REYNOLDS v. COLVIN

Filing 24

ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW - Plaintiff, Michael F. Reynolds ("Mr. Reynolds"), requests judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying him Social Securi ty Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act. The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision denying benefits. Mr. Reynolds' appeal is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 8/6/2014.(MGG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MICHAEL F. REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:13-cv-00569-TWP-DML

ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Plaintiff, Michael F. Reynolds (“Mr. Reynolds”), requests judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”)
denying him Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social
Security Act and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act.1 For the
following reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Procedural History
On January 21, 2010, Mr. Reynolds filed a Title II application for DIB, as well as a Title

XVI application for SSI. In both applications, he alleged the onset date of his disability to be
September 1, 2007. His applications were denied initially on April 10, 2010 and again upon
reconsideration on June 2, 2010. Mr. Reynolds subsequently filed a written request for a hearing
on August 20, 2010. On December 8, 2011, a hearing was held before Administrative Law
Judge T. Whitaker (“the ALJ”). Mr. Reynolds appeared and testified in person at the hearing
1

In general, the court applies the same legal standards to both claims seeking Disability Insurance Benefits and
claims seeking Supplemental Security Income. However, there are separate, parallel regulations and statutes for
DIB and SSI. Therefore, citations in this opinion should be considered to refer to the appropriate parallel provision
as the context dictates. The same applies to citations of statutes or regulations found in quoted decisions.

and was represented by counsel. On March 1, 2012, the ALJ denied Mr. Reynolds’ applications.
On February 27, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Mr. Reynolds’ request for review of the
ALJ’s decision.

The ALJ’s decision, for purposes of judicial review, represents the final

decision of the Commissioner. Mr. Reynolds filed this civil action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), for review of the ALJ’s decision.
B.

Factual Background
Mr. Reynolds was 45 years old on the alleged disability onset date in September 2007.

He has received a marginal education through the fifth grade, has past relevant work as a
fabricator machine operator. Mr. Reynolds alleged, and the ALJ concurred, that he has the
following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, degenerative disc
disease of the lumbar spine with radiculopathy, congenital stationary hip, and obesity. The ALJ
found that Mr. Reynolds also has the following non-severe impairments: hypertriglyceridemia,
vitamin D deficiency, nicotine dependence, sleep difficulties or sleep apnea, depression, anxiety,
bipolar disorder unspecified, and cannabis dependence. Mr. Reynolds also alleges having a
disability in being a slow learner. He alleges he is unable to write at all, and was only observed
writing his name.
As a part of the disability application process, and due to the fact that Mr. Reynolds
alleged being a slow learner, the ALJ sent Mr. Reynolds to Wayne Hoye, Ph.D. (“Dr. Hoye”) to
conduct a psychological consultative examination. After a thorough diagnostic interview, mental
status examination, and intelligence testing, Dr. Hoye provided the following diagnostic
impression: cannabis dependence and anxiety not otherwise specified. Dr. Hoye assigned Mr.
Reynolds a Global Assessment Functioning (“GAF”) score of 70, which indicated “some mild
symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning, but generally

