HOULDEN v. ZATECKY

Filing 13

ENTRY and ORDER Dismissing Action: The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any asp ect of the charge, disciplinary proceeding, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Houlden to the relief he seeks. His arguments that he was denied the protections afforded by Wolff and Hill are refuted by the expanded record. Accordingly, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed (see Entry for additional information). Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Copy to Petitioner via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 1/16/2014.(SWM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
CAPRICE HOULDEN,

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Petitioner,
vs.
D. ZATECKY,
Respondent.

No. 1:13-cv-706-JMS-DKL

Entry and Order Dismissing Action
I.
A.
A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus bears the burden of demonstrating that
he "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28
U.S.C. ' 2254(a). When the challenged custody results from a prison disciplinary proceeding,
due process requires that certain procedural safeguards be observed and that the decision be
supported by a minimum quantity of evidence.
Due process requires that prisoners in disciplinary proceedings be given: “(1)
advance (at least 24 hours before hearing) written notice of the claimed violation;
(2) the opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) the
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence (when consistent
with institutional safety); and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of the
evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Rasheed-Bey v.
Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). In addition, there is a substantive
component to the issue, which requires that the decision of a conduct board be supported by
"some evidence." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985).

B.
In the present case, Caprice Houlden seeks a writ of habeas corpus pertaining to a
disciplinary proceeding identified as No. ISR 12-11-006, In the challenged proceeding, Houlden
was charged with and found guilty of possession of a weapon, which is prohibited by prison
rules. The evidence supporting this finding is that during a search of Houlden’s cell on the
evening of November 1, 2012, at the Pendleton Correctional Facility a knife was found
underneath letters in a t v box.
Houlden contends that the hearing officer’s finding of guilt was not supported by
sufficient evidence. This contention, however, is refuted by the conduct report itself, which was
part of the evidence considered. The conduct report narrates that a search of Houlden’s cell was
being conducted, that a knife was found, and where in the cell the knife was found. The "some
evidence" standard is lenient, "requiring only that the decision not be arbitrary or without support
in the record." McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). A conduct report alone
may suffice as Asome evidence.@ Id.; see also Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir.
2000) (even Ameager@ proof is sufficient). Here, the conduct report is clear and provides a direct
account of the weapon being located. Although the evidence before the disciplinary board must
"point to the accused's guilt," Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1989), Aonly
evidence that was presented to the Adjustment Committee is relevant to this analysis.@ Hamilton
v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 ("The Federal
Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one
reached by the disciplinary board."). The evidence here was constitutionally sufficient.

C.
The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the
charge, disciplinary proceeding, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and
there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Houlden to the relief he
seeks. His arguments that he was denied the protections afforded by Wolff and Hill are refuted by
the expanded record. Accordingly, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and
the action dismissed.
II.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

01/16/2014
Date: __________________

Distribution:
Caprice Houlden
148250
Pendleton Correctional Facility
4490 West Reformatory Road
Pendleton, IN 46064
All electronically registered counsel

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana