RUTLAND v. TARGET CORPORATION
Filing
67
ENTRY - The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Target on all of Rutland's claims. [dkt. no. 50 ]. Because the exhibits were not material to the Court's decision, the Court denies as moot the 62 motion regarding them. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 11/26/2013. (copy to Plaintiff via US Mail) (JKS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
DUWAYNE E. RUTLAND,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TARGET CORPORATION,
Defendant.
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) CAUSE NO. 1:12-cv-189-WTL-DML
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ENTRY ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This cause is before the Court on the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (dkt. no.
50). The motion is fully briefed and the Court, being duly advised, GRANTS the motion for the
reasons set forth below.1 Also pending is the Defendant’s motion to strike certain exhibits and to
sanction the Plaintiff for fabricating those exhibits (dkt. no. 62). Because the exhibits were not
material to the Court’s decision, the Court denies as moot the motion regarding them.
I. STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
admissible evidence presented by the non-moving party must be believed and all reasonable
1
The Plaintiff submitted a large stack of documents along with his response to the
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Included in that stack was a document entitled
Motion for Summary Judgment. That document references a “brief in support of Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment” and a “Designation of Evidence in Support of [his] motion for
summary judgment,” neither of which was included in the stack of documents or otherwise
submitted to the Court. Because the Plaintiff’s purported motion for summary judgment was not
accompanied by a brief and therefore does not include any legal argument or evidentiary support,
the Court has not considered it. The Court notes, however, that the briefing of the Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment demonstrates that the Plaintiff would not have been entitled to
summary judgment even if he had filed an appropriately supported motion.
inferences must be drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476
F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007); Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We view
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences
in that party’s favor.”). However, “[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue
may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations,
that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Id. Finally, the non-moving
party bears the burden of specifically identifying the relevant evidence of record, and “the court
is not required to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.” Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001).2
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Duwayne Rutland brings this case against his former employer, Target
Corporation (“Target”). The relevant facts of record, considered in the light most favorable to
Rutland, are as follow.
Rutland began working for Target in West Jefferson, Ohio, in 2004. His employment
was terminated by Target in October 2006 while he was on medical leave.
In April 2011, after relocating to Indianapolis to attend aviation maintenance school,
Rutland applied to work for Target in Indianapolis. Target Senior Group Leader Todd Davis
interviewed Rutland and made the decision to hire him. Rutland informed Davis that he would
be attending school and was told that “there was no problem with him attending school fulltime.” Rutland also informed Target human resources employee Julie Wells about his classes
when she called to offer him the job.
At the outset of their employment, new employees at Target are subject to an initial
2
The Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this case and was provided with the notice required
by Local Rule 56-1(k).
2
90-day probationary period referred to as a “Learning Period.” As with all new employees,
Rutland’s first 90 days were thus considered a probationary Learning Period. Target also has a
Temporary Schedule Exceptions policy. Under the Temporary Schedule Exceptions policy,
employees who have successfully completed their 90-day Learning Period can request
permission to alter their schedules to miss a portion of their regular shifts. This policy is
primarily used by employees who need to miss part of a scheduled shift on a regular basis to
attend classes, but it can also be used as a temporary solution for employees needing to arrive
late or leave early to take care of childcare needs and similar situations. To request a temporary
schedule exception to accommodate a school schedule, an employee must complete a request
form and generally must submit it at least fourteen days prior to the schedule exception request
date, along with documentation from the school about the relevant class. This request is
submitted first to the employee’s immediate supervisor (referred to by Target as a “Group
Leader”); if approved by the Group Leader, it is then passed on to senior leadership for approval.
Approval is not guaranteed; rather, it is dependent upon the business needs of the Target location
in question.
Rutland’s employment began at Target’s Indianapolis Distribution Center in June 2011.
Rutland was assigned to the A-1 shift, which ran from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. every Saturday,
Sunday, and Monday. Rutland’s Group Leaders on the A-1 shift were Kevin Geary and Jason
Shonkwiler, both of whom reported to Davis.
Rutland was assigned to work on the warehouse dock unloading semi-truck trailers.
During his orientation, Rutland received Target’s Team Member Handbook and training on the
various employee policies that applied to him.
3
On Monday, June 20, 2011, Rutland left his shift over an hour early to go to a class. After
Rutland left the building, he realized that he had left his car keys in the building. Because
Rutland had failed to bring all of the required paperwork with him to his orientation, he had not
yet received a regular Team Member identification badge that would give him access to the
building. Rutland therefore had to wait for the security guard to return to his post to open the
door; when he did, he let Rutland enter the lobby, but he refused to allow him to enter the work
area of the warehouse to retrieve his keys because he did not have a badge. The guard called
Group Leader Geary and the human resources department. As he was waiting in the lobby,
Rutland became agitated and expressed his concern to the security guard that he was going to be
late for his class. A human resources representative and Geary both came to the lobby within a
few minutes and asked Rutland why he was leaving his shift early. Rutland responded that he
needed to leave for a class. Rutland was given his car keys and informed that he would need to
complete a request under the Temporary Schedule Exception policy to leave work early in the
future. Rutland believed that he had made such a request during his interview with Davis and
that it had been approved.
