PERRON et al v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

Filing 95

ENTRY ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence to show that they are entitled to summary judgment on their RESPA claims, and have not presented sufficient questions of materi al fact to defeat Chase's motion for summary judgment on their RESPA and breach of good faith and fair dealing claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (Filing No. 59 ) is DENIED, and Chase's motion for summary judgment (Filing No. 61 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 5/8/2015. (MGG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
STEPHEN H. PERRON,
CHRISTINE M. JACKSON,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
TRUSTEE OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF INDIANA,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. Formally
known as Chase Home Finances, LLC,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 1:12-cv-01853-TWP-TAB

Defendant.
ENTRY ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by
Plaintiffs Stephen H. Perron (“Mr. Perron”) and the United States Bankruptcy Trustee, Southern
District of Indiana, on behalf of Christine M. Jackson (“Ms. Jackson”) (Filing No. 59). On January
1, 2013, Ms. Jackson filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection under Case No. 13-00743-JKC7A. Her claims are now being pursued by the United States Bankruptcy Trustee, Southern District
of Indiana. Before the Court also, is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) (Filing No. 61). Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint asserts
claims against Chase for alleged violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq., and for breach of good faith and fair dealing. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED, and Chase’s
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

1

I.

BACKGROUND

The following material facts are not in dispute and will be viewed in light most favorable
to the non-moving party as it relates to each motion.1 On or about May 2, 2003, Mr. Perron and
Ms. Jackson (collectively, the “Borrowers”), as a married couple, executed and delivered a
promissory note (“Note”) and mortgage (“Mortgage”) on their personal residence in Indianapolis,
Indiana. Chase began servicing the Note and Mortgage in 2005. As servicer, Chase agreed to
disburse escrow funds to pay Borrowers’ annual homeowners’ insurance premium. On or about
February 17, 2009, Chase forwarded payment to the Borrowers’ then current insurance provider,
Allstate, for the insurance premium from the Borrowers’ escrow account in the amount of
$1,422.00. Sometime in early March 2009, the Borrowers canceled their Allstate policy and
obtained homeowners’ insurance through Homesite Insurance (“Homesite”). A few week after
mailing the insurance payment to Allstate, Chase discovered that Borrowers had terminated their
Allstate policy in exchange for a new homeowner policy with Homesite. On or about March 4,
2009, Chase forwarded payment to Homesite for homeowners’ insurance premiums from the
Borrowers’ escrow account in the amount of $838.00. In a letter dated March 5, 2009, Chase
notified the Borrowers that two homeowners’ insurance premiums had been paid due to the change
in providers and any refund received by Chase from the canceled policy would be deposited into
the Borrowers’ escrow account. The letter further explained that if the premium refund was sent
to the Borrowers, it should be remitted to Chase so that the funds could be applied to their escrow
account to prevent an escrow shortage. The letter also notified Borrowers that if Chase did not

1

Plaintiffs did not provide a statement of material facts in dispute in their response to Chase’s motion for summary
judgment, as required by S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1(b). (“The response must include a section labeled ‘Statement of
Material Facts in Dispute’ that identifies potentially determinate facts and factual disputes . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), where a party fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact,
the Court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

