WARREN v. ASTRUE

Filing 29

ORDER on Review of Final Decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. The Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this order. (S.O). Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 3/24/2014.(MAC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
KATHLEEN A. WARREN,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

ORDER
Kathleen A. Warren seeks judicial review of a final decision by the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social
Security Act.
As addressed in this Order, the court finds that the Commissioner’s decision
must be REVERSED and REMANDED.
Administrative Proceedings
Ms. Warren applied for DIB on January 23, 2006, and alleged that her
disability began on February 1, 2005, due to “fibromyalgia, high cholesterol,
depression, and anxiety.” (R. 150, 179). She was last insured for DIB on December
31, 2010, and must have become disabled by that date to be eligible for benefits.
Her application was denied initially and after reconsideration, and an
administrative hearing was held on February 4, 2009, before Administrative Law

Judge James R. Norris. He issued a decision that Ms. Warren was not disabled
because she could perform her past relevant work (R. 89-105), but the Appeals
Council remanded and directed the ALJ to consider several issues that were not
addressed or were insufficiently explained in his decision. (R. 66-68). ALJ Norris
conducted a second hearing on April 19, 2011, at which Ms. Warren, two medical
experts, and a vocational expert testified. On August 12, 2011, the ALJ issued his
decision finding that Ms. Warren was not disabled as of her date last insured
because there were a significant number of jobs available consistent with her
functional capacity. The Appeals Council denied Ms. Warren’s request for review on
October 9, 2012, making the ALJ’s August 12, 2011 disability determination the
final decision of the Commissioner. O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618
(7th Cir. 2010). Ms. Warren timely filed this action for judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision.
Applicable Standards
To be eligible for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant
must prove she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). There must be medical
evidence of an impairment that results “from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical

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and laboratory diagnostic techniques,” and disability may not be adjudged only by a
claimant’s description of her symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.
The Social Security Administration has prescribed a “five-step sequential
evaluation process” for determining disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The first
step inquires whether the claimant is engaged in substantially gainful activity. If
she is not, the second step inquires whether the claimant suffers from any severe
impairment, which is an impairment that “significantly limits [a claimant’s]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If
there is at least one severe impairment, then step three compares the claimant’s
impairments, singly or in combination, to medical conditions included in the Listing
of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which are defined by
criteria that the Administration has pre-determined are disabling. If the claimant’s
impairments meet or medically equal in severity the requirements of a listing, then
the claimant is deemed disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
If the claimant’s impairments do not satisfy a listing, then her residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) is determined for purposes of steps four and five. RFC
is a claimant’s ability to do work on a regular and continuing basis despite her
impairment-related physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. At the
fourth step, if the claimant has the RFC to perform her past relevant work, then she
is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If she cannot perform her past work, the
analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, at which the claimant’s age, work
experience, education, and RFC are evaluated to determine whether she is capable

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of performing any other work available in the relevant economy. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(g). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, and
at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v.
Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 2005).
The task a court faces in a case like this is not to attempt a de novo
determination of the plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits, but to decide if the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise free
of legal error. Kendrick v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 455, 458 (7th Cir. 1993). “Substantial
evidence” has been defined as “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
The ALJ’s Findings
Ms. Warren was born in 1957 and was 53 years old as of her last insured date
of December 31, 2010. In 1979, she earned degrees in Journalism and Business
Administration from Butler University.
At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms.
Warren had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date
of February 1, 2005. Her part-time work at a department store from February 28,
2005, through July 8, 2005, had been classified by the SSA as an unsuccessful work
attempt, and the ALJ found no evidentiary basis to disturb that conclusion. At step
two, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Warren suffered from severe impairments of

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fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, and dependent personality disorder, but that
none of them, alone or in combination, met or medically equaled any of the medical
conditions set forth in the Listing of Impairments.
Next, the ALJ made an RFC determination and concluded that Ms. Warren
had the capacity to perform a modified range of light work with restrictions to
accommodate her mental impairments. The ALJ determined that Ms. Warren had
the mental capacity to understand, remember, and follow simple instructions and,
in the context of performing simple and repetitive tasks, that she could sustain the
attention and concentration necessary to carry out tasks with reasonable pace and
persistence. He found that she could not work if greater than average production
rates were imposed and could tolerate only incidental contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.
With this RFC, the ALJ found that Ms. Warren could not perform her past
relevant work as a bank branch manager, and he moved to step five to determine
whether, based on Ms. Warren’s vocational profile and her RFC, work existed in
sufficient numbers in the relevant economy that she is capable of performing.
Based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Ms. Warren’s
capabilities fit the demands of unskilled, light jobs of cleaner, inspector, and hand
packager, positions that are available in significant numbers in Indiana.
Accordingly, the ALJ found at step five that Ms. Warren was not disabled at any
time between her alleged onset date and her last insured date of December 31,
2010.

