GORE v. CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICE et al
Entry Discussing Motion for Summary Judgment and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - For reasons stated in this entry, the defendants' motion for summary judgment 126 is granted. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. SEE ORDER. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 2/7/2017. (JRB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
JERRY A. GORE,
) Case No. 1:13-cv-00241-JMS-DML
DR. WILLIAM WOLFE,
NURSE CHRISTINE MEYER,
Entry Discussing Motion for Summary Judgment
and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
Plaintiff Jerry Gore (“Mr. Gore”), an Indiana prisoner incarcerated at the Pendleton
Correctional Facility (“Pendleton”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that
the defendants Corizon Health (“Corizon”), Dr. William Wolfe, and Nurse Christine Meyer were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need for treatment of heat stroke in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed
a response in opposition and the defendants have replied. For the following reasons, the motion
for summary judgment [Dkt. 126] is granted. 1
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the admissible
evidence presented by the non-moving party must be believed and all reasonable inferences must
be drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th
The Court acknowledges its gratitude to Mr. Hull for his efforts on behalf of Mr. Gore.
Cir. 2007); Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”).
However, “[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its
pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a
genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490. Finally, the nonmoving party bears the burden of specifically identifying the relevant evidence of record, and “the
court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.” Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001).
II. Undisputed Facts
Construed in a manner most favorable to Mr. Gore, the following facts are undisputed for
purposes of summary judgment: 2
At all times relevant to the allegations in his complaint, Mr. Gore was incarcerated at
Dr. Wolfe was a treating physician at Pendleton but was employed by Corizon. Corizon is
the private company that contracts with the Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”) to provide
health care to inmates at certain IDOC facilities. Nurse Meyer was employed by Corizon as a
registered nurse working at Pendleton.
Heatstroke occurs when an individual’s body temperature rises rapidly and the person is
unable to cool down. Heatstroke can occur without any previous heat-related condition, such as
heat exhaustion. Heatstroke signs and symptoms include:
Fever of 104 F or greater
The facts cited in Mr. Gore’s response in opposition to summary judgment are from the pro se
amended complaint filed on November 19, 2014. Mr. Gore verified the amended complaint so the
Court will treat it as an affidavit. [Dkt. 46].
Changes in mental status or behavior, such as confusion, agitation, or slurred speech
Hot, dry skin or heavy sweating
Nausea and vomiting
Fainting, which may be the first sign in older adults
[Dkt. 141, at pp. 5-6; 143-1, at pp. 6, 10]. 3
On the morning of July 6, 2012, Mr. Gore played basketball outside for approximately fortyfive minutes. [Dkt. 128-4, at p. 9]. He then took his daily shower around 10:45 a.m. The temperature
both inside the facility and outside was particularly hot that day and there were no fans or ventilation
system in Mr. Gore’s cell house or the showers. [Dkt. 46, at pp. 6].
Similarly, the water temperature in the shower was hot. Soon after Mr. Gore started
showering, he began sweating and passed out. He regained consciousness soon after and Sergeant
Turner arrived to escort Mr. Gore back to his cell. During his escort, Mr. Gore passed out again.
Sergeant Turner and Officer Watson assisted Mr. Gore to the bottom of the range, and gave him a
cool rag and placed him in front of a fan. The officer in charge of the cell house called a signal 3000
medical emergency while Sergeant Turner got Mr. Gore water. [Dkt. 46, at pp. 5-8].
Mr. Gore has included information from a medical treatise re-typed in the body of his response
in opposition to motion for summary judgment. [Dkt. 141, at pp. 4-7]. Defendants helpfully
provided copies of the treatises Mr. Gore references. [Dkt. 143-1]. The symptoms of heat stroke
are not in dispute. So that the Court may consider this evidence, Mr. Gore’s motion to take judicial
notice [Dkt. 142] is granted. The Court has taken judicial notice of the online medical treatises
designated in Mr. Gore’s response within the undisputed facts.
Nurse Meyer responded to the emergency medical call from Mr. Gore’s cell house.
When she arrived, Mr. Gore was on the floor in front of a fan, wet from the shower, and sweating.
