BUIS v. COLVIN
Filing
65
ORDER granting in part Plaintiff's 44 Motion for Attorney Fees and Plaintiff's 61 Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees. Plaintiff is entitled to $19,644.35 (payment may be made directly to Counsel). Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 10/22/2015. (TMD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
RICHARD D. BUIS,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security,
Defendant.
1:13-cv-00878-RLY-MJD
ENTRY ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
and PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEY’S FEES
Plaintiff, Richard Buis, brings this action seeking attorney’s fees pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1) (“EAJA”), as the prevailing party in
an action against the United States. Defendant, Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), objects. For the reasons set forth
below, the court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and his
supplemental motion for additional attorney’s fees.
I.
Background
On June 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed his application for benefits, alleging disability
due to various ailments, including rheumatoid arthritis, depression, neuropathy, and
fibromyalgia. Buis’s application was initially denied on September 18, 2006, and denied
on reconsideration on December 6, 2006. On January 21, 2009, a hearing was held
before an Administrate Law Judge (“ALJ”). The Appeals Council granted Plaintiff’s
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request for review, and remanded the matter because the ALJ’s residual functional
capacity assessment did not specify Plaintiff’s sit/stand limitations.
On remand, a second initial hearing was held on September 30, 2010, before a
different ALJ, with a supplemental hearing on May 4, 2011, to allow Plaintiff to review
evidence that had been submitted anonymously. A second supplemental hearing was
held on August 11, 2011, to obtain additional evidence from the vocational expert.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: rheumatoid
arthritis, fibromyalgia and obesity. After reviewing the mental health functional areas,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s depression caused only a “mild” limitation. The ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability at any time from the alleged onset date
through the date of last insured. Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied
his request for review. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s second request for review
on April 10, 2013, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision for purposes of judicial
review.
On May 30, 2013, Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to this court, and on June
30, 2014, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court affirm the judgment of the
ALJ. On July 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Objection, and on February 11, 2015, this court
issued its Entry Adopting in Part and Rejecting in Part the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation. Plaintiff now moves for fees under the EAJA in the amount of
$36,025.55 and an additional $8,798.35 spent reviewing the Commissioner’s Response to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and formulating a Reply, for a total of $44,823.90.
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II.
Standard for Fee Award under the EAJA
Pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. ' 2412(d)(1)(A), a court
shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other
expenses. . . , incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or
against the United States . . . , unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make
an award unjust.
Accordingly, a plaintiff is entitled to fees and expenses if “(1) he was a ‘prevailing party’;
(2) the government’s position was not ‘substantially justified’; (3) there existed no special
circumstances that would make an award unjust; and (4) he filed a timely application
with the district court.” Cunningham v. Barnhart, 440 F.3d 862, 863 (7th Cir. 2006).
The only element in dispute is whether the Government’s position was substantially
justified.
The position of the Government includes both its position during litigation and its
position during the administrative proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). The
substantial justification standard requires the Government to show its position was
grounded in “(1) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in
law for the theory propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged
and the legal theory advanced.” United States v. Hallmark, 200 F.3d 1076, 1080 (7th Cir.
2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court is required to examine the
Government’s position in both the pre-litigation and litigation contexts. Id. When errors
are made by the ALJ, the Commissioner is held accountable. Cummings v. Sullivan, 950
F.2d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1991).
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Although the EAJA does not define “substantial justification,” the Supreme Court
has defined the term to mean “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable
person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). The standard is satisfied upon
the existence of a “genuine dispute,” or if reasonable people could differ as to the
appropriateness of the contested action. Id. (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court
explained:
[A] position can be justified even though it is not correct, and we believe it
can be substantially (i.e., for the most part) justified if a reasonable person
could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.
Id. at 566 n.2. See also Kolman v. Shalala, 39 F.3d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The test
for substantial justification is whether the agency had a rational ground for thinking it had
a rational ground for its decision.”). The burden of proving substantial justification rests
with the Commissioner. Jackson v. Chater, 94 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 1996); Smith v.
Bowen, 663 F. Supp. 59, 60 (S.D. Ind. 1987).
III.