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Analysis
Ms. Warren contends that the ALJ’s decision must be reversed and remanded
on the grounds that the ALJ’s RFC determination erroneously failed to reflect (a)
the opinions of three of Ms. Warren’s treating physicians and (b) an opinion of Dr.
Manders, who provided expert medical testimony at the hearing. She further
asserts that, even if the ALJ’s decision to exclude from his RFC certain functional
limitations is supported by substantial evidence, the step five decision cannot stand.
This is so, she argues, because the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational
expert did not account for all of the functional limitations that the ALJ did find
were supported by the record and were included in his assessment of Ms. Warren’s
RFC.
We first address the opinions of the treating physicians and Dr. Manders,
and then address whether the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert
took proper account of all functional limitations the ALJ had determined for Ms.
Warren’s RFC.
I.

The opinions of Ms. Warren’s treating physicians

A. The opinions of Drs. Smith and Lewis
Dr. Jaclyn Smith and Dr. Hayley Lewis treated Ms. Warren for her
fibromyalgia symptoms. Dr. Smith had seen Ms. Warren approximately every three
months since July 2005 and completed a residual functional capacity questionnaire
dated June 16, 2006. (R. 225-229). Dr. Lewis, an osteopathic physician, began to
see Ms. Warren in August 2007 and continued thereafter about every two or three
months. She completed a residual functional capacity questionnaire dated April 22,
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2008. (R. 451-455). Dr. Smith opined that Ms. Warren’s pain and other symptoms
from fibromyalgia would interfere on a frequent basis with Ms. Warren’s ability to
sustain attention and concentration and that she was incapable of performing even
“low stress” jobs. Dr. Smith also opined that Ms. Warren’s abilities to sit, stand,
and walk were extraordinarily limited, lasting no more than a total of two hours in
combination during an 8-hour work day. She would need to take one-hour rest
breaks during the day to lie down, and if she engaged in prolonged sitting, she
would need to elevate her legs above the level of her heart for 30-35 minutes during
an 8-hour work day. She could not engage in work requiring grasping, twisting,
and turning of objects with her hands, or requiring fine manipulations of her
fingers, or reaching her arms overhead. Dr. Smith also stated that Ms. Warren
would likely miss work more than four days per month. Finally, Dr. Smith stated
that all of these functional limitations had existed since September 2001. (R. 229).
Dr. Lewis’s opinion regarding Ms. Warren’s functional abilities, dated April
2008, was materially identical to Dr. Smith’s opinion, and she also stated that all of
these limitations had existed since September 2001. (R. 451-455). Dr. Lewis
recorded her opinions using the same form of questionnaire that Dr. Smith had
used, which had been supplied by Ms. Warren’s lawyer.
B. The opinions of Dr. Nurnberger
Dr. Nurnberger, a psychiatrist with whom Ms. Warren began treatment on
June 20, 2006, completed two “Mental Impairment” questionnaires in which he
provided his opinions regarding functional limitations stemming from Ms. Warren’s

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mental impairments. The first questionnaire is dated July 13, 2006 (R. 397-402),
and the second is dated August 18, 2010 (R. 482-487). The section of the
questionnaires regarding functional limitations is a check-the-box format. Dr.
Nurnberger’s two opinions, completed four years apart, are materially identical.
Among other things, he checked the boxes that Ms. Warren is unable to (a)
maintain regular attendance at a job, (b) perform work at a consistent pace without
an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, or (c) deal with normal work
stress. (See R. 399, 484).
C. The Treating Physician Rule
A medical opinion by a treating physician about the nature and severity of a
claimant’s impairments, including any resulting mental or physical restrictions, is
entitled to “controlling weight” if it is well-supported by objective medical evidence
and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2);
Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]reating physician’s opinion is
entitled to controlling weight only if it is not inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in the record.”) If a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to
controlling weight, it still must be evaluated using the same factors relevant to
weighing other medical opinions. That is, the ALJ must decide the weight to accord
it based on the degree to which the medical opinion (a) is supported by relevant
evidence and explanations; (b) considered all evidence pertinent to the claimant’s
claim: (c) is consistent with the record as a whole; and (d) is supported or
contradicted by any other factors. Id. § 404.1527(c)(3)-(6). The physician’s field of