The following week, Rutland requested a schedule exception to leave his shift early to
attend classes on Monday evenings as he had been instructed to do by Geary. Geary later told
him that the request had been denied by human resources. Rutland asked to speak to Davis about
the issue, but was told he needed to speak to human resources. Geary told him that “You’re
lucky I didn’t hire you. Because if I’d hired you, if I’d been at the interview, I wouldn’t have
hired you. Because I don’t hire you type of people.” Rutland Dep. at 149. Geary further told
Rutland that he needed to “give him 90 days,” and that after his probationary period was up he
would be able to arrange his work schedule around his school schedule. Id. at 180-81.
4
On Monday, June 27, 2011, Rutland told Geary that he was leaving his shift early to
attend class that evening. Geary told Rutland that since his schedule exception request had not
been approved, the time Rutland missed from his shift would be considered accountable time for
purposes of Target’s attendance policy and could lead to corrective action. Geary also told
Rutland that since he was still in his 90-day Learning Period, Geary would have to discuss any
additional early, unauthorized departures from work with human resources, because Rutland had
already left early the week before without authorization.
At Rutland’s request, Geary further discussed Rutland’s request to leave his shift early
with human resources and with his supervisor, Davis. Davis reiterated that Rutland’s exception
request would not be approved while Rutland was still in his 90-day Learning Period.
After discussing the matter with Davis, Geary again informed Rutland that his schedule
exception request was not approved. Geary was informed later that day that Rutland had left his
shift early to go to class despite the denial of his exception request and despite his conversation
that day with Geary.
Rutland’s next scheduled day of work was Saturday July 2, 2011. Rutland called around
1:00 a.m. that day and left two messages stating that his car had broken down, he was waiting for
a tow truck, and once the tow truck arrived he would be in to work. Despite these messages,
Rutland failed to appear for work that day and failed to call in again to indicate that his plans had
changed and that he would be absent. Because Rutland failed to appear for work without calling
in to say he would be absent, Rutland’s absence was classified as a no-call/no-show, which
would constitute grounds for corrective action under Target’s Counseling and Corrective Action
Policy against Team Members who had completed their 90-day Learning Period.
5
Rutland again left work early without authorization to go to class on Monday, July 11,
2011. When Rutland returned to work the next Saturday, Geary again discussed with him the
fact that his schedule exception request had not been approved and that his continuing to leave
work early without authorization, combined with his no-call/no-show the previous week, were
problematic. Rutland said that he understood but stated that he needed to attend class.
Later that same day, Geary observed Rutland talking on his cell phone while walking on
the warehouse floor heading back to his work station, which is a safety violation that would
warrant corrective action against a regular Team Member who had completed his or her 90-day
Learning Period. When Geary observed Rutland violating this rule, he approached Rutland and
reminded him that Target’s policy prohibited the use of cell phones outside of the break room.
Shortly after observing Rutland talking on his cell phone, Geary spoke with his
supervisor, Davis, about the numerous issues with Rutland. The two of them discussed Rutland’s
“repeatedly leaving his shift early without approval despite denial of his exception request, his
using his cell phone on the warehouse floor in violation of company policy, and his recent nocall/no show” and, based on those “repeated policy violations and ongoing unreliability,” Davis
decided to terminate Rutland’s employment. Davis Declaration at ¶¶ 10-11. Davis and Geary
met with Rutland later that day to inform him that his employment was being terminated
effective that same day, July 16, 2011.
Rutland is African-American. During the course of his employment, Geary made several
comments to Rutland relating to his race.3 On one occasion he asked Rutland what school he
3
The Court recognizes that Geary denies making these statements, but accepts Rutland’s
testimony regarding them as true pursuant to the summary judgment standard. Rutland also
references statements made by other people regarding Geary’s attitude toward and treatment of
black employees. Those statements are not admissible because they are hearsay; accordingly,
the Court may not, and has not, considered them.
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was attending; when Rutland told him it was the aviation technology school, Geary responded,
“Oh, now blacks are taking over the aviation field.” Rutland Dep. at 146. On another occasion
Rutland locked his keys in his car, and Geary commented: “A black intelligent man wouldn’t
lock his keys in the car, especially one that is going to the Aviation Institute of Maintenance.”
Id. at 205. Geary also asked Rutland if he knew “how many black people would love to have
this opportunity to make this kind of money.”
