STEELE v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION et al
Filing
173
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' 162 Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, the Court grants Defendants' request for summary judgment in their favor on Mr. Steele's state law claims against Superintendent Carneygee in her official capacity and denies their request for summary judgment on Mr. Steele's remaining state and federal claims. The following claims survive summary judgment and will proceed to tr ial: Mr. Steele's Eighth Amendment claim against Superintendent Knight in her individual capacity; Mr. Steele's official capacity claims against both Defendants; and Mr. Steele's state law negligence and gross negligence claims agains t Superintendent Knight in her individual capacity. The Clerk is directed to docket the Court's Practices and Procedures, and the Magistrate Judge is asked to set a conference with the parties to establish a schedule for timely resolving this case. (See Order.) Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 12/7/2016. (GSO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SHAUN L. STEELE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WENDY KNIGHT, in her individual and
official capacity, and DONNA CARNEYGEE,
in her official capacity,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 1:13-cv-00982-JMS-DKL
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Shaun L. Steele asserts claims against the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his
incarceration at the state correctional facility in Pendleton. [Filing No. 149.] Specifically, Mr.
Steele alleges that conditions of his confinement related to his denial of access to a toilet, sink,
sanitation, and drinking water, and his exposure to extreme temperatures violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. [Filing No. 149; Filing No. 171
at 4.] Defendants have moved for summary judgment, [Filing No. 162], and Mr. Steele opposes
that motion, [Filing No. 171]. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in
part Defendants’ motion.
I.
APPLICABLE STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As the current version of Rule 56 makes clear,
whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the
asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or
affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
Affidavits or declarations must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant’s factual assertion
can result in the movant’s fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of
summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider disputed facts
that are material to the decision. A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law. Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). In
other words, while there may be facts that are in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate if those
facts are not outcome determinative. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir.
2005). Fact disputes that are irrelevant to the legal question will not be considered. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that would
convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d
892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th
Cir. 2009).
2
II.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The following statement of facts is set forth pursuant to the standards cited above. That is,
the facts stated are not necessarily objectively true, but as the summary judgment standard requires,
the undisputed facts and the disputed evidence are presented in the light most favorable to Mr.
Steele as the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
Mr. Steele is an inmate incarcerated with the Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”).
[Filing No. 163-1 at 1.] From November 10, 2010 until February 14, 2014, Mr. Steele was housed
at the Correctional Industrial Facility (“CIF”) in Pendleton. [Filing No. 163-2 at 5-6.] Defendant
Donna Carneygee was the Superintendent at CIF from July 4, 2010 until November 25, 2011.
[Filing No. 163-4 at 1.] Superintendent Carneygee’s duties included overseeing all operations of
the facility, reviewing IDOC policy, approving facility procedures for compliance with policy, and
approving all final offender discipline, staff hiring, and termination decisions. [Filing No. 163-4
at 1.] Defendant Wendy Knight succeeded Superintendent Carneygee, had the same duties, and
remained in that position through the remainder of Mr. Steele’s time at CIF. [Filing No. 163-3 at
1.] Mr. Steele was ultimately transferred from CIF to another facility.1 [Filing No. 163-2 at 10.]
Mr. Steele’s prison conditions claim focuses on his time in the general population housing
unit at CIF.2 [Filing No. 163-2 at 12-13.] None of the cells in that unit were equipped with sinks
or toilets. [Filing No. 171-1 at 2; Filing No. 163-4 at 3.] Each cell contains 78.2 square feet of
1
Mr. Steele is currently assigned to work release at the Elkhart County Community Corrections
Center, but the subject of his action stems solely from his incarceration at CIF. [Filing No. 171-1
at 1.]
2
All descriptions of cells relate solely to the general population cells at CIF.
3
space, which was reduced to 51.88 square feet of unencumbered space after subtracting the space
occupied by a bunkbed, desk, and chair. [Filing No. 163-5.] Two inmates are housed in each cell.
[Filing No. 163-2 at 7.] The windows on the cells are secured and cannot be opened by the inmates.
[Filing No. 163-3 at 4.] Inmates may purchase personal fans to help cool their cells. [Filing No.
163-3 at 4.]
The cell doors are typically locked from 11:00 p.m. until morning.3 [Filing No. 163-3 at
2; Filing No. 163-2 at 15.] If an inmate needed to use the bathroom during that time, he could
press a button in the cell to signal the request to the control officer stationed in the dorm area.
[Filing No. 163-3 at 2.] The control officer could use the same electronic system to allow the
inmate’s cell door to unlock, and the inmate could then leave the cell and use the restroom. [Filing
No. 163-3 at 2-3.] In Mr. Steele’s experience, his requests to use the restroom “were frequently
ignored or completely discarded.” [Filing No. 171-1 at 2; Filing No. 163-2 at 15.]
Staff conducted a count of the inmates six times per day, in addition to any emergency
counts conducted if staff believed an offender to be missing. [Filing No. 163-3 at 3; Filing No.
163-2 at 13-15.] Conducting a count could last anywhere from 30 minutes to multiple hours,
depending on whether all inmates could be located. [Filing No. 163-3 at 4; Filing No. 163-2 at
14-15.] Based on Mr. Steele’s experience, a count typically lasted less than one hour. [Filing No.