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specialty and the nature and extent of her treatment relationship with the claimant
are also considered. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii).
1. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Opinions of Drs. Smith and Lewis
The ALJ rejected the opinions of Drs. Smith and Lewis primarily on the
grounds that Ms. Warren had worked at a full-time job until January 2005, that she
had lost her job “for excessive absences that were unrelated to her medical
problems,” and that there was nothing in the record to show that her medical
problems worsened severely after she lost her job. (R. 35). The ALJ noted that the
record evidence of pain and fatigue, the effects of which were the bases for the
highly restrictive physical limitations provided by Drs. Smith and Lewis, showed
that Ms. Warren’s signs of fatigue and pain improved over time. (Ms. Warren had
reported modest levels of pain to the consultative psychologist and also to a
rheumatologist who had examined her in 2010.)1 The ALJ also noted that Ms.
Warren’s pain and fatigue symptoms had responded favorably to medication and to
physical exercise that her doctors advised her to do, and that her delay in seeking

Ms. Warren argues that the ALJ’s use of the word “sign” to describe pain and
fatigue, as opposed to the word “symptom” means that the ALJ had improperly
required Ms. Warren to show “objective” proof of pain and fatigue. She also argues
that the ALJ’s comment about two treatment records from Dr. Lewis—one stating
that Ms. Warren did not seem ill or in distress, and another noting normal range of
motion and essentially normal neurological findings—indicate that the ALJ gave
short shrift to her symptoms from fibromyalgia because these matters are not
indicia of fibromyalgia. The court disagrees with these points. There is no
indication that the ALJ rejected Ms. Warren’s complaints of pain and fatigue on the
basis that objective tests did not measure pain and fatigue. The ALJ’s opinion
reflects a detailed review of Ms. Warren’s fibromyalgia treatment and his
evaluation of Ms. Warren’s symptoms from fibromyalgia—her reports of pain and
fatigue—in light of the overall evidence in the record.
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treatment from a specialist in rheumatology severely undermined the credibility of
her complaints of severe pain and fatigue. (R. 30). There is record support for these
observations by the ALJ.
For example, as of September 2005, Dr. Smith reported that Ms. Warren’s
fibromyalgia had significantly improved. That improvement, the ALJ found,
coincided with Ms. Warren’s therapeutic exercise regimen. In January 2006, when
she reported increased pain, Ms. Warren also stated that she had stopped
exercising. (R. 30). The ALJ cited similar evidence indicating that Ms. Warren’s
pain and fatigue were ameliorated by medication and that when she failed to fulfill
her prescriptions, she reported worsening symptoms. (R. 30).
The evidence relating to Ms. Warren’s failure for nearly one year to make an
appointment with a specialist in rheumatology also convinced the ALJ that Ms.
Warren did not suffer from the level of severe pain and fatigue on which Dr. Smith’s
and Dr. Lewis’s opinions were based. In October 2009, Ms. Warren was referred to
a rheumatologist, yet she did not finally see a rheumatologist until September 2010,
nearly a year later. Ms. Warren stated that she had forgotten to make an
appointment, which the ALJ found “remarkable” given the severity of symptoms
Ms. Warren was reporting—needing to spend almost all day in bed and
experiencing pain symptoms of 9 on a 1-10 scale. (R. 30. The ALJ also pointed out
that the rheumatologist “did not report any significant pain behavior, or substantial
signs of fatigue” and had recommended follow-up care in six weeks, yet Ms. Warren
did not follow that recommendation either. (R. 31).

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These are sufficient grounds supporting the ALJ’s decision to reject the
extraordinarily limited functional capacity restrictions provided by Drs. Smith and
Lewis.
2. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Dr. Nurnberger’s Opinion
The ALJ determined that Dr. Nurnberger’s assessment of Ms. Warren’s
mental impairments “are eminently refuted by a greater portion of the clinical
record, including the modest clinical findings reported on separate exams, as well as
the claimant’s favorable response to medication treatment.” In Dr. Nurnberger’s
view, Ms. Warren could not work because of her major depressive disorder and
generalized anxiety disorder. He reached his opinion in July 2006, about one month
after his first examination of Ms. Warren, and his opinion regarding Ms. Warren’s
functioning remained the same as of August 2010, when Dr. Nurnberger completed
a second questionnaire regarding Ms. Warren’s functional capacity.
Ms. Warren contends that the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Nurnberger’s opinion
was wrong because Dr. Nurnberger’s treatment records describe some symptoms
that are supportive of Dr. Nurnberger’s functional restrictions and because the
ALJ’s RFC should have reflected “at least some of Dr. Nurnberger’s more restrictive
opinions.” (Dkt. 17 at pp. 18-19). This argument is insufficient to undermine the
ALJ’s synthesis of the entire record in deciding to reject Dr. Nurnberger’s views.
The ALJ was permitted to view Dr. Nurnberger’s opinion in light of (1) the entire
clinical record, (2) Ms. Warren’s favorable response to medication, (3) a physician’s
report that Ms. Warren’s medication regimen as of August 2006 was of such efficacy