2

receive the refund in its office by the time of their next escrow analysis, the monthly mortgage
payment amount would increase accordingly, and also provided an address to which to mail the
refunded premium amount to Chase. (Filing No. 63-3). Unbeknownst to Chase, Allstate had
already sent Borrowers a refund check dated March 2, 2009, for the entire $1,422.00. Despite
Chase’s request in the March 5, 2009 letter, Borrowers did not send Chase the refund to replenish
the escrow account, did not inform Chase of receipt of the insurance premium refund, and instead
deposited the $1,422.00 refund from Allstate into their National City Bank account on April 28,
2009.
On or about December 28, 2009, Chase sent Borrowers their Annual Escrow Disclosure
Statement (the “2009 Escrow Analysis”). The 2009 Escrow Analysis reflected both the $1,422.00
and the $838.00 insurance premiums paid in 2009, but only projected to pay an $838.00
homeowners’ insurance premium in 2010. Because the $1,422.00 refund paid to Borrowers from
Allstate was not returned to Chase to be deposited back into their escrow account, the 2009 Escrow
Analysis required an escrow shortage payment totaling $802.28 to be included with Borrowers’
payments effective February 1, 2010 to prevent the escrow account from dropping below the
reserve amount required by law. Borrowers were given the option to pay this amount in one lump
sum in December 2009, or to have it spread out over their 2010 monthly mortgage payments.
Because Borrowers did not pay the escrow shortage amount in a single lump sum, the escrow
shortage amount was spread into monthly installments of $66.86, making the monthly mortgage
payment required for 2010 $1,499.01. If the Borrowers had paid the shortage amount in one lump
sum of $802.28, their monthly mortgage payments for 2010, including principal, interest, taxes
and insurance would have been $1,432.15. Even though the 2009 Escrow Analysis stated that
Borrowers’ monthly mortgage payment for 2010 was $1,499.01, Borrowers only tendered

3

$1,469.20 for the period of February 2010 through November 2010, thus underpaying their
mortgage by $29.81 each month.
On or about December 27, 2010, Chase sent Borrowers their Annual Escrow Account
Disclosure Statement (“2010 Escrow Analysis”). The 2010 Escrow Analysis reflected that in
2010, Chase paid one homeowners’ insurance premium in the amount of $861.00, not the two
insurance premiums as Borrowers assumed. The 2010 Escrow Analysis also reflected that the
county taxes on the real estate were less than anticipated, and Chase was only required to pay
$1,306.94 for county tax despite projecting $1,724.96 as the amount that would be payable for
county taxes in 2010. As a result of the reduction in the county tax, and the Borrowers’ February
2010 through November 2010 payments, the 2010 Escrow Analysis reflected a surplus in the
escrow account of $250.05 and a projected monthly payment starting in February 2011 of
$1,399.23. On December 28, 2010, Borrowers received a check from Chase in the amount of
$250.05, representing the amount of their 2010 escrow surplus.
On or about December 3, 2010, as Borrowers attempted to modify their automatic
electronic bank transfer settings, they discovered that the amount of their 2010 scheduled mortgage
payments was $1,499.01, and the monthly mortgage payments for 2011 were scheduled to be
$1,399.23. Based upon the belief that the discrepancy in their monthly payment amount was due
to the double payments made to the Borrowers’ previous and current homeowners’ insurance
carriers, they called Chase customer service and made arrangements with a representative to make
a payment of $1,399.23 toward their December 2010 mortgage payment directly at a Chase branch,
because the online payment system would not accept an amount less than the $1,499.01, the
monthly payment amount for 2010. However, this payment was not applied toward the Borrowers’
mortgage, but instead was held in a “suspense account” and Chase coded their account as being in

4

default. On or about January 10, 2011, Borrowers received eight form letters from Chase notifying
them that their mortgage account was in default and that Chase intended to institute foreclosure
proceedings. After receiving these letters is when Borrowers discovered that their December 2010
payment had been placed into a suspense account and had not been credited toward their December
2010 payment obligation. Borrowers did not make any additional payments on their mortgage in
January 2011 or any time thereafter.
Borrowers sent Chase a letter they entitled a Qualified Written Request Letter (“QWR”)
on January 10, 2011, which accused Chase of improperly taking $1,422.00 from their escrow
account in February 2009 and demanded Chase return the $1,422.00 taken from the escrow
account, re-credit the account for all improper default fees, and report the account as current to the
credit bureaus. Borrowers did not recall that they had received the March 9, 2009 letter from
Chase explaining the double insurance premium disbursement due to the change in insurance
providers, nor did they recall receiving and depositing the check from Allstate in March 2009. On
January 27, 2011, Chase sent Borrowers correspondence acknowledging the receipt of the QWR
and informing them that Chase was investigating the issues contained therein. On February 25,
2011, Chase sent Borrowers a letter in response to their QWR, which included Borrowers’ loan
history and Annual Escrow Account Disclosure Statements from 2007 through 2010, containing a
line-item explanation of the double insurance premiums paid in 2009 and the resulting escrow
shortage in 2010. Borrowers sent another letter to Chase on April 27, 2011, entitled second QWR,
requesting the same information provided to them in the February 25, 2011 response from Chase,
as well as demanding payment in the amount of $330,000.00 for alleged damages. Chase did not
respond to this second QWR letter.

