JUDICIAL WATCH, INC. et al v. KING et al
Filing
50
ORDER denying 39 Motion to Intervene. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 3/20/2013. Copy Mailed. (JD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
J. BRADLEY KING, et al.,
Defendants.
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) Cause No. 1:12-cv-800-WTL-TAB
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ENTRY ON MOTION TO INTERVENE
This cause comes before the Court on Proposed Intervenor Orly Taitz’s motion to
intervene. Dkt. No. 39. The Plaintiffs and the Defendants have responded in opposition to the
motion; Taitz has not replied and the time for doing so has now passed. The Court rules as
follows.
Taitz’s motion is subject to attack on many fronts; between the Plaintiffs and the
Defendants, she is surrounded. The Court addresses only the most salient issues below.
Intervention is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, which contemplates both
intervention as of right and permissive intervention. Taitz invokes permissive intervention.1
When intervention is permissive, the court exercises its discretion in determining whether to
permit it, and in doing so it must consider whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
adjudication of the original parties’ rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).
Intervention may be permitted if a federal statute confers a conditional right to intervene.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(A). Taitz points to no federal statute conferring such a right.
1
Taitz repeatedly cites to Rule 24(b)(2), which governs intervention by a government
officer or agency. However, given the language used, the Court reads her motion as invoking
(b)(1), regarding permissive intervention in general.
Alternatively, one may intervene where her “claim or defense . . . shares with the main action a
common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). Taitz argues that she shares a
common question of law and fact with the instant action insofar as she “believes that the
Secretary of State of Indiana and the Elections Commission of Indiana are aiding and abetting
elections fraud by ignoring complaints of elections fraud.” Mot. to Intervene ¶ 6, No. 39. Taitz
alleges that she has served two Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”) claims on the Indiana
Secretary of State, but has received no response.
With respect to the claims at issue here, the Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive
relief pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”). They allege that the
Defendants have failed to “conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove
the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters by reason of” voter deaths
and residence changes as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1073gg-6(a)(4). They also allege that the
Defendants have failed to “make available for public inspection . . . all records concerning the
implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy
and currency of official lists of eligible voters” as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1937gg-6(i). Taitz’s
claims and the Plaintiffs’ claims therefore have a superficial similarity – federal election law –
but Taitz has not articulated any specific common question of law or fact.2
Furthermore, such minimal overlap does not outweigh the threat posed to the case in
terms of undue delay and prejudice. As the Plaintiffs point out,
2
Taitz has also failed to comply with the pleading requirements for intervention – that is,
the motion must be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which
intervention is sought – although such a defect is not always dispositive. See, e.g., Retired
Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 595 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[I]f no prejudice
would result, a district court has the discretion to accept a procedurally defective motion.”). In
this case, however, her failure to do so amplifies the problems with her motion, as there is no
attached pleading that might give shape to otherwise amorphous claims.
2
[a]t this point, the parties have already exchanged settlement demands and
responses, initiated discovery requests, and negotiated and filed a Joint Case
Management Plan. The parties’ Joint Case Management Plan was approved and
adopted by the Court on or about November 13, 2012. Plaintiffs have invested
substantial time in these efforts to date, and the Joint Case Management Plan did
not contemplate that additional parties would be joining in the lawsuit. If the
motion is granted, it is likely that the deadlines agreed by the parties and
established by the Court (including the trial date) will become impossible to
achieve. Plaintiffs would be unduly prejudiced as a result, as it is unlikely that
they would have a realistic opportunity of obtaining the relief they seek in this
action prior to the November 2014 elections, exacerbating the injuries they have
previously described to the Court.
Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Intervene at 4-5, No. 41. In sum, Taitz has not articulated any specific
common question of law or fact, much less one compelling enough to overcome the looming
threats of delay and undue prejudice. Accordingly, Taitz’s motion is DENIED.3
SO ORDERED:
03/20/2013
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Copies by United States mail to
Dr. Orly Taitz, Esq.
29839 Santa Margarita Ste 100
Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688
Copies to all counsel of record via electronic communication.
3
At times, Taitz identifies herself as Plaintiff-Intervenor, although she also identifies
herself as “President of not for profit ‘Defend Our Freedoms’ foundation.” Whether on behalf of
herself or her organization, Taitz’s motion fails.
3
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