Nurse Meyer examined him and took his vital signs. His blood pressure was 120/90 and his
temperature was 97.5. She also determined that Mr. Gore’s skin turgor was good, and he was
conscious, coherent, and verbal. [Dkt. 128-4, at p. 4]. Mr. Gore was able to stand up and walk back
to his cell. Soon after Nurse Meyer left Mr. Gore’s cell house, his condition worsened and he began
vomiting. He was transported to the medical clinic where Nurse Meyer again examined him and
took his vital signs. His blood pressure was 130/70, and his pulse was 98. He was placed on an
oxygen mask because his oxygen saturation level was only 90%. His oxygen levels returned to
Nurse Meyer called Dr. Wolfe at approximately 12:15 to discuss Mr. Gore’s condition. Dr.
Wolfe ordered “Lactated Ringers solution by IV” to address Mr. Gore’s symptoms of possible
dehydration. The medical staff unsuccessfully attempted to start an IV six times. Mr. Gore also
drank 16 ounces of water and was given a 25 mg injection of Phenergan for nausea. Nurse Meyer
checked his vitals a third time at 2:10 p.m. His temperature was 97.3, his pulse was 72, his oxygen
was 100%, and his blood pressure was 140/85. [Dkt. 128-4, at p. 4].
While he was in the clinic, Mr. Gore complained of acute right upper quadrant (“RUQ”)
pain. Based on this complaint, and the medical staff’s inability to start an IV, Nurse Meyer called
Dr. Wolfe again and recommended he be sent to an outside emergency room (“ER”). Dr. Wolfe
agreed and ordered that Mr. Gore be transported to St. John’s Hospital ER, approximately ten
miles away, by IDOC vehicle. The IDOC vehicle was not an ambulance and the inside was very
hot. Mr. Gore complained to the driver about the heat in the IDOC vehicle and that he was not
feeling well. Dr. Wolfe did not order an ambulance transport for Mr. Gore because his vital signs
were stable and his condition was not an emergency. [Dkt. 128-1].
Mr. Gore was alert and not in distress when he arrived at the St. John’s Hospital ER. His
temperature was 98.4, his pulse was 61, and his blood pressure was 136/76. The ER physician, Dr.
Steven Hill, noted that in 2010 Mr. Gore had been admitted to Wishard Hospital for a similar
situation and underwent a heart catheterization, which reflected normal coronary arteries, although
there was a question as to possible aortic stenosis, which was not evaluated. [Dkt. 128-4, at p. 9].
Dr. Hill admitted Mr. Gore for further evaluation and ordered IV fluids for rhabdomyolysis. 4 He
also ordered aggressive hydration, a repeat enzyme test the following morning, and recommended
that a cardiologist obtain an echocardiogram. [Dkt. 128-4, at p. 10].
On July 6, 2012, an abdominal CT scan was done to rule out gallstones, pancreatitis, and
other potential causes of Mr. Gore’s reported right upper quadrant pain. On July 7, 2012,
cardiologist, Dr. Adam Greene, evaluated Mr. Gore and noted that Mr. Gore was alert and oriented
and in no acute distress. Dr. Greene documented that Mr. Gore was generally physically active
and played basketball approximately five (5) days per week. Dr. Greene also noted that Mr. Gore’s
cardiac exam was “quite normal” and ordered an EKG, which was also normal and demonstrated
no evidence of aortic stenosis. Dr. Greene concluded that Mr. Gore had likely experienced
dehydration, which had improved after receiving IV fluids overnight (as evidenced by Mr. Gore’s
improved biochemical markers). [Dkt. 128-4, at pp. 12-17].
On July 9, 2012, Dr. Imran Nasir evaluated Mr. Gore and noted that Mr. Gore was “feeling
much better, with no nausea, or abdominal pain.” On July 10, 2012, Mr. Gore was discharged from
Rhabdomyolysis is a syndrome characterized by the leakage of muscle-cell contents into the
circulation. Non-traumatic rhabdomyolysis may be caused by excessive physical exertion and heat
stroke. [Dkt. 141, at p. 7].
the St. John’s Hospital ER with instructions to drink plenty of fluids and to avoid working out for
one (1) week. No further follow-up treatments or medications were recommended or prescribed.
[Dkt. 128-4, at pp. 18-22].
