UNITED STATES v. BROWN et al

Filing 82

ORDER - denying 33 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying 33 Motion for More Definite Statement; denying 30 Motion to Stay *** SEE ORDER ***. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 3/25/2013. (CKM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM BROWN,
RACHEL WIGGINS,
INSTANT TAX REFUND SERVICE,
DAVID FRANKLIN,
Defendants.

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No. 1:12-cv-00394-SEB-DKL

ORDER
This cause is before this Court on a Motion to Stay Proceedings [Docket No. 30] and a
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [Docket No. 33] filed by Defendants David
Franklin, Rachel Wiggins, and Instant Tax Refund Service. For the reasons detailed herein,
Defendants’ motions are DENIED.1
Factual Background2
Defendant Franklin owned and operated several Instant Tax Refund Service tax
preparation stores in Indianapolis that conducted business under the name Instant Tax Service
1

Since the briefing of these motions has closed, there have been a few significant developments in the case that
should be noted. First, Plaintiff United States (the “Government”) filed a motion for preliminary injunction in
December 2012. The Court set the matter for a hearing in January 2013 but on the eve of that hearing, Defendant
Franklin sold Instant Tax Refund Service, his franchise, to its franchisor, ITS Financial, which is subject to a
preliminary injunction issued in a separate lawsuit brought by the Government in the Southern District of Ohio. At
the hearing, the parties came to an agreement as to terms of a preliminary injunction against Defendants Franklin
and Instant Tax Refund Service. Shortly thereafter, the parties submitted an agreed upon preliminary injunction
order and the Court duly entered it. [Docket No. 79]. Stipulated orders for permanent injunctions were also
entered against Defendants Rachel Wiggins and William Brown. [Docket Nos. 76, 80].
2
The following factual recitation is based upon the Amended Complaint for Injunction [Docket No. 20] filed in April
2012. We note that the factual circumstances since the time that these allegations were made have changed
substantially.

(“ITS”). ITS is a brand marketed throughout the United States by a national franchisor, ITS
Financial, LLC. Franklin operated 9 stand-alone ITS offices and 13 tax preparation kiosks. He
was the sole shareholder of the franchise, which prepared over 10,000 tax returns in 2010 and
2011 combined.
Defendant Brown was a manager at one of the ITS stores. The Government alleged that
Brown personally prepared false and fraudulent income tax returns and, under Franklin’s
direction, trained other employees to do the same.
Defendant Wiggins was the Chief Financial Officer of the ITS franchise. The
Government alleges that Wiggins supervised ITS managers and tax preparers and, under
Franklin’s direction, taught new employees how to prepare fraudulent tax returns.
The Government’s Amended Complaint alleged that the ITS franchise maintained a
business environment that promoted and encouraged the preparation of false and fraudulent tax
returns for the purpose of enlarging its own profits. ITS allegedly preyed on its customer base,
largely made up of “unsophisticated taxpayers with very low incomes,” by promising these
individuals thousands of dollars of illegal refunds. The Government alleged that while some
customers were complicit in Defendants’ fraud, others had no knowledge that the returns
prepared on their behalf are fraudulent. The Government alleged that ITS charged these
customers unconscionably high tax preparation and added fees, averaging more than $400-$500,
for as little as 15 minutes of return preparation. ITS also allegedly offered these customers false
and deceptive loan products that principally served as an inducement for ITS to prepare the
customers’ tax returns.
ITS made its employees complicit in its fraud by intentionally recruiting individuals with
little or no tax preparation or experience and then training these employees while encouraging