163-2 at 15.] Inmates could not use the bathroom during counts. [Filing No. 163-2 at 16; Filing
No. 171-4 at 6.]
3
Superintendent Knight attests that the cells were locked until 4:00 a.m., [Filing No. 163-3 at 2],
but Mr. Steele attests that the cells were locked “until 7:00 a.m. except for when you went to
breakfast, whatever time that would be. Then you would eat breakfast, come back, lock back
down.” [Filing No. 163-2 at 15.]
4
During facility lockdowns, inmates were not permitted to leave their cells unless escorted
by a member of the correctional staff. [Filing No. 163-3 at 2.] Extended lockdowns occasionally
occurred during Mr. Steele’s incarceration at CIF, such as from January 20-27, 2011, and for
thirteen hours on November 22, 2013. [Filing No. 171-1 at 2.] During lockdown, prison staff took
two inmates at a time to the bathroom, continuously rotating until all inmates had used the
bathroom and then the staff would start over and take them for ice and water. [Filing No. 163-3
at 2.] The staff would then pass out meals and begin the restroom break rotation again. [Filing
No. 163-3 at 2.] During lockdown, inmates were permitted to fill pitchers of water and have
coolers in their cells. [Filing No. 163-3 at 2.]
Inmates occasionally urinated or defecated into empty containers when they were locked
in their cells. [Filing No. 163-3 at 3.] Mr. Steele urinated in bottles once or twice per week while
he was locked in his cell because he could no longer bear the physical pain of waiting to use the
bathroom. [Filing No. 163-2 at 25; Filing No. 171-1 at 2.] He occasionally defecated in a container
during lockdown. [Filing No. 163-2 at 25; Filing No. 171-1 at 2.] On December 16, 2011, prison
staff told Mr. Steele to use a container to go to the bathroom. [Filing No. 171-1 at 2.] On
November 22, 2013, Mr. Steele had to wait thirteen hours to use the restroom. [Filing No. 171-1
at 2.] Mr. Steele was not able to wash his hands or eliminate the foul odor from his cell after
urinating or defecating in his cell without a toilet. [Filing No. 171-1 at 3.] His cellmate also
regularly urinated or defecated in their cell. [Filing No. 171-1 at 3.]
During the summer months when Mr. Steele was incarcerated at CIF, he was occasionally
locked in his cell for several hours or more without access to a fan, air conditioner, or drinking
water, while temperatures exceeded 90 degrees. [Filing No. 171-1 at 3.] This included on July 5,
2012, when Mr. Steele was not allowed access to a fan or drinking water from 8:30 a.m. until 5:00
5
p.m. [Filing No. 171-1 at 3.] There was almost no ventilation in his cell because the prison
windows were barred shut and there was little air flow from the small crack under the cell door.
[Filing No. 171-1 at 3.]
The combination of conditions of his confinement at CIF caused Mr. Steele physical pain,
jeopardized his health and safety, and caused him mental and emotional anguish. [Filing No. 1711.] He still experiences “difficulties using the restroom including incontinence because of the
many times [he] was in physical pain waiting to use the restroom.” [Filing No. 171-1 at 3; Filing
No. 163-6 at 2.] No doctor has treated Mr. Steele for the symptoms of which he complains. [Filing
No. 163-2 at 23.]
In April 2013, Mr. Steele filed a Complaint in state court against various Defendants,
alleging various claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Filing No. 1-1 at 21-29.] Defendants
removed the case to federal court, [Filing No. 1], and Mr. Steele’s Third Amended Complaint
asserts Eighth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law negligence and gross
negligence claims against Defendants. [Filing No. 149.] Defendants have moved for summary
judgment on all of Mr. Steele’s claims, [Filing No. 162], and Mr. Steele opposes that motion,
[Filing No. 171].
III.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Steele challenges the combined conditions of his confinement at CIF, which he alleges
violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, Mr.
Steele challenges the combined effect of his regular denial of access to a toilet, sanitation, and
drinking water; his repeated denial of access to respite from extreme temperatures; and the small
cell he was required to share with another inmate, which he contends made the unsanitary
conditions even more unbearable. [Filing No. 171 at 4-5.] The parties dispute whether summary
6
judgment is appropriate on Mr. Steele’s claims. [Filing No. 163; Filing No. 164; Filing No. 171.]
The Court will separately address the parties’ arguments regarding the state and federal claims Mr.
Steele pursues.
A. Eighth Amendment Claims
1) Generally Applicable Law
Mr. Steele pursues his federal claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Filing No. 149.] 42
U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .” The statute is not an
independent source of liability but, instead, is “a means of vindicating rights secured elsewhere.”
Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313, 319 (7th Cir. 2009). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
allege that he was (1) deprived of a federal right, privilege, or immunity (2) by any person acting
under color of state law. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2005).
The Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects prisoners from prison conditions that cause “the wanton
and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). This includes hazardous prison conditions. Pyles,
771 F.3d at 408 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). To that end, “[i]ncarcerated
persons are entitled to confinement under humane conditions that provide for their ‘basic human
needs.’” Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 337). “[L]ife’s necessities include shelter and heat,” and a “lack of heat, clothing, or
sanitation can violate the Eighth Amendment.” Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.