In the second amended complaint, Mr. Gore alleges that defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his alleged heat stroke on July 6, 2012, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 5 Specifically, Mr. Gore alleges Dr. Wolfe and Nurse Meyer failed to properly
diagnose and treat his condition, and negligently allowed him to be transported to St. John’s
Hospital in an IDOC vehicle rather than by ambulance. Mr. Gore also alleges that Corizon failed
to maintain policies, practices, or procedures designed to ensure that he received medical care
within the standard of care while he was incarcerated at Pendleton, and that Corizon failed to
adequately train and supervise medical staff at Corizon. [Dkt. 79]. Mr. Gore also alleges the
defendants were negligent in treating his medical needs and that Corizon breached the contract
between Corizon and the IDOC related to health care services for inmates at Pendleton.
A. Deliberate Indifference-Nurse Meyer and Dr. Wolfe
In support of the motion for summary judgment, Dr. Wolfe and Nurse Meyer argue they
were not deliberately indifferent to Mr. Gore’s medical needs. Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment,
prison officials have a duty to provide humane conditions of confinement. This means that officials
must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates and ensure that they receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs, a plaintiff
Mr. Gore’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is not applicable to the circumstances presented. The
Eighth Amendment is the most applicable constitutional provision and no due process issues have
must demonstrate two elements: (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition;
and (2) the defendant knew about the plaintiff’s condition and the substantial risk of harm it posed,
but disregarded that risk. Id. at 837; Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d
766, 775 (7th Cir. 2014).
The Court reviews “the totality of an inmate’s medical care when considering whether that
care evidences deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722,
728 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Cavalieria v. Shephard, 321 F.3d 616, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2003)). The
Seventh Circuit has explained that “[a] medical professional is entitled to deference in treatment
decisions unless no minimally competent professional would have [recommended the same] under
those circumstances.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014). “Disagreement between
a prisoner and his doctor, or even between two medical professionals, about the proper course of
treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. But
deliberate indifference can be inferred in some circumstances, such as when a doctor “persists in
a course of treatment known to be ineffective.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 730 (citing Walker v. Peters,
233 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 2000)). Similarly, deliberate indifference may exist when the course
of treatment is “so blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to
seriously aggravate” the inmate’s condition. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996)
(internal quotations omitted).
Mr. Gore alleges he suffered from heat stroke on July 6, 2012. However, the evidence,
including Mr. Gore’s medical records, do not support this assertion. Rather, Dr. Gregory Pugh, an
independent physician who is Board-Certified in Emergency Medicine, opined that Mr. Gore
likely experienced dehydration, heat exhaustion and rhabdomyolysis. The defendants do not
dispute that Mr. Gore suffered a heat related event. Thus, the material issue in this case is not what
kind of heat related event Mr. Gore suffered, but whether the defendants’ response to the event
was deliberately indifferent.
The defendants argue that Mr. Gore was provided with appropriate care, and they were not
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Mr. Gore alleges that Nurse Meyer and Dr.
Wolfe delayed, and then failed, to treat him after he suffered heatstroke, which resulted in further
injuries and a four day hospital stay.
Nurse Meyer and Dr. Wolfe have shown they were not deliberately indifferent to Mr.
Gore’s medical needs. Mr. Gore’s allegations of deliberate indifference and negligence are not
consistent with his medical records, which reflect that he received immediate and medically
appropriate treatment for his condition.
When Nurse Meyer initially evaluated Mr. Gore in the cell house after he passed out in the
shower, his blood pressure was 120/90 and his temperature was 97.5. She also determined that Mr.
Gore’s skin turgor was good, and he was conscious, coherent, and verbal. [Dkt. 128-4, at p. 4].
Mr. Gore showed no signs of heat stroke and was able to stand up and walk back to his cell. Mr.
Gore was transported to the medical clinic when his condition worsened. Nurse Meyer called Dr.
Wolfe and administered oxygen and anti-nausea medication. She also took his vitals again at 2:10
p.m. His temperature was 97.3, his pulse was 72, his oxygen was 100%, and his blood pressure
was 140/85. [Dkt. 128-4, at p. 4]. When Mr. Gore arrived at the St. John’s ER, he was alert and
not in distress. His temperature was 98.4, his pulse was 61, and his blood pressure was 136/76.
Mr. Gore’s medical records conclusively show that his vitals were normal and he was stable, both
before he was transported to the ER and after he arrived.
Dr. Gregory Pugh, after reviewing Mr. Gore’s medical records from the IDOC and St.
John’s Hospital, has concluded, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Dr. Wolfe and
Nurse Meyer complied with the standard of care in their treatment of Mr. Gore on July 6, 2012.
Specifically, Nurse Meyer timely responded to initial reports that Mr. Gore required medical
attention, and appropriately assessed Mr. Gore, took his vital signs, which were within normal
limits, and determined that follow-up care was not necessary. Nurse Meyer also immediately
contacted Dr. Wolfe for orders when Mr. Gore presented to the medical unit for reported vomiting
shortly after Nurse Meyer’s initial assessment. She attempted to follow Dr. Wolfe’s orders to
administer IV fluids without success. However, Dr. Pugh opined it is not uncommon for nurses,
including ER nurses with whom he works, to have difficulty in establishing IV access after several
attempts. After she was unsuccessful in administering an IV, Nurse Meyer contacted Dr. Wolfe,
who ordered that Mr. Gore be transferred to an outside ER for further care. The overall timeframe
in which Nurse Meyer rendered care and contacted Dr. Wolfe for orders to transfer Mr. Gore was
entirely appropriate according to Dr. Pugh, and Mr. Gore has not provided any evidence to the
contrary. Dr. Pugh also concluded that Dr. Wolfe ordered entirely appropriate and standard
medical treatments (IV fluids and anti-nausea medication) for Mr. Gore’s subjective complaints
and objective symptoms. Additionally, Mr. Gore’s condition at the time he was sent to the St.
John’s Hospital ER was not emergent, his most recent vital signs prior to transfer (taken at
approximately 2:10 p.m.) were well within normal limits, and therefore, the decision to transfer
Mr. Gore by IDOC vehicle, as opposed to ambulance, was entirely appropriate. [Dkt. 128-3].
Finally, Dr. Pugh concluded that Mr. Gore likely did not experience heat stroke on July 6,
2012, but instead likely experienced dehydration, heat exhaustion, and rhabdomyolysis. He based
his conclusion on the fact that Mr. Gore’s body temperature never exceeded 98.6 degrees (normal
body temperature) and, in fact, was below-average (97.3 degrees) prior to admission to the St.
John’s Hospital ER and that Mr. Gore was never incoherent, which points strongly away from heat
stroke, which almost always involves a mental status change. [Dkt. 128-3]. In his response in
opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Gore disputes the evidence provided by Dr. Gore by either
relying on his own affidavit or by simply stating he disputes the statement of Dr. Pugh. [Dkt. 141,
at pp. 7-10]. At summary judgment, whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely
disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record,
including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Simply stating you
dispute the statement of an expert, without more, is not sufficient.
Nurse Meyer and Dr. Wolfe have shown that the medical care they provided Mr. Gore on
July 6, 2012, for a heat related event, was timely, reasonable, and appropriate. Mr. Gore has
presented no evidence to dispute the medical records which show Mr. Gore’s vitals were normal,
and that he was stable and alert both immediately before and after arriving at the ER, or the opinion
of Dr. Pugh, that Nurse Meyer and Dr. Wolfe complied with the standard of care. As such, Nurse
Meyer and Dr. Wolfe are entitled to summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim against
Dr. Wolfe and Nurse Meyer.
B. Policy, Practice, or Procedures Claim- Corizon
Mr. Gore alleges that Corizon has a policy, practice or procedure that was deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. He also alleges that Corizon failed to maintain policies, practices
or procedures to ensure he received medical care and treatment within the standard of care, and
that Corizon failed to adequately train and supervise medical staff at Pendleton.
Deliberate indifference claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a corporation
like Corizon cannot be based on the theory of respondeat superior. Chaves v. Illinois State Police,
251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001); Moore v. State of Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir. 1993).
Because Corizon acts under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function,
i.e. providing medical care to correctional facilities, it is treated as a government entity for purposes
of section 1983 claims. See Jackson v. Illinois Medi–Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2002).
To state a deliberate indifference claim against Corizon, Mr. Gore must establish that he
suffered a constitutional deprivation as the result of an express policy or custom of Corizon. Id.
Mr. Gore must show that Corizon has: (1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a
constitutional deprivation; (2) a practice that is so wide-spread that, although not authorized by
written or express policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with
the force of law, or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with
final policy making authority. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 758–759 (7th Cir.
