STORY v. SMITH

Filing 16

ENTRY - Mr. Story's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 3/19/2013. Copy Mailed.(JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

JIMMY STORY, II,
Petitioner,
v.
BRIAN SMITH,
Respondent.

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Case No. 1:12-cv-1199-TWP-DKL

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jimmy Story, II’s (“Mr. Story”)
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. For the reasons explained in this Entry, the
petition must be denied and this action dismissed with prejudice.
Background
The pleadings and the expanded record in this action establish the following:
1.

Mr. Story is confined at an Indiana prison. He seeks a writ of habeas

corpus with respect to a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. IYC 11-080127, wherein he was found guilty of having violated prison rules of conduct by his
unauthorized possession of an electronic device.
2.

A conduct report was issued on August 17, 2011, reciting that during the

morning of that day the reporting officer conducted a search of Mr. Story’s locked
property box and in that box found a black and grey cell phone and cell phone
charger.

3.

After being supplied with a copy of the written charge and notified of his

procedural rights, Mr. Story was found guilty of the misconduct with which he had
been charged at a hearing conducted on August 22, 2011. He was sanctioned, in
part, with the deprivation of a period of earned good-time and a demotion in his
credit class. His administrative appeals were rejected and this action followed.
Discussion
Mr. Story seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the bases that the proceeding
described above is tainted by constitutional error.
A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '
2254(a) only if it finds the applicant Ais in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.@ Id. When a prison disciplinary proceeding
results in a sanction which affects the expected duration of a prisoner=s
confinement, typically through the deprivation of earned good-time credits or the
demotion in credit earning class, the state may not deprive inmates of good-time
credits without following constitutionally adequate procedures to ensure that the
credits are not arbitrarily rescinded. Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir.
2004).
"Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and
the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In these circumstances, Mr. Story was
entitled to the following process before being deprived of his liberty interests: (1)
advance (at least 24 hours before hearing) written notice of the claimed violation;

(2) the opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) the
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence (when consistent
with institutional safety); and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of the
evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Rasheed-Bey v.
Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). In addition, there is a substantive
component to the issue, which requires that the decision of a conduct board be
supported by "some evidence." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985).
Under Wolff and Hill, Mr. Story received all the process to which he was
entitled. That is, the charge was clear, adequate notice was given, and the evidence
was sufficient. In addition, (1) Mr. Story was given the opportunity to appear before
the conduct board and make a statement concerning the charge, (2) the conduct
board issued a sufficient statement of its findings, and (3) the conduct board issued
a written reason for its decision and for the sanctions which were imposed.
Mr. Story’s first claim is that he was denied a fair hearing because the
hearing officer was not impartial. Wolff does require impartial decision makers at
disciplinary hearings. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. The hearing officer here, however, had
no disqualifying personal involvement in or knowledge of Mr. Story’s possession of
the electronic devices. See Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1112-13 (7th Cir.
1983). Mr. Story’s assertion that the hearing officer’s decision was influenced by
another officer rests only on Mr. Story’s speculation. As to the sufficiency of the
evidence, the contraband was clearly described and it was found in Mr. Story’s
locked property box. A[O]nly evidence that was presented to the Adjustment

Committee is relevant to this analysis.@ Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346 (7th
Cir. 1992); see also Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 ("The Federal Constitution does not require
evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the
disciplinary board.").
Mr. Story’s final claim is that his limited right to produce documentary
evidence was violated. He had requested offenders Michael Staton and Ramon
Bowen as witnesses. Statements were obtained from both offenders and considered
by the hearing officer in making her decision.
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary
action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in
the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the
proceeding which entitles Mr. Story to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, Mr. Story’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED and the action dismissed.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

03/19/2013
Date: __________________

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Jimmy Story, II
No. 192388
Plainfield Correctional Facility
Inmate Mail/Parcels
727 Moon Road
Plainfield, IN 46168
Electronically Registered Counsel