DANIELS v. ASTRUE

Filing 26

ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW - The standard for disability claims under the Social Security Act is stringent. The Act does not contemplate degrees of disability or allow for an award based on partial disability. Furthermore, the standard of review o f the Commissioner's denial of benefits is narrow. The Court reviews the record as a whole, but does not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the ALJ's. The Court must uphold a decision where, as here, it is supported by s ubstantial evidence in the record. As the Court cannot find a legal basis to overturn the ALJ's determination that Daniels does not qualify for disability benefits, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Denise K. LaRue on 3/5/2014.(JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

CALVIN L. DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 1:13-cv-00027-DKL-WTL

ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Plaintiff Calvin L. Daniels (“Daniels”) requests judicial review of the decision of
Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (the “Commissioner”),1 denying Daniels’s application for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) disability benefits.
For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner=s decision is AFFIRMED.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Daniels filed applications for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) on December 2, 2009, alleging an onset of
disability of August 27, 2009. [Dkt. 13-2 at 11.] Daniels’ applications were denied
initially on February 23, 2010, and upon reconsideration on June 7, 2010. [Id.] Daniels
1 Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of the SSA on February 14, 2013,

while this case was pending. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), she is substituted for the
former Commissioner Michael J. Astrue.

requested a hearing, which was held on July 19, 2011, before Administrative Law Judge
Tammy H. Whitaker (“ALJ”).

The ALJ denied Daniels’ application on September 19,

2011. [Dkt. 13-2 at 8.] The Appeals Council denied Daniels’ request for review of the
ALJ’s decision on November 20, 2012, making the ALJ’s decision final for purposes of
judicial review. Daniels filed his Complaint with this Court on January 7, 2013. [Dkt.
1.]
B. Factual Background and Medical History
Daniels was born on September 11, 1959 and was 49 years old on the date of
alleged onset of disability. He has past relevant work as a mechanic and truck driver.
Daniels testified that he left his job as a truck driver in 2009 because he was in constant
pain.
Daniels initially alleged multiple physical and mental impairments including
degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, tendonitis, hypertension, asthma, obesity,
carpal tunnel syndrome and diabetes. Daniels confines his request for review of the
Commissioner’s decision to low back pain and contends the ALJ erred in her analysis of
Listing 1.04 (Disorders of the Spine). Accordingly, the Court will confine its recitation
of Daniels’ medical history to the records relevant to this Listing.
In May 2003, Daniels underwent an MRI of his lumbar spine because he was
experiencing bilateral leg numbness and pain. The MRI indicated disc desiccation,
moderate vertical narrowing and nerve impingement at the left L3 ganglion/nerve. An
X-ray of the lumbar spine in 2010 revealed minor lumbar osteophytes and no other
evidence of lumbar disease.
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In February 2010, Daniels underwent a Social Security medical examination with
Dr. Safadi, M.D. Daniels reported sharp, intermittent pain that worsens with activity.
Dr. Safadi noted decreased range of motion in his hips and lumbar region due to back
pain.

Also in February 2010, Daniels underwent a Physical Residual Functional

Capacity Assessment with Dr. Whitely, M.D. Dr. Whitely noted decreased range of
motion in the lumbar spine and hips due to back pain. However, Dr. Whitely also
noted Daniels had no perceived difficulty in walking and performed squats
“completely w/o difficulty.” [Dkt. 13-7 at 50.] Dr. Whitely concluded that Daniels
could occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds; frequently lift and carry 10 pounds; stand,
sit and walk up to six hours in a work day and was unlimited in his ability to push and
pull. Id.
Daniels treated with Dr. Rinderknecht, M.D., several times in 2010 for
osteoarthritis of the back, hips, knees and shoulders.

Daniels received anti-

inflammatory medication and injections as treatment for the pain.
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Standard for Proving Disability

To be eligible for SSI and DIB, a claimant must show he is unable to “engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). To evaluate a disability claim, an ALJ must use the following five-step
inquiry:
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Step One:

Is the claimant currently employed;

Step Two:

Does the claimant have a severe impairment or
combination of impairments;

Step Three: Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal
any impairment listed in the regulations as
being so severe as to preclude substantial
gainful activity;
Step Four:

Can the claimant perform his past relevant
work; and

Step Five:

Is the claimant capable of performing any work
in the national economy?