2004). In addition to showing that his medical care was affected by a policy, custom, or procedure
of Corizon, Mr. Gore must also offer evidence of other offenders who have been subjected to the
same allegedly indifferent conduct as he complains about, because a custom cannot be established
through a single incident. Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2003).
As an initial matter, Mr. Gore did not designate any evidence that it was the policy, custom,
or procedure of Corizon that led to the alleged deliberate indifference. Mr. Gore may not proceed
under the theory of respondeat superior. As Mr. Gore has not presented a shred of evidence that
his alleged lack of medical care was due to any corporate policy, custom, practice, or procedure of
Corizon, the motion for summary judgment must be granted as to this section 1983 claim. 6
C. State Law Claim of Negligence
To the extent Mr. Gore alleges the decision to transport him to the ER by IDOC vehicle rather
than by ambulance was a Corizon policy, this argument fails. Dr. Wolfe stated that he made the
decision to transport Mr. Gore to the ER by IDOC vehicle. [Dkt. 128-1, at pp. 5-6]. This shows
that Dr. Wolfe exercised independent medical judgment to have Mr. Gore transported by IDOC
vehicle, and no underlying Corizon policy determined that an ambulance was not necessary.
Because the Court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate on Mr. Gore’s
constitutional claims, no federal claim remains in this litigation. The Court must assess whether it
should continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Gore’s state law claims. The Court
ultimately has discretion whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law
claims. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
(“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction....”). When deciding
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each
case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173, (1997) (quoting
Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988)).
Here, the relevant factors weigh in favor of the Court exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over Mr. Gore’s state law claims. The parties have fully briefed all of the state law claims. Thus
retaining jurisdiction over the state law claims would promote judicial economy.
Mr. Gore alleged the defendants were negligent and owed him a duty to provide adequate
medical care and they breached this duty by allowing their conduct to fall below the applicable
standard of care. [Dkt. 79, at pp. 14-15]. The Court treats this as a medical malpractice claim. Mr.
Gore addresses this argument in his response by describing the actions of Corizon negligent,
reckless, and intentional. [Dkt. 141, at p. 14]. In order for Mr. Gore to succeed on his medical
malpractice claim he must prove that (1) a duty was owed to him by the defendants; (2) the
defendants breached this duty when their conduct fell below the set standard of care; and (3) he
suffered an injury proximately caused by the defendants’ breach of duty. Stumph v. Foster, 524
N.E.2d 812, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). In addition, expert testimony is generally necessary to
establish that a professional’s performance fell below the requisite standard of care in a medical
malpractice case. Id. However, expert testimony is only required when the issue of determining
the standard of care is beyond the realm of the lay person. Emig v. Physicians Physical Therapy
Serv., 432 N.E.2d 52, 53 (Ind. App. Ct. 1982).
Mr. Gore’s medical malpractice claim fails as a matter of law. There is no dispute that Mr.
Gore suffered a heat related event on July 6, 2012. However, Mr. Gore failed to produce any expert
testimony articulating whether the defendants’ performance fell below the requisite standard of
care. In contrast, the only evidence in this action shows that Dr. Wolfe and Nurse Meyer complied
with the standard of care in their treatment of him on July 6, 2012. The defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on this claim.
Breach of Contract
Mr. Gore alleges the defendants breached the contract between the IDOC and Corizon
when they failed to provide Mr. Gore with adequate medical services when he suffered a
heatstroke. Mr. Gore alleged that he, and other inmates, are intended third-party beneficiaries of
the contract. [Dkt. 79, at p. 14]. A third party beneficiary contract exists when: (1) the parties
intend to benefit the third party, (2) the contract imposes a duty on one of the parties in favor of
the third party, and (3) the performance of the terms of the contract renders a direct benefit to the
third party intended by the parties to the contract. Natl. Bd. of Examiners for Osteopathic
Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. American Osteopathic Ass'n., 645 N.E.2d 608, 618 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994). However, he failed to respond to defendants’ arguments that Corizon did not breach the
contract between it and the IDOC. Accordingly, the Court finds that he has abandoned those
claims. United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 536 (7th Cir. 2005) (“unsupported and
undeveloped arguments are waived”).
Mr. Gore failed to designate any evidence regarding the terms of the contract between
Corizon and the IDOC. Because Mr. Gore failed to designate any evidence related to this claim,
the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 126] is
granted. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: February 7, 2017
Electronically registered counsel
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