7
2006) (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (10th Cir. 1980) (“[A] state must provide . . .
reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, hygienic materials, and utilities (i.e., hot and
cold water, light, heat, plumbing).”)). “Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth
Amendment violation in combination when each alone would not do so. This is true when the
deprivations have a mutually enforcing effect which produces the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need, such as food or warmth, for example a low cell temperature at night
combined with a failure to issue blankets.” Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493. But “prison conditions may
be uncomfortable, even harsh, without being inhumane.” Rice, 675 F.3d at 666.
An inmate’s constitutional challenge to prison conditions requires a two-part examination
where the alleged deprivation is examined both objectively and subjectively.
Haywood v.
Hathaway, --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 6988750, at *3 (7th Cir. 2016); Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d
765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008). First, the Court “must determine whether the conditions at issue were
‘sufficiently serious’ so that ‘a prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Townsend, 522 F.3d at 773 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). If the inmate successfully establishes that the conditions were
sufficiently serious, the Court then examines whether prison officials acted with “deliberate
indifference” to the conditions in question. Townsend, 522 F.3d at 773. Deliberate indifference
is analyzed subjectively to determine whether the official knew that the inmate faced a substantial
risk of serious harm and yet disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to address
it. Id. (citations omitted). “[I]t is not enough for the inmate to show that the official acted
negligently or that he or she should have known about the risk. Instead, the inmate must show that
the official received information from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
existed, and that the official actually drew the inference.” Id.
8
“The burden is on the prisoner to demonstrate that prison officials violated the Eighth
Amendment, and that burden is a heavy one.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 408-09. That said, “[t]he party
opposing summary judgment receives the benefit of reasonable inferences.” Townsend, 522 F.3d
at 773.
2) Individual Capacity Claim Against Superintendent Knight
Mr. Steele brings an individual capacity claim only against Superintendent Knight. [Filing
No. 171 at 15 (“Individual capacity claims in this action only apply to Defendant Knight.”).] The
Court will separately address the parties’ arguments regarding each of the two elements of Mr.
Steele’s § 1983 claim against Superintendent Knight in her individual capacity.
a) Whether Conditions Were Sufficiently Serious
First, the Court “must determine whether the conditions at issue were ‘sufficiently serious’
so that ‘a prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities.’” Townsend, 522 F.3d at 773.
Superintendent Knight argues that there is insufficient evidence for a jury to find that Mr.
Steele was subjected to sufficiently serious conditions in violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights. [Filing No. 164 at 10-16.] While Superintendent Knight concedes that Mr. Steele’s
conditions were “likely inconvenient and unpleasant,” she argues that any delays he suffered from
not being able to access the bathroom, access drinking water, urinating or defecating in a container
in his small cell, or being subjected to extreme heat do not rise to the level necessary for an Eighth
Amendment violation for deprivation of the minimal measures of life’s necessities. [Filing No.
164 at 12-13.] She concludes that “the hardships that [Mr. Steele] experienced were temporary
inconveniences that did not create a risk to [his] health and safety. Thus, they did not amount to
9
deprivations so objectively serious as to implicate the Eighth Amendment.” [Filing No. 164 at 1516.]
In response, Mr. Steele criticizes Superintendent Knight’s “dismissive and patronizing
attitude” to his claims. [Filing No. 171 at 13.] He points out that conditions of confinement may
combine to form the basis of a claim and emphasizes that he was subjected to the complained of
conditions for more than three years at CIF.4 [Filing No. 171 at 12-13.]
In reply, Superintendent Knight contends that Mr. Steele’s complained of conditions do
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. [Filing No. 172 at 5-6.] She claims that Mr.
Steele does not dispute that the nighttime restrictions, counts, and lockdowns resulted in temporary
delays before he could ultimately use the bathroom. [Filing No. 172 at 5-6.] Superintendent
Knight also argues that Mr. Steele has suffered no concrete harm. [Filing No. 172 at 6.]
“Adequate food and facilities to wash and use the toilet are among the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities that must be afforded prisoners.” Jaros v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 684
F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Likewise, “a right to adequate
ventilation is violated if the ventilation is so poor as to constitute punishment.” Budd v. Motley,
711 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Shelby Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085,
1087 (7th Cir. 1986)). “Conditions of confinement, even if not individually serious enough to
work constitutional violations, may violate the Constitution in combination when they have a
mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need.”
4
The Court notes that Mr. Steele did not cite to the evidence presented on summary judgment
when making his arguments regarding the Defendants’ liability. [Filing No. 171 at 13-15.]
Instead, he generally incorporated the fact section of his brief. [Filing No. 171 at 13.] In the future,
to facilitate the Court’s review, Mr. Steele must directly cite to the evidence on which he relies to
support the specific arguments he makes in the argument section of his briefs. Failure to do so
may result in the Court deeming the argument waived.
10
Budd, 711 F.3d at 842-43 (citations omitted); see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 362-63 (“It is important
to recognize that various deficiencies in prison conditions must be considered together. The
individual conditions exist in combination; each affects the other; and taken together they may
have a cumulative impact on the inmates.”).
Extent, duration, and consequences are relevant to determining whether conditions violate
the Eighth Amendment. Jaros, 684 F.3d at 671 (citing Reed, 178 F.3d at 853). When a prisoner
presents evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the conditions of which
he complains fell below the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, summary judgment in
favor of the defendant is inappropriate. See Rice, 675 F.3d at 665-66 (concluding that a prison
conditions claim could not be resolved on summary judgment when “a factfinder reasonably could
conclude that the conditions of [the prisoner’s] confinement exceeded mere discomfort and were
constitutionally unacceptable”); Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992) (reversing
the grant of summary judgment in a case where a prisoner attested that he was confined with,
among other things, “filth, leaking and inadequate plumbing, roaches, rodents, the constant smell
of human waste . . .”).
