STEPP v. REXNORD INDUSTRIES, INC.
Filing
155
ORDER granting 107 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 127 Motion for Leave to File Belated Requests. Mr. Stepp failed to designate evidence showing that Rexnord's decision not to offer him employment was based on racial discrimination . Rexnord showed that its decision not to hire Mr. Stepp was based on a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Mr. Stepp failed to offer any evidence that Rexnord's reason was pretextual. As such, summary judgment is appropriate as a matte r of law. Rexnord's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 107) is GRANTED, and Mr. Stepp's claim is DISMISSED. Additionally, Mr. Stepp's "Motion to Seek Leave of Court for Filing Belated Request(s)" (Filing No. 127) is DENIED. Copy Mailed. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 12/9/2014. (MGG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
DAMON P. STEPP,
Plaintiff,
vs.
REXNORD INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant.
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Case No. 1:13-cv-00683-TWP-MJD
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BELATED REQUESTS
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Rexnord Industries, Inc.’s (“Rexnord”)
Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 107). After failing to receive an offer of employment
from Rexnord, Plaintiff Damon P. Stepp (“Mr. Stepp”) filed a charge of race discrimination against
Rexnord with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The EEOC
conducted an investigation, dismissed the charge, and notified Mr. Stepp of his right to sue. Mr.
Stepp then initiated this lawsuit. Rexnord moves for summary judgment, asserting that Mr. Stepp
cannot show race discrimination in Rexnord’s decision not to hire him.
Also before the Court is Mr. Stepp’s “Motion to Seek Leave of Court for Filing Belated
Request(s)” (Filing No. 127). For the following reasons, Rexnord’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED, and Mr. Stepp’s Motion to File “Belated Requests” is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
As the summary judgment standard requires, the undisputed facts and disputed evidence
are presented in the light reasonably most favorable to Mr. Stepp as the non-moving party. See
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
Rexnord is a worldwide industrial company that designs and manufactures bearings,
couplings, gear drives, and a variety of other products for the automotive, mining, energy, and
other industries. In the fall of 2011, Rexnord’s Indianapolis facility had approximately 400
employees, of which approximately 280 were hourly workers. Most of these hourly employees
worked as computer numerically controlled (CNC) machinist, or in assembly or grinding; while
some worked in inspection, maintenance, shipping and receiving, or the tool room.
In the fall of 2011, Rexnord’s management decided to increase production of bearings by
over thirty percent in its Indianapolis facility. The human resource and other department managers
were tasked with determining how to meet these new production goals as quickly as possible. They
decided to quickly hire five new employees in the assembly department. Because of its need to
quickly hire additional employees, management decided to accept referrals from current
employees as well as accept applications from external candidates. Amanda Bright (“Ms. Bright”),
a current employee of Rexnord, submitted a referral for Mr. Stepp. Rexnord also received dozens
of other referrals for the five assembly positions.
Mr. Stepp graduated from high school and attended Indiana State University but did not
graduate. Following high school, he worked as a mover for a moving and storage company and
worked for several temporary employment agencies. In 2005, Mr. Stepp was hired by Major Tool
& Machine, Inc. (“Major Tool”). His first period of employment with Major Tool ended in 2006
when he had to leave town to help care for his newborn son’s health issues. Mr. Stepp began
working again at Major Tool in 2007 and was employed there for approximately two years. In
2009 his employment with Major Tool was terminated. Mr. Stepp was told his employment with
Major Tool was terminated because someone informed a manager that he was seen drinking
alcohol on his lunch break and he had violated the company’s drug/alcohol policy. Subsequently,
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Mr. Stepp filed a lawsuit alleging his termination was done out of retaliation for complaining about
OSHA violations and racial discrimination. The lawsuit was settled.
After being referred by Ms. Bright, Mr. Stepp completed an employment application,
which he submitted to Rexnord. On the application, Mr. Stepp indicated that he left his
employment with Major Tool in 2009 for a “personal” reason even though he had been terminated.
