CHARLES v. CORIZON
Filing
24
ENTRY granting Defendant's 15 Motion for Summary Judgment and Directing Entry of Final Judgment (see Entry). Copy to Plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 7/15/2014. (SWM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ELMER D. CHARLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORIZON,
Defendant.
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) Case No. 1:13-cv-01820-JMS-DKL
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Entry Granting Motion for Summary Judgment
and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
I. Background
Elmer D. Charles (“Charles”) is a transsexual state prisoner who at all times relevant to
the complaint was confined at the New Castle Correctional Annex. Charles alleges that the
defendant, Corizon, violated her Eighth Amendment rights by denying estrogen treatment,
forcing testosterone treatment, and failing to refer Charles to a gender specialist and
endocrinologist. She seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
The defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment seeking resolution of the claim
against it based on the affirmative defense that Charles failed to exhaust her available
administrative remedies prior to filing this action. Charles has opposed the motion for summary
judgment.
For the reasons explained in this Entry, the motion for summary judgment [dkt. 15] is
granted.
II. Discussion
A.
Legal Standards
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material fact” is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a reasonable jury
could find for the non-moving party. Id. If no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving
party, then there is no “genuine” dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The Court
views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences
are drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Ault v. Speicher, 634 F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).
“The applicable substantive law will dictate which facts are material.” National Soffit &
Escutcheons, Inc., v. Superior Systems, Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248). The substantive law applicable to the motion for summary judgment is the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA’”), which requires that a prisoner exhaust his available
administrative remedies before bringing a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.” Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical
procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some
orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006)
(footnote omitted); see also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In order to
properly exhaust, a prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals ‘in the place, and at the
time, the prison’s administrative rules require.’”) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,
1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). “In order to exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must take all steps
prescribed by the prison’s grievance system.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir.
2004).
“[A]n inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through
administrative avenues.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). “Exhaustion is
necessary even if the prisoner is requesting relief that the relevant administrative review board
has no power to grant, such as monetary damages, or if the prisoner believes that exhaustion is
futile.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); Dixon v.
Page, 291 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2002) (the PLRA requires exhaustion “even if the [grievance]
process could not result in a prisoner’s desired form of relief”).
B. Undisputed Facts
On the basis of the pleadings and the expanded record, and specifically on the portions of
that record which comply with the requirements of Rule 56(c), the following facts, construed in
the manner most favorable to Charles as the non-movant, are undisputed for purposes of the
motion for summary judgment:
Indiana Department of Correction Grievance Procedure
The administrative remedy process available to prisoners incarcerated within the custody
of the Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”) is set forth in IDOC Policy and
Administrative Procedures, Number 00-02-301, entitled the “Offender Grievance Process”
(“OGP”). The IDOC’s OGP consists of three steps. Step One of the grievance process is referred
to as “Informal Resolution,” and requires a prisoner to make an informal attempt to solve a
problem or address a concern before proceeding to Step Two. Step Two of the grievance process
is referred to as “Level I - Formal Grievance,” and requires the submission of a written form
(State Form 45471) on which the prisoner must set forth the problem or concern. Step Three of
the grievance process, referred to as “Level II - Formal Appeal,” is the final step of the grievance
process, and provides a means by which a prisoner, after receiving a response to a Level I Formal Grievance, may appeal to a higher authority.
Plaintiff’s Grievances
IDOC records reflect that Charles filed a grievance in August of 2012, relating to a
request for dental treatment. Charles also submitted a step one grievance on September 20, 2013,
relating to the circumstances alleged in this lawsuit. That grievance was returned to Charles
because it was not completely filled out and it contained excessive legal jargon. The grievance
was not resubmitted.
Charles acknowledges that she did not complete the process of exhausting her
administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit.
C. Analysis
As noted, the defendant seeks summary judgment on the basis that Charles failed to
exhaust her available administrative remedies. Charles does not argue that she fully exhausted
her administrative remedies before filing this action.
This action was filed on November 14, 2013. Charles alleges that after she was seen by
medical staff on October 7, 2013, she submitted an informal grievance. She argues that because
of the slow process of receiving a step two formal grievance from the counselor, she was unable
to file a grievance within the required time limit. Charles has attached a copy of a step one
grievance that the facility received on February 10, 2014, but has attached no copies of
submissions made in October of 2013. It is true that “[p]rison officials may not take unfair
advantage of the exhaustion requirement, … and a remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison
employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct
to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. Charles has not submitted any
admissible evidence, however, demonstrating that prison officials prevented her from completing
the exhaustion process before filing this lawsuit.1
Charles further asserts that after she saw medical personnel on January 22, 2014, she filed
a grievance on January 25, 2014, and that that grievance was still going through the process
when she filed her motion for enlargement of time on February 20, 2014. In that motion, Charles
requested that the case be stayed pending the completion of the administrative process. The
Court denied that request because a stay for the purpose of exhaustion is not permitted under the
PLRA. See Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2005). (Dkt. nos. 19-22).
It is undisputed that Charles failed to complete the exhaustion process before filing this
action. Therefore, in light of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), Charles’ action should not have been brought
against the defendant and must now be dismissed without prejudice. See Ford, 362 F.3d at 401
(“We therefore hold that all dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice.”).
1
It is not clear whether Charles contends that she was not able to complete the grievance process
because she did not timely receive a response to her step one grievance, but if that is one of her
contentions, the grievance policy has a provision that is meant to circumvent such a problem. “If the
offender receives no grievance response within 25 working days of the day he or she submitted the
grievance, he or she may appeal as though the grievance had been denied.” IDOC Grievance Policy, p.24,
docket 18-1. “In that event, the time to appeal begins on the 26th working day after the grievance was
submitted and ends 10 working days later.” Id.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the motion for summary judgment filed by the
defendant [dkt. 15] is granted.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
07/15/2014
Date: __________________
_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
Elmer D. Charles, #985019, New Castle Correctional Annex, Inmate Mail/Parcels, 1000 Van
Nuys Rd., P. O. Box A, New Castle, IN 47362
Electronically registered counsel
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