In analyzing whether Mr. Steele’s conditions were sufficiently serious to be considered an
Eighth Amendment violation, the Court notes that many of his allegations are undisputed. It is
undisputed that Mr. Steele’s cell did not have a sink or a toilet. [Filing No. 163-4 at 3; Filing No.
171-1 at 2; Filing No. 171-4 at 1-2.] It is undisputed that there “were multiple times throughout
the day that [Mr.] Steele was locked in a cell where he did not have access to a working toilet or
sink.” [Filing No. 171-4 at 2.] It is undisputed that Mr. Steele’s cell did not have air conditioning,
that he could not open the window, and that CIF did not provide a fan for the cell, although he was
allowed to purchase one from commissary if he could afford it. [Filing No. 163-3 at 4; Filing No.
11
171-4 at 7.] It is undisputed that CIF policy dictated that empty containers were “not permitted in
offenders’ cells” and that orders were issued for staff members to confiscate empty containers from
cells during searches. [Filing No. 163-3 at 3; Filing No. 171-4 at 2.] It is undisputed that inmates
“did relieve themselves in bottles” at times when locked in their cells and that Superintendent
Knight was aware of that fact. [Filing No. 163-3 at 3; Filing No. 163-4 at 4; Filing No. 171-4 at
2.] It is undisputed that when CIF inmates are locked in their cells at night, they can request to use
the bathroom through an electronic system. [Filing No. 163-3 at 2-3; Filing No. 163-4 at 3-4.] It
is undisputed that inmates “may have to wait their turn before their cells are unlocked.” [Filing
No. 163-3 at 3.] It is further undisputed that the Defendants “received multiple grievances over
the years . . . complaining about staff not letting them out to use the toilets.” [Filing No. 163-3 at
3; Filing No. 163-4 at 4; Filing No. 171-4 at 2.]
In addition to the undisputed evidence, Mr. Steele attests that his requests to use the
restroom at night “were frequently ignored or completely discarded.” [Filing No. 171-1 at 2; Filing
No. 163-2 at 15.] This caused him physical pain, and at least once a week he urinated in his cell
because he could no longer bear the pain. [Filing No. 171-1 at 2.] Mr. Steele also defecated in his
cell several times because he could not bear the pain of waiting. [Filing No. 171-1 at 2.] Mr.
Steele still experiences “difficulties using the restroom including incontinence because of the many
times [he] was in physical pain waiting to use the restroom.” [Filing No. 171-1 at 3; Filing No.
163-6 at 2.] Mr. Steele attests that his cellmate also regularly urinated or defecated in the cell
without a toilet. [Filing No. 171-1 at 3.] He submits an affidavit from a former CIF inmate, Cody
Pennington, who also “had many issues where [he] was forced to urinate and/or defecate in bottles
and other containers because staff would not let [him] out of [his] cell to use the toilets.” [Filing
No. 171-5 at 2.]
12
In moving for summary judgment, Superintendent Knight individually analyzes the
conditions of which Mr. Steele complains—the lack of access to restrooms, sanitation, sinks, and
drinking water; the small cell size; and the high temperatures—and argues that each of those
conditions does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. [Filing No. 164 at 12-16.]
But as Mr. Steele correctly points out in his response brief, a prison conditions claim can focus on
the combined effect of the complained of conditions. [Filing No. 171 at 3-4.] Specifically, the
hygiene and sanitation risk and odor that resulted from Mr. Steele urinating or defecating in his
cell because he did not have access to a toilet could certainly be exacerbated by the small size of
the cell, which he shared with another inmate who also may be urinating or defecating in the cell.
The conditions also could be exacerbated by the lack of ventilation in the cell, particularly on hot
days given that the prison did not provide inmates with free access to a fan.
The Court rejects Superintendent Knight’s characterization of the conditions Mr. Steele
endured as merely “inconvenient and unpleasant.” [Filing No. 164 at 12.] Being confined in a
cell for extended periods of time and denied access to a toilet to the point where an inmate or his
cellmate must urinate or defecate in a contraband container is surely more than an unpleasant
inconvenience. The Court also rejects Superintendent Knight’s argument that Mr. Steele has failed
to identify any harm from or health consequences of the conditions of which he complains. [Filing
No. 164 at 13.] Mr. Steele attests to pain he endured and his resulting incontinence, [Filing No.
171-1 at 2-3], but even without those physical impacts, it is possible for a mere hazard to health to
support an Eighth Amendment violation. See Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[W]e write to correct the judge’s apparent assumption that creation of a mere hazard to health,
as opposed to an actual impairment of health, can never be a harm sufficient to support an Eighth
13
Amendment violation.”); see also Budd, 711 F.3d at 843 (inmates “exposure to psychological harm
or a heightened risk of future injury from living in an infested jail is itself actionable”).
