E.F. TRANSIT, INC. v. INDIANA ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO COMMISSION

Filing 45

ENTRY denying Wine & Spirits Distributors of Indiana's 21 Motion to Intervene (see Entry). Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 6/20/2014. (SWM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
E.F. TRANSIT., INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANA ALCOHOL AND
TOBACCO COMMISSION,
Defendant.

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) CAUSE NO. 1:13-cv-1927-WTL-MJD
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ENTRY ON MOTION TO INTERVENE
This cause is before the Court on the motion of Wine & Spirits Distributors of Indiana
(“W&S”) seeking to intervene as a defendant in this action. The motion is fully briefed, with the
Plaintiff objecting to it and the Defendant, the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission
(“Commission”), taking no position at this time but “reserv[ing] the right to object to any future
filings by [W&S] if they challenge or call into question any Indiana statutes or regulations.” The
Court, being duly advised, DENIES the motion to intervene for the reasons set forth below.
Under Indiana law, a person who is a licensed beer wholesaler cannot also hold an
interest in a liquor wholesaler’s permit. In this suit, Plaintiff E.F. Transit, Inc., (“EFT”)
challenges on federal preemption grounds the fact that the Commission has interpreted Indiana
law as prohibiting EFT from providing transportation services to a liquor wholesaler because
EFT (1) shares common ownership with a beer wholesaler; and (2) provides warehousing and
transportation services to that beer wholesaler.
W&S is an unincorporated association of holders of wine and liquor wholesaler permits
in Indiana. W&S disagrees with EFT’s preemption argument and also asserts that if EFT
prevails in this suit then other provisions of Indiana’s regulatory scheme governing wholesalers
of alcoholic beverages will be rendered unconstitutional because they will violate W&S’s equal

protection rights. W&S thus seeks to intervene as a defendant in this suit to dispute EFT’s
preemption claim and, if necessary, “to protect their legal and constitutional interests in
fashioning an appropriate and even-handed remedy in light of other provisions of the Indiana
Alcoholic Beverage Act implicated by EFT’s challenge.” W&S Brief at 7-8.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides that “[o]n timely motion, the court
must permit anyone to intervene who “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties
adequately represent that interest.” There is no dispute whether W&S’s motion to intervene was
timely; it was filed just a few days after the answer was filed in this case. However, W&S’s
motion fails to satisfy at least one of the other requirements for intervention as of right: W&S
has not demonstrated that its interests will not be adequately represented by the Commission at
this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, W&S virtually concedes as much in its brief, arguing that
while it believes the Commission will defend the status quo as it relates to EFT’s preemption
argument, it also believes that in the event EFT is successful the Commission’s interest will be in
“upholding as much of current Indiana law,” which W&S believes will conflict with its interest
in fashioning a remedy that protects its equal protection rights. Accordingly, the Court finds
that—at least at this time—W&S does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) and does not
have a right to intervene in this action because it has not demonstrated that its interests will not
be adequately represented by the Commission during the merits phase of the litigation. See, e.g.,
Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. Department of Public Welfare of Pa., 701 F.3d 938, 951 (3rd Cir. 2012)
(“We therefore have recognized that it is appropriate in certain cases to conduct a two-step
examination, separately evaluating whether the applicant has a right to intervene at the merits
stage and whether he or she may intervene to participate in devising the remedy.”) (citation
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omitted); see also Gautreaux v. Pierce, 743 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that
intervention may be appropriate only for a specific, limited purpose).
W&S argues that even if it does not have a right to intervene, the Court should
nonetheless exercise its discretion to permit it to do so pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(b). The Court declines to do so at this time. There is no indication that the
Commission will not rigorously defend itself against EFT’s preemption claim. Permitting W&S
to intervene would simply double the number of briefs the Plaintiff will have to respond to and
the Court will have to consider, and while this burden obviously will not be great, it is not likely
to be offset by any benefit, given the State’s motivation and ability to defend its own statutes and
policies.
If the Commission’s efforts ultimately are unsuccessful, then perhaps—although the
Court takes no position on the matter now—there will be reason to permit W&S to intervene to
protect its interests in fashioning a remedy, but it would be premature to make that determination
at this time. Accordingly, W&S’s motion to intervene is DENIED; however, if EFT prevails on
the merits, W&S may move to intervene for the purpose of weighing in on the appropriate
remedy. If it does so, it will need to provide more specific information about the legal bases for
the arguments it plans to advance than it has in its current briefs and explain why those
arguments are better pursued as an intervenor in this suit rather than in a separate suit.
SO ORDERED: 06/20/2014
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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