PAIN CENTER OF SE INDIANA, LLC et al v. ORIGIN HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS LLC et al

Filing 329

ORDER OVERRULING 260 Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court regarding 7/17/15 Entry and Order. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 12/8/2015. (TMD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

PAIN CENTER OF SE INDIANA, LLC;
INDIANA PAIN MEDICINE AND
REHABILITATION CENTER, P.C.; and
ANTHONY ALEXANDER, M.D.,

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Plaintiffs,
vs.
ORIGIN HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS
LLC;
SSIMED (d/b/a SSIMED Holding, LLC);
ORIGIN HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware
Corporation; JOHN DOES (1–50)
inclusive; and JOHN DOES (1–100)
inclusive,
Defendants.

1:13-cv-00133-RLY-DKL

ENTRY ON PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
JULY 17, 2015 ENTRY AND ORDER
On June 11, 2015, the Magistrate Judge extended the fact discovery deadline from
June 30 to July 10, 2015, to accommodate a few outstanding depositions. She
emphasized that this fifth extension was “a firm deadline that will not be extended.”
(Filing No. 240 (“June 11 Entry”) at 5). On June 30, Plaintiffs, the Pain Center of SE
Indiana, LLC, the Indiana Pain Medicine and Rehabilitation Center, P.C., and Anthony
Alexander, M.D., again moved to extend the discovery deadlines. Defendants, SSIMED,
d/b/a SSIMED Holding, LLC, Origin Healthcare Solutions, LLC, and Origin Holdings,
Inc., opposed the motion. On July 17, 2015, the Magistrate Judge denied the motion in
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part, finding that Plaintiffs failed to show good cause for another extension. (Filing No.
254 (“July 17 Entry”) at 3). Plaintiffs now object to the ruling, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 72(a), to the extent the Magistrate Judge declined to extend the
deposition deadline from July 10 to August 15, 2015. For reasons set forth below, the
court OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ objection. 1
The district court reviews the non-dispositive discovery decisions of a magistrate
judge for clear error. Domanus v. Lewicki, 742 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The court, therefore, will not upset a magistrate judge’s
decision unless it runs contrary to law or leaves the court with a definite and firm
conviction that the magistrate judge made a mistake. Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus.
Co., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997). When reviewing a non-dispositive matter for
clear error, the court considers only arguments and issues put forth before the Magistrate
Judge. Murray v. Nationwide Better Health, No. 10–3262, 2011 WL 2516909, at *2
(C.D. Ill. June 24, 2011) (citations omitted).
The Magistrate Judge denied the motion for extension of time on grounds that (1)
Plaintiffs failed to establish the relevance or importance of the expected testimony of
either Dr. Philip R. Corvo or Dr. Carol Harris, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to explain how
Defendants’ delayed production of “alter ego” discovery prevented Plaintiffs from

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Plaintiffs note that Defendants filed their brief in opposition beyond the fourteen-day
window provided by Local Rule 7-1(c). Defendants’ untimely response has no consequence,
however, because the court can overrule Plaintiffs’ objection on its face, as discussed infra. The
court will cite to Defendants’ materials only for illuminative purposes to place the Magistrate
Judge’s ruling into context.

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examining either doctor prior to the deadline. 2 Plaintiffs claim these findings amount to
clear error.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) charges the court with issuing a scheduling
order that limits, inter alia, the time to complete discovery. A party seeking to modify
the schedule may do so only with the court’s consent upon a showing of good cause.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Courts have a legitimate interest in ensuring that parties abide
by scheduling orders to ensure prompt and orderly litigation.” Campania Mgmt. Co. v.
Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843, 851 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Accordingly,
the Seventh Circuit advises district courts to firmly adhere to discovery deadlines
established after consultation with the parties. Id. at 851–52.
In their motion for extensions of time, Plaintiffs cursorily stated that delayed
production of alter ego discovery and “witness cancellations” warranted another deadline
extension to complete depositions. (See Filing No. 246 ¶ 3). Denying the motion, the
Magistrate Judge noted Plaintiffs’ failure to even minimally specify the documents, if
any, missing from Defendants’ production of alter ego discovery and how their absence
prevented meaningful examination of the witnesses. In an attempt to show clear error,
Plaintiffs merely remind the court that it previously determined Plaintiffs were entitled to

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The “alter ego” discovery at issue relates to the ownership interests and operational
interdependence among the defendant entities. This production was the subject of a prolonged
dispute which the court ultimately resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor. (See Filing No. 154). The record
reflects that Defendants produced alter ego discovery in two phases—the first on January 15 and
the second on February 6, 2015. (See Filing No. 264-1). Plaintiffs represent that the inconsistent
labeling of data discs made it impossible for Plaintiffs’ counsel to confirm whether the
production was fully responsive until mid-June. (See Filing No. 274 at 3; Filing No. 243 at 2).

