McClure v. COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Filing 33

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND: The ALJ's decision is legally sound and supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed and McClure's motion to remand [Docket No. 15] is denied (see Order for details). Signed by Magistrate Judge Tim A. Baker on 8/23/2013. (SWM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MARK A. MCCLURE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.

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1:12-cv-571-TAB-RLY

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND
I.

Introduction
Plaintiff Mark McClure brings this action challenging Commissioner Carolyn W.

Colvin’s decision denying him social security benefits. McClure contends he has a number of
impairments that support a finding of disability, including degenerative disc disease, left ulnar
neuropathy, degenerative joint disease (primarily of the left knee), headaches, anxiety, and
depression/adjustment disorder. The Administrative Law Judge denied benefits, and the
Commissioner affirmed.
McClure argues that the ALJ improperly: (1) assessed his severe impairments; (2)
assessed his credibility; (3) relied on the consultative examinations from Family Medical Center
and Circle City Medical Center instead of the consultative examination from Dr. Thomas
Trainer; (4) assessed his RFC; and (5) relied on the vocational expert testimony. The Court held
oral argument on August 20, 2013. For the reasons below, the ALJ’s decision is legally sound
and supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed, and
McClure’s motion to remand [Docket No. 15] is denied.

II.

Background
A.

Medical Evidence

In March and April 2007, McClure sought treatment at the Veterans Medical Center for
chronic neck pain, degenerative joint disease, and lower back pain with x-rays confirming mild
degenerative changes. [A.R. at 248–55, 259–61, 373–82, 387–89.] In May 2007, McClure
underwent a consultative examination which noted that he was in a previous car accident, which
initiated his pain. [A.R. at 180–83.]
In September 2007, McClure returned to the VA for degenerative joint disease,
osteoarthritis, and lumbago. [A.R. at 189, 245–48.] In September 2007, McClure sought
treatment for anxiety and received a prescription for Xanax. [A.R. at 189, 243–45, 301,
369–70.] In October 2007, McClure had a physical therapy consultation for chronic back pain,
but the therapist did not recommend further therapy because the therapist was unable to
reproduce McClure’s pain. [A.R. at 188, 241–42, 300–01, 369–69.] An abdominal ultrasound
showed cholelithiasis and fatty-replaced liver. [A.R. at 259–260, 386–87.] In October 2007,
McClure was treated at the VA for degenerative joint disease, lumbago, chronic neck and back
pain, osteoarthritis, and anxiety. [A.R. at 188, 239–41, 300, 365–68.] A December 2007 liver
function test was abnormal with elevated transminases/enzymes and recommended alcohol
abstinence. [A.R. at 188, 234–38, 300, 361–65.]
A January 2008 cervical MRI revealed left neuroforaminal disc herniation causing severe
left neuroforaminal narrowing and moderate right neuroforaminal narrowing. [A.R. at 256–57.]
A lumbar MRI confirmed posterior central and left paracentral disc protrusion. [A.R. at 258–59,
384–86.] January 2008 VA records noted lumbago and lower back pain as well as pain around

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the left eye after a car accident. [A.R. at 187, 230–33, 299, 350–60.] McClure later returned for
osteoarthritis, degenerative joint disease, lumbago, tingling in his arms, numbness, and increased
anxiety. [A.R. at 187, 226–29, 299, 353–56.] McClure had abnormal MRIs and was referred to
physical therapy with note of past alcohol abuse and depression. [Id.]
Between February and March 2008, the VA treated McClure for lumbago, lower back
pain, and cervical radiculopathy/brachial neuritis. [A.R. at 186, 224–25, 298–99.] McClure had
numbness and tingling in his left arm with constant low grade headaches and neck pain, initially
attributable to his car accident. [A.R. at 186, 217–23, 298, 427–31, 434–51.] A March 2008
EMG/nerve study revealed abnormal results confirming mild left ulnar nerve neuropathy at the
elbow and cubital tunnel syndrome. [A.R. at 186, 215–16, 298, 342–43.] McClure had a
cervical epidural steroid injection administered but by April 2008 his pain returned. [A.R. at
185, 190–214, 256, 297, 302–03, 320–40, 383–84.] At the end of April 2008, the VA treated
McClure twice for similar symptoms. [A.R. at 296–297, 311–17.]
In May 2008, psychologist Dr. Perry examined McClure and noted that McClure was
previously in the army (1982–1986), divorced twice with four children, woke at 3:00 a.m. every
morning to take pain medication, took care of his mother, felt depressed, and was medicated with
Xanax. [A.R. at 269–72.] Dr. Perry diagnosed McClure with adjustment disorder with mixed
anxiety, depressed mood, and assigned McClure a GAF of 70.1 [Id.]
A June 2008 physical therapy report noted McClure’s pain with compression, lumbar
spine tender to prone, tender palpation at C5-6, spasm in the lower back with reports of his left