By signing the application, Mr. Stepp “certif[ied] that all information in this Application is correct
and that [he had] not omitted any information.” He also acknowledged that he “underst[ood] that
falsification of any information or omission of any material information, whenever discovered
shall be grounds for termination of employment.”
Mr. Stepp was interviewed by Ginger Nicholson, one of Rexnord’s human resource
coordinators, who then forwarded his application materials to the assembly department supervisor
for further consideration. The supervisor had some concerns about Mr. Stepp’s responses on his
application, so Ms. Nicholson called Mr. Stepp to seek clarification.
During the follow-up telephone call with Ms. Nicholson, Mr. Stepp again did not disclose
that his employment with Major Tool had been terminated. Mr. Stepp intentionally avoided
disclosing to Rexnord why he was no longer employed by Major Tool. After conducting the
follow-up call with Mr. Stepp, Ms. Nicholson reported to the assembly department supervisor that
she thought Mr. Stepp was not being forthright in his answers about his job history. Because it
appeared Mr. Stepp was being evasive about his prior employment, and in light of the large number
of other applicants under consideration, Rexnord decided not to offer employment to Mr. Stepp.
At the end of the interview process in the fall of 2011, Rexnord hired five applicants for
the assembly position. Rexnord hired Abigail Bell, Paula Collins, Kenneth Mark Hankins II, Frank
Kratoska, and DeWayne Thomas. Of these successful applicants, Mr. Thomas, like Mr. Stepp, is
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an African American male. Rexnord chose to hire these applicants based on their experience, skills,
and qualifications and on a belief that they were self-motivated, detail-oriented, team players, and
problem solvers.
Each of the five successful applicants were forthright about their prior work history during
their interviews. Mr. Stepp was one of dozens of applicants who were not given job offers in the
fall of 2011 for the open assembly positions.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d
487, 489–90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews “the
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences
in that party’s favor.” Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
However, “[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its
pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a
genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted).
“In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence to
defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits of
[the] claim.” Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Finally, “neither the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is
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sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129
F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural and Evidentiary Disputes
The Court first addresses the parties’ procedural and evidentiary disputes regarding
Rexnord’s motion for summary judgment and the related filings.
Rexnord filed its motion for summary judgment on July 11, 2014 (Filing No. 107). Mr.
Stepp is proceeding pro se. In compliance with Local Rule 56-1(k), Rexnord also filed and served
a “Notice Regarding Right to Respond to and Submit Evidence in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment,” so that Mr. Stepp would know of the necessity of responding to Rexnord’s
motion (Filing No. 110). Mr. Stepp timely filed his Response Brief and designated evidence on
August 11, 2014 (Filing No. 120).
In its Reply Brief, Rexnord raises a number of defects in Mr. Stepp’s Response Brief and
designated evidence (Filing No. 128 at 11). 1 Rexnord begins by pointing out Mr. Stepp’s violations
of page limitations and formatting requirements. The Court notes that:
It is well established that courts are required to give liberal construction to pro se
pleadings. However, it is also well established that pro se litigants are not excused
from compliance with procedural rules. [T]he Supreme Court has never suggested
that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse
mistakes by those who proceed without counsel[.] Further, as the Supreme Court
has noted, in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural
requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded
administration of the law.
Loubser v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 2d 897, 909 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Although Mr. Stepp’s Response Brief violates the page limitation, the
1
The Court excuses Mr. Stepp’s grammatical errors, spelling errors, and similar “technicalities,” each of which has
no bearing in deciding Rexnord’s summary judgment motion and Mr. Stepp’s motion for leave.
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line spacing requirement, and the requirement of additional information for oversized briefs as
prescribed by Local Rules 5-1(b), 7-1(e)(1), and 7-1(e)(3), the Court will consider Mr. Stepp’s
Response Brief and the admissible designated evidence that was filed with the Response Brief.