The evidence on summary judgment shows that Mr. Steele was routinely locked in his cell
for hours without access to a toilet or sink, that guards sometimes ignored his requests to use the
bathroom per the protocol to do so, and that sometimes Mr. Steele had to urinate or defecate into
a contraband container in his cell because he had no other option. The evidence also shows that
these conditions were exacerbated because Mr. Knight shared his small cell with another inmate
who also had to urinate or defecate in the cell because he had no other option, that the temperature
in the cell could reach 90 degrees or more because the windows were secured shut, and that the
prison did not provide a fan for each cell. The Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that these
conditions are insufficient to prove an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment.
Thus, the Court denies Superintendent Knight’s request for summary judgment on Mr. Steele’s
Eighth Amendment claim in her individual capacity.
In sum, the Court concludes that based on the evidence presented at summary judgment, a
reasonable factfinder could find Mr. Steele’s three-year detention in the complained of conditions
sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment. See Lindsey v. Esser, 2015 WL 5032659,
at *4 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (“The lack of a functioning toilet, however, is more significant. . . .
‘[W]hen the Eighth Amendment is operative, its ban is violated by locking a person, for any
significant period of time, in a cell lacking a flush toilet and a washbowl.’”) (quoting Flakes v.
Percy, 511 F.Supp. 1325, 1332 (W.D. Wis. 1981)); see also Brown v. Ryker, 2011 WL 221817, at
*3 (S.D. Ill. 2011) (“The plaintiff here describes ongoing exposure to his own and his cellmate’s
human waste in his cell for over four days, being subjected to the constant odor of urine and feces
from his own cell and the entire housing unit, being unable to wash after using the toilet or before
14
eating, and physical pain and discomfort from lack of access to a working toilet. These unsanitary
and hazardous conditions meet the objective component of a constitutional violation.”). On the
other hand, a reasonable factfinder could find that the complained of conditions are not sufficiently
serious such that they violate the Eighth Amendment. See Ashley v. Mollenhauer, 2013 WL
432907, at *3 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (“The Eighth Amendment does not require that prisoners enjoy
immediately available and flushable toilets at all times.”) (citing Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996,
1013 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendants being required to urinate occasionally in their cells
when officers were unavailable to take them to the toilet did not violate the Eighth Amendment)).
To the extent that Superintendent Knight relies on various penological interests the prison
has during lockdown and counts to excuse the conditions in which Mr. Steele was held, the Court
is mindful of the principle that it should be “reluctant to interfere with the administration of
prisons.” Gillis, 468 F.3d at 494-95 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). To that
end, at trial Superintendent Knight can present evidence of the policies and interest surrounding
those situations and also request that the jury be instructed on related established principles of law.
See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“Because routine discomfort is part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations
denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis
of an Eighth Amendment violation.”) (citation and quotations omitted); Lunsford v. Bennett, 17
F.3d 1574 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that temporary discomfort “hardly violates common notions of
decency”). But for the reasons stated above, the Court cannot conclude that Superintendent Knight
is entitled to summary judgment on this element of Mr. Steele’s Eighth Amendment claim against
her in her individual capacity as a matter of law.
15
b) Deliberate Indifference
Superintendent Knight claims that there is no evidence that she was personally involved in
the conditions of which Mr. Steele complains, and she emphasizes that the doctrine of respondeat
superior does not apply in § 1983 actions. [Filing No. 164 at 16-18.] She concludes that at most,
the evidence shows that she acted within her discretion to determine how to best operate the prison
facility and that there is no evidence of her actual intent to cause harm or inflict unnecessary pain.
[Filing No. 164 at 17.]
In response, Mr. Steele argues that Superintendent Knight was not required to be the one
to carry out the obvious ends of the practices she instituted to be deliberately indifferent since she
knew and took no corrective action. [Filing No. 171 at 13-14.] He emphasizes that Superintendent
Knight had extensive knowledge of the prison’s operations but ignored the complained of
violations. [Filing No. 171 at 15.]
In reply, Superintendent Knight argues that Mr. Steele designated no evidence that he made
her aware of the constitutional deprivations he claims to have suffered. [Filing No. 172 at 6-7.]
She emphasizes that knowledge of the operations of the prison are not the same as knowledge of
a risk to Mr. Steele’s safety, let alone evidence of indifference to that risk. [Filing No. 172 at 7.]
State officials are deliberately indifferent if they “know of and disregard an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety.” Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
The plaintiff must show that the official was “‘aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and they must also draw the inference.’” Id.
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). He must also show that the official acted with reckless
disregard toward the serious need by “inaction or woefully inadequate action.” Reed, 178 F.3d at
854. In sum, deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence” but “is
16
satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
“While there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, supervisors may be liable for
the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisors know about and approve of the
conduct.” Williams v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 167 F. App’x 555, 558 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001)). Put another way, “[i]f a senior jail or
prison official, including a person with final policymaking power, is aware of a systemic lapse in
enforcement of a policy critical to ensuring inmate safety, his failure to enforce the policy could
violate the Eighth Amendment.” Daniel v. Cook Cnty., 833 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 2016).
“Similarly, if a supervisor designed or is aware of the institution’s deliberately indifferent policy
that caused a constitutional injury, then individual liability might flow from that act.” Id.
The Court finds that issues of material fact prevent it from granting summary judgment in
favor of Superintendent Knight on the deliberate indifference element of Mr. Steele’s Eighth
Amendment claim. Superintendent Knight’s admissions during discovery confirm her knowledge
of the conditions at issue, particularly with regard to Mr. Steele’s complaints that he was routinely
locked in his cell without access to a toilet, causing him to urinate or defecate in the cell:
17
[Filing No. 171-4 at 2.]