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A GAF score of 61–70 suggests that the claimant has mild symptoms or mild difficulty
with social and occupational functioning. Bartrom v. Apfel, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 23802, *3 n.3
(7th Cir. Sept. 20, 2000).
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foot falling asleep, and that he was dropping things. [A.R. at 296, 307–10.] State agency
psychologist Randal Horton checked off a psychiatric review technique form listing 12.04
affective disorder with mild difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace. [A.R. at
273–86.]
July 2008 VA records note McClure’s pain was exacerbated by the injection with
persistent neck pain, his head felt “heavy,” he was participating in physical therapy, and using a
TENS unit. [A.R. at 304–06, 425–26.] McClure began using Gabapentin, which made him
lethargic. [Id.] McClure was discharged from therapy two days later after no relief and noted
that his left leg was giving out. [A.R. at 422–24.] In an August 2008 questionnaire, McClure
wrote that he was experiencing dull, constant headaches three or four times per week, treated by
pain pills or a cold compress and lasting fifteen to thirty minutes at a time, sometimes waking
him up from his sleep. [A.R. at 176.] In October 2008, McClure was treated for anxiety,
degenerative joint disease, chronic neck/low back pain and left knee pain, with anxiety not
controlled by Xanax. [A.R. at 420–22.] McClure was treated for anxiety, adjustment problems,
depression, stress, loss of sleep, loss of appetite, irritability, bad temper, and feelings of being
overwhelmed. [A.R. at 414–17.] He was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed
emotions versus substance induced mood. [Id.]
A left knee MRI in November 2008 showed thinning of the articular cartilage less than
50% of the medial femoral cartilinous surfaces and fissure of the posterolateral tibial surface.
[A.R. at 407–08, 432–33.] A VA psychology note listed McClure as “on edge and everyone was
getting on his nerves.” [A.R. at 413–14.] McClure was advised to come in, although due to
personal issues, he was not able to adhere to the preferred timeline. [Id.]

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B.

McClure’s Testimony

McClure testified that he previously utilized traction, physical rehabilitation, steroid
injection, medications, a TENS unit, and visited with neurosurgery. [A.R. at 26–27.] He alleged
disability due to a combination of neck and back pain. [A.R. at 26.] At the time of his hearing,
McClure was being treated at the VA and using prescription narcotics and a TENS unit for pain
management. [A.R. at 25, 27.] He had constant low back pain and feelings of “bone rubbing.”
[A.R. at 27–28.] The TENS unit only temporarily relieved his pain. [Id.] McClure’s neck pain
restricted his sleep and made his head feel “heavy.” [A.R. at 26, 31.] The TENS unit failed to
relieve his cervical pain to the extent that it relieved his lumbar pain. [Id.] McClure did not use
his left hand or arm at all, only relying on the right arm and noted that the most he could lift was
a gallon of milk. [A.R. at 33.]
McClure had difficulty sitting and standing due to pain, a “burning sensation,” and his
back tended to spasm if he was not moving. [A.R. at 29.] McClure uses a cane, which was not
doctor prescribed, feeling that he needs it for safety reasons (fear of falling). [Id.] He
experienced side effects from his medications which keep him in a fog, do not relieve his pain,
require him to take naps and create difficulty for him to remember things. [A.R. at 27, 34.]
McClure took Xanax for his anxiety, stemming from his inability to work. [A.R. at 34–35.] He
did not do yard work and if he performed daily chores, he did them in stages. [A.R. at 30.]
McClure hired someone to install a side door at his house to avoid walking up and down steps
and put a plastic chair in his shower so he would not have to stand. [A.R. at 36.]