5

Borrowers began receiving phone calls from Chase’s collection department on or about
January 28, 2011. When Mr. Perron answered the phone and heard that the call was from Chase,
he hung up the phone. From February 2011 through the time the Borrowers’ phone number was
disconnected, Chase’s collection department automatically dialed the Borrowers’ phone at least
two times per day. Most of the time, Borrowers did not answer the phone. Ms. Jackson spoke
with a Chase representative on February 24, 2011, who attempted to convince Ms. Jackson to make
at least one mortgage payment to keep the account from foreclosure. Ms. Jackson refused to make
any additional payments because she believed their account was in error. Mr. Perron filed for
divorce in March 2012, and Ms. Jackson closed her law practice on July 2, 2013. Borrowers allege
that the stress resulting in their divorce and damage to their credit history were due to Chase’s
errors in servicing their mortgage account and failure to properly respond to their QWR.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is only appropriate by the terms of Rule 56 where there exists “no
genuine issue as to any material facts and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. This notion applies equally where, as here, opposing parties each
move for summary judgment in their favor pursuant to Rule 56. I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d
768, 774 (7th Cir. 1996). Indeed, the existence of cross-motions for summary judgment does not
necessarily mean that there are no genuine issues of material fact. R.J. Corman Derailment Serv.,
Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs., 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). Rather, the process of
taking the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, first for one side and then for the
other, may reveal that neither side has enough to prevail without a trial. Id. at 648. “With crossmotions, [the Court’s] review of the record requires that [the Court] construe all inferences in favor
of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made.” O’Regan v. Arbitration

6

Forums, Ins., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hendricks–Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154
F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 1998)).
III.

ANALYSIS

Borrowers allege that Chase breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
mishandling of their escrow account, and that it violated RESPA on ten separate occasions in its
failure to properly respond to their correspondence. Borrowers claim that these violations were
the proximate cause of damages they sustained, including the end of their marriage, loss of credit,
physical and emotional distress, loss of Ms. Jackson’s law practice, as well as statutory damages
for engaging in a “pattern or practice” of RESPA violations.
A. Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Borrowers make factual claims in support of their breach of good faith and fair dealing
claims that they either fail to support with objective evidence and/or which are contradicted by
undisputed evidence. Borrowers claim that the escrow “shortage” of $802.28 as of December 31,
2009, was caused by the incorrect projections for the 2010 insurance premium amount, and that
Chase’s automated annual escrow analysis program calculated the 2010 insurance obligation based
upon the sum of the premiums paid to Allstate and Homesite in 2009, which was $2,260.00.
Borrowers argue that this improper handling of their escrow account constituted a breach of good
faith and fair dealing. However, they have provided no evidence to support their theory that the
inclusion of two amounts for homeowners’ insurance for 2010 was the cause of the payment
discrepancies.
As was explained in the March 5, 2009 letter from Chase to Borrowers, as well as the 2009
Escrow Analysis, the escrow shortage was caused by Borrowers’ failure to send the refund of the
Allstate policy premium to Chase in order to replenish the escrow account. As a result, the $213.58

