NAYAK v. ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC.

Filing 138

ORDER denying Defendant's 125 Motion for Reconsideration re 115 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 8/12/2014. (TMD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

SEEMA NAYAK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL AND
HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC.,
Defendant.

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1:12-cv-00817-RLY-DML

ENTRY ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S ENTRY ON DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant, St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Inc., moves for partial
reconsideration of the court’s Entry on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
issued on May 22, 2014. For the reasons set forth below, that motion is DENIED.
I.

Background
Plaintiff was formally employed at St. Vincent pursuant to a residency contract.

In a nutshell, during her second year in St. Vincent’s residency program, Plaintiff had a
complicated pregnancy that required her to take a medical leave of absence. Not long
after Plaintiff returned to the residency program, Dr. Eric Strand, the OB/GYN Residency
Program Director, notified the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology of St.
Vincent’s decision not to renew her contract. (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1). Notably, the letter
stated, “Due to a medically complicated pregnancy and significant concerns regarding her

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academic progress, our program decided not to extend her contract beyond this academic
year.” (Id.).
On June 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed the present action against St. Vincent, and alleged
that St. Vincent harassed, discriminated, and retaliated against her on the basis of her
national origin (Indian), and discriminated against her on the basis of her gender, under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). She
also alleged St. Vincent discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of her
alleged disability, under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,
et seq. (“ADA”), as amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”).
Following discovery, St. Vincent moved for summary judgment.
In the court’s May 2014 Entry, the court granted in part, and denied in part, St.
Vincent’s Motion for Summary Judgment. St. Vincent moves for reconsideration of that
part of the court’s Entry denying Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination and retaliation claims on
grounds that the court committed a manifest error of law.
II.

Discussion
ADA discrimination and retaliation claims require but-for causation. As is

relevant here, to survive summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim,
Plaintiff must produce evidence permitting a jury to infer that her disability was a but-for
cause of her non-renewal. Fleishman v. Continental Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 604 (7th
Cir. 2012). To survive summary judgment on her ADA retaliation claim, Plaintiff must
produce evidence permitting a jury to infer that Plaintiff’s medical leave of absence was a
but-for cause of St. Vincent’s retaliatory decision not to renew her residency contract.
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Hillman v. City of Chicago, 2014 WL 1613921, at *25 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013)).
The crux of St. Vincent’s motion is the court’s finding that Dr. Strand’s letter
contained direct evidence of gender discrimination. St. Vincent maintains that, because
the court found direct evidence of gender discrimination, Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of
law, establish the requisite but-for causation for either her ADA discrimination claim or
her ADA retaliation claim.
Plaintiff’s gender and ADA claims center around the complications surrounding
her pregnancy both before the birth of her son, and after. While pregnancy
discrimination is a form of gender discrimination, the complications that arise therefrom
may constitute a disability. These claims are thus factually, and perhaps legally,
intertwined.
Moreover, simply because the court found direct evidence of gender
discrimination does not mean that the jury will find St. Vincent liable. “Direct evidence
is evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would prove discriminatory conduct on
the part of the employer without reliance in inference or presumption.” Rhodes v. Illinois
Dep’t of Transp. 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). St. Vincent’s motion asks the court
to usurp the role of the jury and make that credibility determination prior to trial.
In sum, the relevant inquiry is whether there is sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could infer that Plaintiff’s real or perceived disability was a but-for cause
of St. Vincent’s decision not to renew her contract. The court finds, upon review of the
record, that there is. It is now for the jury to determine whether she was the victim of
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gender discrimination or ADA discrimination and/or retaliation. St. Vincent’s Motion to
Reconsider is therefore DENIED.
Plaintiff also requests an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
which provides that “[a]ny attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”
The court has the discretion to impose § 1927 sanctions when an attorney has acted in an
“objectively unreasonable manner” by “pursu[ing] a path that a reasonably careful
attorney would have known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound.” Tate v. Ancell, 551
Fed.Appx. 877, 891-92 (7th Cir. 2014). St. Vincent has not engaged in objectively
unreasonable conduct by filing the present motion. Contrary to Plaintiff’s
characterization of the motion, it is not unsound or baseless, and has not unreasonably
prolonged this litigation. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is DENIED.
III.

Conclusion
The court finds its Entry on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated

May 22, 2014, did not contain a manifest error of law. Accordingly, St. Vincent’s
Motion to Reconsider (Filing No. 125) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 12th day of August 2014.
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s/ Richard L. Young_______________
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Southern District of Indiana

Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record.
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