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functioning pretty well, with some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” (Filing No. 14-7, at
ECF p. 10). Using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition, Dr. Hoye determined
Mr. Reynolds has a full-scale IQ score of 83, which falls within the low average range.
Additional results of the testing indicated that Mr. Reynolds is able to comprehend and follow
task instructions without difficulty, and that his speech and thoughts are within normal limits.
In April 2010, William Shipley, Ph.D. (“Dr. Shipley”), a state agency psychological
consultant, reviewed Mr. Reynolds’ case and provided an opinion. Dr. Shipley recognized Mr.
Reynolds’ diagnoses of anxiety and cannabis dependence, but opined that those conditions did
not rise to the level of severe impairments. Dr. Shipley found that Mr. Reynolds “only had
minor limitations in his activities of daily living, social functioning, and concentration,
persistence, or pace,” and that “he reported no episodes of decompensation.” (Filing No. 14-7, at
ECF p. 19). A reviewing consultant of the state agency agreed with Dr. Shipley’s opinion.
In June 2011, Mr. Reynolds visited his treating physician and expressed concerns related
to depression and anxiety. Mr. Reynolds’ doctor conducted a formal psychological evaluation,
during which Mr. Reynolds reported struggling with various mental symptoms since his father
was murdered eight years ago. The doctor reported that Mr. Reynolds’ speech was “pressured,
but otherwise within normal limits,” and that “his thought process was tangential, with somewhat
loose content.” (Filing No. 14-7, at ECF p. 42). The doctor offered the diagnostic impression
that Mr. Reynolds suffered from bipolar disorder unspecified, cannabis dependence and nicotine
dependence. He also assigned Mr. Reynolds a GAF score of 60, indicating that Mr. Reynolds
suffers from “moderate symptoms or moderate difficulties in social, occupational or school
functioning.” (Filing No. 14-7, at ECF p. 42). Mr. Reynolds was referred to the Midtown
Community Mental Health Center (“Midtown”) for medical evaluation and treatment for his

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mental impairments, but did not follow up with Midtown. He did, however, begin taking
psychotropic medication which alleviated some of his symptoms of anxiety.
In an effort to properly diagnose Mr. Reynolds’ physical ailments and fully understand
his physical capacity for work, the ALJ sent Mr. Reynolds to Dr. Anas Safadi (“Dr. Safadi”) in
February of 2010. Dr. Safadi conducted a physical consultative examination. Mr. Reynolds
reported to Dr. Safadi that he could not walk more than two to three blocks or stand for more
than 30 minutes without pain. He complained of neck, back and hip pain. Dr. Safadi found that
Mr. Reynolds displayed no difficulties walking or standing, and needed no assistive measures to
do so. He displayed a normal gait and station. He displayed normal limitations of joints and
extremities, and normal range of motion of his cervical spine, lumbar spine, shoulders, elbows,
wrists, knees and ankles. The only indication of restriction of range of motion was in his hip.
Mr. Reynolds’ hip range of motion was “impaired bilaterally, secondary to pain.” (Filing No. 147, at ECF p. 3). He had normal grip strength and sensation to light touch. Dr. Safadi provided
the following diagnostic impression: neck pain, back pain, pinched nerve, degenerative disc
disease and congenital stationary hip. Dr. Safadi acknowledged that Mr. Reynolds’ symptoms
were affecting his quality of life and warranted further attention.

Despite Dr. Safadi’s

recommendation to seek treatment, Mr. Reynolds never followed up with any medical treatment.
In March of 2011, Mr. Reynolds was sent to obtain objective images of his spine
following complaints of neck and back pain. The images revealed Mr. Reynolds suffers from
multiple cervical and lumbar spinal conditions, including but not limited to: disc space
narrowing, multi-level spine changes, mild to moderate spinal canal stenosis of the lumbar spine,
minimal right neuroforaminal compromise of the cervical spine, and mild left neuroforaminal
compromise of the cervical spine. A. Dobson, M.D. (“Dr. Dobson”), a state agency medical

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consultant, considered all of these physical impairments as factors in his opinion of Mr.
Reynolds’ physical limitations and capacities. Dr. Dobson opined that, despite Mr. Reynolds’
severe and non-severe impairments, he is still capable of performing work at the light exertion
level. According to Dr. Dobson, Mr. Reynolds can lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and
ten pounds frequently, stand and walk six hours in a workday, and sit six hours in a workday.
Dr. Dobson opined that Mr. Reynolds should never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, but can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. (Filing No. 14-7, at
ECF p. 13). Dr. Dobson advised that Mr. Reynolds should avoid concentrated exposure to
workplace hazards, such as height and moving machinery. (Filing No. 14-7, at ECF p. 15). He
also found that Mr. Reynolds has no manipulative, visual or communicative limitations. (Filing
No. 14-7, at ECF p. 14-15).
II.

