16, 2016 and April 11,
2017, respectively. These motions are now fully briefed and ripe for ruling.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is “no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material
fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party
and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See id. at 255.
However, neither the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties,” id., 477 U.S. at 247, nor the existence of “some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986), will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of
Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).
The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of
the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The party seeking summary judgment on a claim on which the non-moving party bears
the burden of proof at trial may discharge its burden by showing an absence of evidence
to support the non-moving party's case. Id. at 325.
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits, nor is it a vehicle
for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th
Cir. 1994). Therefore, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of
the non-movant, if genuine doubts remain and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the
party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enterprises,
Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); Wolf v. City of
Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989). But if it is clear that a plaintiff will be
unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his or her case, summary
judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Ziliak v.
AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2003). Further, a failure to prove one
essential element “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
A plaintiff’s self-serving statements, which are speculative or which lack a
foundation of personal knowledge, and which are unsupported by specific concrete facts
reflected in the record, cannot preclude summary judgment. Albiero v. City of Kankakee,
246 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2001); Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 995 (7th Cir. 1999);
Slowiak v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1993).
To establish a Brady violation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the evidence at issue
is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the
evidence has been suppressed by the government, either willfully or inadvertently; and
(3) the suppressed evidence is material, or, in other words, resulted in prejudice. United
States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Evidence is
“suppressed” if it is not disclosed “in time for the defendant to make use of it,” and it
“was not otherwise available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.” Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 567 (7th Cir. 2008). Evidence is
“material” where there is a “reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would
have produced a different verdict.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). In a
civil case, such as this, a plaintiff must also show that a particular defendant is liable for
the Brady violation. See Ienco v. City of Chi., 286 F.3d 994, 998-99 (7th Cir. 2002).
Harvell Interview Notes
Mr. Goudy contends that the City Defendants are liable under Brady and its
progeny for failing to produce to the trial prosecutors the notes from their initial interview
with Mr. Harvell and for actively covering up the true nature of that conversation. The
City Defendants do not dispute that this evidence is favorable to Mr. Goudy because Mr.
Harvell’s statements disavowing having been at the scene of the shooting could have
been used to impeach his subsequent trial testimony admitting that he was in fact present
and that Mr. Goudy was one of the shooters. Nor is there any dispute that these notes
were not provided to Mr. Goudy’s defense counsel before his criminal trial. 6
Accordingly, the issues before us here are whether this nondisclosed evidence resulted in
prejudice to Mr. Goudy and whether the City Defendants are the individuals responsible
for its withholding.
Here, Mr. Puckett, one of the two trial prosecutors, testified by deposition that he
is “as certain as he can be” that he knew before Mr. Goudy’s trial that Mr. Harvell had
initially denied any involvement in the shooting. 7 Exh. GG (Puckett Dep., Part 2) at 33.
The City Defendants cannot be held liable for suppression of evidence if one of the trial
We note, however, that we are not entirely convinced that the allegedly impeaching evidence
contained in the notes, to wit, that Mr. Harvell initially denied being in Anderson on the night of
the shooting, was actually “suppressed” for Brady purposes because it appears likely that Mr.
Goudy’s criminal defense attorney could have discovered it through reasonable diligence. See
Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 567 (“Suppression does not occur when the defendant could have
discovered it himself through ‘reasonable diligence.’”) (quoting Ienco, 429 F.3d at 683). There
is no evidence that the City Defendants concealed their initial June 1994 interview with Mr.
Harvell. To the contrary, that interview was directly referenced by the City Defendants in a
September 1994 interview with Mr. Harvell of which defense counsel had notice. In that later
interview, Defendant Cummings expressly mentioned interviewing Mr. Harvell in June 1994,
stating: “We [the City Defendants and Harvell] had some conversation. You elected at that time
not to talk with us; is that correct?” Exh. NN (September 9, 1994 Harvell Interview) at 2-3.
Given that it was well-established in June 1994 that a suspect could invoke Miranda rights at any
point during an interview with police, Bobo v. Kolb, 969 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)), and Defendant Cummings referenced having
“some conversation” during the interview where Mr. Harvell invoked his Fifth Amendment
rights, it would have been reasonable for defense counsel to have believed more inquiry was
required into whether Mr. Harvell had made any statement about his involvement. Had he made
such inquiries, this information presumably would have been disclosed.
