MALIBU MEDIA, LLC v. JOHN DOES 1-11

Filing 294

ORDER denying 237 Motion for Sanctions against defendant for the intentional destruction of material evidence. The Court denying as moot 288 Motion in Limine to preclude defendants witness from testifying at the Evidentiary Hearing and DENIES the remainder of this motion. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore on 12/24/2014. (CBU)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MALIBU MEDIA, LLC,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL HARRISON,
Defendant.

No. 1:12-cv-01117-WTL-MJD

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions Against
Defendant for the Intentional Destruction of Material Evidence. [Dkt. 237.] For the reasons set
forth below, the Court recommends that the motion be DENIED. Also before the Court is
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Defendant’s Witnesses from Testifying at the
Evidentiary Hearing. [Dkt. 288.] The Court DENIES AS MOOT part of this motion and
DENIES the remainder of this motion.
I.

Background

Malibu Media, LLC (“Plaintiff”) is a California company that owns a registered
copyright for the motion picture “Pretty Back Door Baby.” [Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 6, 11-12.] On August 14,
2012, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, alleging that various unidentified defendants had infringed
its copyright by using the peer-to-peer file sharing protocol BitTorrent. [Id. ¶¶ 7, 14, 33-35.]
Each Defendant initially was “known to Plaintiff only by an IP address,” i.e., “a number that is
assigned by an Internet Service Provider (an ‘ISP’) to devices, such as computers, that are
connected to the Internet.” [Id. ¶¶ 7-8.]

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On August 27, 2012, Plaintiff issued a subpoena to one such ISP—Comcast Corporation
(“Comcast”)—ordering Comcast to “produce documents identifying the name, address, and
telephone number” associated with the IP addresses that Plaintiff had identified as involved in
infringement of its copyright. [See Dkt. 19.] Comcast’s response identified Michael Harrison
(“Harrison” or “Defendant”) as one of the individuals associated with an infringing IP address.
[See Dkt. 59 ¶ 4.] Plaintiff accordingly filed an amended complaint against Harrison and others,
alleging direct and contributory copyright infringement. [See Dkt. 38.] 1
During discovery, Plaintiff served Interrogatories and Requests for Production on
Harrison. [See Dkt. 237-2 & 237-3.] Plaintiff also deposed Harrison on August 7, 2014. [See
Dkt. 237-1.]
Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 4 asked Defendant to identify “each of the Computer
Devices used in [Defendant’s] home during the preceding two years.” [Dkt. 237-2 ¶ 4.]
Defendant responded that he had two devices: an Acer 5730 laptop and a custom-built gaming
computer. [Id.] Interrogatory No. 5 asked Defendant to identify the wireless routers used in his
home and to describe whether and how they were password protected. [237-2. ¶ 5.] Defendant
responded that he used a Netgear wgr614 v9 router, and that he had “changed the password for it
in October [2012]” when he received a letter from Comcast. [Id.]
At his deposition, Defendant testified about the letter. He said that the document notified
him that Plaintiff had issued a subpoena to Comcast in connection with a lawsuit. [Harrison Dep.
15:21-23, Aug. 7, 2014.] Based on the letter, he “knew the lawsuit was pending,” but “didn’t
know it was a lawsuit directly against [him] at the time.” [Harrison Dep. 16:1-4.] He “thought it
was just [Plaintiff] looking for information through Comcast.” [Harrison Dep. 16:5-6.]

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Since this filing, Plaintiff has further amended its complaint to assert only the direct infringement claim against
Harrison. [See Dkt. 165.]