Mr. Stepp filed a separate “Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute” as an
exhibit of designated evidence to his Response Brief (Exhibit 20) (Filing No. 120-4). A party’s
“Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute” or “Statement of Material Facts in Dispute” should
be included in the summary judgment brief, see Local Rule 56-1(a) and (b), and is not considered
designated evidence. Additionally, Mr. Stepp included in his Response Brief a section titled
“Response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute.” Much of Mr. Stepp’s
separately filed “statement of material facts” designated as evidence is duplicative of this section
of Mr. Stepp’s brief. But Mr. Stepp cannot file an exhibit to his brief in order to submit duplicative
or additional material that should have been included in his already oversized brief. See, e.g.,
Ekanem v. Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County, Ind., 724 F.2d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1984);
Stevens v. Lifecare Centers of America, Inc., 2008 WL 151844, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2008).
This “creates [an] undue burden to opposing counsel and the Court at the summary judgment stage
of litigation.” Stevens, 2008 WL 151844, at *2. Furthermore, many of the statements in Exhibit 20
are not supported by evidence designated to the Court. Therefore, The Court will not consider Mr.
Stepp’s Exhibit 20 when deciding the summary judgment motion.
The Court previously denied Mr. Stepp’s motion to file belated designated evidence (Filing
No. 122), which was filed separately after Mr. Stepp had already filed his Response Brief and
designated evidence. (See Filing No. 148.) Because the Court previously denied Mr. Stepp’s
motion to file belated designated evidence, the Court will not consider Mr. Stepp’s untimely
designated evidence, listed as Exhibits 4–14, for purposes of this summary judgment motion.
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Mr. Stepp asserts that Rexnord’s Reply Brief was untimely. Mr. Stepp’s Response Brief
was served on Monday, August 11, 2014, and Rexnord’s Reply Brief was filed on August 27. Mr.
Stepp did not account for Rule 6(d), which provided Rexnord with three additional days to file its
Reply Brief following Mr. Stepp’s service by mail. Thus, Rexnord’s Reply Brief was timely filed
and will be considered.
The Court’s local rules allow surreplies in limited circumstances:
A party opposing a summary judgment motion may file a surreply brief only if the
movant cites new evidence in the reply or objects to the admissibility of the
evidence cited in the response. The surreply must be filed within 7 days after the
movant serves the reply and must be limited to the new evidence and objections.
Local Rule 56-1(d) (emphasis added). In its Reply Brief, Rexnord designated additional, new
evidence and objected to the admissibility of Mr. Stepp’s evidence. Thus, the Court will consider
Mr. Stepp’s surreply, but only to the extent the matters are limited to the new evidence and
objections raised in Rexnord’s Reply Brief.
Each party asserts that the other party has designated evidence that is hearsay, not
authenticated, irrelevant or immaterial, or otherwise inadmissible. Where “none of the exhibits are
supported by affidavit or otherwise authenticated,” they are “inadmissible and may not be
considered on summary judgment.” Cohen v. Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6778, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2001) (citing Martz v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 135,
138 (7th Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Fed. R. Evid. 801; Fed. R. Evid. 901). Additionally,
“hearsay [] is inadmissible on summary judgment.” Id. at *11. When considering a motion for
summary judgment, the Court considers only admissible evidence. Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d
979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only
consider disputed facts that are material to the decision. . . . Fact disputes that are irrelevant to the
legal question will not be considered.” Estate of Williams v. Ind. State Police, 2014 U.S. Dist.
7
LEXIS 80648, at *5 (S.D. Ind. June 13, 2014). Further, “the Court is perfectly well-equipped to
determine which facts and arguments . . . are, or are not, material to the dispute.” Allman v. Smith,
6 F. Supp. 3d 889, 897 (S.D. Ind. 2014). The Court has reviewed the designated evidence and
relies on only the timely designated evidence that is admissible and material in deciding Rexnord’s
motion.
As stated earlier, the Court views the designated evidence in the light most favorable to
Mr. Stepp, as the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Bright v.
