HEDDEN et al v. A.W. CHESTERTON CO. et al

Filing 362

ORDER on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment - Defendants' Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. (Filing No. 174 ), CBS Corporation (Filing No. 179 ), General Electric Company (Filing No. 180 ), Gardner Denver, Inc. (Filing No. 196 ), Li nk-Belt Construction Equipment Company (Filing No. 200 ), and Riley Power, Inc's. (Filing No. 202 ) Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED. Defendants Crane Co. (Filing No. 181 ) and John Crane, Inc's. (Filing No. 198 ) Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 9/30/2015. (TRG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
BRYAN KIMBERLY HEDDEN, and
CYNTHIA HEDDEN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CBS CORPORATION, CRANE CO.,
CROWN CORK & SEAL COMPANY, INC.,
GARDNER DENVER INC., GENERAL
ELECTRIC COMPANY, JOHN CRANE,
INC., LINK-BELT CONSTRUCTION
EQUIPMENT CO. LTD, RILEY POWER,
INC., and SPX CORPORATION,
Defendants.

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ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on multiple Motions for Summary Judgment filed pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 by Defendants Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. (Filing
No. 174), CBS Corporation (Filing No. 179), General Electric Company (Filing No. 180), Crane
Co. (Filing No. 181), Gardner Denver, Inc. (Filing No. 196), John Crane, Inc. (Filing No. 198),
Link-Belt Construction Equipment Company (Filing No. 200), and Riley Power, Inc. (Filing No.
202). Following many years of employment with Louisville Gas & Electric and approximately a
year and a half of active duty service in the United States Navy, Plaintiff Bryan Kimberly Hedden
(“Mr. Hedden”) developed malignant pleural mesothelioma. Mr. Hedden asserts that he developed
mesothelioma as a result of being exposed to asbestos during his time with the Navy and while
employed by Louisville Gas & Electric. He filed this tort action against various manufacturers,
distributors, contractors, and miners. Mr. Hedden has since resolved his dispute with many of the

Defendants. Many other Defendants moved for summary judgment on various grounds. The
Court will address each of the Motions for Summary Judgment in turn.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Hedden graduated from high school in 1967. Before graduating, he enlisted in the
United States Navy Reserves. He began active duty service in the Navy in April 1968 and was
assigned to the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (the “Roosevelt”), one of the Navy’s aircraft carriers,
in May 1968 in Mayport, Florida. Mr. Hedden was a yeoman, Petty Officer Third Class, and was
responsible for clerical and paper work and maintaining records. He traveled throughout the ship
and worked around all of the equipment on the ship. Mr. Hedden’s office was in the berthing deck
right above the engine, fire, and boiler rooms. His sleeping compartment was right above and next
to the engine rooms. While his job responsibilities did not require him to personally work on any
equipment, he did work in close proximity to equipment on the Roosevelt in order to complete his
duties.
After Mr. Hedden boarded the Roosevelt in Mayport in May 1968, the Roosevelt remained
in Mayport for about a month to undergo routine maintenance, including pump, valve, evaporator,
and blower work. The valve work included repairing and replacing asbestos-containing packing.
The Roosevelt had twelve boiler rooms, and Mr. Hedden visited them many times during that
month. The work going on in these areas exposed Mr. Hedden to asbestos.
The Roosevelt then travelled to the Norfolk Shipyard in Portsmouth, Virginia for a major
overhaul, which lasted approximately thirteen months. During this overhaul, nearly every piece
of equipment on the ship was touched, worked on, repaired, and maintained. The main engine,
the boilers, the turbines, the other equipment, and the berthing compartments were overhauled or
rebuilt. All of the ship’s pumps, blowers, and turbines, and many of the ship’s pipes and valves

