CHAIB v. THE GEO GROUP, INC.

Filing 115

ORDER granting 56 Motion for Summary Judgment and Ms. Chaib's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 2/18/2015. (CBU)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
NORA CHAIB,
Plaintiff,
v.
GEO GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 1:13-cv-00318-TWP-MJD

ENTRY ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO Group”) (Filing No. 56). Plaintiff, Nora Chaib (“Ms. Chaib”), filed this
action against her former employer, GEO Group, alleging she was discriminated against on the
basis of her race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), as well as based upon her sex and national origin
in violation of Title VII. In addition, she alleges GEO Group retaliated against her after she
complained about discriminatory conduct and for filing a workers’ compensation claim under
Indiana state law. GEO Group argues it is entitled to summary judgment on all of Ms. Chaib’s
federal claims because she was not meeting legitimate employment expectations and cannot show
that GEO Group’s reason for her termination was pretext. For the same reasons, GEO Group
contends it did not retaliate against Ms. Chaib in violation of Indiana law. For the reasons set forth
below, GEO Group’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND

As the summary judgment standard requires, the undisputed material facts and the disputed
evidence are presented by the court in the light reasonably most favorable to Ms. Chaib as the non-

moving party. Ms. Chaib was born in France and is of French and Algerian descent. GEO Group
provides private correctional and detention management, community re-entry services, and
behavioral mental health services to government agencies worldwide. GEO Group operates the
Short Term Offender Program (“STOP”) facility in Plainfield, Indiana.1 Ms. Chaib began working
for GEO Group as a correctional officer at its STOP facility on or around August 8, 2011. At her
orientation, she received and reviewed various GEO Group employment policies, including the
Employee Handbook, Conduct Policy, Progressive Discipline Policy, the Sexual Harassment and
Workplace Harassment policy, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Policy. On September 23,
2011, Ms. Chaib was promoted to the Assistant Safety Manager position.

David Burch

(“Superintendent Burch”), STOP’s Superintendent, was Ms. Chaib’s direct supervisor after the
promotion.
A.

Ms. Chaib’s Complaints
On October 31, 2011, Ms. Chaib complained to Human Resources that a co-worker, Denise

Bondelie (“Ms. Bondelie”) had made a “racist comment” and that Ms. Chaib “felt offended.” Ms.
Bondelie asked Ms. Chaib who a visiting “Black” employee was. When Ms. Chaib answered that
he was the director if the region, Ms. Bondelie replied that he could not be because GEO Group
did not have any Black men in the pictures of corporate representatives in the lobby. Human
Resources investigated Ms. Chaib’s complaint, and referred it to the Internal Affairs/Office of
Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) for further investigation. The Internal Affairs investigator
did not substantiate Ms. Chaib’s claims stating that “nobody else had heard the conversation.”
GEO Group took no further action on this matter.

On November 18, 2010 The GEO Group, Inc. was awarded a contract from the Indiana Department of Correction to
operate the Short Term Offender Program Facility (STOP). On March 21, 2011, the facility began receiving offenders.
http://www.in.gov/idoc/3208.htm.
1

2

On December 19, 2011, Ms. Chaib got into a verbal altercation with her co-worker,
Lieutenant Kevin Davis (“Lt. Davis”), about Ms. Chaib working over the weekend as a
correctional officer. During the argument, Lt. Davis claimed that she had “stabbed him in the
f____ back,” called her a “stupid foreigner” and that she would “work sanitation.” Two days later,
Ms. Chaib called into GEO Group’s employee hotline number to complain about the incident with
Lt. Davis. GEO Group referred her allegation to OPR for investigation by Holly Strong (“Ms.
Strong”). Lt. Davis disputed Ms. Chaib’s version of the incident. Because Ms. Chaib could not
corroborate her allegation against Lt. Davis with any other evidence, Ms. Strong concluded her
investigation and determined she could not substantiate the allegation.
In late January or early February 2012, Ms. Chaib reported to Acting Assistant
Superintendent Daniel LaFlore (“Mr. LaFlore”) that she had discovered a document on her
computer titled “Simplex Information” that contained an inappropriate comment.

Simplex

Grinnell is one of GEO Group’s vendors who provide monitoring of smoke detectors and other
alarms for the STOP facility. Specifically, the document was titled Smoke Detectors, but when
Ms. Chaib opened the document it contained the statement: “All niggers remain on your bunk or
you will be shot.” Ms. Chaib did not know how the document or statement got onto the computer
in her office and did not know how long it had been there. Mr. LaFlore asked Ms. Chaib to place
the document on an external drive. After she did so, Mr. LaFlore removed the document and
returned the drive to Ms. Chaib.
B.