DISABILITY AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order to qualify for DBI or SSI, a claimant must demonstrate that he has a disability.
Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423 (d)(1)(A). A claimant seeking disability benefits must demonstrate that his limitations
prohibit him not only from performing his previous work, but all other kinds of gainful
employment that exist in the national economy, considering his age, education and work
experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(A).
The ALJ uses a five step, sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant qualifies as
disabled. If at any step in this analysis it becomes clear that the claimant is not disabled, the
analysis will end, and there is no need to proceed to the next step. The first step is to determine

5

whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. If so, then he does not qualify as
disabled, despite any impairment he might have. If he is not engaged in substantial gainful
activity, then, at the second step, the ALJ determines whether the impairment from which the
claimant suffers is severe, and whether such impairment meets the 12 month duration
requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Only those impairments that rise to the level of
being medically severe qualify as disabilities. Step three requires the ALJ to compare the
claimant’s severe impairment to the requirements of one in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The impairment must also meet the minimum 12 month
durational requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). At steps four and five, the ALJ must
then determine the claimant’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). A claimant’s RFC is the
most work he can do considering all of his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); Social
Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p. At step four, the ALJ must determine, taking all the claimant’s
impairments together, both severe and non-severe, whether the claimant is capable of performing
his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If he is capable of such work, he is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If he is not capable, step five requires a determination
of whether the claimant can perform any other work in the relevant economy, considering all of
his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). The burden of proof at the first four steps lies
with the claimant. If the claimant provides enough evidence to support his claims, the burden of
proof will then shift to the Commissioner to provide evidence at step five. Young v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992).
The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision in this case. Therefore, the
ALJ’s findings became the findings of the Commissioner. Henderson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 507,
512 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court granted judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision, pursuant

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to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for
that of the ALJ. Harris v. Barnhart, 219 F. Supp. 2d 996, 972 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (citing Binion
on Behalf of Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 1997)). However, it is the duty of the
Court to review the ALJ’s decision to ensure that her findings are supported by substantial
evidence and that no error of law occurred. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir.
2001). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
In assessing the validity of the ALJ’s reasoning and analysis, this Court will evaluate
whether the ALJ’s decision “demonstrate[s] the path of her reasoning,” as “the evidence must
lead logically to her conclusion.” Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (additional citation omitted).
The ALJ “need not evaluate in writing every piece of testimony submitted.” Carlson, 999 F.2d
at 181. However, “the ALJ’s decision must be based upon consideration of all of the relevant
evidence.” Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, the ALJ’s
justification of her decision need only be minimal if it is legitimate. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357
F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2004). If the Court finds that the ALJ has committed an error of law,
“reversal is required, without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual
findings.” Harris v. Barnhart, 219 F. Supp. 2d 996, 973 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
III. THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ decided the following. Mr. Reynolds meets the insured status requirements of
the Social Security Act for the purposes of DIB through December 31, 2012. Therefore, he
would be permitted to receive DIB if he were found to be disabled. At step one, the ALJ

7

determined Mr. Reynolds has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset
date of his disability, September 1, 2007. At step two, the ALJ found that Mr. Reynolds has the
following severe physical impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine,
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with radiculopathy, congenital stationary hip, and
obesity. The ALJ found that Mr. Reynolds has the following non-severe physical impairments:
hypertriglyceridemia, vitamin D deficiency, hypertension, and nicotine dependence. The ALJ
also found that Mr. Reynolds has the following non-severe mental impairments: depression,
anxiety bipolar disorder unspecified, and cannabis dependence. The ALJ concluded that Mr.
Reynolds only has mild, if any, restrictions in activities of daily life and social functioning.
Considering all of his mental impairments and limitations, according to the ALJ, Mr. Reynolds
only has mild difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace, and has had no episodes of
decompensation. At step three, the ALJ found that Mr. Reynolds does not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ concluded that Mr. Reynolds
has a RFC to perform a range of light work, that includes: lifting, carrying, pushing and pulling
twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; standing and walking each for only one
hour at a time, for a total of six hours in an eight hour workday; sitting for only one hour at a
time, for a total of six hours in an eight hour work day; no climbing of ladders, ropes or
scaffolds; no crouching, kneeling or crawling; occasional climbing of ramps or stairs; occasional
balancing; occasional stooping, but no repetitive stooping below the waist; no exposure to
vibration; no repetitive rotation flexion or extension of the neck; avoiding concentrated exposure
to unprotected heights and dangerous machinery; and work that allows an individual to be off
task five percent of the day, in addition to regularly scheduled breaks. (Filing No. 14-2, at ECF