Ms. Maras-Roberts, the second trial prosecutor, testified that she had never seen the notes
before and that, if she had had access to those notes, she would have been required to produce
them to the defense. Exh. FF at 46-47.
prosecutors was in fact aware of the exculpatory information. Beaman v. Freesmeyer,
776 F.3d 500, 512 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Usually, a police officer’s Brady obligations are
discharged by disclosing material exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor, for it is the
prosecutor’s responsibility to turn the evidence over to defense counsel.”). Although Mr.
Goudy argues that Mr. Puckett’s testimony is not credible because Puckett is a friend of
Defendant Cummings, he offers no other evidence to discredit this testimony. While
credibility determinations are generally inappropriate at the summary judgment stage,
“the prospect of challenging a witness’ credibility is not alone enough to avoid summary
judgment.” Dugan v. Smerwick Sewerage Co., 142 F.3d 398, 406 (7th Cir. 1998).
Even assuming that the City Defendants withheld the information contained in the
Harvell interview notes from the trial prosecutors, namely, that Mr. Harvell denied being
in Anderson on the night of the shooting and having any involvement in a murder, they
are still entitled to summary judgment on this claim because the suppressed evidence is
not sufficiently material to undermine the verdict in Mr. Goudy’s criminal case. As
discussed above, there can be no Brady violation “unless the nondisclosure was so
serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have
produced a different verdict.” Strickler, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). “The question is not
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with
the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
Mr. Goudy argues that the prosecution’s case against him was so tenuous that the
fact that Mr. Harvell initially denied involvement in the shooting was of “crucial
importance, especially where the prosecutor in closing argument bragged that Harvell
[had] always told a consistent story.” Dkt. 286 at 26. We disagree. First, we are not
persuaded that the Plaintiff’s characterization of the prosecutor’s closing argument is
accurate. The thrust of the prosecution’s closing did not focus on Mr. Harvell’s
credibility or the consistency of his story, but rather on the corroboration among the
eyewitnesses in their identification of Mr. Goudy as one of the shooters. Dkt. 287-29.
More importantly, this is not a case in which Mr. Harvell’s testimony was the only
evidence tying Mr. Goudy to the crime. Rather, a number of other eye-witnesses also
identified Mr. Goudy as one of the shooters, including Damon Nunn, Latonia Young,
Jacqueline Barclay, and Jill Barclay. The fact that Mr. Harvell could have been
impeached by his initial denial of involvement does not undermine the testimony of these
other witnesses. Additionally, these other witness identifications were corroborated by
additional evidence at trial, such as Ms. Young’s testimony that a recording of Mr.
Goudy’s car alarm was the same alarm she had heard at the scene of the crime on the
night of the shooting. Thus, the fact that the jury may have disbelieved the testimony of
Mr. Harvell had they been presented with the fact that he initially denied having been at
the scene of the shooting is insufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict. 8 We,
therefore, conclude that the withheld evidence was not material for Brady purposes.
This is particularly true given the nature and context of the brief comments made by Mr.
Harvell in which he denied involvement in the shooting. As recorded on the second page of the
officer’s handwritten notes, Harvell stated: “Walter [Goudy] never let me use his car[.] I can’t
get to Anderson on my own[.] I didn’t kill nobody and don’t know of nobody get[ting] killed.
[I] haven’t been to Anderson since Sept (2nd or 3rd week) at end.” Exh. HH at 3-4. These
disclosures came at a very early stage of the questioning by the police and likely had limited
Mr. Goudy also contends that, in violation of Brady and its progeny, a videotape
of the September 1, 1994 lineup with Mr. Harvell was withheld by Defendant Cummings,
initially in his capacity as a police officer and continuing thereafter when he became
First, there is no basis for liability on the part of Defendant Cummings in his
capacity as a police officer for withholding the videotape recording of the September 1,
1994 lineup. According to the police evidence locker logs, Defendant Cummings
checked out the lineup video on September 6, 1994, when he was still a police officer.