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520. See also Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). The
individual claiming disability bears the burden of proof at steps one through four.
Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). If the claimant meets that burden, then the
SSA has the burden at Step Five to show that work exists in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform, given his age, education, work
experience and functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560 (c)(2).
B. Standard for Judicial Review
An ALJ=s decision will be upheld so long as the ALJ applied the correct legal
standard, and substantial evidence supported the decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d
664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Id. (internal quotation

omitted). This limited scope of judicial review follows the principle that Congress
designated the Commissioner, not the courts, to make disability determinations:

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In reviewing the decision of the ALJ, we cannot engage in
our own analysis of whether [the claimant] is severely
impaired as defined by the SSA regulations. Nor may we
reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide
questions of credibility, or, in general, substitute our own
judgment for that of the Commissioner. Our task is limited
to determining whether the ALJ’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence.
Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th 2004). Where conflicting evidence allows
reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is entitled to benefits, the court
must defer to the Commissioner’s resolution of this conflict. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d
780, 782 (7th Cir. 1997). The ALJ is required to articulate a minimal, but legitimate,
justification for her decision to accept or reject specific evidence of a disability. Scheck v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2004). “An ALJ need not specifically address every
piece of evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his
conclusions.” O=Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION
Daniels claims the ALJ committed various errors that require reversal of the

Commissioner’s decision. Specifically, Daniels contends the ALJ erred when he: (1)
misstated the evidence when determining Daniels was not totally disabled due to
chronic low back pain; (2) failed to summon a medical advisor to determine whether
Daniels’ spinal impairments medically equaled a Listing; (3) negatively assessed
Daniels’ credibility; and (4) failed to account for the impact of Daniels’ chronic pain at
Step Five.
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A. Listing 1.04 (Disorders of the Spine)
Daniels first argues that the ALJ’s denial decision was in error because
“substantial medical examination and treatment evidence” establish that his low back
pain rendered him totally disabled. [Dkt. 15 at 5.] In support of this argument, Daniels
asserts the ALJ only “selectively considered” the results of a May 2003 lumbar spine
MRI and mischaracterized the results of an August 2010 X-ray. Daniels clarified this
argument in his reply brief, noting that the ALJ “committed reversible error by
misstating the evidence to determine that the claimant was not totally disabled due to
chronic spine-back pain.” [Dkt. 23 at 3.]
Daniels is correct that the ALJ referenced the May 2003 MRI as finding one
herniated disc instead of two and referred to the August 2010 as an MRI when it was in
fact an X-ray. But Daniels fails to provide any analysis to show how this evidence, if
correctly stated, would prove Daniels’ disability.

Instead, Daniels strings together

several disjointed phrases from Seventh Circuit social security decisions without
connecting the law to the facts of her case. “This method of argumentation is not
argumentation at all .... The Court cannot and will not forge new arguments for [the
Claimant].” Poston v. Astrue, 2010 WL 987734, at *8 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
Daniels’ argument here is difficult to follow. He asserts the ALJ’s mistaken
recitation of the evidence was not harmless error because “accurate recognition of the
medical evidence would reasonably have resulted in finding the claimant totally
disabled. [Dkt. 23 at 4.] Yet in the very next sentence, concedes that he “never argued
that the claimant’s impairments met Listing 1.04A. That, in the Court’s opinion, is the
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issue. Daniels had the burden to establish his impairments met or equaled a listing.
Pointing out the ALJ’s error does not meet that burden without an analysis of how, in
the absence of that error, Daniels is disabled.
The medical records provide more than substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
conclusion that Daniels’ impairment does not meet Listing 1.04.