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Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 1 asked for a “complete copy of the hard drive for
each of the Computer Devices in [Defendant’s] house, apartment or dwelling.” [Dkt. 237-4 ¶ 1.]
Defendant responded that Plaintiff “was provided a complete copy of the hard drive for each of
[his] computer devices on July 25, 2013.” [237-4 ¶ 1.] At his deposition, Defendant testified
about the drive that he had provided from his gaming computer. He stated that the hard drives in
his computers “get used pretty hard and die pretty quickly,” such that he “replaced hard drives a
lot in all of [his] computers.” [Harrison Dep. 17:9-11.] In January 2013, for instance, the hard
drive in Defendant’s gaming computer “had begun crashing,” and “it needed to be replaced.”
[Harrison Dep. 15:12-14.] Thus, Defendant replaced the drive shortly thereafter. [Harrison Dep.
15:3-10.]
A replacement hard drive for the “crashing” drive was shipped to Defendant in January
2013, but its purchase was billed to a different individual—John Harlan. [Harrison Dep. 14:1518; see also Dkt 237-7.] Harrison stated that Harlan “owed [him] a little bit of money” and that
purchasing the hard drive “seemed an easy way for him” to pay Harrison back. [Harrison Dep.
14:19-22.] After receiving the new drive, Defendant said it “went into [his] gaming computer.”
[Harrison Dep. 14:24.]
Plaintiff asked what happened to the previous hard drive, and Defendant stated that he
“got rid of it” by taking the drive to his former employer, GGI Recycling LLC. [Harrison Dep.
15:17-19.] He said he “was taking some other electronic scrap” to GGI to be recycled, and “just
tossed [the previous hard drive] in the piles [GGI] had.” [Harrison Dep. 16:10-11.] Defendant
then explained that GGI “melt[s]” the electrical scrap it receives, and “sell[s] it to refineries and
stuff like that.” [Harrison Dep. 16:13-15.] It was thus his belief that “GGI recycled the hard
drive.” [Harrison Dep. 16:16-18.]

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After Defendant’s deposition, Plaintiff filed its current Motion for Sanctions Against
Defendant for the Intentional Destruction of Material Evidence. [Dkt. 237.] Plaintiff contends
that Defendant received notice of this lawsuit in October 2012 through the letter from Comcast,
[id. at 2], and that the hard drive that Defendant replaced in early 2013 could have “contained
evidence of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works.” [Id. at 8.] Thus, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s
recycling of the hard drive violated Plaintiff’s duty to preserve evidence relevant to this
litigation. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff also contends that Defendant tried to conceal his alleged
wrongdoing: Plaintiff notes that its Requests for Production instructed Defendant to disclose the
existence of and circumstances surrounding the destruction of any hard drives that Defendant
had used but that Defendant no longer had in his possession. [Id. at 4; see also 237-3 at 5.]
Defendant, however, allegedly did not reveal the existence of the hard drive he replaced in early
2013 until his August 2014 deposition, several months after he responded to Plaintiff’s requests
for production. [Dkt. 237 at 4-5.]
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter default judgment against
Defendant, [id. at 7], or “at minimum,” issue “an adverse inference instruction requiring the jury
to infer that Plaintiff would have found its copyrighted movies on the destroyed drive.” [Id. at
10.] The Court referred Plaintiff’s motion to the Magistrate Judge for proposed findings and
recommendations, [Dkt. 263], and the Court set an evidentiary hearing for December 18, 2014.
[Dkt. 261.]
Before the hearing, Plaintiff filed its Motion in Limine to Preclude Defendant’s
Witnesses from Testifying at the Evidentiary Hearing. [Dkt. 288.] Plaintiff sought to exclude
Jason Bosaw, Delvan Neville, Eric Goldsmith, Rhonda Arnold, and John Harlan from testifying

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at the hearing. [Id. at 1.] The Court took that motion under advisement and conducted the hearing
on December 18, 2014.
II.

Discussion

Plaintiff in this case seeks imposition of sanctions for spoliation of evidence resulting
from the destruction of Defendant’s hard drive. [Dkt. 237 at 1.] The Seventh Circuit notes that
“courts have found a spoliation sanction to be proper only where a party has a duty to preserve
evidence because it knew, or should have known, that litigation was imminent.” Trask-Morton v.
Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672, 681 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Norman-Nunnery v.
Madison Area Technical Coll., 625 F.3d 422, 429 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing that plaintiff
“fail[ed] every element of the test for the spoliation inference” where evidence was destroyed
“before [defendant] knew or should have known that litigation was imminent”).
Furthermore, a showing of “bad faith” is “a prerequisite to imposing sanctions for the
destruction of evidence.” Trask-Morton, 534 F.3d at 681. “‘[B]ad faith’ means destruction for
the purpose of hiding adverse information.” Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153,
1155 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013), reh'g
denied (May 1, 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 900 (2014) (citation omitted) (“A party destroys a
document in bad faith when it does so for the purpose of hiding adverse information.”).
Sanctions for spoliation therefore may not be imposed simply because evidence was destroyed;
instead, such sanctions are appropriate only if the evidence was destroyed for the purpose of
hiding adverse information. See, e.g., Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 615 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted) (“[T]he crucial element is not that evidence was destroyed but rather the reason
for the destruction.”). The movant bears the burden to make this showing. Bracey, 712 F.3d at
1019.