CCA, 2013 WL 6047505, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 14, 2013). “However, employment discrimination
cases are extremely fact-intensive, and neither appellate courts nor district courts are obliged in
our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes.” Id. (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
B. Mr. Stepp’s “Motion to Seek Leave of Court for Filing Belated Request(s)”
After filing his response to Rexnord’s summary judgment motion, Mr. Stepp filed a
“Motion to Seek Leave of Court for Filing Belated Request(s)” on August 25, 2014 (Filing No.
127). Rexnord filed a response in opposition to Mr. Stepp’s motion on September 11, 2014 (Filing
No. 133).
As the Court has noted, “courts are required to give liberal construction to pro se pleadings
. . . . However, it is also well established that pro se litigants are not excused from compliance
with procedural rules.” Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008).
In his motion, Mr. Stepp asks the Court to “allow [him] to supplement [his] summary
judgment response with a statement of claim” and “accept and incorporate into [his] summary
judgment motion . . . ‘[his] statement of claim.’” (Filing No. 127 at 1, 2.) It is unclear whether Mr.
8
Stepp is requesting leave to amend his complaint to add claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983
or requesting leave to add argument to his summary judgment response brief.
Mr. Stepp’s motion for leave discusses a “statement of claim” under two statutes and
discusses liberally construing pro se complaints filed on “standard forms.” His motion also
addresses dismissing complaints pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Mr. Stepp
subsequently filed a surreply brief to provide additional summary judgment argument (Filing No.
130). Considering these facts, it appears that Mr. Stepp’s motion for leave (Filing No. 127) is a
motion to amend his complaint.
The Court’s Case Management Plan (“CMP”) was entered on September 25, 2013 (Filing
No. 29). The CMP required the parties to amend their pleadings on or before November 25, 2013.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) allows the Court to enlarge filing and other deadlines for
“good cause.” When a motion for time is filed after the deadline already has passed, the moving
party must show that he “failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) allows amendments to pleadings only with
the opposing party’s written consent or by leave of court.
The “‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking
amendment.” Trustmark Ins. Co. v. General & Cologne Life Re of Am., 424 F.3d 542, 553 (7th
Cir. 2005). “[I]n order to demonstrate ‘good cause’ a party must show that despite their diligence
the time table could not have reasonably been met.” Tschantz v. McCann, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8654, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 1995). On the other hand, “[n]eglect is excusable (though not
justifiable--‘neglect’ implies lack of justification) if there is a reason, which needn’t be a
compelling reason, to overlook it. A common reason is that the neglect didn’t harm anyone, but it
will not suffice if no excuse at all is offered or if the excuse is so threadbare as to make the neglect
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inexplicable.” United States v. McLaughlin, 470 F.3d 698, 700–01 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal
citations omitted).
Mr. Stepp has not shown good cause or offered a reason for his neglect in failing to amend
his complaint before the expiration of the deadline. As the sole basis for this motion, Mr. Stepp
asserts that he needed additional time to file his summary judgment response, but that filing
deadline was many months after the deadline to amend his complaint, and Mr. Stepp actually did
timely file his summary judgment response. Thus, there is no basis to grant Mr. Stepp leave to file
these “belated requests.” Rexnord would be prejudiced by the expansion of Mr. Stepp’s claims if
leave were granted at this late stage of the litigation; discovery closed on April 1, 2014, summary
judgment has been fully briefed on Mr. Stepp’s claim, and trial is scheduled to begin in four
months. Therefore, the Court DENIES Mr. Stepp’s “Motion to Seek Leave of Court for Filing
Belated Request(s)” (Filing No. 127).