As an initial matter, Superintendent Knight’s characterization of inmates urinating or
defecating in containers in their cells “of their own volition” is contrary to her later admission that
she was aware of complaints that staff were not letting inmates out of their cells to use the
bathroom. Moreover, Mr. Steele attests that he had to urinate or defecate in his cell because he
could no longer bear the pain after not being let out to use the bathroom. [Filing No. 171-1 at 2.]
He designates the affidavit of former CIF inmate Mr. Pennington who also “had many issues where
[he] was forced to urinate and/or defecate in bottles and other containers because staff would not
18
let [him] out of his cell to use the toilets.” [Filing No. 171-5 at 2.] Thus, even ignoring the
unsympathetic tone of Superintendent Knight’s response to the requests for admission erroneously
presuming that humans have total control over the bodily functions at issue herein, Mr. Steele has
clearly presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact regarding the voluntariness of the
practice of urinating and defecating in his cell.
Superintendent Knight asks for summary judgment on the deliberate indifference element
of Mr. Steele’s Eighth Amendment claim because there is no evidence that she was actually in
charge of letting inmates out of their cells to use the bathroom. [Filing No. 164 at 16.] While this
is true, she ignores her own admissions that Mr. Steele’s cell did not have a toilet, that he was
locked in it multiple times per day, that she ordered all containers and trashcans to be confiscated
from the cells, and that she was aware of multiple grievances that staff were not letting inmates
out of their cells to use the toilet. [Filing No. 171-4 at 2.] That evidence is sufficient at this stage
of the litigation to create an issue of fact regarding Superintendent Knight’s deliberate indifference.
See Daniel, 833 F.3d at 737 (“Similarly, if a supervisor designed or is aware of the institution’s
deliberately indifferent policy that caused a constitutional injury, then individual liability might
flow from that act.”); Rice, 675 F.3d at 679 (holding that where there was evidence that hourly
checks were not being performed per a policy, a factfinder could find deliberate indifference “to
the concerns underlying the rule mandating those checks”).
Additionally, while Superintendent Knight attempts to downplay the significance of any
injury Mr. Steele may have suffered, the well-known physical pain that can result from the denial
of access to a toilet could support an Eighth Amendment claim to the extent that denial was
repeated and unnecessary. See, e.g., Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Notably, a
medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it could be a condition that
19
would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not
treated.”). While it is possible that the factfinder will not conclude that Superintendent Knight
acted with deliberate indifference regarding the conditions at issue in Mr. Steele’s Eighth
Amendment claim, the Court cannot grant summary judgment as a matter of law to her based on
the record before it.
c) Qualified Immunity5
Superintendent Knight argues that even if Mr. Steele was subjected to an Eighth
Amendment violation, she is “nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity.” [Filing No. 164 at 2021.] She emphasizes that Mr. Steele has the burden of showing that the constitutional right at issue
was clearly established and that he cannot meet that in this case. [Filing No. 164 at 20-21.]
In response, Mr. Steele relies on the cases he cited in the Eighth Amendment section of his
response brief to establish the underlying constitutional violation. [Filing No. 171 at 18-19.]
In reply, Superintendent Knight argues that the bathroom access cases Mr. Steele cites are
insufficient, and she distinguishes those cases as more severe circumstances than what Mr. Steele
alleges he endured. [Filing No. 172 at 7-8.]
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil “liability ‘insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Werner v. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In determining whether qualified immunity
applies, the Court must address whether the constitutional right that the plaintiff alleges was
5
While both Defendants try to invoke qualified immunity, Mr. Steele is not pursuing a claim
against Superintendent Carneygee in her individual capacity. [Filing No. 171 at 15.] Thus,
Superintendent Carneygee cannot invoke qualified immunity. See Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235
F.3d 1000, 1024 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Qualified immunity protects government officials from
individual liability under Section 1983.”).
20
violated “was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” 6 Werner, 836
F.3d at 759. The Seventh Circuit applies the following standard to determine whether a right was
clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct:
In determining whether a right is “clearly established,” we look first to controlling
precedent on the issue from the Supreme Court and from this circuit. If such
precedent is lacking, we look to all relevant case law to determine whether there
was such a clear trend in the case law that we can say with fair assurance that the
recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely a question of time.
Even dicta, although we do not rely on it here, in certain cases, can clearly establish
a right. In undertaking this analysis, we take care to look at the right violated in a
particularized sense, rather than at a high level of generality. But a case directly on
point is not required for a right to be clearly established and officials can still be on
notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances.
Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 528 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotations and citations omitted).
Mr. Steele was confined at CIF from November 2010 until February 2014. [Filing No.
171-1 at 1.] The Court has found that he has presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary
judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim against Superintendent Knight in her individual
capacity. The Court concludes that Superintendent Knight is not entitled to qualified immunity on
this claim because it was well-established in the Seventh Circuit before the time at issue that a lack
of sanitation can violate the Eighth Amendment. Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493-95 (“A lack of heat,
clothing, or sanitation can violate the Eighth Amendment. . . . [D]efendants have not shown that
they are entitled to qualified immunity. They cannot show that in 2002, when these events
occurred, it was not well-established that denial of shelter, heat, and hygiene items implicated an
inmate’s constitutional rights.”); see also Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989)
The Court must also determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations “make out a deprivation of a
constitutional right.” Werner, 836 F.3d at 759. Because the Court has already concluded that Mr.