the fraudulent practices discussed in more detail below. ITS also allegedly linked its employees’
compensation to the fees that it charges its customers, meaning that employees were rewarded
for charging customers higher fees. Specifically, employees’ hourly wages doubled if they
prepared and successfully filed a certain number of tax returns with the IRS. However, the
employee would only “get credit” for the return if ITS’s “average fee” was charged. Lesser fees
meant that the employee was given partial credit for the return, while higher than average fees
meant that the employee could earn credit for more than one return. This incented the employees
to charge customers higher fees and to inflate their customers’ tax refunds in the first place.
The Government alleged that Defendants operated illegally in the following respects: (1)
engaging in a practice called “paystub filing” and fabricating W-2 forms and otherwise lying to
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) agents in order to hide the practice; (2) luring unsuspecting
customers by offering deceptive and misleading loan products and then charging customers
unconscionable fees; and (3) engaging in fraudulent tax return preparation in order to inflate their
customers tax refunds (and, consequently, their own fees) and trafficking EIN numbers. We
explain each of these practices in more detail below.
Paystub Filing
The IRS prohibits tax return preparers from filing a return based on a taxpayer’s last
paycheck stub, as opposed to a an official W2 form, issued by the taxpayer’s employer. This
practice is referred to as “paystub filing” and is forbidden by the IRS because it inevitably leads
to calculation errors and other incorrect or unreliable information. The Government alleges that
Defendants routinely engaged in paystub filing despite the prohibition against the practice.
In 2009, an IRS investigating agent discovered numerous violations of the IRS’s
prohibition of paystub filing by ITS. Franklin’s response was to promise the agent that he would

instruct his employees to stop the practice. However, according to Plaintiff’s Complaint,
Franklin’s promise was illusory because he had no intention of ending the practice, since it gave
ITS a competitive advantage over other tax preparers.3 Indeed, in a three week employee
training session beginning during the last week of November 2010, Franklin, Wiggins, and
Brown all allegedly taught and instructed approximately 30 prospective employees the
procedures for paystub filing and the way to create fictitious W-2s utilizing Drake tax
preparation software. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Phony W-2s were placed in customers’ case files to
cover up the fact that ITS had continued to engage in paystub filing, in the event of future IRS
audits. Id. ¶ 32.
During a subsequent visit from an IRS agent in March 2010, Defendants Franklin and
Brown were questioned about numerous, identical W-2’s found in the files. Franklin and Brown
lied to the agent, telling him/her that the W-2’s looked identical only because they were obtained
from the same source. In actuality, the W-2’s were fabricated by ITS employees using Drake tax
preparation software. Compl. ¶ 34.
In January 2011, Franklin conducted employee training via the internet during which he
once again encouraged the employees to continue the practice of creating phony W-2’s from the
tax preparation software and the taxpayer-customer’s paystubs. Compl. ¶ 33.
False and Deceptive Loan Products
The Government alleged that ITS offered false and misleading loan products to lure
customers into having ITS prepare their tax returns. Specifically, Defendants allegedly offered
small, non-recourse loans called “Instant Cash Loans” intended to attract customers before the
tax filing season began (December and early January). When the customer applied for the loan
3

A taxpayer can file only one electronic return with the IRS per year. Thus, filing an early return for a customer
based only on their paystub prevented the customer from seeking out the tax preparation services of ITS’s
competitors.

using his or her final paystub of the year, ITS employees also completed an “estimated” tax
return that they filed for the customer without waiting for the requisite W-2 form. The
Government alleged that ITS offered recourse loans that used the customer’s expected tax refund
as collateral, referred to as “Refund Anticipation Loans.” RAL funds were given to the customer
only after ITS prepared and filed the customer’s tax return and that return was accepted by the
IRS. The application for these loans listed Tax Tree, LLC as the loan provider and stated that
Tax Tree “is not affiliated with the Tax Preparer.” In actuality, however, the owner of franchisor
ITS Financial is also the sole owner and CEO of Tax Tree. Tax Tree is allegedly
undercapitalized and, thus, denies over 90% of the loan applications filled out by customers that
ITS simply wants to get in the door. Customers were charged fees, whether their loan
applications were denied or not, and those that did receive loans were for amounts so small that
they were subsumed by fees charged by ITS and Tax Tree.
Fraudulently Inflating Customers’ Tax Returns
The Government alleged that Defendants instructed ITS employees to report phony
businesses inflating income and expenses, to conduct lax due diligence when it came to
determining whether ITS customers qualify for the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”),4 falsely
claim education credits, fraudulently claim false filing statuses, and fraudulently omit income
and file the tax return without the customer’s consent. The Government alleged that ITS
employees were instructed on how to engage in some of these practices during the 2010 end-of
year training session referenced above. Am. Compl. ¶ 44. The inflation of ITS customers’ tax
refunds benefits the tax preparer because ITS rewards the preparer through its commission and
bonus structure. Id. ¶ 45. The Amended Complaint contains several instances in which