8

pp. 19, 24). At step four, the ALJ determined that Mr. Reynolds is unable to perform any past
relevant work. At step five, the ALJ found, considering Mr. Reynolds’ age, education, work
experience, and RFC, that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that he is capable of performing. Therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A), the
ALJ concluded that Mr. Reynolds was not disabled from the alleged date of onset through the
date of the ALJ’s decision.
IV. DISCUSSION
Mr. Reynolds raises two issues in his appeal. First, he argues the ALJ failed to fully
develop the record and therefore relied on improper and incomplete evidence in making her
decision. Second, Mr. Reynolds argues the ALJ’s decision wrongfully equates activities of daily
living to the ability to engage in full-time work. Mr. Reynolds requests that, due to these alleged
errors, he should be awarded DBI and SSI benefits or, in the alternative, that this case be
remanded for further administrative proceedings.
A.

The ALJ adequately developed the record and relied on sufficient evidence in
making her decision.
Mr. Reynolds argues that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record and did not obtain all

of the relevant information required to make an informed decision in this case. In her decision,
the ALJ points out that there is “little evidence of record” concerning Mr. Reynolds’
impairments (Filing No. 14-2, at ECF p. 20). She notes that Mr. Reynolds did not seek medical
treatment during the time between the alleged onset date of his disability in September 2007
through 2010, nor did he follow Dr. Safadi’s instructions to seek follow up treatment after his
consultative examination. The ALJ also found it suspicious that with impairments of the level of
severity described by Mr. Reynolds, he had no record of emergency room visits or treatment
from a free clinic. Mr. Reynolds argues that because the record was lacking in this respect, the
9

ALJ had a duty to develop it further, and she allegedly did not. Mr. Reynolds alleges the ALJ
was required to discover why he did not seek medical treatment before making her decision, and
she failed to do so. He also contends that the ALJ did not send him to doctors to investigate his
claims of disability, despite her suspicion and the fact that the record was lacking.
The Court is not persuaded. As an initial matter, Mr. Reynolds has applied an incorrect
standard of performance to the ALJ. Mr. Reynolds cites in his argument to the case Binion v.
Shalala, in which Binion, a pro se litigant, argued that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record
in her case and, therefore, did not rely on substantial evidence in making the decision. 13 F.3d
243, 247 (7th Cir. 1994). The court in Binion found that an ALJ who is working with a pro se
litigant has a “heightened duty to ‘scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and
explore for all relevant facts.’” Id. at 245 (quoting Smith, 587 F.2d at 860). Mr. Reynolds argues
that the ALJ in this case should be held to the standard set forth in Binion. However, Mr.
Reynolds was represented by counsel in his hearing before the ALJ. The Seventh Circuit has
held that an ALJ is “entitled to assume” that a claimant represented by counsel has made his
“strongest case for benefits.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2007).
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has consistently held that the standard to which an ALJ
is held is limited to developing a “full and fair record,” in order to make a fully informed
decision. Thompson v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Smith, 587 F.2d at
860). Therefore, no heightened duty exists in this case, and the ALJ will be held to the required
standard of developing a “full and fair” record. While the ALJ must develop a full and fair
record, it is the claimant's burden to prove that he is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) ( “An
individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and

10

other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require.”);
20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a).
Similarly, Mr. Reynolds has not shown how or in what way the ALJ’s failure to inquire
about the gaps in his treatment history had a negative impact on the ALJ’s ultimate
determination. From Mr. Reynolds’ citation to the Brennan-Kenyon case, it appears that he takes
issue with the ALJ’s credibility determination. Brennan-Kenyon v Barnhart, 252 F.Supp. 2d
681, 696 (N.D. Ill. 2003). In the case Brennan-Kenyon v. Barnhart, the ALJ discredits Ms.
Brennan-Kenyon for claiming that she had “incapacitating orthopedic pain,” but not seeking any
medical treatment for relief.

