GRAY v. ALSIP et al
Filing
44
ENTRY granting Defendant Herb Troyer's 39 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting Defendants D. Alsip and Jennifer Rhinehart's 36 Motion for Summary Judgment. No partial final judgment shall issue as to the c laims resolved in this Entry. Gray shall have through March 24, 2014, in which to show cause why his claims against defendant Franklin should not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the same reasons the claims against defendants Alsip, Rinehart, and Troyer have been dismissed. Failure to show cause will result in the dismissal of the action without prejudice (see Entry for additional information). Copy to Plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 3/3/2014. (SWM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DIS ICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
STEVEN GRAY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
D. ALSIP, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:13-cv-297-JMS-DML
Entry Discussing Motions for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Steven Gray brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the
defendants failed to protect him from harm by other inmates. Arguing that Gray failed to exhaust
his available administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit, defendants D. Alsip, Jennifer
Rinehart (misspelled “Rhinehart” in the complaint), and Herb Troyer move for summary
judgment. Gray has not responded.
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material fact” is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a reasonable jury
could find for the non-moving party. Id. The court views the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Ault v.
Speicher, 634 F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).
Gray has not opposed the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The consequence
of his failure to do so is that he has conceded the defendants’ version of the facts. Smith v. Lamz,
321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the
local rules results in an admission.”); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921–
22 (7th Cir. 1994). This does not alter the standard for assessing a Rule 56(a) motion, but does
“reduc[e] the pool” from which the facts and inferences relative to such a motion may be drawn.
Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
II. Discussion
A. Undisputed Facts
Consistent with the foregoing, therefore, the following facts are undisputed.
Gray’s complaint alleges that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his
requests for protection in October and November of 2012. The Indiana Department of Correction
maintains a grievance policy that must be followed by inmates wishing to raise issues related to
the conditions of their confinement. This grievance policy includes three steps: 1) an informal
complaint, 2) a formal, written grievance, and 3) an appeal. All three steps must be completed
before the grievance process is considered to be exhausted. Gray has never filed a grievance
related to his request for protection or otherwise related to the allegations of his complaint.
B. Analysis
The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust his available administrative remedies before
bringing a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516, 524-25 (2002). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to “all inmate suits about
prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they
allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. “Proper exhaustion
demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no
adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the
course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote omitted); see
also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In order to properly exhaust, a prisoner
must submit inmate complaints and appeals ‘in the place, and at the time, the prison’s
administrative rules require.’”) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.
2002)).
Here, it is undisputed that Gray never filed a grievance related to the incidents at issue in
his complaint. He therefore failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by
the PLRA.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants D.
Alsip, Jennifer Rinehart, and Herb Troyer [dkt. 36 and dkt. 39] must be granted. No partial final
judgment shall issue as to the claims resolved in this Entry.
Gray shall have through March 24, 2014, in which to show cause why his claims
against defendant Franklin should not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for the same reasons the claims against defendants Alsip, Rinehart, and
Troyer have been dismissed. Failure to show cause will result in the dismissal of the action
without prejudice
IT IS SO ORDERED.
03/03/2014
Date: _________________
Distribution:
Steven Gray
#906531
Pendleton Correctional Facility
4490 West Reformatory Road
Pendleton, IN 46064
All electronically registered counsel
_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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