C. Mr. Stepp’s Discrimination Claim
It is well-established that a plaintiff may show race discrimination through direct evidence
or, as an alternative, indirectly through the burden-shifting mechanism established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 2 See Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 376 (7th
Cir. 2000). Under the direct method, a plaintiff may proffer direct or circumstantial evidence to
prove discrimination. Direct evidence “requires an admission of discriminatory intent.” Alexander
v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 979 (7th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff may also prevail under the
direct method by constructing a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that “allows a
2
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested moving away from the direct/indirect paradigm and using “a
simple analysis of whether a reasonable jury could infer prohibited discrimination and an adverse employment action
based on that discrimination.” Chaib v. Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 981 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). The Seventh Circuit explained, however, that “[w]hile this approach is being considered, the Court
has continued to look at the factors embodied in the traditional tests to determine whether plaintiff has succeeded in
creating a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.
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jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decision maker.” Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359
F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “That circumstantial
evidence, however, must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.” Id.
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Alternatively, a plaintiff can use the indirect method of proof to show race discrimination.
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race. If he does so,
the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
action. Then the plaintiff must show the stated reason is pretextual. See Stewart, 207 F.3d at 376.
The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of race discrimination by presenting evidence that
would allow a reasonable jury to find that: (1) he is a member of the protected class; (2) he applied
for and was qualified for the position; (3) he was rejected for the position sought; and (4) the
position was given to an individual outside of the protected class who was either similarly qualified
or less qualified than the plaintiff. Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54653, at
*14 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 2013).
1. Direct Method
Mr. Stepp asserts that he can show Rexnord’s decision not to offer him employment was
racially discriminatory using both the direct method and indirect method of proof. Under the direct
method, Mr. Stepp has not designated any evidence of an admission of discriminatory intent, so
he must construct a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to
infer intentional discrimination by Rexnord.
Mr. Stepp alleges that Michael Shadoan (“Mr. Shadoan”), one of Rexnord’s managers,
made a comment about a hairstyle around the time that Mr. Stepp was not offered employment.
Specifically, a week or so after his interview, as Ms. Bright was walking through the front office
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she overheard Mr. Shadoan state that “he just couldn’t get past the hair.” (Filing No. 128-2 at EFC
p. 15-16). The evidence does not show that the comment was made in reference to Mr. Stepp. Nor
does it show that the comment was made in reference to a particular hairstyle (Mr. Stepp wore his
hair in dreadlocks). Additionally, the evidence does not provide the context in which the comment
was made and to whom the comment was made. Even assuming the comment was made with
respect to Mr. Stepp, this singular comment about an unidentified hairstyle does not support an
inference that Rexnord discriminated against Mr. Stepp based on his race when it did not offer him
employment.
Mr. Stepp also suggests that after he brought his discrimination claim against Rexnord,
Rexnord altered and manipulated its hiring data provided to the EEOC by replacing a Caucasian
individual with an African American male among the individuals that Rexnord hired. Mr. Stepp’s
allegation is meritless. The designated evidence shows that Rexnord consistently, from the
beginning, has submitted accurate hiring data to the EEOC and to this Court, which includes data
regarding DeWayne Thomas, an African American male, who was hired during the time period
when Mr. Stepp was not offered employment. Mr. Stepp’s inaccurate allegation cannot support an
inference that Rexnord discriminated against him based on his race when it did not offer him
employment.
Mr. Stepp offers no other evidence or argument to directly support his discrimination
claim. For the aforementioned reasons Mr. Stepp has not constructed a “convincing mosaic” of
circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by Rexnord,
and thus, he cannot support his race discrimination claim using the direct method.
2. Indirect Method
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Mr. Stepp relies on the hairstyle comment and Rexnord’s allegedly altered and manipulated
hiring data to support his discrimination claim indirectly through the burden-shifting mechanism
established in McDonnell Douglas. He also asserts that Rexnord altered his employment
application materials. Importantly, these alterations to the application materials are handwritten
notes of the job interviewer. The employment decision was not based on the handwritten notes of
the job interviewer. Instead, the designated evidence shows that Rexnord’s decision not to hire Mr.
Stepp was based on the misleading information that Mr. Stepp wrote on his application materials
and his “cagey” responses to follow-up interview questions.