Brennan-Kenyon, 252 F.Supp. 2d at 696-97.

The court in

Brennan-Kenyon held, citing to Social Security Rulings 96-7p, that an adjudicator must first
consider a claimant’s explanations, or other indications from the record, to provide insight into
why she has not sought treatment before using this fact to draw conclusions about her credibility.
Id.
Here, the ALJ did point out, although without explanation, Mr. Reynolds’ lack of
treatment in the record and made an appropriate and thorough credibility determination. The
decision was based upon the record in its entirety, with a focus on consultative examinations
(Filing No. 14-2, at ECF p. 20, 22, 24). In fact, the ALJ addressed all of the requirements for
credibility determination listed under SSR 96-7p. (Filing No. 14-2, at ECF p. 20-23). According
to SSR 96-7p, the ALJ is instructed to consider all of the following in assessing a claimant’s
credibility, in addition to “objective medical evidence”:
1. The individual’s daily activities;
2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the individual’s pain or other
symptoms;
3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;
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4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the
individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;
5. Treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or has received for
relief of pain or other symptoms;
6. Any measures other than treatment the individual uses or has used to relieve
pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20
minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board);
7. Any other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and
restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
SSR 96-7p.
In addressing the first factor, the ALJ discussed the discrepancy between Mr. Reynolds’
reported symptoms and his activities with his children and in his home.2 In addressing the
second factor, the ALJ discussed the discrepancy between Mr. Reynolds’ account of his pain and
symptoms, and the medical findings. Mr. Reynolds’ complaints of debilitating neck and back
pain conflict with his documented ability to squat completely, to walk on his heels and toes, and
the normal range of motion of his spine. Although Mr. Reynolds may be a slow learner, he was
able to complete all memory exercises successfully when tested, and to follow instructions well.
The objective medical evidence overall conflicts with Mr. Reynolds’ statements regarding his
pain, symptoms and other limitations. (Filing No. 14-2, at ECF p. 20.) In addressing the third
factor, the ALJ considered Mr. Reynolds’ aggravation of coping with obesity, coupled with his
other symptoms. The ALJ accounted for this factor in her disability determination by further
limiting Mr. Reynolds’ exertion level for work. However, the ALJ gave weight to the medical
findings which indicate that, despite his weight, he is still capable of working. This Court agrees
2

The Court acknowledges that Mr. Reynolds disputes the ALJ’s use of the fact that he is the primary caretaker of his
children against him in determining his credibility. The Court will address this issue in the following section. Here,
however, the factor of Mr. Reynolds’ daily activities is just one of many factors in determining Mr. Reynolds’
credibility. Even if the ALJ would have considered Mr. Reynolds to be completely limited in his daily activities, the
other, multiple factors for consideration would outweigh the former, and would still support the ALJ’s credibility
determination.

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with the ALJ’s assertion that disability requires more than the ability to work without pain or
discomfort. (Filing No. 14-2, at ECF p. 24.)
In addressing the fourth factor, the ALJ stated that there is no indication in the record of
Mr. Reynolds’ medication limiting him in any way. With regard to the fifth factor, the ALJ
addressed the issue of the lack of treatment in the record until 2011, and found this gap to be
suspicious. Addressing the sixth factor, the ALJ discussed Mr. Reynolds’ daily use of marijuana
to cope with pain. It is evident from the above analysis that the ALJ did not base her credibility
determination in any significant way on Mr. Reynolds’ lack of treatment in the record. The ALJ
made a logical, fully developed decision, addressing all of the necessary criteria, and meeting her
legal burden by supporting her decision with substantial medical evidence.
Moreover, the mere idea that more evidence would result in a different credibility or
disability determination is not enough.