Ms. Chaib’s Injury and Termination
On March 6, 2012, Ms. Chaib was injured when a swinging gate struck her on the head.

Specifically, on a windy day, the control room released the gate and it swung out suddenly, hitting
Ms. Chaib in the head. Later that day, Ms. Chaib went to visit a physician and complained of a

3

headache, progressively blurred vision, nausea, dizziness, vomiting, and light sensitivity. The
physician placed Ms. Chaib off work on March 6 and 7, 2012, and noted that she was not to drive.
Ms. Chaib returned to the physician’s office on March 8, 2012, with complaints of dizziness when
getting up, headaches of 5 out of 10 on a pain scale, and difficulty sleeping. The physician placed
Ms. Chaib under restrictions until March 11, 2012 of no lifting over five pounds, no repetitive
motions/awkward positions, no walking or standing over an hour, and no operation of motorized
vehicles. Ms. Chaib returned to the physician on March 12, 2012. At that visit, she complained
that she felt no improvement and had been vomiting over the weekend. She also reported that her
headache was 8 out of 10 on the pain scale and was worse when she stood up, and that she was
experiencing trouble sleeping. The doctor placed Ms. Chaib off work on March 12 and 13, 2012,
and instructed that she could not drive or operate machinery. She again went to the physician on
March 14, 2012 and continued to complain of headaches, dizziness and nausea. The physician
again placed Ms. Chaib off work until March 20, 2012 and directed her not to operate motor
vehicles.
On or around March 14, 2012, GEO Group’s Director of Claims Management, Kathy
Chiarello (“Ms. Chiarello”), directed Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. GEO Group’s
workers’ compensation third party administrator, to hire an independent investigator to record Ms.
Chaib’s activities. Ms. Chiarello, who had never met Ms. Chaib, was suspicious because Ms.
Chaib appeared to show no improvement after several days. At Ms. Chiarello’s direction, the
contracted investigators videotaped Ms. Chaib on March 17, 18, and 19, 2012, and recorded her
changing the tags on her license plates, driving her car and running errands to the tanning salon,
Dollar General store, drug store, auto parts store, multiple clothing stores, the grocery store on
multiple occasions, a hair accessory store, a park, two gas stations, and several friends’ homes.

4

On March 20, 2012, Ms. Chaib again visited the physician and complained of daily
headaches, nausea, vomiting, and waning concentration. The physician placed Ms. Chaib off
work, referred her to a neurologist, and directed that she should not operate motor vehicles.
On or around March 26, 2012, Ms. Chiarello received a report from the investigator along
with a portion of the video surveillance. Ms. Chiarello watched the video and observed Ms. Chaib
driving and running errands, and reviewed the investigator’s report summarizing Ms. Chaib’s
activities. Ms. Chaib was scheduled to visit a neurologist, Dr. Karyn Vogel, M.D. (“Dr. Vogel”),
on April 10, 2012. GEO Group forwarded the investigator’s video to Dr. Vogel before the April
10, 2012 appointment. After reviewing the surveillance video and examining Ms. Chaib, Dr.
Vogel concluded that the video showed no evidence that Ms. Chaib was at all impaired, and
appeared to be functioning at a very normal level. Furthermore, Dr. Vogel stated, “I believe that
there is likely malingering contributing to her persistent complaints. I do not see any sign on her
exam today or in the surveillance video that would suggest that she has sustained any neurologic
injury.” (Filing No. 58-3, at ECF p. 76.)
After reviewing the surveillance video, investigator’s report, and the neurologist’s notes,
Ms. Chiarello contacted GEO Group’s Human Resources Director, Julie Owens (“Ms. Owens”),
to inform her of the investigator’s findings.

Ms. Chiarello also forwarded a copy of the

surveillance video to Ms. Owens. Ms. Owens then forwarded the video to Ms. Chaib’s supervisor
and Rose Wells (“Ms. Wells”), Human Resources Assistant for the STOP facility.
Ms. Chaib returned to work from her medical leave on or around April 17, 2012. On April
18, 2012, after watching the surveillance footage, Superintendent Burch placed Ms. Chaib on
administrative leave for unbecoming conduct based upon workers’ compensation fraud, effective
immediately. During the meeting with Superintendent Burch Ms. Chaib told him that she told her

5

doctors she had been driving because she did not have a choice. Superintendent Burch then made
the recommendation to terminate Ms. Chaib’s employment for falsifying records. On June 14,
2012, GEO Group informed Ms. Chaib via letter that her employment was terminated for
unbecoming conduct.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476 F.3d
487, 489-90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews “the
record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in
that party’s favor.” Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
However, “[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its
pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a
genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted).
“In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence to
defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits of
a claim.” Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations
omitted). Finally, “neither the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment.” Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir.
1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

6

III. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court must resolve GEO Group’s Motion to Strike Surreply (Filing
No. 111).
A.