Although Mr. Goudy contends that Cummings must have had a nefarious purpose for
checking out the video at that time, this is nothing more than speculation. In September
1994, the McCloud murder case was still open and unsolved and there has been no
showing that it was improper for Defendant Cummings, as a police officer, to check out a
video relevant to an open homicide investigation. Nor was there any obligation at that
time for Defendant Cummings in his capacity as a police officer to turn the video over to
the trial prosecutors because there were no charges then pending against Mr. Goudy,
since those charges were dismissed in May 1994 and not reinstituted until April 1995,
after Cummings had been elected prosecutor and was thus no longer an employee of the
impeachment value because of their brief, unembellished, unexplained nature and because they
are the sort of disclaimers typical of criminal suspects when first questioned by law enforcement.
Accordingly, we turn to the issue of whether Defendant Cummings can be held
liable in his capacity as prosecutor for withholding the lineup videotape. We conclude
that he cannot. It is the trial prosecutors who have “a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case ….” Kyles,
514 U.S. at 437. Here, it is undisputed that Prosecutor Cummings had no role in Mr.
Goudy’s criminal trial—he was not involved in discovery, did not try the case, and was
not otherwise involved in the trial. There is also no dispute that the prosecutors who did
try the case were aware of the fact that the videotape existed. One of the police reports,
as Mr. Goudy concedes, which was in the trial prosecutors’ possession, disclosed the fact
that the lineup was videotaped. The trial prosecutors’ knowledge of the video’s existence
is further evidenced by the “videos of lineup ?? still N/A” note on the November 14,
1995 to-do list authored by Ms. Maras-Roberts. It is clear beyond dispute, therefore, that
the trial prosecutors knew of the videotape, whether they ever actually possessed it or not.
Mr. Goudy argues that Prosecutor Cummings is nevertheless liable for
withholding the videotape because, by keeping it in his possession from September 6,
1994 to November 22, 1995, he intentionally concealed it from the trial prosecutors,
thereby preventing them from accessing it and turning it over to defense counsel. There
is no evidence to support this theory, at least not in the record before us. Although
Cummings did retain the videotape in his possession for a significant time period (over
fourteen months), he in no way concealed that fact. To the contrary, he used his own
name to check the video out of the police evidence locker using the ordinary procedures
utilized by the Anderson Police Department and then returned the video, again under his
own name, 9 weeks before Mr. Goudy’s trial began. There simply is no evidence in the
record that the trial prosecutors made any attempt to obtain the videotape during that time
period, much less that any such attempt was thwarted by Prosecutor Cummings.
In sum, because the trial prosecutors knew of the existence of the videotape, the
location of the videotape was not concealed (anyone who went looking for it in the place
it was supposed to be, to wit, the police evidence locker, would see that it had been
checked out by Defendant Cummings and thus know where to find it), and it was
returned to the evidence room prior to the start of Mr. Goudy’s trial and thus available for
the trial prosecutors to access and timely turn over to defense counsel, there can be no
ruling holding Prosecutor Cummings responsible for a Brady violation based on his
withholding the videotape. Any failure of the trial prosecutors to locate that videotape
and turn it over to the defense is not attributable to Prosecutor Cummings. 10
It is true that Defendant Cummings was the prosecutor at the time he checked the videotape
back into the evidence room, which Plaintiff argues is an investigatory, not a prosecutorial,
function. That is irrelevant for our analysis, however, because our ruling is not based on a
finding that Defendant Cummings is entitled to prosecutorial immunity for his actions.
In a prior order in this case, we held that any potential liability for Defendant Cummings in his
prosecutorial capacity was limited to the time period between January 1, 1995, when he began
his term as Madison County Prosecutor, and April 7, 1995, when he refiled charges against Mr.
Goudy, and that he was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for any actions after that
date. Goudy v. Cummings, No. 1:12-cv-00161-SEB-TAB, 2013 WL 5487355, at *6-*7 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 30, 2013). Mr. Goudy now asks that we reconsider that ruling, given that Defendant
Cummings checked the lineup video back into evidence in November 1995, which is an
investigative rather than a prosecutorial function for which Cummings is not entitled to absolute
immunity. We decline to revisit our prior ruling, given our finding that Defendant Cummings
did not improperly withhold or conceal the videotape from the trial prosecutors at any point.
