JONES v. STATE OF INDIANA et al
Filing
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ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS - The motion by the State of Indiana, the Madison County Circuit Court IV-D, and Rodney J. Cummings is GRANTED. The Madison County Sheriff's Department's motion is likewise GRANTED. However, the dismissal of Mr. Jones's claims against the Sheriff's Department is without prejudice. This means that Mr. Jones may amend his complaint to make the necessary factual allegations in support of his alleged incompetency, if the fac ts do indeed support them. If Mr. Jones is aware of detailed facts tending to show his incompetency during the relevant time period, he may be granted leave to amend his complaint to add those facts. Leave shall be granted for this limited purpose only. If Mr. Jones wishes to seek leave to file amended allegations regarding his incompetency, he shall file the appropriate motion by Wednesday, April 10, 2013. If Mr. Jones seeks leave, he shall include with his motion for leave a copy of his proposed amended complaint.1 If no such motion is filed by that date, the Court will enter final judgment dismissing Mr. Jones's claims with prejudice. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 3/20/2013. Copy Mailed. (JD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
CLIFTON-JEREL: JONES,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF INDIANA,
in c/o Office of the Governor, et al.,
Defendants.
Cause No. 1:12-cv-1501-WTL-MJD
ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This cause comes before the Court on the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Defendants the
State of Indiana, the Madison County Circuit Court IV-D, and Rodney J. Cummings move to
dismiss on various grounds. Dkt. No. 13. That motion is fully briefed, and the Court rules as
follows.
Defendant Madison County Sheriff’s Department has moved separately to dismiss. Dkt.
No. 15. Plaintiff Clifton-Jerel: Jones has not responded, and the time for doing so has now
passed. Accordingly, the motion is ripe for ruling.
I.
STANDARD
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court takes the facts alleged in
the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. The complaint
must contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and there is no need for detailed factual allegations. However, the
statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests” and the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
II.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Clifton-Jerel: Jones brings the instant action alleging numerous violations of his
federal and state constitutional rights. In doing so, he invokes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and
1986. The facts as alleged in the Complaint are as follow.
Mr. Jones asserts a number of claims against the Madison County Circuit Court IV-D.
Specifically, he maintains that the Court entered his being into a contract when he was sixteen
that effectively obligated him to pay child support and go to jail if he could not make the
payments. Further, the Court did not inform him of the federal funding incentives the State of
Indiana was set to receive once it established parentage and child support. He contends the Court
violated the law of contracts by not fully disclosing what was required of him and that he was
under the age of capacity. Additionally, Jones contends that the Court twice incarcerated him for
contempt of court but that the Court was not authorized by the Indiana Code to arrest him for
contempt and that it issued multiple warrants for his arrest but was not authorized to do so.
Furthermore, Mr. Jones contacted the Court and the State of Indiana to have his paternity petition
removed from the court so that he would “be left to handle [his] own affairs how [he wills]
without any further interference from the State of Indiana or Madison County,” but neither
responded to him. Rather, he alleges that the Court improperly changed his designation from
petitioner to respondent.
Mr. Jones also seeks redress from the State of Indiana, alleging that, after he brought the
aforementioned events to the attention of the Governor, the State neither responded nor remedied
the situation. Similarly, Mr. Jones seeks redress from child support prosecuting attorney Rodney
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Cummings, who Mr. Jones alleges committed obstruction of justice, perjury, and official
misconduct.
Mr. Jones also asserts claims against the Madison County Sheriff’s Department. While
incarcerated on an unrelated issue in February 2008, Mr. Jones attempted to perform his dawn
prayer as a Muslim. Officers of the Madison County Sheriff’s Department are alleged to have
hindered and then violently interrupted Mr. Jones’s prayer.
In total, Mr. Jones seeks $32.9 million in damages, to be allocated among the Defendants
according to their culpability. He separately seeks $150,000 from Mr. Cummings. Mr. Jones also
seeks dismissal with prejudice of his paternity petition from Madison County Circuit Court.
III.
DISCUSSION
In the view of the Defendants, Mr. Jones seeks to attack the establishment of paternity
and related child support orders. Mr. Jones has clarified that he does not seek to relitigate
paternity, Jones’ Resp. at § D, No. 19, although he does seek the dismissal of his petition and all
child support petitions and orders. As the Defendants point out, it is rarely appropriate for this
Court to intervene in state court proceedings, see, e.g., Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 645-47 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine), much less
vacate state court orders. It is likewise inappropriate here.
Mr. Jones also seeks monetary redress for improper acts that occurred during the
proceedings but are independent of its result. The Court turns to those claims now.
A. State of Indiana and Madison County Circuit Court IV-D
Mr. Jones seeks redress from the Circuit Court for its complicity in the paternity
proceedings, the issuance of arrest warrants, and the incarceration of Mr. Jones for contempt. He
asserts claims against the State of Indiana for the same reasons, as well as for failing to redress
the alleged violations after they occurred.
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To the extent that these actions may constitute violations of federal constitutional law,
neither the State nor the Circuit Court are “persons” within the meaning of §§ 1983, 1985, and
1986. E.g., Johnson v. Supreme Court of Illinois, 165 F.3d 1140, 1141 (7th Cir. 1999); Thomas v.
Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2012). Furthermore, Mr. Jones has not pointed to any
other federal claim against the State or the Court that is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
See Thomas, 697 F.3d at 613. Any federal claim against these defendants therefore does not lie.
B.