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III.

Discussion
A.

Standard of Review

The Social Security Administration authorizes judicial review of the Commissioner’s
final decision regarding whether substantial evidence supports that decision and whether the
Commissioner committed legal error. 42 U.S.C. 405(g); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869
(7th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310. (7th Cir.
2012). The ALJ is obligated to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply choose
to emphasize facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that suggests
disability. Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). If evidence contradicts the
ALJ’s conclusions, the ALJ must confront that evidence and explain why it was rejected. Terry
v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009). The ALJ need not mention every piece of
evidence, so long as there is a logical link from the evidence to the conclusion. Denton, 596
F.3d at 425.
A reviewing court may not decide the facts anew, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute its
judgment for that of the ALJ. Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2000). Where an
ALJ denies benefits, he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his
conclusion. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001). Where there is an error of
law, the court must remand regardless of the volume of evidence otherwise supporting the ALJ’s
decision. Freeman v. Astrue, 816 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (E.D. Wis. 2011). However, if
reasonable minds could disagree on whether a claimant is disabled, the court must affirm the
Commissioner’s decision denying benefits. Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).

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B.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Assessment of McClure’s Impairments

McClure suggests that the ALJ erred in finding his low left knee cartilage, mild left ulnar
nerve neuropathy at the elbow, cubital tunnel syndrome, anxiety, and cardiac impairment to be
non-severe impairments. [Docket No. 18 at 10–11, 15.] However, the ALJ found McClure’s
cubital tunnel syndrome to be severe, noting that left ulnar neuropathy is synonymous with
cubital tunnel syndrome, and finding McClure’s ulnar neuropathy to be a severe impairment.
[A.R. at 12.] Similarly, the ALJ found that McClure had a limitation related to his left knee,
finding that his degenerative joint disease affected his left knee. [A.R. at 11.] The ALJ made
specific references to the record, including the MRI showing McClure’s thinning left knee
cartilage and an EMG showing mild left ulnar neuropathy. [A.R. at 12, 342, 408.] Therefore,
McClure shows no error in the ALJ’s assessment of his neuropathy, cubital tunnel syndrome,
and knee impairment.
1.

Anxiety

McClure argues his anxiety was a severe impairment because he was mildly limited in
concentration, persistence, and pace, and had some social limitations, as indicated by the state
agency findings and a GAF score of 70. [Docket No. 18 at 13.] However, mild limitations under
the Commissioner’s regulations indicate a non-severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d).
The ALJ accounted for these mild findings, and observed that they did not indicate a severe
impairment. [A.R. at 13.] Further, McClure admitted he was able to socialize. [A.R. at 133.]
McClure highlights various treatment notes and diagnoses which he claims the ALJ
should have considered in assessing the severity of his anxiety. [Docket No. 18 at 14.]
However, the ALJ accounted for McClure’s allegations of mental illness and prescribed Xanax.

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The ALJ noted, and McClure’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument, that McClure was not
diagnosed as clinically depressed. [A.R. at 13.] The ALJ also accounted for McClure’s alleged
medication side effects, which McClure now suggests augmented his mental limitations. [A.R.
at 15.] However, as McClure’s counsel conceded during oral argument, the record does not
reflect that McClure complained to his treating physicians of side effects from any medication,
but rather that he tolerated his medication well.2 [A.R. at 311, 317.]
2.