III. DISCUSSION
The first issue that must be addressed is what claims Rutland has properly asserted in this
case. Rutland filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) in August 2011 asserting that Target fired him because of his race. His Complaint in
this Court was submitted on a form entitled “Complaint Under Title VII for Discrimination”;
however, in addition to referencing “racial and threatening slurs” during his employment in
Indianapolis, the factual narrative contained in the Complaint also refers to the fact that he was
terminated in Ohio and not rehired when he was medically able to return to work. It also
suggests that Target’s knowledge of his past illness may have contributed to the decision to
terminate him from his Indianapolis position. Consistent with these factual allegations, in his
response to Target’s motion for summary judgment, Rutland references both Title VII and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
Rutland cannot pursue an ADA claim against Target in this case, however, because he
did not include such a claim in his EEOC charge.
A plaintiff may pursue a claim not explicitly included in an EEOC complaint only
if his allegations fall within the scope of the charges contained in the EEOC
complaint. To determine whether the allegations in the complaint fall within the
scope of the earlier EEOC charge, we must look at whether the allegations are
like or reasonably related to those contained in the charge. Claims are reasonably
related if there is a factual relationship between them. That means that the EEOC
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charge and the complaint must, at minimum, describe the same conduct and
implicate the same individuals.
Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Rutland’s EEOC charge alleges only that he was terminated because
of his race and his color. He neither checked the “disability” box on the form nor referenced any
actual or perceived disability in the facts he included on the form. An allegation that you were
fired because you have had an illness in the past is not reasonably related to an allegation that
you were fired because of your race. Nor can Rutland assert an ADA claim in this case for his
termination in 2006—not only was that termination not raised in his EEOC charge, but it would
have been untimely.4 Accordingly, to the extent that Rutland has attempted to assert an ADA
claim against Target in this case, that claim is without merit.
Rutland’s brief also discusses an injury that he suffered while working at Target. The
Court does not read Rutland’s Complaint or his brief to suggest that he is asserting a claim
relating to that injury or the workers compensation claim that followed; to the extent that he did
intend to raise such a claim, it fails for a variety of reasons, including the failure to articulate it.
Turning to Rutland’s race discrimination claim, which is properly before this Court,
Rutland has not attempted to proceed under the “indirect” method,5 so the Court will analyze his
claim under the “direct” method. “Under the direct method of proof, a plaintiff must provide
either direct or circumstantial evidence that the employer had a discriminatory motive.” Perez v.
4
Similarly, to the extent that Rutland seeks to sue Target under the Family Medical Leave
Act (“FMLA”), to which he alludes in his brief, for terminating him from his position in Ohio in
2006, that claim is time barred. Any claim under the FMLA must be filed within either two
years or, for willful violations, three years. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c). This case was filed over five
years after his employment in Ohio was terminated.
5
For example, Rutland has not alleged that there was any similarly situated employee
who was not African American who was treated better than he was by Target. See, e.g., Perez v.
Thorntons, Inc.¸731 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2013) (setting forth requirements of a prima facie
case under the indirect method).
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Thorntons, Inc.¸731 F.3d 699, 710 (7th Cir. 2013). Rutland does not have any direct evidence of
discrimination, which “would require something akin to an admission by [Target] that it fired
[him] because of [his race].” Id. Under the direct method using circumstantial evidence,
Rutland must “construct a convincing mosaic” that “allows a jury to infer intentional
discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Id. (citation omitted).
Generally, but not exclusively, the pieces of that “mosaic” will fall into three
categories. The first includes “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or
written, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of retaliatory intent
might be drawn.” The second is “evidence, but not necessarily rigorous statistical
evidence, that similarly situated employees were treated differently.” And the
third is “evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an adverse
employment action.”
Id. at 711.
In this case, the only evidence Rutland points to that has anything to do with race are the
comments by Geary quoted above. Racially tinged comments by a decisionmaker, or one, like
Geary, who had input into the adverse employment decision, can support a claim for race
discrimination if they are made “(1) around the time of, and (2) in reference to, the adverse
employment action complained of” because “then it may be possible to infer that the decision
makers were influenced by those feelings in making their decision.” Hunt v. City of Markham,
Ill., 219 F.3d 649, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2000). This is not such a case, however. None of the racially
tinged statements Rutland attributes to Geary were made in reference to the decision to terminate
Rutland. The fact that racist comments were made is not, by itself, sufficient to support the
inference that the decision to terminate Rutland was motivated by racial animus; the
“circumstantial evidence must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the termination
decision.” Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Cerutti v.
BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1063 (7th Cir. 2003) (statements regarding plaintiff’s age did not
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form a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence sufficient to prevail under direct method
where the prejudicial views were not clearly linked to termination decision)).
The comments by Geary, while inappropriate, are simply not sufficient to sustain a claim
for race discrimination. Rutland points to nothing else that suggests that Target terminated him
because of his race. Accordingly, Target is entitled to summary judgment on Rutland’s Title VII
claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reason set forth above, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Target
on all of Rutland’s claims.
SO ORDERED: 11/26/2013
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Copy by United States Mail to:
Duwayne Rutland
660 Windrow Ave. Apt. 1
Columbus, OH 43207
Copies to all counsel of record via electronic notification
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