Correcting two

misstatements of the evidence would not alter the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion of nondisabled. Therefore the mistaken references were, at most, harmless error.
B. Medical Advisor
Daniels next asserts the ALJ was required to summon a medical advisor to testify
as to whether his spinal impairments met or medically equaled a Listing. An ALJ must
rely on a medical expert's opinion when finding a claimant does not meet or equal a
listed impairment. SSR 96–6p. In some instances, this requires the ALJ to hear
additional evidence from a medical examiner. See Green v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 780, 781 (7th
Cir. 2000) (noting that the ALJ incorrectly made medical conclusions instead of
consulting a medical examiner). However, when the medical evidence in the record is
sufficient to make a decision, the ALJ may rely on it alone. Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503,
516 (7th Cir. 2009).
Here, the ALJ relied upon the report of a state agency physician that found
Daniels was capable of light work. See Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir.
2004) (finding that disability forms completed by state agency physicians conclusively
establish that a physician designated by the agency has given consideration to the
question of medical equivalence). Daniels attempts to rely upon Barnett v. Barnhart, 381
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F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2004), but his reliance is misplaced because the ALJ in Barnett did not
consult a medical expert at all or rely on a signed Disability Determination and
Transmittal Form. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 670–71. Instead, the ALJ based his findings on his
own layman opinion. Id. at 671. By contrast, the ALJ in this present case grounded his
findings in medical opinions from a state agency physician as well as other physicians
who treated Daniels. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in holding a
hearing without summoning a medical advisor to testify in this case. The Court finds
the record substantially supports the ALJ’s determination that Daniels did not meet or
medically equal a Listing.
C. Daniels’s Credibility
Daniels also contends the ALJ’s negative credibility determination must be
reversed because it is contrary to SSR 96-7p. The Court disagrees. In assessing a
claimant's credibility when the allegedly disabling symptoms are not objectively
verifiable, an ALJ must first determine whether those symptoms are supported by
medical evidence. See SSR 96–7p; Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2007). If
not, SSR 96–7p requires the ALJ to “consider the entire case record and give specific
reasons for the weight given to the individual's statements.” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d
503, 517 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting SSR 96–7p). The ALJ “should look to a number of
factors to determine credibility, such as the objective medical evidence, the claimant's
daily activities, allegations of pain, aggravating factors, types of treatment received and
medication taken, and ‘functional limitations.’” Simila, 573 F.3d at 517 (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c) (2)-(4)).
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The ALJ noted that Daniels’ good work history generally bolsters his credibility;
however, there was a lack of treating evidence to support his allegation of total
disability. For example, diagnostic imaging revealed only moderate to normal results.
Physical exams generally were normal and Daniels only underwent conservative
treatment for his alleged back impairments. Finally, the ALJ noted that no treating
source assigned work restrictions as a result of his alleged impairments. As there was
no medical evidence to support Daniels’ allegation of total disability, the ALJ’s
determination to not fully credit Daniels’ testimony cannot be “patently wrong.”
D. Step Five and RFC
Daniels’ final argument for the reversal of the ALJ’s decision challenges the ALJ’s
determination of his Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Specifically, Daniels asserts
the ALJ failed to accurately consider the impact of his chronic pain. This argument
appears to be based upon the ALJ’s misstatement that Daniels was diagnosed with one
herniated disc rather than two. Daniels generally asserts that his impairment “was at
least twice as severe as the ALJ thought,” but he fails to cite to any support for this
argument either in the record or relevant case law. In the absence of legal analysis as to
why a diagnosis of two herniated discs versus one establishes total disability, the Court
has no reason to disturb the ALJ’s decision. The Court concludes the ALJ’s RFC is
supported by substantial evidence and does not require remand.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The standard for disability claims under the Social Security Act is stringent. The

Act does not contemplate degrees of disability or allow for an award based on partial
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disability.

Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 285 (7th Cir. 1985).

Furthermore, the

standard of review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is narrow. The Court
reviews the record as a whole, but does not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its
judgment for the ALJ’s. Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Court

must uphold a decision where, as here, it is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. As the Court cannot find a legal basis to overturn the ALJ’s determination that
Daniels does not qualify for disability benefits, the Commissioner’s decision is
AFFIRMED.

03/05/2014
Date: _____________

_______________________________
Denise K. LaRue
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Patrick Harold Mulvany
[e-mail]
Thomas E. Kieper
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
[e-mail]

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