Discussion
In the instant case, Plaintiff raised the following six allegations of error regarding
the ALJ’s decision in his brief, including that:
(1)
the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating
rheumatologist, Dr. Harry Staley;
(2)
the ALJ improperly evaluated whether Plaintiff’s impairments met
or medically equaled Listing 14.09B;
(3)
The ALJ improperly evaluated the medical opinions of state agency
medical consultants, Dr. Richard Wenzler and Dr. M. Ruiz, with
regard to Plaintiff’s ability to stand and walk during an eight hour
work day;
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(4)
the ALJ improperly evaluated the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony;
(5)
the ALJ’s step five finding was not supported by substantial
evidence because the vocational expert failed to provide a proper
foundation for the number of jobs; and
(6)
the ALJ failed to evaluate the medical opinion of treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Susan Schneider.
(Filing No. 22). In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge rejected each
of Plaintiff’s six challenges to the ALJ’s decision, finding that substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled. As such, the
Magistrate Judge recommended that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed on all six
issues. (Filing No. 39).
Upon consideration of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation in
light of Plaintiff’s Objection, the court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s findings with
regard to issues numbered 3, 5, and 6, and rejected his findings with regard to issues 1, 2,
and 4.
A.
Dr. Staley’s September 2010 Assessment
Plaintiff raises three issues with respect to the opinion of Dr. Staley: (1) the
Commissioner did not have a rational reason for believing the September 2010
assessment could be rejected because it was completed two years after the date he was
last insured (“post-DLI”); (2) the ALJ failed to evaluate the September 2010 assessment;
and (3) the ALJ “played doctor” by discounting the September 2010 assessment.
Because the September 2010 assessment was post-DLI evidence, the court will discuss
issues (1) and (2) together.
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1.
The September 2010 Assessment
Plaintiff argues the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified
because the ALJ failed to evaluate Dr. Staley’s Medical Source Statement (“assessment”)
dated September 12, 2010. In that assessment, Dr. Staley found, inter alia, that Plaintiff
has significant limitations in doing repetitive handling or fingering. Dr. Staley estimated
that during an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff could perform handling and fingering with each
hand for only one-third of an 8-hour workday. (R. 1323-1324). The Commissioner
advanced two arguments in support of the ALJ’s finding: (1) the evidence was irrelevant
because the assessment is dated two years after his date of last insured; and (2) Dr. Staley
undermined the reliability of his own opinion by handwriting on the assessment that his
opinion of Plaintiff’s functional abilities and limitations was a “[p]ure estimate,”
explaining that he did “not do functional assessments.” (Filing No. 34 at 4-5; Tr. at 1321,
1324). The Magistrate Judge agreed with the Commissioner. (Filing No. 39 at 11-12).
In rejecting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the court found that post-DLI
evidence is generally relevant. Halvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir.
1984). The court found the “ALJ cannot simply ignore evidence from a treating
physician he disagrees with.” (See Filing No. 42 at 7) (quoting Denton v. Astrue, 596
F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010)). The court further found, however, that the ALJ did
consider the May 31, 2011 assessment from Dr. Staley and, as such, did consider postDLI evidence.
Having reviewed the record in this case, the court finds the ALJ should have also
addressed the September 2010 assessment. “While an ALJ is not required to give a
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written evaluation of every piece of evidence in the record, Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300,
308 (7th Cir. 1995), an ALJ may not completely ignore the report of a treating source,”
Henderson v. Barnhart, 205 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1013 (E.D. Wis. 2002).” Samuel v.
Barnhart, 316 F. Supp. 2d 768, 773 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (quoting Samuel v. Barnhart, 295
F. Supp. 2d 926, 946 (E.D. Wis. 2003)). By failing to address Dr. Staley’s September
2010 assessment, the ALJ made it impossible for “the reviewing court to tell whether the
evidence was rejected or simply overlooked.” Id. at 774 (citing cases). Accordingly, the
court finds the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified.
2.
The ALJ “Played Doctor”
With respect to the May 2010 assessment, the ALJ concluded:
The only findings that Dr. Staley cites in making the assessment concerning
use of the hands are swelling and tenderness of the small joints in his hands
and some remote, abnormal laboratory findings. In my opinion, these
findings do not justify limiting the claimant to only occasional use of the
hands. Moreover, such a limitation is not consistent with the other
evidence in the record, such as the reports from Dr. Iodoro, or even the
claimant’s testimony.
(R. 22) (citing R. 1554). Dr. Iodoro, Plaintiff’s primary care physician, observed that
Plaintiff “has passive [range of motion] of the joints but fights it with good motor.” (R.
at 1014). The court concluded that the ALJ’s opinion regarding whether the findings
justified limiting the claimant to only the occasional use of his hands was improper
because such a determination is “quintessentially a matter for medical judgment.” (Filing
No. 42 at 8) (quoting Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff
seizes upon this portion of the Entry, citing Seventh Circuit cases which warn against an
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ALJ “playing doctor.” This, he argues, is evidence that the Commissioner was not
rational in believing that the ALJ’s finding was defensible.