Failure to Pursue Treatment

The ALJ observed that McClure cancelled a referral for mental health counseling and
failed to attend a stress group. [A.R. at 13, 411, 414, 416–417.] In his appeal, McClure contests
this finding, claiming that he sought mental health treatment, while arguing that the ALJ failed to
consider that “a failure to seek mental health treatment may be the result of mental illness rather
than evidence that a mental impairment is not severe.” [Docket No. 18 at 14.] An ALJ must
consider a claimant’s reasons for failing to pursue treatment. See Surratt v. Astrue, No. 1:08-cv06588, 2009 WL 51840009, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2009) (noting the relevance of claimant’s
allegations regarding failure to follow treatment). However, McClure’s claim that his mental
illness contributed to his failure to follow treatment is only in this appeal. No such allegation
appears anywhere in the record below. McClure’s only explanations for his failure to follow
treatment were personal issues and caring for his mother. [A.R. at 442.]

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Counsel cited to A.R. at 425–26, but then admitted this was not a valid citation to the
assertion in question. Counsel provided no other citation on this point.
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3.

Liver Study

McClure also claims that the ALJ failed to address evidence from September through
December 2007. [Docket No. 18 at 11.] However, this evidence reflects only diagnoses,
medications, and the evaluation of an abnormal liver study, evidence which has no bearing on
McClure’s claim. [A.R. at 188–89, 234–241.] Otherwise, the notes suggest that McClure
received anxiety medication, and had ongoing complaints of degenerative disc disease, two facts
that the ALJ incorporated into his decision. Therefore, McClure shows no error with respect to
these treatment notes. See Burnett v. LFW Inc., 427 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that
diagnosis alone does not prove disability).
4.

Headaches

McClure also argues that the ALJ failed to address limitations from his headaches, but he
fails to highlight any evidence in the record supporting the presence of limitations from this
condition, beyond his subjective complaints. [Docket No. 18 at 15.] See Eichstadt v. Astrue,
534 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the claimant bears the burden of producing
medical evidence that supports his disability claim).
5.

Combination of Impairments

Otherwise, McClure argues that the ALJ failed to consider the combination of his severe
and non-severe impairments, highlighting various treatment notes and diagnoses. [Docket No.
18 at 16.] Yet McClure offers no actual analysis of the treatment notes or their significance.
Therefore, McClure shows no error in the ALJ’s assessment of these impairments as non-severe.

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C.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Credibility Assessment

McClure argues that the ALJ erred in assessing his credibility, claiming that the ALJ
relied on boilerplate language, and included no real credibility analysis.3 [Docket No. 18 at
16–17, 19.] The Seventh Circuit has rejected the use of boilerplate language by an ALJ in some
instances. See Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 644–45 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that such
boilerplate language fails to inform the court of the specific evidence considered in determining
claimant’s credibility and fails to link the ALJ’s conclusions to evidence in the record).
Although the ALJ’s opening statements regarding McClure’s credibility are somewhat generic
[A.R. at 15], the ALJ goes on to address specific evidence in the record. [A.R. at 15-16.]
Therefore, the ALJ’s use of boilerplate language does not undermine his credibility assessment.
McClure asserts that the ALJ mistakenly relied on objective evidence in his credibility
assessment. [A.R. at 11.] ALJs are in the best position to assess the forthrightness of claimants
and therefore the courts give their credibility determinations special deference. Jones v. Astrue,
623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, an ALJ’s credibility determination will be reversed
only if the claimant can show that it was “patently wrong.” Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435
(7th Cir. 2000).
McClure attacks the ALJ’s credibility findings. He claims that an individual need not be
required to undergo surgery to be considered disabled. [Docket No. 18 at 17.] However,
McClure’s lack of surgery is relevant where it correlates to his otherwise conservative treatment
and response to the TENS unit. See Stanley v. Astrue, No. 1:11-cv-00298, 2012 WL 1158630, at

