STURGEON et al v. AT&T TELEHOLDINGS, INC. et al

Filing 44

ENTRY ON MOTION TO DISMISS: For the foregoing reasons, the AT&T's motion to dismiss 32 is DENIED. The Court notes that the parties have not yet filed a Case Management Plan with the Court pursuant to Local Rule 16-1(b)(1). A Case Management Plan must be filed with the Court within 30 days of the date of this Entry ***SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 6/17/2013. (DW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
DEBORAH STURGEON, individually and on )
)
behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.,
)
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Plaintiffs,
)
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vs.
)
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AT&T TELEHOLDINGS, INC., et al.,
)
)
Defendants.

Cause No. 1:12-cv-1099-WTL-DKL

ENTRY ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This cause is before the Court on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1 Dkt. No. 32. The
motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, rules as follows.
I.

STANDARD

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
Court takes the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff. The complaint must contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and there is no need for
detailed factual allegations. However, the statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and the “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499
F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).

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AT&T filed a brief in opposition to the Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended
complaint, or, in the alternative, renewed motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On March
6, 2013, the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file and docketed the Plaintiffs’
amended complaint and accompanying exhibits. Dkt. No. 38, 39.
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II.

BACKGROUND

The facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 39) are as follow. The
Plaintiffs worked as field technicians for the Defendants (hereinafter “AT&T”) in Indiana and
performed work in the areas of construction, engineering, installation, and repair.2 The Plaintiffs
were required by AT&T to work shifts ranging from eight and a half to nine hours each workday.
Each shift included an unpaid lunch break of either 30 or 60 minutes.
Technicians, including the Plaintiffs, assigned to underground cable or manhole work
were required to remain at the site of the manhole and guard it during the lunch break.
Additionally, technicians, including the Plaintiffs, were required to guard other equipment, such
as generators, pumps, air compressors, trailers, and splicing equipment and have their cell
phones on and be available at all times, including during their lunch breaks.
Technicians, including the Plaintiffs, not assigned to manhole work were allowed to eat
their lunches at eating establishments outside of their vehicles, but under heavy restriction as to
where. Specifically, technicians must break while en route from one assigned job site to another
along GPS-monitored routes prescribed by AT&T, but were prohibited from deviating more than
one-half mile from those routes, even in rural areas.
Additionally, the technicians, including the Plaintiffs, were not allowed to eat at
establishments at which more than one AT&T vehicle was parked. Technicians, including the
Plaintiffs, were allowed to eat packed lunches in the A&T vehicle, but were prohibited from
using extra time during an unpaid lunch break for any personal activities such as reading
newspapers, magazines, or books in the vehicle, napping, or using personal laptops or CD
players.
2

The Complaint suggests that some Plaintiffs may still work for AT&T. For simplicity’s
sake only, the Court employs the past tense in the following section.
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AT&T did not permit these technicians, including the Plaintiffs, to idle their vehicles, and
hence prohibited their use of heating or air conditioning in the vehicle during the course of the
unpaid lunch break.
Moreover, separate from the restrictions, AT&T’s productivity-based performance
ranking system put the technicians and the Plaintiffs under significant pressure to work through
their unpaid lunch breaks in order to complete as many jobs as possible during each shift.
As a result of the restrictions and ranking system, each Plaintiff regularly worked during
his or her unpaid lunch break and therefore allegedly worked in excess of 40 hours per
workweek. The Plaintiffs claim in the instant action that the severe restrictions on what they
were allowed to do during their breaks– both alone and in combination with pressure to improve
performance by using the lunch break to complete more work – render the unpaid lunch breaks
compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). AT&T has moved to dismiss the
Plaintiffs’ claims.
III.

DISCUSSION

According to AT&T, the restrictions alleged by the Plaintiffs are insufficient to render
their lunch period compensable as a matter of law. In response, the Plaintiffs contend that
“AT&T is simply wrong in concluding that company ‘restrictions’ on what is suppose[d] to be a
bona fide break cannot constitute compensable claims under the FLSA and blatantly ignores the
case law that recognizes this principle.” Pls.’ Resp. at 5, No. 40.
The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime to employees who work more than 40
hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). The accompanying regulations provide that “bona fide
meal periods are not worktime” and “[t]he employee must be completely relieved from duty for
the purposes of eating regular meals.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). This Circuit has adopted the

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“predominant benefits” test for determining whether meal periods are work periods. “Under this
test, a meal period is not work time if the employee’s time is not spent predominantly for the
benefit of the employer.” Alexander v. City of Chicago, 81 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 1993).
The Plaintiffs are correct that restrictions alone may satisfy this test. Under the
regulations, an employee who is restricted to his or her desk or production-line machine is
deemed working while eating. 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). However, when the restrictions at issue fall
below this standard – really, the strictest of limitations – the inquiry focuses not on those
restrictions, but how the employee predominantly spends his or her time. See 29 C.F.R.
785.19(b) (“It is not necessary that an employee be permitted to leave the premises if he is
otherwise completely freed from duties during the meal period.”); Barefield v. Vill. of Winnetka,
81 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Plaintiffs do not allege that the civilian employees had any
duties during their meal period.” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, even in Alexander, the
Plaintiffs alleged that, during their meal periods, they were “required to respond to emergencies
and requests for assistance by the public” and were “subject to report and review by inspectors
during meal periods.” 994 F.3d at 335; see also id. at 340 (remanding for further factual
development of “whether officers are unable to comfortably and adequately pass the mealtime
because their time or attention is devoted primarily to official responsibilities”), 341 (Crabb, J.,
concurring) (“It is the allegation of frequent interruptions that raises the possibility that the
officers could show that their ‘attention is devoted primarily to official responsibilities’ during
meal periods.”).
Thus, as explained in the analysis above, the focus of the inquiry is not what the Plaintiffs
could not do, but what they did do. See Haviland v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp., 729
F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1063 (S.D. Iowa 2010). Here, the Plaintiffs allege that they guarded manhole

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covers and equipment and/or drove to the next stop on their route.3 AT&T admits that guarding
manholes and equipment may be sufficient to state a claim, Defs.’ Br. at 6, No. 32, and likewise
admits that driving “arguably identifies a work task,” id. at 22. Thus, the Plaintiffs have alleged
that they performed a task during a meal period that may meet the predominant benefits test. At
this stage, this is all that is required, and the Plaintiffs’ claims are not subject to dismissal on this
basis.
One additional argument bears mention. AT&T also argues that the Plaintiffs’ allegations
are otherwise too non-specific to state a plausible claim. The Court agrees that the manner in
which the Plaintiffs have pled their claims could be read to suggest that only some of the
Plaintiffs guarded equipment and/or drove while eating. However, the Plaintiffs’ complaint
nevertheless puts AT&T on notice of the claims against it. Furthermore, in the context of an
alleged collective action, this problem is best raised in a motion addressing the collective action
allegation, which AT&T has not yet filed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the AT&T’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. The Court notes
that the parties have not yet filed a Case Management Plan with the Court pursuant to Local Rule
16-1(b)(1). A Case Management Plan must be filed with the Court within 30 days of the
date of this Entry.
SO ORDERED: 06/17/2013

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Copies to all counsel of record via electronic communication.
3

The fact that driving on one’s lunch break is not “required” may not be determinative.
29 C.F.R. § 785.11 (“Work not requested but suffered or permitted is work time.”).
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