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Based on this standard, Plaintiff must establish 1) that Defendant had a duty to preserve
evidence because he knew or should have known that litigation was imminent; and 2) that while
under this duty, Defendant destroyed evidence for the purpose of hiding adverse information.
A. Duty to Preserve Evidence
“A party has a duty to preserve evidence when it knows, or should have known, that
litigation was imminent.” Trask–Morton, 534 F.3d at 681. “At the latest, this duty attaches when
the plaintiff informs the defendant of his potential claim.” Chandler v. Buncich, No. 2:12 CV
175, 2012 WL 4343314, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2012). The duty may arise “even prior to the
filing of a complaint as long as it is known that litigation is likely to commence.” MacNeil Auto.
Products, Ltd. v. Cannon Auto. Ltd., 715 F. Supp. 2d 786, 801 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
In this case, Defendant learned of the litigation through the letter he received from
Comcast, his ISP. [Pl.’s Ex. P1; Evidentiary Hr’g Tr. 10:18-20, Dec. 18, 2014.] The letter was
dated September 27, 2012, [Pl.’s Ex. P1], and Plaintiff introduced deposition testimony from
Comcast’s 30(b)(6) corporate representative confirming that Comcast sent the letter to Defendant
on this date. [Padgett Dep. 22:2-10, Nov. 5, 2014.] Defendant testified that he received the letter
in October 2012. [Hr’g Tr. 10:18-20, 29:16-18.]
The Comcast letter states:
Malibu Media, LLC has filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana. You have been identified in our records via
your assigned Internet Protocol (“IP”) address, which is unique to each internet
user, in this lawsuit for allegedly infringing Malibu Media, LLC’s copyrights on
the Internet by uploading or downloading a movie without permission.
[Pl.’s Ex. P1.] The letter adds that “the court has ordered Comcast to supply your name,
address and other information to Malibu Media, LLC,” and that “Comcast will provide
your name, address and other information as directed in the Order.” [Pl.’s Ex. P1.] It

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further advises the recipient to “consult an attorney immediately” if the recipient has any
questions about the lawsuit. [Pl.’s Ex. P1.]
The Court finds that the contents and receipt of this letter were sufficient to
establish Defendant’s duty to preserve evidence. The letter specifically informs the
recipient—Defendant Harrison—that “[y]ou have been identified . . . for allegedly
infringing Malibu Media, LLC’s copyrights,” and advises that “your name, address and
other information” will be supplied in connection with the lawsuit. [Pl.’s Ex. P1
(emphasis added).] The letter thus informs the recipient not only that litigation has
already commenced, but that the recipient has been personally connected to that litigation
and the alleged infringement. A person reading this letter thus reasonably “should have
known” that “litigation was imminent.” Trask–Morton, 534 F.3d at 681. Further, the
description of the alleged illegal activity—“infringing Malibu Media, LLC’s copyrights
on the Internet by uploading or downloading a movie without permission”—indicates
that, through the letter, “plaintiff inform[ed] the defendant of his potential claim.”
Chandler, 2012 WL 4343314, at *1. The duty to preserve evidence thus arose upon
Defendant’s receipt of the letter.
The Court must next consider the scope of Defendant’s duty. Once the duty of
preservation attaches, it imposes a “broad” obligation “encompassing any relevant
evidence that the non-preserving party knew or reasonably could foresee would be
relevant to the action.” Chandler, 2012 WL 4343314, at *1; see also MacNeil, 715 F.
Supp. 2d at 800 (“A party has a duty to preserve evidence over which it had control and
reasonably knew or could reasonably foresee was material to a potential legal action.”).

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In this case, Defendant’s computer storage devices fall within the scope of the
duty of preservation. The letter informed Defendant that the lawsuit had been filed
because a person associated with Defendant’s IP address had been “allegedly infringing
Malibu Media, LLC’s copyrights on the Internet by uploading or downloading a movie
without permission.” [Pl.’s Ex. P1.] A person reading this claim “reasonably could
foresee,” Chandler, 2012 WL 4343314, at *1, that computer hardware capable of
connecting to the Internet and storing potentially infringing copies of movies would be
relevant to the claim. In addition, Plaintiff’s expert witness, Patrick Paige, testified at the
evidentiary hearing that Defendant’s hard drive “absolutely” would have “been an
important piece of evidence” to inspect, [Hr’g Tr. 85:17-19], and several of Defendant’s
own witnesses acknowledged at their depositions “that in these types of cases a computer
hard drive is an important piece of evidence.” [See Dkt. 288 at 10.] This testimony thus
confirms that the destroyed hard drive fell within the scope of the duty of preservation.
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that, at the time of the
destruction of the hard drive, Defendant was under a duty to preserve the hard drive. The
Court next considers whether Defendant’s actions were sufficiently culpable to impose a
spoliation sanction.
B. Bad Faith Destruction of Evidence
As noted above, sanctions for spoliation of evidence can be entered only if the culpable
party destroyed evidence in bad faith. Trask-Morton, 534 F.3d at 681. Bad faith, in turn, “means
destruction for the purpose of hiding adverse information.” Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc.,
136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998). In this case, then, Plaintiff must show bad faith, and thus