The court’s ultimate decision did not rest on the ALJ’s impermissible opinion;
rather, the court’s decision rested on whether the ALJ’s “fail[ure] to articulate why Dr.
Staley’s statement indicating a full range of motion may still be consistent with a very
limited use of the hands conflicts with other evidence. As such the court finds the ALJ
failed to build the requisite logical bridge.” (Filing No. 42 at 8). The ALJ’s failure to
articulate why he discounted the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating rheumatologist over the
opinion of Plaintiff’s primary care physician is particularly troubling where, as here, his
rheumatologist specializes in Plaintiff’s claimed impairment. The Commissioner’s
position was, therefore, not substantially justified.
B.
Listing 14.09B
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated whether Plaintiff’s
limitations meet or medically equal Listing 14.09B, inflammatory arthritis. To meet
Listing 14.09B, the claimant must show the following three requirements: (1)
“inflammation or deformity in one or more peripheral joints,” (2) “involvement of two or
more organs/body systems with one of the organs/body systems involved to at least a
moderate level of severity,” and (3) “at least two of the constitutional symptoms or signs
(severe fatigue, fever, malaise, or involuntary weight loss).” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,
App. 1. In his ruling, the ALJ found:
[T]he foregoing evidence indicates that the claimant’s impairment does not
cause the very serious limitations required by Section 14.09. The claimant
may have some limitations on his ability to stand and/or walk throughout a
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workday or lift more than twenty pounds. However, he has not had persistent
inflammation and he is able to ambulate and to perform fine and gross
movements.
(R. 19). The ALJ’s finding is consistent with an analysis of Listing 14.09A 1, but not with
an analysis of Listing 14.09B. He therefore failed to build a logical bridge from the
evidence to his conclusion. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002).
Therefore, the court cannot determine whether the Commissioner had a “rational ground
for thinking it had a rational ground for its action.” Kolman, 39 F.3d at 177. Again, the
Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified. See Scott v. Barnhart, No. 99 C
4651, 2003 WL 1524624, at *4 (N.D. Ill. March 21, 2003) (finding Commissioner’s
position not substantially justified where the Seventh Circuit could not determine
“whether the ALJ’s assessment of the facts adequately addressed the criteria of [a
listing]”).
C.
The Fee Request
The court now turns to the amount of fees that are reasonable to award the
Plaintiff. The EAJA defines “fees and other expenses” to include “reasonable attorney
fees . . . based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and the quality of the services
furnished” not to exceed “$125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in
1
That listing reads:
A. Persistent inflammation or persistent deformity of:
1. One or more major peripheral weight-bearing joints resulting in the inability to ambulate
effectively (as defined in 14.00C6); or
2. One or more major peripheral joints in each upper extremity resulting in the inability to
perform fine and gross movements effectively 9 (as defined in 14.00C7).
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1.
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the cost of living or a special factor . . . justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that a cost of living increase is
warranted. Sprinkle v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 421, 427-28 (7th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff also has
the burden to show that the EAJA fees sought are reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(B); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). In evaluating the
reasonableness of a fee request, the court considers the following factors:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4)
the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
(5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability
of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases.
Id. at 430 n. 3. The prevailing party may only recover those fees that are reasonably
expended; thus, “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” are
excluded from the fee calculation. Id. at 434. The amount of the fee award is a matter of
the court’s discretion. Id. at 437.
Plaintiff argues his attorney is entitled to an hourly rate of $187.00 due to the
change in the cost-of-living index for All Urban Consumers in the entire country since
the base rate set in March 1996. As additional support for an enhanced rate, Plaintiff
included the affidavits of two other social security lawyers who practice in Indiana and
charge substantially more than $125.00 per hour, (see Filing Nos. 45-1, 45-2), and cited
several cases from Indiana district courts authorizing an enhanced rate. See, e.g., Hudnall
v. Astrue, No. 1:11-cv-101, 2012 WL 2504883 (N.D. Ind. June 28, 2012) (approving an
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enhanced hourly rate of $179.00 per hour); Weber v. Astrue, 1:10-cv-359, 2012 WL
2504877 (N.D. Ind. June 28, 2012) (approving an enhanced rate of $176.00 per hour).
