VALDEZ v. SCROGGINS et al
ORDER - denying 119 Motion *** SEE ORDER ***. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 8/19/2013. Copy Mailed. (CKM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
MICHAEL SCROGGINS, et al.,
Entry Discussing Post-Judgment Motion for Relief
A litigant subject to an adverse judgment, and who seeks reconsideration by the
district court of that adverse judgment, may “file either a motion to alter or amend the
judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or a motion seeking relief from the judgment
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).” Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th
Cir. 1991). “[W]hether a motion filed within  days of the entry of judgment should be
analyzed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on the substance of the motion, not
on the timing or label affixed to it.” Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir.
2008) (emphasis in original) (citing Borrero v. City of Chicago, 456 F.3d 698, 701–02
(7th Cir. 2006) (clarifying that “the former approach-that, no matter what their
substance, all post-judgment motions filed within  days of judgment would be
construed as Rule 59(e) motions no longer applies”)).
Given the timing of the post-judgment request just referenced relative to the entry
of final judgment, and given the argument set forth in such request, the request seeks
relief within the scope of Rule 59(e) and is thus treated as such a motion.
Rule 59(e) allows a party to move the court for reconsideration of a judgment
within 28 days following the entry of the judgment. Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489
U.S. 169, 174 (1989), explains that Rule 59(e) encompasses reconsideration of matters
decided on the merits and should be used only “to correct manifest errors of law or fact
or to present newly discovered evidence.” Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827
F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F.Supp.
656 (N.D.Ill. 1982), aff'd 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984)). “A ‘manifest error’ is not
demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the ‘wholesale disregard,
misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.’” Oto v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F.Supp.
1063, 1069 (N.D.Ill. 1997)). Apart from manifest errors of law, “reconsideration is not for
rehashing previously rejected arguments.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI
Industries, Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996).
The plaintiff does not offer newly discovered evidence. There was in this case no
manifest error of law or fact. The court did not misapprehend the plaintiff’s claims or the
nature of his challenge, nor did the court misapply the law to those claims. Accordingly,
the post-judgment motion to reconsider, etc., treated as a motion to alter or amend
judgment [Dkt 119], is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Delaware County Jail
100 West Washington Street
Muncie, IN 47305
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