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that psychologically she “was almost symptom-free” (R. 32), (4) the evidence of Ms.
Warren’s adaptive functioning (her ability to “sustain ordinary household tasks,” to
do part-time work videotaping educational sessions, and to enjoy reading and
watching television), and (5) her performance at mental status examinations that
did not show substantial deficits in attention, memory, or concentration.
Because the ALJ gave sufficient reasons supported by the evidence for
rejecting Dr. Nurnberger’s opinion regarding Ms. Warren’s mental impairments and
their restrictions on her functioning, we cannot find that the ALJ erred in his
evaluation.
II.

The ALJ’s Evaluation of Dr. Manders’s Opinion

Dr. Manders testified as a medical expert at the administrative hearing. He
testified about controversy within the medical community over whether
fibromyalgia should be evaluated as a “legitimate medical condition,” and indicated
his agreement that the malady is not a specific medical impairment. The ALJ
rejected Dr. Manders’s view and decided that although fibromyalgia may be difficult
to diagnose, the medical community has accepted certain diagnostic tools to
determine whether a person suffers from fibromyalgia, and the ALJ accepted that
fibromyalgia was “generally indicated in the claimant’s medical file.” (R. 29). The
ALJ’s opinion includes little else about Dr. Manders’s testimony except to report
that Dr. Manders agreed that Ms. Warren’s subjective pain complaints “appeared
complicated by her psychological problems.” (R. 28).

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Ms. Warren contends that the ALJ erred by not expressly evaluating
comments made by Dr. Manders regarding her functional capacity. In response to
the ALJ’s question whether Dr. Manders, based on the record, would “put any
limitations” on Ms. Warren, Dr. Manders answered no, but then said Ms. Warren
“should have a job [in] which she can stand, sit, move about, when that gets
tiresome, do something else.” (R. 730). He also said in conjunction with discussing
whether any listing was met, that “[t]here’s nothing there [in the record] except,
from a functional standpoint, she’s going to miss a lot of time from work because of
her complaints. And that I verify, but I can’t put a – I can’t put a diagnosis on it. I
mean, she’s diagnosed with fibromyalgia, but there’s nothing here.” (R. 733).
We agree with the Commissioner that Dr. Manders’s stray comments are not
a definitive opinion regarding Ms. Warren’s functional abilities stemming from any
impairment identified by him. There is nothing in his comments to translate into a
determination about how much Ms. Warren should stand, or sit, or move about, or
what he meant by missing a lot of time from work. The latter comment, in context,
appears only to repeat a statement provided by Drs. Smith and Lewis, rather than
to endorse it. As Ms. Warren concedes, the ALJ had good grounds for rejecting Dr.
Manders’s overall assessment of her medical impairments; indeed, she contends
that it would have been legal error if the ALJ had not rejected Dr. Manders’s views
of fibromyalgia. Because of the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Manders’s medical
assessment of Ms. Warren’s medical impairment and because his comments on

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functioning are equivocal and imprecise at best, we do not find error in the ALJ’s
failure to address those comments in his decision.
III.

The ALJ’s RFC and Hypothetical to the Vocational Expert

Ms. Warren’s final assertion of error focuses on the ALJ’s RFC, and concerns
whether the ALJ included within his hypothetical question to the vocational expert
all of the functional restrictions he found were supported by the record. She also
contends that her difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace were not
adequately explained to the VE.
The ALJ’s RFC, as expressed in his written decision, states that Ms. Warren
is capable of light-level exertion work and describes Ms. Warren’s mental
functioning capacity as follows:
She . . . retains the mental capacity to understand, remember,
and follow simple instructions. Within these parameters, and in the
context of performing simple and repetitive tasks, she [is] able to
sustain the attention and concentration necessary to carry out worklike tasks with reasonable pace and persistence. She would not be able
to tolerate work requiring greater than average production rates,
however. She further is able to do work that permits incidental
contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the general public.
(R. 37). At the hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert about jobs available to
a person capable of light-level exertion work “with the further limitations of
restricted to incidental contact with the general public, co-workers, and supervisors;
performance of simple, repetitive tasks, and no assembly line or greater than
production rate work. I would also include fast food.” (R. 756-57).
The issue before the court is whether the ALJ’s RFC as described in his
decision was captured within his hypothetical question to the expert. Ms. Warren
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contends that the ALJ’s decision reflects greater restrictions than the ALJ told the
vocational expert to consider.
When, at step five, an ALJ relies on the testimony of a vocational expert
regarding jobs that fit particular functional abilities, the claimant must of course
actually have that functional capacity. E.g., Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 813 (7th
Cir. 2011) (“We have stated repeatedly that ALJs must provide vocational experts
with a complete picture of a claimant’s residual functional capacity. . . .”). There
must be some assurance that the VE’s testimony regarding available jobs took into
account all functional limitations stemming from physical or mental impairments
the ALJ has found. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2002).
Ms. Warren contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical question did not include the
following limitations expressed in his opinion: (1) inability to tolerate greater than
average production rates; (2) ability to work only at reasonable pace and
persistence; and (3) restriction to simple instructions jobs. We find that Ms. Warren
has shown that the ALJ’s limitation in his RFC to “simple instructions” was not
properly communicated to the VE in the hypothetical.2