The Commissioner does not object to Plaintiff’s asserted cost-of-living increase. Given
that Plaintiff’s requested hourly rate is supported by the record and is reasonable, the
court will accept it.
Plaintiff also submitted two affidavits from his Counsel, each with an attachment
itemizing the hours Counsel spent on this case. (Filing No. 46-1, Filing No. 62-1).
Plaintiff seeks $44,823.90 for 239.7 hours his Counsel charged for work performed in
federal court on this case. This equates to: 86.45 hours 2 for his work on the opening
brief, 39.40 hours for his work on the reply brief, 64.5 hours for work on his Objection to
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, 2.3 hours for his initial EAJA fee
request, and 47.05 hours for his EAJA reply brief. The Commissioner argues Counsel
should have billed for 40.20 hours on his opening brief, 22.4 hours for his reply brief, and
14.63 hours for his work on the Objection. Counsel also filed a supplemental motion for
EAJA attorney’s fees, seeking an additional 47.05 hours for his work on the EAJA reply
brief. The Commissioner did not respond to the supplemental motion. The court now
turns to the Commissioner’s objections.
1.
Opening Brief
2
These numbers, if believed, would mean that Counsel dedicated over five and-one-half weeks
just to this case.
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The Commissioner argues the time billed for Plaintiff’s opening brief (86.45
hours) is grossly excessive and unreasonable. The record reflects that Plaintiff’s Counsel
is an experienced social security litigator with specialized experience in handling social
security cases in various federal courts for 27 years. (Filing No. 47, ¶ 3). In addition,
Counsel represented Plaintiff at the administrative level and is familiar with the record
and the facts of the case. And while the issues in the case – evaluation of treating
physician and state agency physician opinions, listing analysis, credibility evaluation, and
the reliability of the vocational expert’s testimony – are multi-faceted and require close
and careful analysis of the record, Snider v. Astrue, No. 1:08-cv-53, 2009 WL 1766925,
at *5 (N.D. Ind. June 23, 2009), the court agrees with the Commissioner that 86.45 hours
for this one brief is grossly excessive and unreasonable.
Counsel’s time records reflect he billed for 18.40 hours to read the transcript and
make notes (entries on 11/29/13, 11/30/13, 12/1/13), and billed 21.70 hours to prepare or
revise a statement of facts (entries on 12/1/13, 12/6/13, 12/8/13, 12/12/13, 12/16/13,
12/22/13) for purposes of his opening brief. As noted by the Commissioner, writing a
statement of fact necessarily requires reading the relevant portions of the transcript. His
request for 18.40 hours to read the transcript and take notes is therefore denied. The
court further finds, given Counsel’s familiarity with the case, that 21.70 hours to prepare
and revise a statement of facts should be reduced to 16 hours.
Counsel also billed 21.25 hours for his argument related to the ALJ’s evaluation of
Dr. Staley’s opinion. The Commissioner argues these hours are excessive and redundant
in light of Plaintiff’s brief to the Appeals Council. (Compare Opening Brief, Filing No.
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22 at 13-22, with brief to Appeals Council, Tr. at 515-17). The court read the relevant
pages from the two documents, and finds that, while Counsel did raise many of the same
arguments to the Appeals Council, his opening brief included arguments not raised with
the Appeals Council. In addition, unlike Plaintiff’s opening brief, the argument to the
Appeals Council did not cite relevant case law nor relevant portions of the transcript.
The court therefore finds Counsel should be compensated for more than “a couple of
hours.” (Filing No. 54 at 10). That said, 21.5 hours is excessive in light of Counsel’s
familiarity with the law and the facts of this case. Accordingly, the court reduces the
number of hours from 21.5 to 8.
Counsel billed 5.3 hours for his argument related to the vocational expert’s
testimony. The Commissioner argues this is an “egregious example of excessive and
improper billing for work done at the administrative level.” The court reviewed
Counsel’s Opening Brief with the briefs submitted to the ALJ and to the Appeals
Council. (Tr. at 502-18). While 5.3 hours is excessive in light of those briefs, the 45
minutes advocated by the Commissioner is too little; 1.5 hours is more appropriate.
Accordingly, the court reduces the number of hours from 5.3 to 1.5. Counsel is therefore
entitled to 45.05 hours for the work performed on the opening brief.
2.
Reply Brief
The Commissioner argues the time billed for Plaintiff’s reply brief (39.40 hours) is
excessive and unreasonable; she therefore asks the court to strike 13 hours for vague and
inadequately documented entries, and another 4 hours for arguments previously made at
the administrative level and in his opening brief.