4

The EITC is a refundable tax credit intended to help low-income individuals and families.

Defendant Brown as well as other unidentified ITS employees have prepared such inflated tax
returns for ITS customers. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48-50; 52-53; 55-56; 68.
In 2009, following a EITC compliance visit, the IRS warned ITS for failing to conduct
the due diligence required related to customers claiming the EITC. Notwithstanding these
warnings, Defendants continued to instruct employees on ways to circumvent EITC due
diligence requirements in 2010 and 2011. Am. Compl. ¶ 91.
The Government also alleged that Defendants instructed ITS employees to use incorrect
EIN numbers. Compl. ¶ 37. EIN numbers are listed on official W-2 forms and identify the
taxpayer’s employer. The number is not located on taxpayers’ paystubs, which is presumably
one reason that paystub filing is prohibited. The Government alleged that Defendants saved a
list of valid EIN numbers for use when engaging in paystub filing to ensure that the tax return
was not immediately rejected by the IRS.
Legal Analysis
As noted above, this cause is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for a Stay of
Proceedings and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or For a More Definite Statement. We discuss
the merits of each of these motions below.
I.

Defendants’ Motion for a Stay of Proceedings

Defendants request a stay of these civil proceedings until the threat of criminal
prosecution for the matters giving rise to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint no longer exists for
Defendants. They maintain that with the possibility of criminal investigations pending against
them, allowing the civil litigation to continue puts Defendants in the position of having to waive
their Fifth Amendment rights or invoke those rights by declining to participate in the civil

litigation, thereby inviting a default judgment against them.5 Plaintiff opposes Defendants’
request.
As both parties acknowledge, the Constitution does not require a stay of civil proceedings
pending the outcome of criminal proceedings. Jones v. City of Indianapolis, 216 F.R.D. 440,
450 (S.D. Ind. 2003). However, district courts have discretion to stay civil proceedings in such
situations. See, United States v. 6250 Ledge Rd., 943 F.2d 721, 729 n. 9 (7th Cir. 1991). “The
ultimate question, therefore, is ‘whether the court should exercise its discretion in order to avoid
placing the defendants in the position of having to choose between risking a loss in their civil
cases by invoking their Fifth Amendment rights, or risking conviction in their criminal cases by
waiving their Fifth Amendment rights and testifying in the civil proceedings.’” Jones, 216
F.R.D. at 451 (quoting Cruz v. County of Dupage, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9220, 1997 WL
370194, *1 (N.D. Ill. 1997)).
District courts consider a variety of factors in determining whether a stay pending
criminal proceedings is warranted, including: (1) the posture of the criminal proceedings; (2) the
overlap of the criminal and civil proceedings; (3) whether the government entity initiating the
criminal action is also a party in the civil matter; (4) the burden on the defendants if the civil case
is not stayed; (5) the prejudice to the civil plaintiff if the civil case is stayed; and (6) the effect of
a stay on the public interest. PNC Bank v. Pence, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1883 (S.D. Ind. Jan.
12, 2009) (citing Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., No. 04 C 698, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3289, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008)). As discussed below, we decline to grant a stay of the
instant litigation after considering these factors.

5

The Fifth Amendment provides a privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972). “It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial,
investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be
used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.” Id.