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must establish that Defendant destroyed his hard drive “for the purpose of hiding adverse
information.” Norman-Nunnery, 625 F.3d at 428.
At the hearing, Defendant testified at length about his use of computers, the
circumstances of the hard drive’s destruction, and his replacement of the hard drive. As
explained below, the Court finds that the evidence presented does not establish that he destroyed
the hard drive in February 2013 for the purpose of hiding adverse information.
As an initial matter, Defendant directly testified under oath that he did not do so. When
asked whether he took his “old gaming hard drive to GGI because [he] was trying to hide
information,” he said “no.” [Hr’g Tr. 59:2-5.] He explained that he built his gaming computer in
2007, [Hr’g Tr. 33:11-12], and that since that time, he had replaced the hard drive in the
computer “somewhere between four and six times.” [Hr’g Tr. 35:20.] Each time, he did so
because “gaming is really hard on computer hardware,” [Hr’g Tr. 35:23], such that hard drives
used for gaming will frequently have “corruption issues and functionality issues, and eventually .
. . will stop working entirely.” [Hr’g Tr. 34:21-24.] He said that the hard drive in his gaming
computer “crashed in January of 2013,” and that the hard drive was “no longer usable.” [Hr’g Tr.
49:6-16.]
Because the hard drive was no longer useable, Defendant sought a replacement. He
testified that he had previously loaned his friend, John Harlan, approximately 400 dollars “for
some car parts.” [Hr’g Tr. 49: 20-24.] Harlan had repaid part of this loan, but still owed
Defendant money. [Hr’g Tr. 49:25, 50:1.] Thus, Defendant asked Harlan to pay back the rest of
the loan by buying a replacement hard drive for him. [Hr’g Tr. 50:17-24.] Harlan did so on
January 26, 2013, [Def.’s Ex. A], and Defendant received the hard drive in February 2013. [Hr’g
Tr. 53:24.] At that point, the old gaming hard drive was still non-functional, [Hr’g Tr. 54:5], so

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Defendant took the hard drive to GGI to be recycled. [Hr’g Tr. 57:19-20.] He decided to dispose
of the hard drive this way because he was a former GGI employee, and “it help[ed] [his] old
employer’s business to take electronic scrap there to be recycled.” [Hr’g Tr. 58 at 2-4.]
Defendant, in short, testified that he recycled the hard drive not to hide adverse information, but
because it—like several of the previous hard drives in his gaming computer—had crashed and
was no longer functional. Destroying the hard drive for such a reason does not establish bad
faith. See Norman-Nunnery, 625 F.3d at 428. The Court finds Defendant’s testimony in this
regard to have been credible.
Of course, the lack of direct testimony from Defendant is not dispositive of the bad faith
inquiry. “‘Bad faith’ is a question of fact like any other, so the trier of fact is entitled to draw any
reasonable inference.” Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998);
Davis v. Carmel Clay Sch., No. 1:11-CV-00771-SEB-DML, 2013 WL 5487340, at *6 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 30, 2013). Thus, the Court may infer bad faith from the circumstances of the destruction of
evidence. See Mathis, 136 F.3d at 1155; see also Sokn v. Fieldcrest Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 8,
No. 10-CV-1122, 2014 WL 201534, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2014) (“The way to determine
whether evidence was destroyed in order to hide adverse information is . . . [to] infer bad intent
based upon when the destruction occurred in relation to the destroyer’s knowledge that the
evidence was relevant to potential litigation.”). In this case, however, the circumstances do not
warrant an inference that Defendant destroyed the hard drive for the purpose of hiding adverse
information.
First, the timing of the destruction does not support such an inference. As noted earlier,
Defendant received notice of this lawsuit at the beginning of October 2012. [Hr’g Tr. 10:18-20,
29:16-18; see also Pl.’s Ex. P1.] Defendant, however, did not destroy the hard drive until “late