Madison County Prosecutor
Mr. Jones also seeks relief from Rodney Cummings, the prosecuting attorney of the Child
Support Division of the Circuit Court. A prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from suit for all
actions and decisions undertaken in furtherance of his prosecutorial duties and qualified
immunity for actions taken in an investigatory role, such as searching for clues and collaboration
in order to recommend that a suspect be arrested. E.g., Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 510 (7th
Cir. 2012).
Here, Mr. Jones complains of Cummings’ “illegal actions” – obstructing justice, perjury,
and official misconduct. Am. Compl. at Claim XI, No. 5. As best the Court can tell, these claims
relate to an affidavit prepared by Mr. Cummings and filed in the paternity action in Madison
County Court. Mr. Cummings is alleged to have suborned perjury insofar as he drafted an
affidavit in which the mother of Mr. Jones’s daughter attests that she is the petitioner in the
paternity and child support action. Mr. Jones asserts that he is the petitioner; his daughter’s
mother is the respondent. However, to the extent that the Prosecutor is alleged to have violated
Mr. Jones’s federal rights in doing so, the Prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit.
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C.
Madison County Sheriff’s Department
Mr. Jones also asserts claims against the Madison County Sheriff’s Department for its
officers’ interference with his dawn prayer while incarcerated on February 14-15, 2008. These
claims are time-barred by the statute of limitations.
The applicable statute of limitations for a matter brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985 in Indiana is two years, while the statute of limitations for a matter brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1986 is one year. Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, Ind., 415 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th
Cir. 2005); Campbell v. Chappelow, 95 F.3d 576, 580 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996) (two-year, not fiveyear, statute of limitations under state law applies to § 1983 claims against public officer); 42
U.S.C. § 1986. A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of
action” as governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). In other words, the claim accrues when the plaintiff
can file suit and obtain relief. Id. It would appear that Mr. Jones could file suit and obtain relief
immediately after the incident occur. However, Mr. Jones argues in response that he was
incompetent “until recently,” but he points to no supporting facts to render such a tolling factor
plausible. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Jones’s claim accrued in February 2008 and the
applicable limitations period lapsed in February 2009 and February 2010 respectively. Mr. Jones
did not file the instant action until October 16, 2012; accordingly, the §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986
claims asserted by Mr. Jones against the Sheriff’s Department are time-barred. After independent
review, the Court can read no other federal claims against the Sheriff from Mr. Jones’ Amended
Complaint. Accordingly, the Sheriff is entitled to dismissal of the federal claims against it.
D. State Law Claims
The Plaintiff also asserts claims against the State, the Court, the Prosecutor, and the
Sheriff’s Department for violation of state law. The Court’s jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s
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remaining state law claims is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which provides for the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over claims based on state law that are closely related to the federal
claims in a case. However, “[w]hen the federal claim in a case drops out before trial, the
presumption is that the district judge will relinquish jurisdiction over any supplemental claim to
the state courts.” Leister v. Dovetail, Inc., 546 F.3d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 2008). There are
exceptions to that general rule, and the court should decide the merits of a supplemental state
claim when (1) the statute of limitations has run, precluding the filing of a separate suit in state
court; (2) substantial judicial resources have already been committed, so that sending the case to
another court will cause a substantial duplication of effort; or (3) when it is “absolutely clear”
how the state claims should be decided. Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.
2008). None of those exceptions apply here. To the extent statute of limitations problems
already exist, they would not be exacerbated by the refiling of the Plaintiff’s claims in state
court; none of this Court’s resources have been expended on the state law claims; and the parties
have not briefed the state law claims sufficient to render their resolution so obvious as to
overcome the presumption that remand is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
E.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion by the State of Indiana, the Madison County
Circuit Court IV-D, and Rodney J. Cummings is GRANTED.
The Madison County Sheriff’s Department’s motion is likewise GRANTED. However,
the dismissal of Mr. Jones’s claims against the Sheriff’s Department is without prejudice. This
means that Mr. Jones may amend his complaint to make the necessary factual allegations in
support of his alleged incompetency, if the facts do indeed support them. See Foster v. DeLuca,
545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008) (district courts routinely do not terminate a case at the same
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time that they grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss; rather, they generally dismiss the plaintiff's
complaint without prejudice and give the plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend complaint);
Barry Aviation, Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Mun. Airport Comm’n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004)
(better practice is to allow at least one amendment regardless of how unpromising the initial
pleading appears). If Mr. Jones is aware of detailed facts tending to show his incompetency
during the relevant time period, he may be granted leave to amend his complaint to add those
facts. Leave shall be granted for this limited purpose only.
If Mr. Jones wishes to seek leave to file amended allegations regarding his incompetency,
he shall file the appropriate motion by Wednesday, April 10, 2013. If Mr. Jones seeks leave, he
shall include with his motion for leave a copy of his proposed amended complaint.1 If no such
motion is filed by that date, the Court will enter final judgment dismissing Mr. Jones’s claims
with prejudice.2
SO ORDERED:
03/20/2013
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Copies to all counsel of record via electronic notification.
Copy by United States mail to:
Mr. Clifton-Jerel: Jones
2431 Sheffield Ave.
Anderson, IN 46011
1
In the event that Mr. Jones seeks leave to amend his allegations of incompetency and
thereafter withstands response by the Defendants, the Defendants may move to renew their
motions to dismiss regarding the state law claims.
2
In light of the Court’s ruling, the pending motion to stay, as well as the Plaintiff’s
motions for summary judgment, are DENIED AS MOOT.
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