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were rebuilt. The ship’s decks and some of the walls were removed, including those of Mr.
Hedden’s office, which left it open to the engine rooms and turbines below. In 1968, when this
work was performed, there was no dust collection system was in place.
While Mr. Hedden did not personally repair, rebuild, or overhaul any of the equipment, he
worked in the vicinity of others while they performed this work. Many of the pieces of equipment
utilized asbestos-containing gaskets, insulation, or packing. Work on this equipment and the
asbestos-containing parts created dust which Mr. Hedden breathed. Mr. Hedden’s duties took him
by and through the engine rooms on a regular basis. The work on the turbines located in the engine
rooms included taking the turbines apart and checking all of the blades, veins, and housing. This
required the turbines’ asbestos insulation to be removed and disturbed, and Mr. Hedden was in the
immediate vicinity when such work was performed. He spent approximately one or two months
eating and sleeping in a barracks while the berthing compartments, gully, and mess decks were
redone, but the rest of his time was served on board the ship.
The Roosevelt’s major overhaul was completed in approximately December 1969. During
the return trip to Mayport, the ship underwent a “shakedown,” during which all of its equipment
was tested at maximum capacity to ensure it was seaworthy and battle-ready. The equipment was
fired-up and pushed to the limit so that necessary adjustments could be determined and made. The
adjustments were made, which included adding asbestos insulation during the return trip to
Mayport. Mr. Hedden was around this work when it was being performed. Upon return to
Mayport, Mr. Hedden was released from active duty on New Year’s Eve, 1969, shortly before the
Roosevelt shipped out for the Mediterranean.
After leaving active duty with the Navy, Mr. Hedden returned to work at Louisville Gas &
Electric. He previously had worked at Louisville Gas & Electric for about five months prior to his

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service in the Navy. From December 1967 through April 1968, he had worked as a mechanic’s
helper, serving as an apprentice performing millwright and mechanical work on pumps,
compressors, and valves. Mr. Hedden worked on piping for some major pieces of equipment,
which involved extensive insulation work including wrapping joints with heat-proof wrapping.
He also worked on blowers and valve indicators during this time.
In January 1970, Mr. Hedden returned to Louisville Gas & Electric and worked again as a
mechanic’s helper. He also worked as an insulator’s helper. He put metal lagging on pipes and
worked around the soot boiler piping, turbine, and steam chest. He also performed maintenance
services as needed. Mr. Hedden became a second-class insulator/pipe cutter and then a first-class
insulator/pipe fitter. This work required him to repair, replace, remove, and install asbestos
insulation. He also provided support at various Louisville Gas & Electric facilities throughout
Kentucky, performing construction and insulation work. Around 1979, Mr. Hedden was promoted
to be a “pusher,” essentially a foreman’s assistant, and then a year or two later he was promoted
to be a foreman. As a foreman, Mr. Hedden performed progressively less hands-on work with
insulation and equipment. Around 1988, Mr. Hedden became an “A” mechanic at the Trimble
County powerhouse. In the late 1990s, he became a service leader and ceased performing handson work. Mr. Hedden retired in April 2001 but was later rehired by Louisville Gas & Electric as
a contract coordinator, performing no hands-on work. He retired again in January 2014.
During Mr. Hedden’s earlier years with Louisville Gas & Electric, the company conducted
turbine “turnarounds,” essentially a turbine overhaul, approximately two to four times a year
between 1970 and 1985. Each turnaround lasted approximately six weeks. The turbines required
insulation to function otherwise they would burn up within a few minutes. Mr. Hedden and other
insulators removed the insulation during turnarounds. The turbine manufacturers specified the

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type of insulation to be used. Many of Louisville Gas & Electric’s turbines used asbestoscontaining block insulation, mud/asbestos-cement, and blankets. The removal of this asbestos
insulation caused visible dust to circulate in the air that Mr. Hedden breathed.
After removing a turbine’s asbestos insulation, Mr. Hedden often continued working in the
vicinity while internal turbine maintenance took place. Such work included disturbing asbestoscontaining gaskets and packing. He also was close by when asbestos wedges were installed in
turbines to help maintain the tightness of the rotor windings. This required sanding the wedges to
make them fit tightly, a process which created visible dust. Once the turbine work was completed,
Mr. Hedden re-insulated the turbines with asbestos-containing insulation, again creating visible
asbestos dust that Mr. Hedden breathed. Later in Mr. Hedden’s career, Louisville Gas & Electric
tested the insulation and confirmed that it was asbestos. Louisville Gas & Electric followed the
specifications of its equipment’s manufacturers when performing work.
Throughout his time with Louisville Gas & Electric in his various capacities as a
mechanic’s helper, insulator helper, insulator, pusher, and foreman, Mr. Hedden worked in or on
the coal mills, hot air ducts, various steam piping systems, blow-down stations, turbines, turbine
steam chests, control valves, intercept valves, pumps, and water piping. Many times, this
equipment was shipped with the asbestos-containing parts or insulation, which the manufacturer
specified should be used. He was regularly exposed to various asbestos-containing products
during the course of his employment at Louisville Gas & Electric.
Mr. Hedden was never warned about the hazards of asbestos until the late 1970s or early
1980s, and even then, he was provided insufficient workplace safeguards to protect him from
exposure. It was not until about the 1990s that more appropriate safeguards were implemented.