7

monthly escrow payments originally scheduled for 2010 would have been insufficient to keep the
escrow account above the required minimum, and would have resulted in a funding deficit of
$375.12 by April 2010. The $375.12 projected deficit, plus the $427.16 required reserve, equaled
the $802.28 escrow shortage amount. (Filing No. 65-6). The 2009 Escrow Analysis compared
the 2009 projections versus the actual payments made by Borrowers, including the two entries for
“Homeowner In[surance].” (Filing No. 65-6, at ECF p. 2). The 2009 Escrow Analysis also gave
Borrowers the option to pay the escrow shortage in one lump sum, and included a payment coupon
for $802.26. (Id.) In the “Computation of Your Escrow Account” section of the statement, Chase
notified Borrowers of their anticipated escrow balance, the target escrow balance, and the resulting
shortage “that will be collected over a period of 12 months or more” if they chose not to make a
lump-sum payment using the attached payment coupon. (Filing No. 65-6, at ECF p. 3). It also
explicitly stated “[y]our new monthly mortgage payment for the coming year will be $1,499.01 of
which $1,218.57 will be for principal and interest and $280.44 will go into your escrow account.”
(Id.) Borrowers provide no support for any other alternative reason or calculation for the
discrepancy between what they believed their payments should have been versus the amount stated
in their 2009 and 2010 Escrow Analyses, besides their unsupported affidavits based upon
“information and belief.” Because Borrowers do not dispute Chase’s factual assertions in their
response to Chase’s brief in support of summary judgment, the Court may accept Chase’s factual
explanation as undisputed, and finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that Chase caused an
error in the borrowers’ escrow account calculations, or that any discrepancies were caused by
Chase, not Borrowers.
Borrowers have not shown that Chase made any error in the computation of their monthly
mortgage payments, the escrow calculations or disbursements, or in the servicing of their loan.

8

Based upon the undisputed evidence presented by Chase, Borrowers had been informed in March
2009 that their failure to remit the Allstate insurance premium refund to Chase could result in a
potential escrow shortage, and that their payment amount would increase accordingly. (Filing No.
65-1, at ECF p. 2). The evidence shows that by the time Borrowers’ account was declared to be in
default, they had been underpaying the amount due on their Mortgage each month, based upon the
2009 Escrow Analysis, for almost an entire year.
Borrowers have also not presented any evidence, aside from their own unsupported
assertions, that Chase wrongfully placed their December 2010 payment in a suspense account
instead of applying it to their December payment obligation. Borrowers argue that they were
verbally authorized by a Chase phone representative to make a payment of only $1,399.23 for
December 2010 at a Chase branch, instead of the $1,499.01 payment scheduled to be made for
December 2010. At best, this is an oral modification of the mortgage agreement, which is not
enforceable under Indiana law. I.C. § 26-2-9-4(b)(1) (“A debtor may assert a claim or defense . .
. only if the credit agreement at issue . . . is in writing.”); see also Collins v. America’s Servicing
Co., 652 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[Debtor] cannot make a breach of contract claim based
on alleged oral modifications to loan agreements.”) (citing I.C. § 26-2-9-4(b)). The undisputed
evidence also shows that the agreement to accept $1,399.23 for December 2010 was based upon
incorrect information supplied by Borrowers to the Chase representative, not because of a mistake
made by Chase.
The Court concludes that there exists no reasonable basis upon which a jury could conclude
that Chase breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing either in the calculation of Borrowers’
monthly mortgage payments, nor in the placement of the Borrowers’ December 2010 payment into

9

a suspense account. Therefore, Chase’s motion for summary judgment on Borrowers’ breach of
good faith and fair dealing claim is GRANTED.
B. RESPA Claims
Congress enacted RESPA to regulate the real estate settlement process, including servicing
of loans and assignment of those loans. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601. RESPA imposes a number of duties
on lenders and loan servicers. Most relevant here is the requirement that loan servicers respond
promptly to borrowers' written requests for information, § 2605(e). RESPA establishes the
requirement for how a mortgage loan servicer or lender must conduct its post-closing servicing of
the loan, and § 2605(e) specifically sets forth the duties and statutory obligations of a loan servicer
or lender in receiving and responding to borrowers’ written inquiries. Under RESPA, a Qualified
Written Request (“QWR”) is a written correspondence that includes the borrower’s name and
account number, and a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower that the account is in
error. 12 U.S.C. §2605(e). Under § 2605(e), the loan servicer must provide a written response
acknowledging receipt of the correspondence within twenty days, and then within sixty days must
either (1) make appropriate corrections in the borrower’s account and send a written notification
of such correction; (2) after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a written
explanation or clarification that includes a statement of the reasons why the servicer believes the
account is correct, as well as the name and telephone number of an individual or department who
can provide assistance to the borrower; or (3) after conducting an investigation, provide the
borrower with a written explanation that includes information requested by the borrower, or an
explanation of why the information is unavailable, and the contact information of an individual or
department at the servicer who can provide assistance to the borrower. Here, Borrowers allege