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“[W]hen a fee petition is vague or inadequately documented, a district court may
either strike the problematic entries or (in recognition of the impracticalities of requiring
courts to do an item-by-item accounting) reduce the proposed fee by a reasonable
percentage.” Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted). The Commissioner argues Counsel billed time for more than one
argument; for example, on 5/5/2014, Counsel billed 7 hours for “arguments #1 [Dr.
Staley] & #2 [Listing]”; on 5/6/2014, he billed 1 hour for “arguments #1 & #2”; and on
5/12/2014, he billed 2.8 hours for “arguments #2 [Listing], #6 [Dr. Schneider] & #7
[argument on reversal with an award of benefits].” (Filing No. 46-1 at 2). The court
agrees with the Commissioner that this type of “cluster billing” precludes the court from
determining “whether the individual activities were a reasonable expenditure of time.”
Harper, 223 F.3d at 604. Accordingly, the court reduces the billed time for those entries
by 10.8 hours. The court will allow Counsel 2.2 hours for “final review for additions and
corrections.”
The Commissioner also asks the court to scrutinize Counsel’s billing for argument
#1 – whether the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinion of Dr. Staley. As noted above,
he billed for that argument on 5/5/2014 and 5/6/2014; the Commissioner notes he billed
an additional 6.2 hours for that argument on 5/10/2014. This issue was previously
addressed at the administrative level and in Plaintiff’s opening brief. The court agrees
that the additional 6.2 hours was excessive, and reduces the number of hours worked on
that issue by 3.6 hours, for a total of 2.6 hours. Counsel is therefore entitled to 25 hours
for the work done on the reply.
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3.
The Objection
Finally, the Commissioner objects to the 64.50 hours Counsel billed for work on
the Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. She posits that
“the amount of time he billed for work on the Objection amounted to just about the
amount of time normally expected for all the work on a social security case.” See, e.g.,
Schulten v. Astrue, No. 08 C 1181, 2010 WL 2135474, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2010)
(collecting cases finding that permissible range of attorney hours spent in district court
for social security cases is 40 to 60 hours). While the number of hours for which fees are
awarded is dependent on case-specific factors, such as the complexity of the case and the
size of the record, 64.5 hours spent on one brief is highly unusual, and is not justified in
this instance. As an example, Counsel spent 36.15 hours for work on his argument
regarding Dr. Staley; that number does not include the argument on Dr. Staley’s post-DLI
assessment. Furthermore, the Objection contains many of the same arguments as the
reply brief. (See Filing No. 54 at 13 (comparing the Objection with the Reply)). The
court therefore finds that 15 hours is a reasonable amount of time spent on Plaintiff’s
Objection.
4.
EAJA Reply Brief
Counsel also seeks an additional 47.05 hours for work associated with his EAJA
reply brief. The Commissioner did not file an objection to this request. Upon review of
the time record, the court discovered: (1) Counsel billed an additional 7.6 hours related to
the opinions of Dr. Staley; (2) he billed 2.7 hours for reading and taking notes on the
Commissioner’s 15-page EAJA response brief; (3) he billed 2.15 hours for the “playing
15
dr.” argument, which encompassed less than one typewritten page of the reply brief; (4)
he billed 2.5 hours on the “substantial justification” argument, which encompassed
approximately three typewritten pages (one of which was the “playing dr.” argument);
and (5) he billed 0.30 hours for “EAJA reply brief,” 2.5 hours for “Arg. 1 on Substantial
Justification,” 2.5 hours for “Argument II on Hensley factors/reasonable fee,” and 4.00
hours for “Argument III on billing issues.” (Filing No. 62-1). Counsel’s billable time is
not reasonable, particularly in light of his experience and familiarity with the case and
familiarity with the relevant case law. The court finds 20 hours is more reasonable.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the court hereby GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s
Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (Filing
No. 44) and GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for Award of
Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (Filing No. 61). Plaintiff is
entitled to $19,644.35 (105.05 3 hours x $187.00). Plaintiff assigned the EAJA fees to
Counsel, and there is no evidence that Plaintiff owes a debt to the government;
accordingly, payment may be made directly to Counsel.
SO ORDERED this 22nd day of October 2015.
_________________________________
__________________________________
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Southern District of Indiana
3
This number includes 2.3 hours of attorney time for work dated 7/15/2014, 8/10/2014,
4/24/2015, and 5/1/2015 that was not objected to by the Commissioner. (See Filing No. 46-1 at
3).
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Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record.
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