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McClure also claims the ALJ did not cover credibility factors. [Docket No. 18 at 19.]
However, the hearing reflects that the ALJ and McClure’s attorney questioned him on daily
activities, medication, and other relevant factors. [A.R. at 22–41.]
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*10 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 6, 2012) (affirming relevance of ALJ’s observation of relatively
conservative treatment for back pain in assessing credibility).
McClure argues that his injury in the 1980s was not the immediate cause of his disability,
but rather a car accident in 1999 that caused worsening symptoms. [Docket No. 18 at 17.]
McClure concedes that his back and neck problems began with a car accident in 1988, although
he claims it worsened a few years prior to his examination. [A.R. at 181, 344.] Despite
complaining of disabling symptoms, McClure was able to get on and off the examination table
without support in 2007. [A.R. at 182.] The ALJ observed that a physical examination in March
2008 was essentially unremarkable, McClure failed to follow through with physical therapy, and
was the primary caretaker for his mother. [A.R. at 15, 219–220, 270, 422, 442.] Therefore, the
ALJ was entitled to consider that McClure worked with the conditions he now alleges are
disabling.
McClure argues that the record reflected that he consistently used a cane, and no doctor
disputed this use. [Docket No. 18 at 18–19.] He also argues that Dr. Trainer indicated that use
of the cane was medially necessary at times. [Id. at 18.] However, as the ALJ noted, the record
does not reflect that use of the cane was prescribed by any medical source. [A.R. at 15.] When
faced with evidence both supporting and detracting from a claimant’s allegations, the resolution
of competing arguments is for the ALJ to determine. Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 444
(7th Cir. 2002).
For the above reasons and absent any evidence to the contrary, substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s credibility assessment. See Sims v. Barnhart, 442 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir.
2006) (“Credibility determinations can rarely be disturbed by a reviewing court, lacking as it

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does the opportunity to observe the claimant testifying. Only if the trier of fact grounds his
credibility finding in an observation or argument that is unreasonable or unsupported . . . can the
finding be reversed.”).
D.

The ALJ Properly Assessed McClure’s Consultative Examinations

McClure argues that the ALJ erred in assigning substantial weight to the consultative
examinations from Family Medical Center and Circle City Medical Center while discounting the
more recent consultative examination from Dr. Trainer. [Docket No. 18 at 11–12, 18.] The ALJ
afforded less weight to Dr. Trainer’s opinion because it did not reference McClure’s
symptomatic treatment and the possibility that McClure’s condition could improve if he
complied with physical therapy. [A.R. at 15–16.] The ALJ also discounted Dr. Trainer’s
findings to some degree because Dr. Trainer did not review McClure’s MRI results. [A.R. at 16,
456–57.] In doing so, the ALJ also noted that no treating medical source classified McClure as
totally and permanently disabled. [A.R. at 16.] McClure rightly conceded this point at oral
argument as well.
The ALJ has the responsibility to determine the weight afforded to different opinions.
See Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007). The ALJ properly rejected these
findings where they were inconsistent with the record as a whole. The record contains no other
evidence, beyond his subjective complaints, that McClure was unable to stoop or sort, handle, or
use paper files. Indeed, in his application for disability benefits, McClure indicated that he had
no difficulty with manipulation of his hands. [A.R. at 134.] Even Dr. Trainer indicated that
McClure had no difficulty with manipulation of his hands, elbows, or shoulders. [A.R. at 457.]

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McClure argues that the ALJ should have ordered a new consultative examination and
additional MRIs if there was confusion in the record. [Docket No. 18 at 12.] The Commissioner
will order a consultative examination when unable to obtain needed information from a
claimant’s medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519(a). In fact, the ALJ ordered Dr. Trainer’s
examination after the hearing. [A.R. at 39.] The ALJ incorporated that opinion, although not
entirely, where the findings were inconsistent with the record as a whole. For example, the ALJ
noted that Dr. Trainer concluded McClure had degenerative lumbar and cervical disc disease
without significant nerve deficit or impingement. [A.R. at 14.] Assessment of Dr. Trainer’s
opinion is within the ALJ’s discretion, as the determination of an individual’s RFC need not be
based on a specific medical opinion because it is a determination reserved to the ALJ as factfinder for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2). Therefore, McClure shows no error
in the ALJ’s assessment of his consultative examinations.
E.

