FRANKLIN v. ASTRUE
Filing
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ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW: For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Entry ***SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 2/21/2013.(DW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
BRIAN V. FRANKLIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Defendant.
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Cause No. 1:12-cv-230-WTL-MJD
ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Plaintiff Brian V. Franklin requests judicial review of the final decision of Defendant
Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”),
denying his application for Supplemental Social Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the
Social Security Act (the “Act”). The Court now rules as follows.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 21, 2008, Franklin filed an application for SSI alleging disability beginning
April 13, 2006. Franklin’s application was initially denied on September 10, 2008, and again
upon reconsideration on October 20, 2008. Thereafter, Franklin requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The hearing was held on September 20, 2010 before ALJ
John Metz in Indianapolis, Indiana. During the hearing, Stephanie R. Archer testified as a
vocational expert and Lee Fisher, M.D., testified as a medical expert. On November 3, 2010, the
ALJ issued a decision denying Franklin’s application for benefits. The Appeals Council upheld
the ALJ’s decision and denied Franklin’s request for review on December 28, 2011. This timely
action for judicial review ensued.
II.
EVIDENCE OF RECORD
The specifics of Franklin’s medical history are set forth in the parties’ briefs and need not
be recited here.
In short, Franklin has a history of heart problems dating back to at least April, 2006.
Since then, he has been hospitalized and received treatment for, inter alia, myocardial infarction,
arteriosclerotic heart disease, and congestive heart failure. Franklin’s recurrent heart problems
caused doctors to implant a defibrillator in his chest in October, 2008. Franklin’s cardiologist,
Dr. Wayne L. Gray, has opined that Franklin is a “candidate for sudden death.” Transcript at
794.
III.
APPLICABLE STANDARD
Disability is defined as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of a medically determinable mental or physical impairment which can be expected to
result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least
twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1)(A). In order to be found disabled, a claimant must
demonstrate that his physical or mental limitations prevent him from doing not only his previous
work, but any other kind of gainful employment that exists in the national economy, considering
his age, education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner employs a five-step
sequential analysis. At step one, if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is
not disabled, despite his medical condition and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). At
step two, if the claimant does not have a “severe” impairment (i.e., one that significantly limits
his ability to perform basic work activities), he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At
step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of
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impairments meets or medically equals any impairment that appears in the Listing of
Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, and whether the impairment meets the twelvemonth duration requirement; if so, the claimant is deemed disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(iii). At step four, if the claimant is able to perform his past relevant work, he is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five, if the claimant can perform any other
work in the national economy, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
On review, the ALJ’s findings of fact are conclusive and must be upheld by this Court
“so long as substantial evidence supports them and no error of law occurred.” Dixon v.
Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” id., and this
Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Overman v.
Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ is required to articulate only a minimal, but
legitimate, justification for his acceptance or rejection of specific evidence of disability. Scheck
v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2004). In order to be affirmed, the ALJ must articulate
his analysis of the evidence in his decision; while he “is not required to address every piece of
evidence or testimony,” he must “provide some glimpse into [his] reasoning . . . [and] build an
accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusion.” Id.
IV.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
At step one, the ALJ found that Franklin has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since his alleged onset date of April 13, 2006. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Franklin had
the following severe impairments: coronary artery disease; prior myocardial infarction; prior
myocardial dysfunction; prior stents with balloon angioplasty; pacemaker/defibrillator; prior
congestive heart failure; nonsustained ventricular tachycardia; and polysubstance abuse. At step
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three, the ALJ determined that Franklin’s severe impairments did not meet or medically equal a
listed impairment. At step four, the ALJ concluded that Franklin had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with some limitations; Franklin, however, could not
perform any past relevant work. Given the RFC finding, and taking into account Franklin’s age,
education, and work experience, the ALJ determined at step five that Franklin could perform
jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, those being an assembler or a
general office clerk. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Franklin was not disabled as defined
by the Act from April 13, 2006, through the date of his decision (i.e., November 3, 2010).
V.
DISCUSSION
Franklin advances a single objection to the ALJ’s decision: “[t]he ALJ failed to satisfy
step three of the sequential evaluation process.” Plaintiff’s Brief at 13. Specifically, Franklin
maintains that the ALJ did not properly consider the listings applicable to Franklin’s
impairments. Franklin also argues that his symptoms do, in fact, meet Listing 4.02, but that the
ALJ ignored the potentially dispositive evidence.
Under the third step of the sequential evaluation process,
[A] claimant is eligible for benefits if [he] has an impairment that meets or equals
an impairment found in the Listing of Impairments. The listings specify the
criteria for impairments that are considered presumptively disabling. A claimant
may also demonstrate presumptive disability by showing that her impairment is
accomplished by symptoms that are equal in severity to those described in a
specific listing. In considering whether a claimant’s condition meets or equals a
listed impairment, an ALJ must discuss the listing by name and offer more than a
perfunctory analysis of the listing.
Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
In this case, the ALJ considered five listings: Listing 4.04C, Ishemic Heart Disease;
Listing 4.02, Chronic Heart Failure; Listing 4.05, Recurrent Arrhythmias; Listing 1.02, Major
Dysfunction of a Joint; and Listing 1.04, Disorders of the Spine. The ALJ included the specific
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language of each listing in his decision, but summarily concluded that the “the objective medical
evidence fail[ed] to demonstrate” that the requirements of each listing were met. See e.g.,
Transcript at 22. Franklin argues that the ALJ’s examination is insufficient because there is not
“a shred of analysis or justification for” his finding. Plaintiff’s Brief at 13. Franklin also argues
that the ALJ ignored medical evidence supportive of Listing 4.02.
Although the ALJ clearly noted five separate listings that Franklin’s impairments failed
to meet, his analysis was perfunctory. In this regard, the ALJ recited each listing word-for-word
and generically concluded that the objective medical evidence failed to satisfy the requirements
for the listings. The ALJ did not include any references to Franklin’s medical history in his
discussion of the listings. Further, the ALJ did not discuss in any meaningful way why Franklin’s
impairments and symptoms failed to meet or equal the relevant listings. It is especially
troublesome here because the medical evidence indicates that Franklin may have met the
requirements for chronic heart failure. In this regard, there were at least four instances in which
Franklin’s ejection fraction fell below 30%.1 This evidence is not noted at step three or anywhere
in the ALJ’s decision. Thus, this Court is unable to determine whether the ALJ considered and/or
ruled out this evidence in relation to Listing 4.02. See Brindisi ex rel. Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315
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In addition to other related symptoms, Listing 4.02 requires a medically documented
presence of one of the following:
1. Systolic failure . . . with left ventricular end diastolic dimensions greater than
6.0 cm or ejection fraction of 30 percent or less during a period of stability
(not during an episode of acute heart failure); or
2. Diastolic failure . . . with left ventricular posterior wall plus septal thickness
totaling 2.5 cm or greater on imaging, with an enlarged left atrium greater
than or equal to 4.5 cm, with normal or elevated ejection fraction during a
period of stability (not during an episode of acute heart failure).
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F.3d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 2003) (An ALJ has a “duty to acknowledge potentially dispositive
evidence.”) (citation omitted).
Because the ALJ did not provide a glimpse into his reasoning, the ALJ’s analysis in
relation to step three of the sequential evaluation process is inadequate and warrants remand.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this
cause is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Entry.
SO ORDERED: 02/21/2013
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Copies to all counsel of record via electronic communication.
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