MATHUR v. FAMILY AND SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION OF INDIANA

Filing 32

ENTRY - FSSA's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 12 ) is GRANTED. Ms. Mathur's ADEA claim, Count II, is DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 2/5/2014. (JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
KIRAN MATHUR,
Plaintiff,
v.
FAMILY SOCIAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION OF INDIANA,
Defendant.

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) Case No. 1:13-cv-00519-TWP-DML
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ENTRY

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Family Social Services Administration of
Indiana’s (“FSSA”) Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 12).

Plaintiff Kiran Mathur (“Ms. Mathur”)

brought this suit against FSSA, her former employer, for discrimination on the basis of national
origin under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., and for age discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 626. FSSA seeks dismissal of Ms.
Mathur’s ADEA claim on sovereign immunity grounds. For the reasons set forth below, FSSA’s
motion is GRANTED. Ms. Mathur’s ADEA claim, Count II of her Complaint, is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
FSSA claims immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, which bars actions in
federal court against a state, state agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities.
Ind. Prot. and Advocacy Servs. v. Ind. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 371 (7th
Cir. 2010). There are three principal exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar:
First, a state may waive immunity by consenting to suit in federal court. Second,
Congress may abrogate the state’s immunity through a valid exercise of its
powers under recognized constitutional authority, such as by later constitutional
amendments. Third, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441,
52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), a plaintiff may file “suit[ ] against state officials seeking

prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law....” Marie O. v.
Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. Here, the State of Indiana has not consented to suit in federal court. Montgomery v. Bd. of
Trs. of Purdue Univ., 849 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (Ind. 2006) (“Indiana has not consented to suit
under the ADEA by enacting the IADA.”). Further, the ADEA does not contain a valid exercise
of Congress’ constitutional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000). Finally, Ms. Mathur has not sued state officials, but
has sued the agency. “Although the Eleventh Amendment bars all claims against [a state
agency] and the damages claims against its officials in their official capacities, it does not thwart
the claims against officials in their official capacities for the injunctive relief of reinstatement.”
Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added); see Tyler v. Trs.
of Purdue Univ., 834 F. Supp. 2d 830, 845 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that in a claim against state
defendant for prospective equitable relief of reinstatement, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment’s
jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought”).
Thus, the law is clear that Ms. Mathur may not bring an ADEA claim for damages or
reinstatement against FSSA as a state agency. Accordingly, FSSA’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.
12) is GRANTED. Ms. Mathur’s ADEA claim, Count II, is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.
Date: 02/05/2014
_________________

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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DISTRIBUTION:
David M. Henn
HENN LAW FIRM P.C.
[e-mail]
Paul J. Cummings
HENN LAW FIRM PC
[e-mail]
Jefferson S. Garn
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE
[e-mail]
Laura Lee Bowker
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE
[e-mail]

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