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February 2013.” [Hr’g Tr. 57:14-15.] Thus, almost five months passed between the time that
Defendant learned of the lawsuit and Defendant’s destruction of the hard drive. Had Defendant
truly wished to hide adverse information, the Court finds it unlikely that Defendant would have
waited nearly five months to destroy such information. Instead, Defendant’s continued use of the
hard drive for the months after he learned of the litigation suggests that the hard drive contained
no information to hide at all, or that Defendant did not intend to hide any such information.
The timing of Plaintiff’s amendment and the service of its complaint also detract from an
inference of bad faith. Plaintiff amended its complaint to add Harrison as a Defendant on
November 9, 2012. [Dkt. 38.] Plaintiff, however, did not serve the amended complaint on
Harrison until April 2013, [Hr’g Tr. 60:7-8; see also Dkt. 62 at 2 (requesting that Court grant
Plaintiff “until April 19, 2013” to serve Defendant)], after Defendant had arranged to order the
replacement hard drive, [see Pl.’s Ex. P1.], and after the recycling of Defendant’s hard drive.
[Hr’g Tr. 60:3-4.] Furthermore, Defendant testified that the service of the complaint was the first
time that he became aware that he was personally being sued for copyright infringement. [Hr’g
Tr. 60:12-14.] Thus, at the time of the destruction in February 2013, Defendant was not even
certain he had been sued, making it much less likely that he destroyed the hard drive to hide
information that could prove damaging in this litigation. 2
Next, the circumstances of Defendant’s purchase of the replacement hard drive are not as
suspicious as Plaintiff contends. Plaintiff notes that Defendant had a third party purchase the new

2

The Court notes that its previous order, [Dkt. 18], stated that “[w]ithin seven days of the identification through
discovery or otherwise of any putative Defendant, Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint naming that Defendant
and shall undertake immediate efforts to effect service of process upon that Defendant.” [Id. ¶ 4.] Had Plaintiff
complied with the Court’s order and “immediately” undertaken efforts to serve its amended complaint on Harrison,
Plaintiff’s current motion for sanctions would rest on firmer ground: in such a case, Defendant’s destruction of the
hard drive would have occurred after service of the amended complaint, and it would be much easier for the Court to
infer that Defendant’s conduct was an attempt to hide information that could have been adverse to Defendant in the
present litigation. As it is, however, Plaintiff did not serve Harrison for approximately five months after amending
its complaint, and thus cannot benefit from such an inference.

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hard drive for him and implies that Defendant did so to hide the existence of his original hard
drive. [See Dkt. 254 at 2-3.] As noted above, however, Defendant explained the circumstances of
the third party’s purchase and gave a legitimate reason—repayment of the loan—for Harlan’s
purchase of the hard drive. Furthermore, Mr. Harlan testified that he did in fact purchase the hard
drive because he owed Defendant money, and agreed that the original loan had been for parts for
Harlan’s car. [Hr’g Tr. at 98:15-19.] Harlan’s testimony thus corroborates Defendant’s
explanation for Harlan’s purchase of the drive, making it less likely that the purchase was part of
a plan to hide adverse information.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s First Request for Production of Documents asked Defendant to
produce “[a]ll documents referring, relating to or comprising records associated with the
purchase of a Computer Drive.” [Dkt. 237-4 ¶ 3.] Defendant responded by attaching a copy of
the receipt showing the purchase of the hard drive by John Harlan. [See id.; Dkt. 237 at 5.] The
Court finds unlikely that Defendant would have produced the receipt showing the purchase of the
hard drive had Defendant wished to hide the purchase of the replacement hard drive. Defendant’s
disclosure of this receipt thus further erodes the strength of any inference that Defendant was
attempting to hide adverse information.
Next, Defendant also testified that he had two computers: the gaming computer and a
separate Acer laptop. [See Hr’g Tr. 46-47.] He acquired the laptop “sometime in 2009 or 2010.”
[Hr’g Tr. 47:9.] After acquiring the laptop, he purposefully avoided doing anything on his
gaming computer other than playing games and engaging in “light” Internet activity, such as
accessing Facebook. [Hr’g Tr. 46:13-23.] He explained that doing “anything else” on “a
computer tends to slow it down,” leading him to avoid other activity—such as downloading
movies—that would have impaired the performance of the gaming computer. [See Hr’g Tr.