Steele has presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment regarding his alleged
deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights, the Court will not further address that element of the
qualified immunity analysis.
21
6
(“Clearly, prison officials have a responsibility to provide inmates with a minima of shelter,
sanitation and utilities—basic necessities of civilized life. . . . This Court has repeatedly stressed
that the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to maintain minimal sanitary and safe prison
conditions . . . .”). In fact, in 2007 the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s decision granting
qualified immunity to defendants on a prison conditions claim stemming from a prisoner’s
assignment to a cell with blood and feces on the walls and no working toilet. Vinning-El v. Long,
482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007) (“it was clearly established well before 2001 that the conditions
[the inmate] describes, if true, deprived him of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities”). While Superintendent Knight attempts to distinguish cases cited by Mr. Steele as
more extreme than the conditions of which Mr. Steele complains, a case need not be directly on
point for a right to be clearly established. Phillips, 678 F.3d at 528. For these reasons, the Court
concludes that Superintendent Knight is not entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Steele’s § 1983
claim against her in her individual capacity.
3) Official Capacity Claims
Mr. Steele brings official capacity claims against both Defendants. [Filing No. 171 at 1415.] Defendants ask for summary judgment on Mr. Steele’s official capacity claims, arguing that
“neither a State nor its official acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.” [Filing No. 164 at 19 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989)).]
In response, Mr. Steele argues that to prove an official capacity claim, he must show an
official policy, widespread custom, or deliberate act that cause the conditions under which he
suffered. [Filing No. 171 at 14-15.] He contends that he has sufficiently supported this claim with
evidence at summary judgment to show that Defendants controlled the policies that he contends
22
injured him. [Filing No. 171 at 14-15.] Mr. Steele also argues that to the extent Defendants are
invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity, they have waived that by voluntarily removing his case
to federal court. [Filing No. 171 at 16-17.] Mr. Steele points to the parties’ Joint Stipulation
stating that Superintendent Knight—the only remaining defendant before Mr. Steele amended his
complaint to add Superintendent Carneygee—agreed that “the full array of damages, including
compensatory and punitive damages as set forth in the Amended Complaint shall be available to
Steele for the remaining claims in this lawsuit, subject to the verdict of the jury or ruling of this
Court as to the merits of Steele’s Eight[h] Amendment claims.” [Filing No. 134 at 2-3.]
In reply, Defendants confirm that they are not invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity.
[Filing No. 172 at 1-2.] Instead, they contend that when sued in their official capacity, they are
not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. [Filing No. 172 at 1-2.]
“An official capacity suit is tantamount to a claim against the government entity itself.”
Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008). To establish liability, a plaintiff must
“establish that the deliberate indifference to which he was subjected came about as a result of a
custom or policy established by the officials.” Id.
Typically, “official-capacity suits for retrospective relief—i.e., money damages payable
from the state treasury—generally implicate the eleventh amendment in the absence of a waiver
by the state or a valid congressional override.” Kroll v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 934
F.2d 904, 907-08 (7th Cir. 1991). While it is possible to obtain injunctive relief through an official
capacity claim, id., “when a prisoner who seeks injunctive relief for a condition specific to a
particular prison is transferred out of that prison, the need for relief, and hence the prisoner’s claim,
become moot[,]” Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 2004).
23
It is undisputed that Mr. Steele is no longer housed at CIF. [Filing No. 171-1 at 1.] Thus,
he does not, and cannot, seek injunctive relief for his Eighth Amendment claim. Typically, he
would not be able to obtain money damages for his official capacity claims, but as Defendants
confirm in their reply to summary judgment, they are not invoking Eleventh Amendment
immunity. [Filing No. 172 at 1-2; see also Filing No. 134 (Joint Stipulation).] This is not an
oversight, however, because it is the natural consequence of their removal of Mr. Steele’s state
court suit to federal court. See Nuñez v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 817 F.3d 1042, 1044 (7th
Cir. 2016) (“state’s removal of suit to federal court amounted to waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity in that suit”) (citing Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia, 535 U.S.
613 (2002)).
While Defendants are correct that when sued in their official capacity they are not
“persons” within the context of a § 1983 claim, Will, 491 U.S. at 71, they ignore that the claims
against them in this capacity are really claims “against the government entity itself[,]”
Klebanowski, 540 F.3d at 637. In fact, the case Defendants cite in support of their argument
confirms that legal principle. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“Obviously, state officials literally are
persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the
official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against
the State itself.”) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that they
cannot be subject to suit for Mr. Steele’s claims in their official capacity.
As cited above, to establish liability on an official capacity claim, a plaintiff must “establish
that the deliberate indifference to which he was subjected came about as a result of a custom or
policy established by the officials.” Klebanowski, 540 F.3d at 637. Mr. Steele argues that he has
done this, [Filing No. 171 at 14-15], and Defendants do not dispute that in their opening or reply
24
briefs, [Filing No. 164; Filing No. 172]. Given that it is the moving party’s initial burden to
identify the basis for seeking summary judgment and develop the arguments that entitle it to relief,
Costello v. Grundon, 651 F.3d 614, 635 (7th Cir. 2011), and the Court has rejected the only
argument presented by Defendants regarding Mr. Steele’s official capacity claims, the Court
denies summary judgment on those claims.