Without addressing whether Mr. Stepp has established a prima facie case of race
discrimination, the Court determines that Mr. Stepp’s claim also fails as a matter of law under the
indirect method of proof because Rexnord presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
not hiring Mr. Stepp, and Mr. Stepp failed to present any evidence to show Rexnord’s reason was
pretextual.
A plaintiff may “prove pretext through indirect evidence, which can be accomplished by
establishing that the reasons given by the employer are factually baseless, were not the actual
motivation for the decision, or were insufficient to motivate the decision.” Stewart, 207 F.3d at
376. “The focus of a pretext inquiry is whether the employer’s stated reason was honest, not
whether it was accurate, wise, or well-considered. We do not sit as a superpersonnel department
that reexamines an entity’s business decision and reviews the propriety of the decision. Our only
concern is whether the legitimate reason provided by the employer is in fact the true one.” Id. at
378 (internal citations omitted).
Rexnord explained its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring Mr. Stepp and
designated evidence to support its reason. Rexnord did not hire Mr. Stepp because he evasively
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listed on his employment application that he left his prior employment with Major Tool for a
“personal” reason when in reality he had been fired. When Rexnord conducted an informal followup interview with Mr. Stepp about his previous employment and education, he was not straight
forward in responding to the questions. He later admitted in his deposition that he “stretched the
truth” and evaded responding to Rexnord’s questions because he did not want to divulge the
circumstances of his prior employment. Because of Mr. Stepp’s evasiveness and the large number
of other applicants Rexnord was considering for its open positions, Rexnord decided to pursue and
hire other applicants who were not misleading in their responses and who were qualified for the
positions. This is a legitimate and non-discriminatory basis for not offering employment to an
applicant. Thus, to avoid summary judgment, Mr. Stepp must establish that Rexnord’s proffered
reason is pretextual.
To establish pretext, Mr. Stepp must show the reason given by Rexnord is factually
baseless, was not the actual motivation for the decision, or was insufficient to motivate the
decision. Mr. Stepp simply failed to meet this burden. He did not designate evidence that raises a
factual dispute regarding Rexnord’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring him.
The facts in evidence support Rexnord’s proffered reason as the actual reason for not hiring
Mr. Stepp. Indeed, Mr. Stepp admitted that he was not forthright in responding to Rexnord’s
questions and states that he tried to keep the circumstances of his employment with Major Tool
confidential because of a non-disclosure stipulation contained within a settlement agreement that
he signed with Major Tool. Mr. Stepp did not designate any evidence showing that the applicants
Rexnord chose to hire also were misleading or evasive in responding to Rexnord’s questions,
which would suggest that this wasn’t the actual reason for Rexnord’s decision. Rexnord’s decision
not to spend more time and effort on one applicant who was evasive when it had numerous other
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forthright applicants it could consider for employment was rational and reasonable. That an
applicant was not forthright in responding to application or interview questions is a sufficient
reason not to offer employment. Mr. Stepp has designated no evidence to suggest otherwise.
Because Mr. Stepp failed to establish that Rexnord’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for not hiring him was pretextual, as a matter of law, he cannot support his discrimination claim
by the indirect, burden-shifting method established in McDonnell Douglas.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Stepp failed to designate evidence showing that Rexnord’s decision not to offer him
employment was based on racial discrimination. Rexnord showed that its decision not to hire Mr.
Stepp was based on a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Mr. Stepp failed to offer any evidence
that Rexnord’s reason was pretextual. As such, summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of
law. Rexnord’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 107) is GRANTED, and Mr. Stepp’s
claim is DISMISSED. Additionally, Mr. Stepp’s “Motion to Seek Leave of Court for Filing
Belated Request(s)” (Filing No. 127) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 12/9/2014
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Distribution:
Damon P. Stepp
8659 Rockville Road
Indianapolis, IN 46234
Charles B. Baldwin
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART
charles.baldwin@odnss.com
Christopher C. Murray
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART
christopher.murray@ogletreedeakins.com
Michelle R. Maslowski
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART
michelle.maslowski@ogletreedeakins.com
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