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46:17-25, 47:1-5.] In particular, Defendant stated that he had a BitTorrent client installed on his
laptop but, after acquiring the laptop, never had a BitTorrent client installed on his gaming
computer. [Hr’g Tr. 47:18-20.] He also stated that he originally acquired the recycled hard drive
in “late 2011.” [Hr’g Tr. 48:6-8.] Because he acquired this hard drive after acquiring the laptop,
his testimony indicates that he never would have installed a BitTorrent client and never would
have downloaded movies on the hard drive he ultimately recycled.
The Court finds such testimony credible: Plaintiff testified that using a computer for
gaming purposes can be strenuous for the computer’s hardware and that games are less desirable
to play when the hardware struggles to properly run them. [Hr’g Tr. 41:17-23.] The Court thus
finds it logical that, after acquiring his laptop in 2009 or 2010, Defendant would use only the
laptop for BitTorrent use and downloading movies, thereby preserving his gaming computer to
more effectively run Defendant’s gaming software.
Because Defendant likely did not use the destroyed hard drive for downloading movies,
the Court finds it unlikely that Defendant recycled the hard drive for the purpose of hiding
adverse information. After all, if Defendant did not use the hard drive to download any movies,
then the hard drive could not contain evidence of Plaintiff’s copyrighted movies, and Defendant
would not have destroyed the hard drive to hide such evidence.
In this respect, the case is similar to the situation the Seventh Circuit analyzed in Bracey.
There, the plaintiff alleged that prison officials used excessive force against him during a
jailhouse struggle. Id. at 1015-16. He filed an inmate complaint and “notified the prison that
tapes of the incident probably exist[ed.]” Id. at 1015. The footage, however, was erased before a
copy was made. Id.

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During the course of the lawsuit, the plaintiff “sought sanctions for spoliation of the
video recording.” Id. at 1016. The Seventh Circuit, however, noted that the plaintiff “[made] no
assertion that any prison official actually viewed the relevant video (or deliberately avoided
watching the video for fear of what it contained).” Id. at 1019. Thus, without “having seen the
video, no prison official could have known the tapes potentially contained adverse information
and, without that knowledge,” no prison official “could have destroyed the tapes for the purpose
of hiding adverse information.” Id.
So, too, in this case: Defendant credibly testified that he never used his gaming computer
for downloading movies or otherwise using BitTorrent during the time the destroyed drive was
connected to the gaming computer. He therefore could not “have known the [hard drive]
potentially contained adverse information,” Bracey, 712 F.3d at 1019, related to Plaintiff’s claim
that he used BitTorrent to infringe Plaintiff’s movies. Without this knowledge of potentially
adverse information, Defendant could not have destroyed the hard drive for the purpose of hiding
that adverse information. See id.
For these reasons, then, the Court concludes that Defendant did not destroy the hard drive
in bad faith. No direct testimony establishes that Defendant did so, and the circumstances of the
destruction as outlined above do no warrant an inference that Defendant destroyed the hard drive
for the purpose of hiding adverse information. As such, Plaintiff has not carried its burden to
prove bad faith destruction of evidence, and Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.
C. Plaintiff’s Alternative Argument
In support of its motion in limine and at the hearing, Plaintiff asserted that “bad faith” is
not required for imposition of spoliation sanctions, and that “the Court can sanction Defendant if
it finds that he acted with willfulness, fault, or bad faith.” [Dkt. 290 at 2 (emphasis original).]

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Plaintiff cites Marrocco v. General Motors Corp., in which the Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that “sanctions may be appropriate in any one of three instances—where the noncomplying party
acted either with willfulness, bad faith or fault.” 966 F.2d 220, 224 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
original). That case, however, involved sanctions for “violation of [a] protective order,” id. at
222, and did not address intentional destruction of evidence. See id. at 222-24. Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit in Marrocco derived the “willfulness, bad faith or fault” standard from National
Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976), in which the Supreme Court
addressed the circumstances in which a court may sanction a party under Rule 37 for failure to
“obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Id. at 639-40. This standard is thus inappropriate
for this case, as Plaintiff has not invoked Rule 37 and has not identified any court order that
Defendant allegedly disobeyed. [See Dkt. 237.]
Instead, Plaintiff’s motion apparently relies not on violation of a court order, but on the
Court’s “inherent power to sanction parties for misconduct such as spoliation of evidence.”
Naseer v. Trumm, No. 11-CV-004-BBC, 2011 WL 1749322, at *5 (W.D. Wis. May 6, 2011)
(citing Schmude v. Sheahan, 420 F.3d 645, 649–650 (7th Cir.2005)). As courts have previously
noted, reliance on this power requires a showing of bad faith. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Asia Pac.
Telecom, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 779, 790 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“A court’s inherent power to impose
spoliation sanctions arises only if a party destroyed evidence in bad faith.”).
This requirement is also consistent with Seventh Circuit precedent. Plaintiff argues that
Defendant “committed spoliation,” [Dkt. 237 at 6], and when the issue is spoliation, the Seventh
Circuit is clear that only bad faith will suffice: “This court has noted that the spoliation doctrine
applies if two conditions are met. A party must destroy evidence, and its destruction must have
been in bad faith.” United States v. Esposito, 771 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis

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added); see also Norman-Nunnery, 625 F.3d at 428 (“The crucial element in a spoliation claim is
not the fact that the documents were destroyed but that they were destroyed for the purpose of
hiding adverse information.” (emphasis added)); Trask-Morton, 534 F.3d at 681 (“Morton has
made no showing, however, that Motel 6’s destruction of any of those materials was done in bad
faith. Such a showing is a prerequisite to imposing sanctions for the destruction of evidence.”). 3
Plaintiff’s above-described failure to establish bad faith is thus fatal to its request for sanctions.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s contention were correct, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
not shown that Defendant acted with willfulness or fault. First, “willfulness” is similar to “bad
faith,” in that “wilfulness and bad faith are associated with conduct that is intentional or
reckless.” Long v. Steepro, 213 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, the Seventh Circuit has
approved a finding of willfulness when a litigant repeatedly disobeys court orders, see In re
Golant, 239 F.3d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 2001), or repeatedly disregards a court’s warnings about
conduct during discovery. See Holt v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 497 F. App’x 662, 664 (7th Cir.
2012). In this case, Plaintiff has not identified any orders or warnings from this Court directing
Defendant to preserve evidence or otherwise produce the hard drive from Defendant’s gaming
computer. [See Dkt. 237.] The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has not established the sort of
repeated misconduct that might suffice to show “willfulness.”
“Fault,” meanwhile, “doesn’t speak to the noncomplying party’s disposition at all, but
rather only describes the reasonableness of the conduct—or lack thereof—which eventually
culminated in the violation[ 4].” Marrocco, 966 F.2d at 224. Thus, the Seventh Circuit in

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The Seventh Circuit has also expressly acknowledged that “[s]ome circuits have adopted less stringent standards
than we require for issuing” spoliation sanctions. Bracey, 712 F.3d at 1020. In the Sixth Circuit, for instance, a duty
to preserve evidence combined with negligent destruction of that evidence can warrant sanctions, and bad faith is
not required for sanctions in the Ninth Circuit. See id. Plaintiff, however, must meet the Seventh Circuit’s more
stringent standards, and thus must show bad faith. See id.
4
Again, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not actually alleged a “violation” of any court order in this case, such that
Plaintiff’s reliance on Marrocco is misplaced.

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Marrocco determined that the noncomplying party acted with “fault” when it “showed poor
judgment” in the way it handled evidence and when its conduct showed a “flagrant disregard of
[the party’s] assumed duty, under the protective order,[ 5] to preserve and monitor the condition
of evidence which could be pivotal in a lawsuit.” Id.
Defendant in this case did not show a similar degree of fault. As described above,
Defendant credibly explained that he never used the recycled hard drive for downloading movies
and never had a BitTorrent client installed on the recycled drive. Without such evidence, the hard
drive could hardly be “pivotal” to this lawsuit, such that destroying it did not show “poor
judgment” of the sort exhibited by the culpable party in Marrocco. In addition, Plaintiff has not
identified any court order or other explicit promise to preserve evidence that Defendant allegedly
violated. [See Dkt. 237.] Without such an explicit undertaking to preserve evidence, Defendant’s
conduct is not a “flagrant” disregard of any duty, Marrocco, 966 F.2d at 224, such that, again,
Defendant’s conduct does not rise to the level of “fault.”
D. Relevance of Destruction at Trial
Because Defendant did not destroy evidence in a way that demonstrates “bad faith,”
“willfulness,” or “fault,” the Court will not sanction Defendant. The destruction of the hard
drive, however, may yet be relevant at trial.
The core of Plaintiff’s claim in this case is that “Defendant copied the constituent
elements” of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works by “using the BitTorrent protocol and a BitTorrent
Client.” [Dkt. 165 ¶ 4 (Fourth Am. Compl.).] Plaintiff’s expert witness Patrick Paige examined

5

The protective order in Marrocco provided that its purpose was “to ensure preservation and safekeeping of the
motor vehicle which is the subject of this litigation,” and required the parties to refrain from “destructive testing” of
the vehicle. Id. at 221. Although the Court entered a protective order in the current litigation, that order relates only
to the confidentiality of information, and imposes no duty to preserve evidence. [See Dkt 177.]