The ALJ Properly Assessed McClure’s Residual Functional Capacity

McClure claims that the ALJ failed to perform function-by-function assessment in his
determination of McClure’s RFC. [Docket No. 18 at 10.] The Seventh Circuit rejected this
mechanical rule that McClure advocates. In an unpublished decision, the court held that
“[a]lthough the ‘RFC assessment is a function-by-function assessment,’ . . . the expression of a
claimant’s RFC need not be articulated function-by-function; a narrative discussion of a
claimant’s symptoms and medical source opinions is sufficient.” Knox v. Astrue, 327 Fed.
App’x. 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2009) (unpublished decision) (citing Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d
1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2004); Depover v.
Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 567–68 (8th Cir. 2003)). Here, the ALJ properly determined McClure’s

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RFC in light of all the evidence of record, including objective medical evidence and medical
opinions.
In regards to sitting and standing, the ALJ noted that McClure’s allegations of pain were
not entirely credible because McClure showed no medical need for his use of a cane, missed
physical therapy appointments, and was the primary caretaker for his mother. [A.R. at 15,
219–220, 270, 306, 422, 442.] McClure also suggests that his ulnar neuropathy caused greater
limitations than the ALJ assessed. [Docket No. 18 at 11, 15.] Yet McClure highlights no
evidence of any limitations beyond his subjective complaints. [Id. at 15.] McClure indicated no
problems with his hands in his disability application. [A.R. at 15.] Where the ALJ found
McClure not entirely credible, and even Dr. Trainer found no manipulative limitations, McClure
provides no supportable evidence that he was more limited that the ALJ found him to be.
McClure also claims that the ALJ should have incorporated limitations in concentration
into the RFC assessment, as McClure was mildly limited in concentration, persistence, and pace.
[Docket No. 18 at 14.] However, a mild limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace
actually indicates that there was no more than minimal limitation, and therefore it is not relevant
to the RFC assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d). Moreover, McClure argues that prescription
side effects and subjective pain levels would have affected his ability to remain “on task.”
[Docket No. 18 at 14, 20, 21.] Yet McClure provides no evidence in support of this contention,
beyond his own subjective allegations. [Docket No. 18 at 14.] The ALJ recounted that McClure
complained his medications made him groggy, while also noting that McClure was not entirely
credible. [A.R. at 15.] The record does not reflect that McClure complained to his treating
physicians of side effects from any medication but rather that he tolerated his medication well.

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[A.R. at 311, 317.] Therefore, the ALJ provided sufficient explanation for his RFC assessment
and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
F.

The ALJ Properly Relied on the Vocational Expert’s Testimony

McClure reframes his credibility and RFC arguments to state that the ALJ improperly
relied on the vocational expert’s testimony. [Docket No. 18 at 20–21.] Particularly, McClure
highlights his inability to concentrate, stoop, or use his hands. [Id.] However, McClure fails to
point to any credible evidence in the record indicating that he had more than mild limitations in
concentration, persistence, and pace, or any limitations in stooping or handling paper and files.
See Schmidt, 496 F.3d at 846 (finding that an ALJ is “required only to incorporate into his
hypotheticals those impairments and limitations that he accepts as credible”) Therefore,
McClure failed to demonstrate that the ALJ erred by relying upon the vocational expert’s
testimony.
IV.

Conclusion
The ALJ’s decision is legally sound and supported by substantial evidence. Therefore,

the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed and McClure’s motion to remand [Docket No. 15] is
denied.
Dated: 8/23/2013
_______________________________
Tim A. Baker
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

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Copies to:
Javitt Adili
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
[e-mail]
Frederick J. Daley Jr.
DALEY DEBOFSKY & BRYANT
[e-mail]
Thomas E. Kieper
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
[e-mail]
Meredith E. Marcus
DALEY DISABILITY LAW, P.C.
601 W. Randolph Street, Suite 300
Chicago, IL 60661

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