The Commissioner suggests that Ms. Warren’s lawyer should have alerted
the ALJ at the hearing that he had not included all functional limitations in his
hypothetical question to the vocational expert. This argument is nonsensical. It is
not possible for a claimant to foresee an ALJ’s determination of her RFC. That
determination is made by the ALJ in his written decision, after taking into account
the entire administrative record and testimony by the claimant and any medical
experts or other witnesses at the hearing. Because an ALJ has not yet formulated a
definitive RFC by the time of the hearing, he or she generally poses to the
vocational expert a variety of hypothetical questions, expressing different ranges of
functioning. Once the ALJ makes an RFC determination after the hearing, he may
rely on vocational expert opinion about jobs availability that was elicited at the
2

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As Ms. Warren points out, the vocational expert interpreted the ALJ’s
hypothetical question as restricting Ms. Warren to “unskilled” work. Some
unskilled work, however, requires more than the ability to understand, remember,
and follow “simple instructions.” Two of the three jobs about which the VE testified
and on which the ALJ relied in determining that significant jobs existed that Ms.
Warren could perform require a reasoning level above “simple one- or two-step
instructions.” Unskilled work that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles describes
as Reasoning Level 1 work is that which requires “understanding to carry out
simple one- or two-step instructions.” See Ms. Warren’s Reply Brief, Dkt. 25 at pp.
6-7. But the VE included jobs that require Reasoning Level 2, a level described as
requiring the ability to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed
but uninvolved written or oral instructions. . . .” See id. (emphasis added; citing
Dictionary of Occupational Titles). The Commissioner has not explained how
Reasoning Level 2 jobs are consistent with the RFC, and it was her burden to show
that the ALJ’s step five decision is supported by substantial evidence. Because it
appears that the VE included jobs that, according to Ms. Warren’s RFC, she may
not be capable of performing, we must remand.
On remand, the ALJ should ensure that all of his restrictions are accurately
captured in his hypothetical to the expert. Ms. Warren has pointed out other ways
in which the ALJ’s hypothetical question does not line up perfectly with the
restrictions described in his RFC. The ALJ’s instruction to the VE to exclude
hearing so long as at least one hypothetical included the limitations the ALJ
eventually determined were appropriate for the claimant.
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assembly line jobs or “greater than production rate work” likely captures his opinion
that Ms. Warren is capable of “reasonable pace and persistence” but cannot tolerate
work greater than “average” production rates. But on remand the ALJ should make
clear that he is excluding assembly line jobs and any other jobs that require a
production rate higher than “average.”
Ms. Warren’s other complaint about the ALJ’s RFC—that his restriction to
“simple, repetitive work” did not adequately account for Ms. Warren’s moderate
limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace—should also be addressed on
remand. The ALJ should ensure that the vocational expert is aware of all of the
restrictions he found were appropriate: that Ms. Warren is limited to simple and
repetitive work, is limited to understanding, remembering, and following simple
instructions, and is limited to work that requires no greater than average
production rates and only reasonable pace and persistence. The ALJ’s decision
indicates that all of these limitations were necessary facets of the RFC to
accommodate Ms. Warren’s particular moderate difficulties in concentration,
persistence, and pace. See O’Connor v. Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614 (7th Cir.
2010) (there must be some indication that the VE’s expert opinion on jobs
availability accounted for the claimant’s particular deficiencies in concentration,
persistence, and pace).

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Conclusion
The Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for
proceedings consistent with this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
3/24/2014
Date: ___________________

_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email generated by the court’s ECF system

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