10

that Chase violated RESPA on ten separate occasions, and that they have demonstrated a “pattern
and practice” of RESPA violations by Chase.
Borrowers have not shown that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Chase
violated RESPA in its response to their correspondence. Borrowers allege that Chase did not
research or respond “appropriately” to their January 10, 2011 QWR, and did not correct their
account after the January 2011 QWR was received by Chase. However, the undisputed evidence
shows that Chase responded to the Borrowers’ inquiry by sending both an acknowledgement that
the inquiry had been received (Filing No. 60-8), as well as copies of the loan history and escrow
statements from 2007 through 2010. (Filing No. 60-9). Under RESPA, Chase was only required
to respond to inquiries regarding the servicing of the loan, as a QWR is correspondence that
“includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower . . . that the account is in error.”
12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B)(ii). Any additional requests for action or information does not fall
within the definition of a “Qualified Written Request,” and therefore a failure of Chase to provide
such information or requested remedy would not constitute a violation of RESPA. See MorEquity
Inc. v. Naeem, 118 F. Supp. 2d 885, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (dismissing RESPA counterclaim because
the purported QWR sought information related to the validity of the loan but unrelated to the
servicing); Moore v. F.D.I.C., 2009 WL 4405538 at*4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2009) (“Because requests
for information related to the status of a defaulted mortgage loan and delinquent mortgage
payments do not relate to the receipt of a scheduled periodic payment or information regarding the
servicer making any payments with funds received from the borrow, such requests do not
constitute ‘servicing.’”)
Borrowers have not presented any evidence that the response provided by Chase did not
satisfy its obligation under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(B), which was to provide “a statement of the

11

reasons for which the servicer believes the account of the borrower is correct as determined by the
servicer[.]” Chase provided a detailed record of each payment received and each disbursement
made from the escrow account from 2007 to 2011, showing the reason why it believed there was
no error in the Borrowers’ account. Chase was not required to make a correction to the Borrowers’
account under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(A) because there was no correction to be made. The fact
that the Borrowers forgot they had received a refund of their Allstate homeowners’ insurance
premium in 2009, and thus did not understand the explanation provided by Chase until their
attorney met with Chase’s attorney prior to filing this action, does not render Chase’s investigation
or response inadequate under RESPA. See Bates v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 768 F.3d 1126,
1135 (11th Cir. 2014) (no RESPA violation where borrower was merely “confused and/or
unsatisfied” with the answer from the servicer where servicer provided written explanation for its
belief that borrower’s account was correct).
Because the April 27, 2011 correspondence from Borrowers to Chase was, in all material
respects, a duplicate of the January 10, 2011 QWR that did not seek any additional information as
it related to the servicing of the loan, Chase had already satisfied its obligation under RESPA to
provide this information. Importantly, Borrowers have not shown that there was any basis for
Chase to make any corrections to their account or provide them compensation for damages arising
from Chase’s alleged “improper handling” of Borrowers’ QWR. Thus, the Court concludes there
was no RESPA violation in Chase’s response to the original request or the duplicate request.
And, even if the Court were to find that Chase violated RESPA by their failure to respond
to the second QWR, such a finding alone is not sufficient for Borrowers to succeed on their RESPA
claim. Borrowers have not shown that Chase committed a pattern or practice of violating RESPA
as Ms. Jackson relies only on her “information and belief.” Likewise, there is no evidence that

