JOHNSON v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS et al
Filing
90
ORDER denying Plaintiff's 80 Motion to Amend/Correct Compaint; and denying 83 Motion for Oral Argument (S.O.). Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 10/14/2014. (MAC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MARY ANGELA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN LAYTON, SHERIFF OF MARION
COUNTY, INDIANA,
Defendant.
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) CAUSE NO. 1:13-cv-0809-WTL-MJD
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ENTRY ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
This Cause is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s motion to amend/correct her amended
complaint (dkt. no. 80). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, DENIES
the motion for the following reasons. 1
I.
BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to the lawsuit are found in a previous Entry, dkt. no. 77, and are
incorporated herein. A brief procedural history relevant to the present motion follows.
Plaintiff Mary Angela Johnson filed suit against the City of Indianapolis, the Sheriff of
Marion County, Indiana, Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County d/b/a Wishard
Memorial Hospital (“Wishard”), William Snyder, and Tim Steele in Marion County Superior
Court on April 23, 2013. The case was removed to this Court on May 16, 2013. On October 31,
2013, Ms. Johnson timely filed a motion to amend her complaint, which the Court granted;
among other things, the amended complaint dismissed the City of Indianapolis.
1
Because the Court does not believe oral argument would be helpful, the Plaintiff’s
motion for oral argument (dkt. no. 83) is DENIED.
On November 15, 2013, Defendants Wishard, Snyder, and Steele (“the Wishard
Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss. The Court granted that motion on April 18, 2014, and
dismissed all claims against them in Ms. Johnson’s amended complaint. Currently, therefore,
Defendant Sheriff Layton is the sole remaining Defendant.
On May 16, 2014, however, Ms. Johnson filed a motion to amend/correct her amended
complaint because her previous complaints “failed to clearly set forth the necessary legal
framework by which to demonstrate the sufficiency of the facts pled,” dkt. no. 80 at 4; she
moved for oral argument on her motion on May 30, 2014. The Wishard Defendants and Sheriff
Layton oppose both motions, arguing that she lacks good cause and/or that her amendment
would be futile.
II.
STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that “a party may amend its pleading only
with . . . the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(3). However, since the Plaintiff is seeking to amend her complaint after the
deadline set forth in the case management plan, she has to show that good cause exists for the
amendment. See Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Gen. & Cologne Life Re of Am., 424 F.3d 542, 553 (7th
Cir. 2005) (“To amend a pleading after the expiration of the trial court’s Scheduling Order
deadline to amend pleadings, the moving party must show ‘good cause.’”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)). Further, the Seventh Circuit has noted that “[a]lthough leave to amend a complaint
should be freely granted when justice so requires, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), the district court
need not allow an amendment when there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, or when the amendment would be futile.” Bethany Pharmacal
2
Co., Inc. v. QVC, Inc., 241 F.3d 854, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2001). With this standard in mind, the
Court turns to the Plaintiff’s motion.
III.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the Defendants argue that Ms. Johnson has failed to establish good cause
for her amendment. The Court agrees. The only reason Ms. Johnson gives, other than noting
that justice so requires, is that her previous two complaints were deficient because they were
prepared by her former counsel. This argument is without merit. Ms. Johnson’s current counsel
entered his appearance on January 31, 2014; if he believed the First Amended Complaint was
deficient after he reviewed it, a more timely motion should have been filed. See Trustmark, 424
F.3d at 553 (“Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party
seeking amendment.”). Instead, he waited until after this Court dismissed the Wishard
Defendants to remedy the concededly deficient complaint. The facts of the case have not
changed, and Ms. Johnson had ample opportunity to plead a more sufficient complaint if she so
desired. No good cause has been shown.
Moreover, with regard to the Wishard Defendants, Ms. Johnson’s proposed second
amended complaint fares no better than the previous, rendering any amendment futile. 2 Ms.
Johnson repeatedly asserts that she has pled numerous new facts that show the Wishard
Defendants “were motivated by their prejudicial stereotype of [her] because she was female.”
2
Ms. Johnson scoffs at the Wishard Defendants for arguing that her amendment would
be futile, noting that this is akin to another Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See dkt. no. 82 at 1-2
(“Defendants’ [sic] really move this Court to ‘dismiss’ the Second Amended Complaint for
‘failure to state a claim’ pursuant to Rule 12 rather than deny leave to amend pursuant to Rule
15.”). Despite Ms. Johnson’s argument to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit expressly permits the
Court to deny a motion to amend if it would be futile. See, e.g., Hongbo Han v. United Cont’l
Holdings, Inc., 762 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We see no basis for remanding to the district
court to allow Han to amend the complaint because any amendment would be futile.”).
3
See dkt. no. 82 at 4-10. The Court disagrees. After reviewing her proposed Second Amended
Complaint, the Court views the new facts as mere additional details. For instance, the Court now
knows that Ms. Johnson was wearing a dress on the night she was attacked, and that the rape
occurred on a cold and rainy Easter Sunday. See dkt. no. 80-1 ¶¶ 13-14. These, and other, details
fail to address the deficiencies the Court noted in its previous Entry.
Deputies Snyder and Steele are still entitled to qualified immunity because they acted
reasonably based on how Ms. Johnson was behaving—those facts have not changed, and Ms.
Johnson continues to admit that she was acting belligerently, screaming and physically assaulting
hospital staff. See dkt. no. 80-1 ¶¶ 6, 18. With regard to Wishard, the only new salient allegation
in Ms. Johnson’s proposed Second Amended Complaint is as follows: “Other female victims
found and brought to Wishard under similar circumstances, who like Mary were victims of rape
by males and not criminals, were also charged, arrested, incarcerated, and treated callously, with
disdain and disregard of their constitutionally protected rights.” Id. ¶ 42. This is far too
conclusory to suffice. See Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Johnson has not demonstrated good cause for why, at this late phase in the litigation,
she should be allowed to amend her complaint. Moreover, the Court agrees that, with respect to
the Wishard Defendants, the amendment would be futile. Her motion to amend/correct her
amended complaint (dkt. no. 80) is, therefore, DENIED.
4
SO ORDERED: 10/14/14
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Copies to all counsel of record via electronic notification
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