First, no indictment has been issued against any of the Defendants. Indeed, while
Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants’ fears that the serious allegations against them might be
criminally investigated are not unreasonable, the Government has not indicated or confirmed that
a criminal investigation into Defendants’ activities has commenced.6 As a general rule, “preindictment requests for stay are denied.” Pence, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1883 at *2; see also
Microfinancial, Inc. v. Premier Holidays Intern., Inc., 385 F.3d 72, 79 (1st Cir. 2004)(“While preindictment stays of parallel civil proceedings occasionally have been granted, an unindicted
defendant who argues that going forward with a civil proceeding will jeopardize his Fifth
Amendment rights usually presents a much less robust case for such extraordinary relief . . . .
[T]he case is weakened further [if] defendants’ motion papers d[o] not inform the court of when
the investigation started, how long it was expected to last, or any other facts that might tend to
suggest that an indictment was more than a remote possibility.”). Thus, the lack of an indictment
means that the first factor (the posture of the criminal proceedings) weighs against our imposing
a stay. That said, the lack of an indictment impedes the Court’s ability to consider the second
factor – the extent to which the criminal and civil proceedings overlap. Without an indictment,
we have no basis on which to determine the extent to which the current civil proceedings and a
possible future criminal proceedings might overlap. Thus, the potential overlap factor is neutral
in terms of whether to impose a stay of these proceedings.
Defendants argue that the fourth factor (their burden in the absence of a stay) is severe.
We think Defendants’ point is well-taken, assuming that criminal proceedings against them are
actually undertaken at some point. The Seventh Circuit as well as many district courts have
acknowledged the perilous position of defendants who are subject to both civil and criminal

6

Apparently, it is the Government’s general policy not to disclose in civil tax injunction cases whether or not a civil
defendant is under criminal investigation or may be in the future.

proceedings. See, e.g., 6250 Ledge Rd., 943 F.2d at 729 (quoting United States v. Little Al, 712
F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1983)); Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Hollinger, Inc., No. 04 C 698, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3289, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008)(“Proceeding with discovery would force the
Defendants into the uncomfortable position of having to choose between waiving their Fifth
Amendment privilege or effectively forfeiting the civil suit. If the Defendants invoke their
constitutional privilege during civil discovery, not only does this prevent them from defending
their position, it may subject them to an adverse inference from their refusal to testify.”); Pence,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1883, at *4 (“In essence, [Defendants’] choice is to testify in the civil
matter at their peril in the criminal matter or, "plead the Fifth" and face resolution of the civil
matter against them because they cannot form a defense.”). We acknowledge the difficulties
imposed by the threat of parallel civil and criminal proceedings on Defendants and, thus,
conclude, therefore, that this factor does weigh in favor of granting Defendants’ request for a
stay.
Regarding the prejudice to the Government and the effect of a stay on the public interest,
Defendants argue that this factor also weighs in favor of a stay because the remedy that the
Government seeks would put Defendants’ non-party employees out of work. However,
Defendants’ argument addresses the way members of the public might be burdened by Plaintiff’s
requested relief, not by the denial of their request for a stay. The Government argues that this
factor weighs against the issuance of a stay because a stay would impede its effort to protect lowincome taxpayers from Defendants’ fraudulent practices and to prevent the U.S. Treasury from
wrongfully losing tax revenue. Because criminal proceedings have not even commenced against
these Defendants, it is impossible to predict how long such an impediment might be in place, i.e.
how long it will be until Defendants are no longer confronting the possibility of criminal charges

against them. We agree that, if the Government’s allegations are indeed true, these taxpayers
and the U.S. Treasury should not have to await the resolution of a criminal prosecution that may
or may not ensue to be free from Defendants’ fraudulent activities. Thus, we hold that these
final two factors weigh against the imposition of a stay. 7
In sum, the only factors weighing in favor of a stay of this litigation are that the
Government would be the initiating party in both this and any criminal proceedings that might
ensue and the burden on Defendants of having to choose how to participate in this civil litigation
without waiving their Fifth Amendment rights from self-incrimination. The Seventh Circuit and
various district courts have acknowledged that “it is not unconstitutional to put a defendant to
such a choice.” Pence, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1883, at *4; see also 6250 Ledge Rd., 943 F.2d at
729, n.9. Accordingly, a stay of these proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings
is at best premature and Defendants’ request must be denied.
II.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants have also filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint fails to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that “a party must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
The reason for this heightened pleading standard is to prevent plaintiffs from charging a
defendant with fraud irresponsibly. See Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469
(7th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff “claiming fraud . . . must do more pre-complaint investigation to
7