Motion to Strike Ms. Chaib’s Surreply
GEO Group objects to Ms. Chaib’s surreply and has moved to strike it on the basis that the

surreply exceeds the scope permitted by Southern District of Indiana Local Rule 56-1(d). (Filing
No. 111.) GEO Group argues that Ms. Chaib is not responding to evidentiary objections or new
evidence raised for the first time in the reply, but instead her surreply is merely a rehash of
arguments previously made, and she has mistakenly characterized GEO Group’s arguments as
objections. GEO Group does not, as Ms. Chaib argues, object to the admissibility of any of her
evidence; rather, they merely argue that such evidence is not material. Although the Court always
tries to allow litigants a full and fair opportunity to respond to arguments made by their adversary,
including allowing surreplies, see e.g., Pike v. Caldera, 188 F.R.D. 519, 535–36 (S.D. Ind. 1999),
surreplies are not allowed under the local rules unless they are to address newly raised evidence or
arguments, or respond to objections raised in the reply. The Court agrees with GEO Group that
Ms. Chaib’s surreply is not limited to new evidence and objections; therefore, GEO Group’s
Motion to Strike Surreply (Filing No. 111) is GRANTED and Ms. Chaib’s Surreply (Filing No.
110) is STRICKEN.
B.

Title VII and § 1981 Discrimination Claims
A plaintiff alleging race, national origin, or sex discrimination may show discrimination in

one of two ways: either (1) through the “direct” method, by presenting direct and/or circumstantial
evidence on the issue of discriminatory intent, or (2) by relying on the “indirect,” burden shifting
method set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, (1973). See Wyninger v.

7

New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 978 (7th Cir. 2004). “Direct evidence is evidence which
if believed by the trier of fact, will prove the particular fact in question without reliance on
inference or presumption . . . stated differently, direct evidence essentially requires an admission
by the decision-maker that his actions were based on the prohibited animus.” Hossack v. Floor
Covering Assocs. of Joliet, Inc., 492 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 2007). Direct evidence of a defendant
admitting discrimination is rare, so most cases are proven by circumstantial evidence.
“Circumstantial evidence, unlike direct evidence, need not directly demonstrate discriminatory
intent, but rather it ‘allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decision maker’ from
suspicious words or actions.” Id. at 862 (quoting Rogers v. City of Chi., 320 F.3d 748, 753 (7th
Cir.2003)).
Although Ms. Chaib argues there is ample circumstantial evidence to prove race
discrimination under the direct method, the Court is not persuaded. Ms. Chaib has presented no
direct evidence and insufficient circumstantial evidence to support her contention that GEO Group
discriminated against her because of her race, gender, or national origin. She asserts that the
anonymous racial statement on her computer and her complaints about discrimination because
there were no pictures of Black persons on the wall and later that Lt. Davis was discriminating
against her and other African-Americans is direct evidence of discrimination. However, none of
the evidence cited shows that the decision makers held any discriminatory animus toward Ms.
Chaib, nor is there any evidence that could impute liability to GEO Group for the allegedly
offensive comments to which Ms. Chaib cites. The designations fail to establish a genuine issue
of material fact utilizing the direct method; therefore, Ms. Chaib must proceed under the indirect
method.

8

1.

Race Discrimination Claims

With respect to Ms. Chaib’s race discrimination claims, GEO Group argues that she cannot
satisfy the first element of her prima facie case, which is that she is a member of a protected class.
Ms. Chaib argues that she “self-identifies” as African-American based upon her Algerian ancestry,
while GEO Group argues that because Ms. Chaib appears to be Caucasian she is not included
within a protected racial class. While Title VII does not define the term “race,” the Supreme Court
has stated that “Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons
who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics . . . whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific
theory.” St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (construing § 1981).
Ms. Chaib’s argument that she was discriminated against based upon her Algerian descent
conflates race and national origin. “[R]ace and national origin . . . are ideologically distinct
categories.” Nyunt v. Tomlinson, 543 F. Supp. 2d 25, 35 (D.D.C. 2008) aff’d sub nom. Nyunt v.
Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 589 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) (defining national origin as “the country where a person was born, or,
more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came”); Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve
and Instrument Div., 494 F. Supp. 215, 216 (W.D. La. 1980) (finding that the legislative history
of Title VII precisely states that a person’s national origin has nothing to do with race)). In addition
to the undisputed evidence that employees at GEO Group perceived Ms. Chaib as Caucasian, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines for reporting employee demographics
provides that for purpose of race and ethnic designations, “White (Not Hispanic or Latino)” is
defined as “[a] person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or
North Africa.” See Equal Employment Opportunity Standard Form 100, Employer Information

9

Report EEO-1 Instruction Booklet Appendix, O.M.B. No. 3046-0007, Revised January 2006,
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/2007instructions.cfm (last accessed
January 30, 2015) (emphasis added); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Compliance
Manual, Section 15: Race & Color Discrimination, 2006 WL 4673425 (June 1, 2006) (Racial
categories are “social-political constructs . . . and should not be interpreted as being genetic,
biological, or anthropological in nature.”). Ms. Chaib cannot use her Algerian descent to form the
basis of the claim that she is “African-American” merely because Algeria is on the continent of
Africa. Algeria is located in North Africa, an area in which the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission considers the people “White.” There is no credible evidence in the record that the
employees considered Ms. Chaib “African-American;” thus the Court finds that Ms. Chaib has not
shown that there is a question of fact as to whether she is member of a protected group for purposes
of her race discrimination claims.
2.

Legitimate Employment Expectations and Pretext

Regardless of whether Ms. Chaib can show that she is a member of all of the protected
classes upon which her discrimination claims are based, and whether she can show she engaged in
a protected activity, fatal to each of Ms. Chaib’s claims is the fact that she cannot satisfy the forth
element of her prima facie case for discrimination and retaliation, which is that she was meeting
GEO Group’s legitimate employment expectations at the time of her termination. Ms. Chaib
argues that prior to her injury, she was meeting GEO Group’s legitimate employment expectations
and they cannot rely upon conduct that lead to her termination to argue that she was not meeting
her employment expectations. “[W]hen a district court evaluates the question of whether an
employee was meeting an employer’s legitimate employment expectations, the issue is not the
employee’s past performance but ‘whether the employee was performing well at the time of [her]

10

termination.’” Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 329 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Karazanos v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 336 (7th Cir. 1991)). Because GEO
Group’s proffered reason for terminating Ms. Chaib is also the basis for its conclusion that she
was not meeting employment expectations, the question of whether her performance was
satisfactory merges with the inquiry into whether the stated reason was pretextual. See Jones v.
Ill. St. Toll Highway Auth., 502 F. App’x 587, 591 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Everroad v. Scott Truck
Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2010); Senske v. Sybase, Inc., 588 F.3d 501, 506–07
(7th Cir. 2009); Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 642 (7th Cir. 2008)). To demonstrate
pretext, Ms. Chaib must show that the nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her is a lie
masking discriminatory intent. Id.
Ms. Chaib has not presented any evidence that GEO Group’s proffered reason for her
termination—unbecoming conduct in the form of workers’ compensation fraud—is a lie. To
demonstrate pretext, Ms. Chaib must demonstrate that GEO Group’s articulated reason for her
discharge either: (1) has no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate her discharge; or (3) was
insufficient to motivate her discharge. Velasco v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 246 F.3d 1010, 1017
(7th Cir. 2001).

First, Ms. Chaib argues pretext because the restriction that she not drive was

contained in Work Status reports for workers compensation that were sent to GEO Group and she
did not know she was prohibited from driving during her leave. However, the proper inquiry is
not whether Ms. Chaib knew that she was not supposed to drive, but whether GEO Group honestly
believed that she committed workers compensation fraud by her activities, which included driving.
Ms. Chaib admits that she engaged in the activities deemed by her employer to be inconsistent
with the restrictions placed upon her by the physician, based upon her subjective complaints
following her injury. Chaib Dep. 144:2-25 (Filing No. 58-3, at ECF p. 26).