12

Chase’s RESPA violation of failing to respond to the April 27, 2011 letter caused Borrowers’
actual damages. (“Plaintiffs must come forward with evidence sufficient to support an award of
actual damages to pursue their RESPA…claim[]”). Catalan v GMAC Mortgage Corp., 629 F.3d
676, 693 (7th Cir. 2011).
Borrowers also allege that Chase violated § 2605(e)(3) of RESPA by providing information
to consumer reporting agencies regarding overdue payments allegedly owed by Borrowers that
were related to their QWR. Section 2605(e)(3) provides that “[d]uring the 60-day period beginning
on the date of the servicer’s receipt from any borrower of a [QWR] relating to a dispute regarding
borrower’s payments, a servicer may not provide information regarding any overdue payment,
owed by such borrower and relating to such period or qualified written request, to any consumer
reporting agency.” 12 U.S.C. § 2650(e)(3). Borrowers have not provided any evidence that Chase
made any reports to a consumer reporting agency within sixty days of Chase’s receipt of the
January 10, 2011 QWR, relating to their December 2010 mortgage payment. Any negative
account information submitted to the credit bureaus relating to the placement of the Borrowers’
account in default status and the Notice of Intent to Accelerate and Foreclose was would have been
sent prior to the QWR, and therefore would not have been prohibited by RESPA.
Finally, Borrowers have not cited to any legal authority that would have required Chase to
cease collection efforts on their mortgage account, nor have they cited to any authority that gave
them the right to cease making monthly payments on their mortgage as of January 2011. In a letter
dated January 31, 2011, Chase explained that they would no longer be able to debit Borrowers
monthly mortgage payment through the Autocharge Program (“ACH”) because of the delinquent
status of the loan. (Filing No. 60-6 at p. 3). Borrower’s argument that Chase should have continued
the ACH withdrawals is disingenuous. The continued collection efforts were not merely as a result

13

of the December 2010 payment being placed into a suspense account, but also for Borrowers’
subsequent refusal to pay and ignoring calls and correspondence from Chase for several months.
The damages alleged by Borrowers arose not from Chase’s response to their QWR, but rather
initially due to their own error with respect to the refund of their Allstate insurance premium in
2009, the underpayment of their monthly scheduled mortgage payment for 2010 and their
continuing refusal to make payments on their mortgage account in 2011.
At bottom, Borrowers have not shown that any of their alleged damages were directly and
proximately caused by any of Chase’s actions under RESPA. No reasonable jury could conclude
that Chase’s correspondence—or alleged lack thereof— caused the actual damages claimed by
Borrowers, including their divorce, loss of credit, failure to obtain employment, loss of business,
and physical and emotional damages. Because Borrowers have failed to show that Chase violated
RESPA, they have also failed to show that Chase engaged in a pattern or practice of violating
RESPA, making an award of statutory damages inappropriate as well. The Court concludes that
Borrowers have failed to present sufficient questions of material fact showing that they can prove
their claims under RESPA, and therefore DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
judgment, and GRANTS Chase’s motion for summary judgment on their claims.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient
evidence to show that they are entitled to summary judgment on their RESPA claims, and have
not presented sufficient questions of material fact to defeat Chase’s motion for summary judgment
on their RESPA and breach of good faith and fair dealing claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion
for partial summary judgment (Filing No. 59) is DENIED, and Chase’s motion for summary
judgment (Filing No. 61) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims are hereby DISMISSED with

14

prejudice.
SO ORDERED:

Date: 5/8/2015

Distribution:
Brian Scott Jones
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
[e-mail]
Christina M. Bruno
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
[e-mail]
David J. Jurkiewicz
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
[e-mail]
Joel T. Nagle
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
[e-mail]
Steven D. Groth
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
[e-mail]
Ryan R. Frasher
RYAN FRASHER P.C.
[e-mail]

15