The 7th Circuit has held that “mere conjecture or

speculation that additional evidence might have been obtained in the case is insufficient to
warrant a remand of a social security disability case on grounds that the ALJ failed to fully and
fairly develop the record. Instead a claimant must set forth specific, relevant facts—such as
medical evidence—that the ALJ did not consider.” Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th
Cir. 2009) (citing Binion, 13 F.3d at 246) (additional citation omitted).

Additionally, an

omission of evidence is only significant if it is prejudicial. Nelson, 131 F.3d at 1235.
To the contrary, Mr. Reynolds has not pointed to any specific or relevant evidence that is
missing from the record. He offers mere speculation that inquiry into his reason for not seeking
medical treatment for his back problems would have tipped the scales in the ALJ’s credibility
determination. As the ALJ relied most heavily on the consultative examinations in making her
decision, additional evidence pertaining to Mr. Reynolds’ reasons for not seeking treatment

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would not be prejudicial. This evidence is sufficient to support the ALJ’s finding regarding Mr.
Reynolds’ credibility. Although the ALJ did address Mr. Reynolds’ lack of treatment, and did
not inquire as to why it was lacking, the law does not support a remand without specific,
prejudicial evidence omitted. Nelms, 553 F.3d at 1098. Mr. Reynolds has provided no such
evidence.
Mr. Reynolds also argues that although the ALJ questioned the validity of his complaints,
she chose to “completely ignore the possibility of any real objective impairment by refusing to
send the claimant for any consultative examinations.” (Filing No. 18, at ECF p. 12.) From the
record, it is clear that this is not true. The ALJ sent Mr. Reynolds to consultative examinations
for both his alleged mental and physical impairments. In March 2010, the ALJ sent Mr.
Reynolds to Dr. Hoye for a psychological examination. (Filing No. 14-2, at ECF p. 15.) In
February of 2010, the ALJ sent Mr. Reynolds to Dr. Safadi for a physical examination. (Filing
No. 14-2, at ECF p. 20-21.) In March of 2011, the ALJ sent Mr. Reynolds to obtain objective
images of his spine. (Filing No. 14-2, at ECF p. 21.) The ALJ also solicited the opinion of Dr.
Dobson, a state agency medical consultant. (Filing No. 14-2, at ECF p. 22.) The ALJ referenced
the medical findings obtained from these visits many times in her decision. (Filing No. 14-2, at
ECF pp. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24.) Mr. Reynolds’ allegations in this regard are not
supported by the objective evidence in the record.
B.

The decision does not wrongfully equate activities of daily living to the ability to
engage in full time work.
Next, Mr. Reynolds argues the ALJ erred in concluding that he is capable of engaging in

substantial gainful employment because he is capable of being the primary caretaker of his two
children, and performing some household chores with the help of his family. The Seventh
Circuit has held that the imperative nature of taking care of one’s children may “impel [one] to
14

heroic efforts,” and does not necessarily negate the finding that one has a disability. Gentle v.
Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005). The Court agrees that it is improper to infer that
one is capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity simply because one is the primary
caretaker of their children. The Seventh Circuit has also held that the ability to perform minimal
daily activities does not imply the ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. Clifford v.
Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1490). Therefore, the
ALJ would be mistaken to conclude that Mr. Reynolds’ ability to care for children at home, to
whatever extent, negates his potential disability status. However, the ALJ does not equate Mr.
Reynolds’ abilities in taking care of his household with his ability to engage in substantial
gainful activity. Instead, the ALJ considered Mr. Reynolds’ account of his abilities to perform
daily activities as one factor of many in determining his credibility. The ALJ made an overall
credibility determination, relying on substantial evidence, and assessing all of the relevant and
requisite factors for determination.
As was addressed in the issue above, the Seventh Circuit requires thorough investigation
into a claimant’s credibility. The court in Clifford states:
If the allegation of pain is not supported by the objective medical evidence in the
file and the claimant indicates that pain is a significant factor of his or her alleged
inability to work, then the ALJ must obtain detailed descriptions of claimant’s
daily activities by directing specific inquiries about the pain and its effects to the
claimant. She must investigate all avenues presented that relate to pain, including
claimant’s prior work record, information and observations by treating physicians,
examining physicians, and third parties. Factors that must be considered include
the nature and intensity of claimant’s pain, precipitation and aggravating factors,
dosage and effectiveness of any pain medications, other treatment for relief of
pain, functional restrictions, and the claimant’s daily activities.
Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872 (citing Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1994)). In Clifford,
the court held that the ALJ was in error for neglecting to consider certain medical evidence, and
instead, relying on the claimant’s minimal daily activities as “substantial evidence that she does
15

