JOHNSON v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS et al

Filing 100

ORDER granting Defendant's 96 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Because the Court found that no underlying constitutional violation occurred by the actions taken by Deputies Snyder and Steele on the night in question, no liability can be placed on Sheriff Layton. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Sheriff Layton's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the Monell claims alleged against him in Johnson's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 97). **SEE ORDER** Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 2/17/2015. (AH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MARY ANGELA JOHNSON,

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) CAUSE NO. 1:13-cv-0809-WTL-MJD
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Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, et al.,
Defendants.

ENTRY ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
This cause is before the Court on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by
Defendant John Layton, Sheriff of Marion County (Dkt. No. 97). The Plaintiff has not
responded to the motion, and the time for doing so has passed. The Court, being duly advised,
GRANTS the motion for the following reasons.
I.

APPLICABLE STANDARD

In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c), the Court applies the same standard that is applied when reviewing a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir.
2007). The Court “take[s] the facts alleged in the complaint as true, drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. The complaint must contain only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
While there is no need for detailed factual allegations, the complaint must “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Pisciotta, 499
F.3d at 633 (citation omitted).

II.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are found in a previous Entry, Dkt. No. 77, and are incorporated
herein. In April 2013, Plaintiff Mary Angela Johnson filed a suit against Sheriff Layton, Health
and Hospital Corporation of Marion County d/b/a Wishard Memorial Hospital (“Wishard”), and
Special Deputies William Snyder and Travis Steele. Johnson alleged eight counts against the
Defendants, arising out of an unfortunate incident in which she was attacked and raped. On
April 18, 2014, the Court granted Defendants Wishard, Snyder, and Steele’s motion to dismiss
(Dkt. No. 77). Thus, only Johnson’s Monell claims (Count I) against Sheriff Layton remain.
III.

DISCUSSION

Sheriff Layton moves for judgment on the pleadings arguing that “[t]he Sheriff cannot be
held liable for a constitutional deprivation allegedly brought about through an official policy or
custom because the Court dismissed all other alleged constitutional violations[;] therefore,
Plaintiff’s remaining Monell claims are not properly before this Court and must be dismissed.”
Dkt. No. 97 at 5. Indeed, Johnson’s Monell claims against Sheriff Layton allege that the Marion
County Sheriff’s Office’s “policies and customs” and/or Sheriff Layton’s 1 actions and omissions
caused the alleged violation of her Equal Protection rights. See Dkt. No. 40, Count I.
The Supreme Court has noted that “neither Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Services, nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages against a municipal
corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the
officer inflicted no constitutional harm.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)
(internal citation omitted). Because the Court found that no underlying constitutional violation

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The Amended Complaint alleges that Sheriff Layton is “an official with final policymaking authority with respect to the Special Deputy program.” Dkt. No. 40 ¶ 96.
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occurred by the actions taken by Deputies Snyder and Steele on the night in question, no liability
can be placed on Sheriff Layton. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Sheriff Layton’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings on the Monell claims alleged against him in Johnson’s Amended
Complaint (Dkt. No. 97).
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Sheriff Layton’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Dkt. No. 97) is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED: 2/17/15
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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