MASSEY v. HANKS

Filing 14

ENTRY and ORDER - There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceeding, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Masse y to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, Massey's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED and the action DISMISSED. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 8/19/2013. (copy to Petitioner via US Mail) (JKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

CLIFTON MASSEY,

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Petitioner,
vs.
CRAIG HANKS, Superintendent,
Respondent.

No. 1:13-cv-482-JMS-MJD

Entry and Order Dismissing Action
I.
Limited and well-defined due process procedures must be followed before good time may
be taken from a prison inmate such as petitioner Clifton Massey.
Due process requires that prisoners in disciplinary proceedings be given: “(1)
advance (at least 24 hours before hearing) written notice of the claimed violation;
(2) the opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) the
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence (when consistent
with institutional safety); and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of the
evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Rasheed-Bey v.
Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). In addition, there is a substantive
component to the issue, which requires that the decision of a conduct board be supported by
"some evidence." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985).
In the present action, state inmate Massey seeks a writ of habeas corpus based on his
contention that the disciplinary identified as No. ISR 12-10-0136, in which Massey was found
guilty of theft of state property, is tainted by constitutional error.

The pleadings and the expanded record, however, show that prison authorities adhered to
each of the procedural requirements of Wolff and that the hearing officer’s decision was
supported by constitutionally sufficient “some evidence.” Massey’s contentions otherwise are
either refuted by the expanded record or based on assertions which do not entitle him to relief.
Specifically:
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Massey was notified of the charge at 8:07 a.m. on October 30, 2012. His hearing was
conducted the next day. On the date of the hearing, Massey was taken from his cell at 8:00
a.m. The hearing was conducted a few minutes later. These circumstances support the
possibility that the hearing was conducted before 8:07 a.m. on October 31, 2012, and
hence less than 24 hours after being notified. This is unlikely, to be sure, but possible.
Even if that is what occurred, Massey identifies no prejudice from this. The asserted
infringement of Massey’s due process right to 24 hours advanced notice of the charge
before the hearing was harmless error, and because of this does not entitle Massey to relief
here. See Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 750 (2d Cir. 1991) (harmless error analysis
applies to prison disciplinary proceedings).

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Massey claims that he was denied an impartial decision maker. He claims, mistakenly, that
Hearing Officer Rhinehart screened him on the conduct report. In fact, her only
involvement other than presiding over the hearing was to sign the Notice to Lay Advocate
Form. This purely administrative step has not been shown to have compromised Officer
Rhinehart’s impartiality. Massey was not denied an impartial decisions maker. Wolff, 418
U.S. at 571 (a conduct board that follows established procedures, whose discretion is
circumscribed by regulations, and which adheres to Wolff's procedural requirements, does
not pose a hazard of arbitrariness violative of due process).

•

Massey also claims that his petition should be granted because he was not given a
segregation or confinement report within 24 hours, and that he was improperly segregated
prior to his hearing. As to the first of these specifications, the asserted infringement is of
prison policies and procedures. However, the asserted violation of prison regulations does
not support habeas corpus relief. Evans v. McBride, 94 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1996). As to
the second of these specifications, pre-hearing segregation does not implicate a due process
interest. Woodson v. Lack, 865 F.2d 107, 109 (6th Cir. 1989)(pre-hearing segregation is not
unlawful).
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of

the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the
charge, disciplinary proceeding, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and

there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Massey to the relief he
seeks. Accordingly, Massey’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action
dismissed.
II.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

08/19/2013
Date: __________________
_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
CLIFTON T. MASSEY
894401
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
4490 West Reformatory Road
PENDLETON, IN 46064
Electronically Registered Counsel