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both the hard drive from Plaintiff’s Acer laptop and the replacement hard drive that Defendant
used in his gaming computer after recycling the previous hard drive. [Dkt. 213-4 ¶ ¶ 25-26 (Decl.
of Patrick Paige).] Mr. Paige’s examination of the replacement hard drive, however, “revealed no
evidence of BitTorrent use.” [Id. ¶ 25.] Such a finding could undermine Plaintiff’s claim of
copying via BitTorrent, and the fact-finder at trial should know that Paige’s examination was not
an examination of the hard drive that Defendant had in his possession during the alleged time of
infringement. See, e.g., Taylor v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. CIV.09-123-GPM, 2010 WL
5474172, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2010) (admitting evidence concerning destruction of allegedly
defective product where expert’s later test was performed on a different copy of the product).
To prevail on its infringement claim, Plaintiff must also show, inter alia, that copying of
the protected work did in fact occur. See Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff’s expert in this case found various torrent files indicating that Defendant’s Acer laptop
had been used to produce copies of numerous audiovisual works, but these works did not include
Malibu Media’s copyrighted movies. [See Dkt. 213-6.] Also, as noted above, Plaintiff’s expert
found no evidence of BitTorrent use whatsoever on the replacement hard drive from Defendant’s
gaming computer. [See id.] Without knowing that the replacement hard drive was a replacement,
and without knowing that it was not the hard drive in use during the time of the alleged
infringement, the fact finder at trial might conclude that Paige’s combined findings exonerate
Defendant by establishing that no copying of Malibu Media’s works occurred at all. This,
however, could be an erroneous conclusion in light of the destruction of the hard drive that was
in use at the time of the alleged infringement, such that Plaintiff should be allowed to present
evidence explaining why the original hard drive was not available for its expert to examine.
Hence, although the Court will not sanction Defendant for destroying the hard drive, the Court

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also will not bar the introduction of evidence at trial concerning the circumstances of that
destruction.
E. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine
As noted above, Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude Jason Bosaw, Delvan
Neville, Eric Goldsmith, Rhonda Arnold, and John Harlan from testifying at the evidentiary
hearing. [Dkt. 288 at 1.] Eric Goldsmith and Delvan Neville did not testify at the hearing, and the
Court has not referred to the testimony of Rhonda Arnold or Jason Bosaw. The Court therefore
DENIES AS MOOT the portion of Plaintiff’s motion seeking to exclude these witnesses.
The Court also DENIES the portion of Plaintiff’s motion seeking to exclude the
testimony of John Harlan. Plaintiff asserts that Harlan “lacks personal knowledge of the facts
relevant to the spoliation inquiry.” [Id. at 11.] As described above, however, Harlan’s testimony
corroborated Defendant’s explanation for Harlan’s purchase of the hard drive, and thus reduced
the likelihood that Defendant’s purchase of the hard drive through Harlan was an attempt to hide
information on the hard drive that was destroyed. Because the intent to hide adverse information
is an element of the spoliation inquiry, see Trask-Morton, 534 F.3d at 681, Harlan’s testimony is
relevant to Plaintiff’s spoliation allegations, and Plaintiff’s argument for excluding Harlan’s
testimony is not sound.

III.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
Against Defendant for the Intentional Destruction of Material Evidence, [Dkt. 237], be
DENIED. Also, the Court DENIES AS MOOT part of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Preclude

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Defendant’s Witnesses from Testifying at the Evidentiary Hearing, [Dkt. 288], and DENIES the
remainder of this motion.
Date: 12/24/2014

Distribution:
Anthony Jay Saunders
[e-mail]
Amy L. Cueller
LEMBERG LAW, LLC
[e-mail]
David Scott Klinestiver
LEWIS & KAPPES
[e-mail]
Matthew S. Tarkington
LEWIS & KAPPES, PC
[e-mail]
Jason H. Cooper
LIPSCOMB, EISENBERG & BAKER, PL
[e-mail]
Michael K. Lipscomb
LIPSCOMB, EISENBERG & BAKER, PL
[e-mail]
Paul J. Nicoletti
NICOLETTI LAW, PLC
[e-mail]
Gabriel J. Quearry
QUEARRY LAW, LLC
[e-mail]

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