11

Additionally, Ms. Chaib argues that she drove because she had no other way to get back
and forth to her doctor appointments; however, this does not account for the other inconsistent
activities she engaged in while she was off work. On March 20, 2012, one day following the last
videotaping, Ms. Chaib reported to the physician that she still has daily headaches of the same
intensity and that she continues to feel nauseated and dizzy. (Filing No. 58-3, at ECF p. 73). In
the video, however, she is observed performing normal activities such as shopping, tanning, and
visiting friends with no apparent difficulty. On April 10, 2012 Ms. Chaib told the physician that
she was extremely dizzy, had poor energy, and could not do any normal activity including those
requiring minimal exertion and that she sits on the couch all day. (Filing No. 58-3, at ECF p. 75.)
Ms. Chaib also ignores neurologist Dr. Vogel’s assessment, based upon her review of the video,
that Ms. Chaib’s activities and behavior were inconsistent with her alleged symptoms, and that she
was of the opinion that Ms. Chaib was malingering. (Filing No. 58-3, at ECF pp. 75-76.) Ms.
Chaib’s focus on the fact that she drove while under a driving restriction as being the reason for
her termination is too narrow; rather, she was terminated because GEO Group believed she was
exaggerating the severity of her injury in order to collect workers’ compensation benefits.
Ms. Chaib focuses much of her pretext argument on Lt. Davis’s conduct and his treatment
of other employees and prisoners. Importantly, Lt. Davis did not supervise Ms. Chaib and had no
role in GEO Group’s decision to terminate her employment. She argues that Lt. Davis was a “serial
harasser” and that more than six complaints of discrimination had been filed against him by more
than five different employees before he was eventually terminated by GEO Group. However, Lt.
Davis’s conduct, as well as complaints about his conduct, are irrelevant to Ms. Chaib’s admission
that she engaged in activities that a physician determined were inconsistent with her complaints as
to her condition and functional ability. Ms. Chaib provides absolutely no evidence that GEO

12

Group fabricated the evidence and reason for her termination as a cover up for unlawful
discrimination. At bottom, the verbal altercation with Lt. Davis and the offensive language in a
document on her computer have nothing to do with the alleged workers’ compensation fraud.
Finally, GEO Group’s reason for Ms. Chaib’s termination has always been consistent,
contrary to her argument. See Filing No. 92-9, at ECF pp. 59; Filing No. 92-9, at ECF p. 77. There
is no actual conflict in GEO Group’s explanations of why it recommended and eventually
terminated Ms. Chaib’s employment. The only change was the recommended termination code,
but all of the factual allegations remained the same. Thus, there is insufficient evidence from which
a reasonable jury could conclude that GEO Group’s stated reason for Ms. Chaib’s termination was
pretext for unlawful discrimination or retaliation. Therefore, GEO Group is entitled to summary
judgment on Ms. Chaib’s Title VII and § 1981 claims.
C.

Workers’ Compensation Retaliation Claim
Ms. Chaib also asserts that she was discharged because she filed a workers’ compensation

claim, which is also known as a Frampton claim under Indiana law. Frampton v. Central In. Gas
Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). “In order to be successful on a claim for retaliatory discharge, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her discharge was solely in retaliation for the exercise of a
statutory right.” Purdy v. Wright Tree Serv., Inc., 835 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The
Indiana Court of Appeals has explained that the use of the word “solely” means only that any and
all reasons for the discharge must be unlawful in order to sustain the claim for retaliatory discharge.
Id. In order to assert a Frampton claim, the employee must “present evidence that directly or
indirectly supplies the necessary inference of causation between the filing of a worker’s
compensation claim and the termination.” Id. at 213. The burden then shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. Id. Finally, if the employer

13

carries that burden, the employee can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the reason
offered by the employer is a pretext. Id. This can be done by showing, for example, that the
employer’s proffered reason is factually baseless, is not the actual motivation for the discharge, or
is insufficient to motivate the discharge. Id.
Ms. Chaib’s Frampton claim fails for the same reason her Title VII and § 1981
discrimination and retaliation claims fail; she has not presented sufficient evidence to show that
the proffered reason for her termination was pretext. Ms. Chaib is essentially challenging GEO
Group’s determination that she fraudulently obtained workers’ compensation benefits by
misleading them and her physicians regarding her injury and ability to work. The court does not
sit as a “super-personnel” department to decide whether the business decisions of an employer are
correct; the court’s only concern is whether the employer honestly believed that reason. Purdy,
835 N.E. 2d at 214. Whether Ms. Chaib disagrees with GEO Group’s conclusion is irrelevant, and
she has offered no other evidence to show that she was terminated because of the workers’
compensation claim itself, and not because her employer believed that she exaggerated the extent
of her injuries. Therefore, the Court finds that Ms. Chaib has not presented a question of triable
fact on her claim alleging she was terminated in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation
claim, and GEO Group is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ms. Chaib has failed to show that there are questions of material fact for the jury on all of
the elements of her discrimination, retaliation, and Frampton claims. For the reasons set forth
above, GEO Group’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 56) is GRANTED, and Ms.
Chaib’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
14

Date: 2/18/2015

DISTRIBUTION:
Richard L. Darst
COHEN GARELICK & GLAZIER
[e-mail]
Alan L. McLaughlin
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. (Indianapolis)
[e-mail]
Emily L. Connor
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. (Indianapolis)
[e-mail]

15