B. State Law Negligence Claims
Mr. Steele asserts state law claims for negligence and gross negligence against the
Defendants. Defendants move for summary judgment on those claims, arguing that there is no
evidence that they acted negligently. [Filing No. 164 at 21-22.] They also argue that they are
immune from these claims pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) because the conduct
at issue stems from the performance of discretionary duties. [Filing No. 164 at 22-24.] They
emphasize that the conditions of which Mr. Steele complains were general practices not limited
just to him. [Filing No. 164 at 23-24.]
In response, Mr. Steele argues that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on
his state law claims because “the harm they caused Mr. Steele was intentional and reckless with
open disregard to the hazard to his safety and mental health.” [Filing No. 171 at 18.] Mr. Steele
contends that Defendants are not entitled to immunity under the ITCA because he alleges that they
acted willfully and wantonly. [Filing No. 171 at 19-20.]
In reply, Defendants point out that Mr. Steele “still fails to indicate what conduct
Defendants performed which fell below a reasonable standard of care.” [Filing No. 172 at 8-9.]
Defendants also contend that none of the exceptions to ITCA immunity apply. [Filing No. 172 at
9.]
25
Prison officers are shielded from liability in their official capacity under the ITCA. Smith
v. Indiana Dep’t of Correction, 871 N.E.2d 975, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Ind. Code § 3413-3-1, et seq.). In order to bring a suit against an employee personally, the plaintiff must show
“that an act or omission of the employee that causes a loss is (1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the
scope of the employee’s employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated to
benefit the employee personally.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c). The purpose of the ITCA is to
“ensure that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their
duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within
the scope of their employment.” Smith, 871 N.E.2d at 986 (citing Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v.
Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 452 (Ind. 2000)). When the employee’s conduct is “of the same general
nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized,” it is “within the scope of
employment.” Smith, 871 N.E.2d at 986 (citing Celebration Fireworks, 727 N.E.2d at 452).
Mr. Steele has confirmed through summary judgment briefing that he is only pursuing an
individual capacity claim against Superintendent Knight. [Filing No. 171 at 15.] Thus, the ITCA
precludes Mr. Steele’s state law negligence claims against Superintendent Carneygee because she
has only been sued in her official capacity, Smith, 871 N.E.2d at 986, and Superintendent
Carneygee is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Steele’s state law claims.
As for Mr. Steele’s state law negligence claims against Superintendent Knight in her
individual capacity, he contends that the ITCA does not bar those claims because the evidence
establishes that she acted willfully and wantonly, which is an exception to the ITCA. [Filing No.
171 at 17-18.] “The elements of willful or wanton misconduct are: (1) the defendant must have
knowledge of an impending danger or consciousness of a course of misconduct calculated to result
in probable injury; and (2) the actor’s conduct must have exhibited an indifference to the
26
consequences of his conduct.” Ellis v. City of Martinsville, 940 N.E.2d 1197, 1204-05 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011). “‘[W]anton and willful’ and ‘reckless’ seem to imply the same disregard for the safety
of others.” Id. (quoting Obremski v. Henderson, 497 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. 1986)).
The Court notes that the willful and wanton standard is similar to the deliberate indifference
standard analyzed in the context of Mr. Steele’s § 1983 claim. See Conley v. Birch, 796 F.3d 742,
746 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that deliberate indifference for purposes of a § 1983 claim “require[s]
a reckless disregard of a substantial risk”). For the reasons that the Court found issues of material
fact to preclude summary judgment in favor of Superintendent Knight on Mr. Steele’s § 1983
claim regarding the deliberate indifference element, the Court also finds that issues of material fact
exist regarding whether Superintendent Knight acted willfully and wantonly, such that an
exception to the ITCA could apply. If the ITCA does not apply, the Court’s prior reasoning also
precludes summary judgment on the elements of Mr. Steele’s negligence and gross negligence
claims because those standards are actually lower than the standard for deliberate indifference, for
which the Court has already found issues of material fact. See Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816,
821 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have consistently held that deliberate indifference requires a showing
of more than mere or gross negligence.”). For these reasons, the Court denies Superintendent
Knight’s request for summary judgment on Mr. Steele’s negligence and gross negligence claims
brought against her in her individual capacity.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. [Filing No. 162.] Specifically, the Court grants
Defendants’ request for summary judgment in their favor on Mr. Steele’s state law claims against
Superintendent Carneygee in her official capacity and denies their request for summary judgment
27
on Mr. Steele’s remaining state and federal claims. The following claims survive summary
judgment and will proceed to trial:
Mr. Steele’s Eighth Amendment claim against Superintendent Knight in her individual
capacity;
Mr. Steele’s official capacity claims against both Defendants; and
Mr. Steele’s state law negligence and gross negligence claims against Superintendent
Knight in her individual capacity.
The Clerk is directed to docket the Court’s Practices and Procedures, and the Magistrate Judge is
asked to set a conference with the parties to establish a schedule for timely resolving this case.
Date: 12/7/2016
Electronic Distribution to Counsel of Record via CM/ECF
28
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?