Defendants also contend that the absence of a stay will require the Court to “micromanage” the parties’
discovery because Defendants will be concerned at every stage of discovery as to whether their cooperation will
be held against them. While we appreciate Defendants’ concern for the Court’s time and urge the parties to
consider the impact on judicial resources before bringing motions to compel or motions for protective orders, we
do not find that this consideration warrants a stay of the civil proceedings.
8
We agree with Defendants that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard applies to the Government’s Amended
Complaint. “A claim that 'sounds in fraud' -- in other words, one that is premised upon a course of fraudulent
conduct -- can implicate Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements." Borsellino, 477 F.3d at 507. The
Government’s allegations that Defendants “illegally prepare false and fraudulent federal income tax returns”
clearly “sound in fraud.”

assure that the claim is responsible and supported, rather than defamatory and extortionate.’ . . .
A complaint alleging fraud must provide . . . ‘the who, what, when, where, and how.’”
Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Payton v.
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1999)). Still, absolute
particularity is not required, see Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Krejci, 123 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1941), and in
considering the motion to dismiss, the court still construes all inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2003).
Defendants’ primary argument is that the Amended Complaint’s allegations
impermissibly refer to “Defendants” as a group, without specifically identifying fraudulent acts
taken by each individual Defendant. “Under Rule 9(b), a claimant must make specific and
separate allegations against each defendant; ‘[a] complaint that attributes misrepresentations to
all defendants, lumped together for pleading purposes, generally is insufficient.’” Winforge, Inc.
v. Coachmen Indus., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18360, at *16 (S.D. Ind. March 13, 2007) (quoting
Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1990)).
Whether the Amended Complaint often refers to “Defendants” as a group or not, we
disagree with Defendants’ assertion that that fact that means the pleading must be dismissed or
that Plaintiff must file a more definite statement. While Plaintiff’s Complaint clearly does
include some allegations against “Defendants,” considering the Complaint as a whole we find
that it provides adequate detail to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). United States ex rel.
Robinson v. Northrop Corp., 824 F. Supp. 830, 832-33 (N.D. Ill. 1993). The Complaint explains
how each of the Defendants was associated with ITS and with each other, and alleges facts
detailing each Defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged fraudulent activity. These
allegations are not lacking in detail regarding “the who, what, when, where, and how” of

Plaintiff’s allegations of fraudulent activity. For instance, Paragraph 25 expressly alleges that
“Franklin -- assisted by Wiggins and Brown -- taught employees how to prepare and file federal
tax returns using customers’ end-of-year paystubs” and “how to use those paystubs, along with a
program in the Drake tax preparation software, to create fictitious W-2s.” Compl. ¶ 25. That
paragraph further specifies that this activity occurred at a training session beginning the last
week of 2010 “at a facility near the intersection of 12th Street and Ritter.” Id. Paragraph 31 also
illustrates the type of detailed allegations in the Complaint against Franklin, the only individual
Defendant who has not stipulated to a permanent injunction in this case, explaining that an IRS
agent confronted Franklin after a compliance visit in 2009 during which numerous instances of
“paystub filing” were discovered. The Complaint further alleges that Franklin misrepresented to
the IRS agent that he would instruct his employees to stop the practice but that he had no
intention of doing so and, indeed, instructed his employees to continue to engage in paystub
filing at the training session referenced above. Compl. ¶ 31-32; see also Compl. ¶ 33 (alleging
that “Franklin personally conducted additional employee training via the internet in the first
week of January 2011, during which he encouraged employees to continue fabricating W-2s
using the Drake software and customers’ paystubs.”). Such detailed allegations, provide
Defendants sufficient notice of the fraudulent activities alleged against them to satisfy the Rule
9(b) requirements.
Defendants point to several specific paragraphs that lump “Defendants” activities
together. To the extent that this is true, these “summary” paragraphs do not negate or obfuscate
the more specific allegations regarding each Defendant or otherwise pose an unfairness to
Defendants. By way of example, Paragraph 14 of the Complaint provides:
Defendants, and others acting with them, have created and maintain a business
environment at Franklin’s Instant Tax Service franchise that expressly promotes