In Count II of Mr. Goudy’s complaint, he alleges that the City Defendants
subjected him to suggestive line-up procedures thereby depriving him of the “right to
receive a fair trial, in violation of [his] Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due
process and fair trial rights.” Compl. ¶ 141. Mr. Goudy has since clarified that he
challenges only the February 5, 1994 showup identification involving Jill Barkley. The
City Defendants maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim
because: (1) the showup procedure did not deprive Mr. Goudy of a fair trial; and (2) it
was the trial prosecutors, not the City Defendants, who made the decision to introduce the
showup identification at trial, thus breaking the chain of causation between any
suggestive showup procedure conducted by the City Defendants and the violation of Mr.
Goudy’s constitutional rights.
It is well established law that “due process protects the accused against the
introduction of evidence of, or tainted by, unreliable pretrial identifications obtained
through unnecessarily suggestive procedures.” Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227
(1977). The suggestiveness of identification procedures is assessed under a two-step test:
“First, the court must decide whether the police used an unduly suggestive pretrial
procedure in obtaining an identification. … [T]hen the court must determine whether,
under all the circumstances, that suggestive procedure resulted in a substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification.” United States ex rel. Lee v. Flannigan, 884 F.2d 945,
948 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1027 (1990) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977)).
Being subjected to a suggestive identification procedure alone does not rise to the
level of a constitutional injury, however. Hensley v. Carey, 818 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir.
1987) (“[T]he defendants could not have violated [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights
simply be subjecting him to a lineup which was allegedly unduly suggestive.”). Rather,
“[t]he rule against admission of evidence from unnecessarily suggestive lineups is a
prophylactic rule designed to protect a core right, that is the right to a fair trial, and it is
only the violation of the core right and not the prophylactic rule that should be actionable
under § 1983.” Id. at 649. Thus, as Justice Stevens put it in United States ex rel. Kirby v.
Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 406 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975), “if a
constitutional violation results from a showup, it occurs in the courtroom, not in the
Here, we need not delve into an analysis of whether the showup procedure used in
this case was unduly suggestive and whether the use at trial of testimony and evidence
that was obtained as a result of the showup identification denied Mr. Goudy his right to a
fair trial and thus violated due process. Even if we resolved these questions in Mr.
Goudy’s favor, the City Defendants cannot be held liable on the record before us for any
such constitutional violation because the trial prosecutors’ independent decision to
introduce such evidence at trial constituted the intervening, proximate cause of any
constitutional injury suffered by Mr. Goudy. See Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d
567, 582-85 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that general tort principles governing causation
apply equally to § 1983 claims).
There has been no evidence adduced by Mr. Goudy that the City Defendants hid
from the trial prosecutors the circumstances surrounding Jill Barclay’s February 5, 1994
showup identification of him or otherwise in any way were involved in or influenced the
trial prosecutors’ decision to use testimony and evidence gained from that showup
identification in his trial. To the contrary, the record is clear that the trial prosecutors
knew that Jill Barclay identified Mr. Goudy following a showup procedure, that the
prosecutors had sufficient information to make an informed decision about the reliability
of that evidence, and that they exercised independent judgment when they chose to
introduce such evidence at Mr. Goudy’s trial. The trial judge apparently saw no error in
this decision as the evidence was admitted. Under these facts, the chain of causation
between the alleged conduct by the City Defendants and any constitutional violation was
broken. See Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189 (2d. Cir. 2007) (“In the absence of
evidence that [the defendant police officer] misled or pressured the prosecution or trial
judge [to use or admit testimony regarding an unduly suggestive identification], we
cannot conclude that his conduct caused the violation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional
rights; rather, the violation was caused by the ill-considered acts and decisions of the
prosecutor and trial judge.”). The City Defendants are thus entitled to summary
judgment on Mr. Goudy’s due process claim based on the showup identification
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are
GRANTED. Final judgment shall be entered following the Court’s resolution of the
remaining sanctions issues.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
DVORAK LAW OFFICES LLC
Alexander Phillip Will
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
Amy Stewart Johson
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
Anthony W. Overholt
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
Gregory P. Gadson
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
Gregory P. Gadson
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
Rebecca L. Loeffler
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
Betsy M. Isenberg
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE BLAKE HOROWITZ LAW FIRM, LTD.
THE BLAKE HOROWITZ LAW FIRM, LTD.
Blake Wolfe Horwitz
THE BLAKE HORWITZ LAW FIRM
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