not suffer disabling pain.” Id. The court ruled that “this [reliance] is insufficient because
minimal daily activities, such as those in issue, do not establish that a person is capable of
engaging in substantial physical activity.” Id. The SSR guidelines indicate, however, that
medical records contain objective evidence which can be “extremely valuable,” though not
determinative, in determining one’s capability of engaging in substantial gainful employment.
SSR 96-7p.
Here, the ALJ found that while Mr. Reynolds’ medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, Mr. Reynolds’ statements on intensity,
persistence and limiting effects were not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the
RFC. (Filing No. 14-2, at EFC p. 20.) For example, the ALJ noted that although Mr. Reynolds
reported he could not walk or stand for extended periods of time, the medical records provided
no indication that he was unable to ambulate effectively. (Filing No. 14-2, at ECF p. 18.) And,
although Mr. Reynolds complained of musculoskeletal difficulties and neck and back pain, there
are no corresponding clinical findings of such symptoms in the record.

Rather, at the

consultative examination he was able to squat completely, walk on his heels and toes and tandem
walk. Neurologically he was intact, with full muscle strength and tone, normal reflexes, and
intact sensation. (Filing No. 14-7, at ECF p. 3.) Again, there are no records of any emergency
room visits or free clinics or other methods of treatment (other than Mr. Reynolds’ reported
social and self-medicated use of marijuana) for four of the five years under consideration. The
Court finds the ALJ made a logical conclusion, based on inconsistencies with substantial medical
evidence, that Mr. Reynolds’ account of his symptoms is not completely credible. The medical
records, however, are not determinative, and according to Clifford, need to be considered in
context with other relevant factors. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872.

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In this case, the ALJ rightly factored into her consideration aggravation from Mr.
Reynolds’ obesity, and the findings of the x-rays in making her determination. She credits Mr.
Reynolds with experiencing musculoskeletal pains, even though there is no medical evidence of
it. The ALJ then accounted for this pain by limiting the exertion level of his prescribed work.
The ALJ also considered that Mr. Reynolds’ pain is likely due to the degenerative changes
evidenced by objective images, and noted however, that “disability requires more than just the
inability to work without pain”. (Filing No. 14-2, at ECF p. 24.) It is clear that the ALJ did not
rely solely upon her view of Mr. Reynolds’ daily activities in making her decision, but made a
thorough and fair determination based upon all of the required factors.
The Court may not reject an ALJ’s credibility finding unless it is “patently wrong.”
Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923,
928–29 (7th Cir. 2010)). While it may have been improper to factor Mr. Reynolds’ ability to
care for his children and to perform minimal chores into her credibility decision, the ALJ’s
credibility and overall disability determination was based primarily on contradictions with and
support from substantial evidence from the medical record. Moreover, “because the ALJ is in
the best position to observe witnesses, we will not disturb her credibility determinations as long
as they find some support in the record.” Dixon, 270 F.3d 1178-79; see also Herron v. Shalala,
19 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 1994). Due to the fact that the ALJ’s credibility finding was based
upon substantial evidence, the Court finds that the ALJ made no error that warrants reversal or
remand.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision denying
benefits. Mr. Reynolds’ appeal is DISMISSED.

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SO ORDERED.
08/06/2014
Date: _________________

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

DISTRIBUTION:
Charles D. Hankey
[e-mail]
Thomas E. Kieper
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
[e-mail]

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