and encourages the preparation of false and fraudulent federal income tax returns.
Defendants train new Instant Tax Service employees to prepare false and
fraudulent tax returns for the purpose of significantly and illegally enlarging
Instant Tax Service’s profits. Defendants also direct employees to engage in other
illegal conduct, such as the preparation of fabricated Forms W-2.
Compl. ¶ 14. Importantly, in the paragraphs preceding Paragraph 14, the Complaint specifically
accuses each Defendant of participation in the fraud. Compl. ¶ 4 (alleging that Franklin “directs,
supervises and manages dozens of tax return preparers who illegally prepare false and fraudulent
federal income tax returns at his numerous Instant Tax Service locations” and providing
examples of the alleged illegal activities); ¶ 6 (alleging that “Brown personally prepares false and
fraudulent federal income tax returns, and helps Franklin train new employees to prepare
fraudulent tax returns.”); ¶ 7 (alleging that “Wiggins also assists Franklin in supervising Instant
Tax Service managers and tax preparers, and helps Franklin teach new employees how to
prepare fraudulent tax returns.”). Likewise, Paragraph 26 of the Complaint recites:
Following the creation of the fabricated W-2s, defendants told the trainees to cut
off the small-print on the W-2 stating that it was not an original W-2, but rather
was made using the Drake software. Defendants also directed trainees to put the
forged W-2 in the customer’s case file, and the end-of-year paystub (used to
prepare the return and bogus W-2) in a separate, undisclosed file to prevent the
IRS from detecting the fraud.
Compl. ¶ 26. Again, as discussed above, the preceding Paragraph 25 provides significant details
that put that paragraph into context. Compl. ¶ 25.
Defendants also take issue with the fact that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not disclose the
specific taxpayer-customer(s) involved in their various schemes. For instance, several
paragraphs reference unidentified employees at Franklin’s various ITS locations and the
preparation of fraudulent tax returns for customers identified only as “Customers 1-7.” This lack
of information is of no moment’ while identifying victims of or individuals otherwise involved
with Defendants’ allegedly illegal activities could be one method of providing defendants with

notice of the fraudulent allegations against them, Defendants have provided no authority
requiring such identification where the allegations already clearly provide adequate notice to
them.
Having satisfied ourselves that the detailed allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint
are quire sufficient so as not to run afoul of Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements for
claims of fraud, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, for a More Definite
Statement Pursuant to Rule 12(e) is denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons detailed herein, Defendants’ Motion for a Stay and their Motion to
Dismiss are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
03/25/2013
Date: _____________
_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Julie A. Camden
CAMDEN & MERIDEW, P.C.
[e-mail]
Joshua Thornton Robertson
COHEN GARELICK & GLAZIER
[e-mail]
James P. Madigan
GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
[e-mail]
Thomas D. Sykes
GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
[e-mail]
Lauren Phyllis Buford
GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
[e-mail]
Jose Apolinar Olivera
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[e-mail]
Russell J. Edelstein
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-Ben Franklin
[e-mail]
Sean M. Green
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-Ben Franklin
[e-mail]
Jill Z. Julian
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
[e-mail]
Nathan E. Clukey
US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[e-mail]