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certain alter ego discovery. (See Filing No. 260 4–5). This falls far short of explaining
how delayed receipt of such discovery prevented Plaintiffs from deposing either doctor.
It accomplishes even less in showing clear error.
As to the depositions of Dr. Corvo and Dr. Harris, Plaintiffs attempted to show
good cause only with respect to Dr. Harris, claiming that her employer interfered with the
deposition by “intimat[ing] that a motion to compel is necessary in order to obtain her
deposition . . . .” (See Filing No. 252 at 2–3). The Magistrate Judge deemed this
insufficient to establish good cause because Plaintiffs’ made no attempt to describe the
relevance or nature of either doctor’s expected testimony. 3 Absent the slightest effort to
establish good cause—i.e., some reason to believe the absence of the sought testimony
would prejudice Plaintiffs—Rule 16(b) compelled denial of Plaintiffs’ motion.
Now on objection, Plaintiffs’ rely on the faulty conclusion that the Magistrate
Judge deemed the doctors’ expected testimony irrelevant. A finding that Plaintiffs failed
to make their case for relevance or prejudice does not equate to a finding of irrelevance.
(See July 17 Entry at 4 (“Plaintiffs also have not shown the relevance or materiality of
any expected testimony from Drs. Corvo or Harris.”)). Indeed, during a June 11
conference, the Magistrate Judge accepted Plaintiffs’ representation, over Defendants’
objection, that Dr. Corvo “might have insight into the [EMger and Practice Manager
Suite software at issue].” (June 11 Entry at 1–2). Plaintiffs subpoenaed Dr. Corvo on
June 6 for a deposition set for Saturday, June 20, immediately following five consecutive

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The court also notes the complete absence of documentation, prior to the filing of the
present objection, to support Plaintiffs’ claim of interference.

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days of depositions. (July 17 Entry at 3; Filing No. 264-1). On June 11, Plaintiffs’
counsel still had not confirmed Dr. Corvo’s availability for June 20. Because no
exceptional circumstances warranted ordering a deposition to occur on a Saturday, the
Magistrate Judge instructed Plaintiffs to find another date (before the July 10 deadline)
for the deposition. (June 11 Entry 2–3). Plaintiffs failed to do so and likewise failed to
explain their failure to the Magistrate Judge. 4 Thus, the claim that the Magistrate Judge
found the expected testimony of Drs. Corvo and Harris irrelevant has no basis in fact.
Plaintiffs, once again, simply failed to make their case before the Magistrate Judge and
resorted to Rule 72 for a second take. (See, e.g., Filing No. 258 at 5–7 (rejecting
arguments raised for the first time on a Rule 72(a) objection)).
Plaintiffs also suggest that because the Magistrate Judge permitted the depositions
to go forward in the first place, they did not need to further defend the relevance or
importance of the expected testimony to justify another deadline extension. (See Filing
No. 260 at 3). This wrongly presumes that a minimum justification for subpoenaing a
potential witness during the discovery period suffices as good cause to depart from a
scheduling order. Plaintiffs’ logic, in effect, would remove the teeth from any such
deadline. Failure to establish good cause before the Magistrate Judge condemns

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The closest Plaintiffs come to showing good cause lies in an attempt to establish their
diligence, claiming that “during the last few months there have been over [twenty] depositions
conducted.” (Filing No. 252 at 2). They also divert blame to Defendants by baldly asserting that
their “enormous obstruction” caused Plaintiffs’ predicament. (Id. at 3). Without more, the
Magistrate Judge was well within her discretion to discredit such claims.

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Plaintiffs’ objection to defeat. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Murray, 2011 WL 2516909,
at *2.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s July 17,
2015 Entry and Order (Filing No. 260) is OVERRULED.

SO ORDERED this 8th day of December 2015.

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RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record.

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