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Asbestos can cause a variety of both non-malignant and malignant diseases when inhaled
or ingested (Filing No. 271-6). Asbestosis is a non-malignant disease caused by scar tissue
forming in the gas exchange regions of the lung. Id. Pleural fibrosis is another non-malignant
disease caused by scar tissue forming in the sub-mesothelial connective tissue around the lungs
and abdominal organs. Id. Lung cancer is a malignant tumor, which forms in the lung typically
around a conducting airway. Id. Mesothelioma is a malignant tumor resulting from the
uncontrolled growth of cells in a mesothelial lining such as the pleura or peritoneum.
Mesothelioma has a long latency period and may take ten to fifty years between the first exposure
to asbestos and a diagnosis of mesothelioma. Id.
Unfortunately, in June 1985, Mr. Hedden was informed that he had been diagnosed with
asbestosis. Mr. Hedden then filed a complaint in state court in 1986 against numerous defendants,
none of which are defendants in this case. Mr. Hedden alleged that, as a result of working with
asbestos products while employed by Louisville Gas & Electric, he contracted “diseases and
injuries to his body system, lungs, and respiratory disorders, and the risk of mesothelioma and
other cancers and injuries causing him pain, suffering and mental anguish.” (Filing No. 204-1 at
23.)
Approximately twenty-seven years later, on August 16, 2013, Mr. Hedden was diagnosed
with malignant pleural mesothelioma, resulting from his exposure to asbestos. After his diagnosis,
Mr. Hedden had the pleural lining of his right lung removed and underwent chemotherapy.
However, these treatments only manage and slow down the mesothelioma because there is no
known cure for mesothelioma. On November 6, 2013, Mr. and Mrs. Hedden initiated this lawsuit,
asserting claims based on Mr. Hedden’s mesothelioma.

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d
487, 489–90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews “the
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences
in that party’s favor.” Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Additionally, “[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its
pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a
genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted).
“The opposing party cannot meet this burden with conclusory statements or speculation but only
with appropriate citations to relevant admissible evidence.” Sink v. Knox County Hosp., 900 F.
Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).
“In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence
to defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits
of [the] claim.” Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). “[N]either the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment.” Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir.
1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

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III. DISCUSSION
This case presents questions regarding choice-of-law, the application of maritime law, and
the application of either the “one-disease” or “two-disease” rule. The Court will first address these
issues and then turn to the Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment.
A.

Application of Maritime Law
The Heddens assert that maritime law applies to their claim for damages arising out of Mr.

Hedden’s exposure to asbestos during his Navy service. The Defendants assert that the evidence
does not support the application of maritime law to any of Mr. Hedden’s injuries. Maritime law
applies to claims involving a plaintiff who was a sea-based Navy worker where the allegedly
defective product was produced for use on a vessel as long as the plaintiff can meet the test set out
in the Sisson and Grubart cases. Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 2d 455, 465–66 (E.D.
Pa. 2011).
In Grubart, the Supreme Court explained that a court has admiralty jurisdiction and will
apply maritime law in a tort action if the claims “satisfy conditions both of location and of
connection with maritime activity.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995).
A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on
navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on
navigable water. The connection test raises two issues. A court, first, must assess
the general features of the type of incident involved, to determine whether the
incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Second, a court
must determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the
incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.
Id. at 534 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the location test is satisfied because Mr. Hedden’s alleged exposure to asbestos
occurred while he was on board the Roosevelt when it was docked in navigable water in Mayport,

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Florida and when it was being overhauled in the port (and also in dry dock) at the Norfolk Shipyard
in Portsmouth, Virginia. Some of the alleged exposure occurred in navigable water during the
return trip to Mayport, Florida.
Concerning the connection test, the incident—asbestos exposure on the Roosevelt—could
potentially disrupt maritime commerce by rendering the ship too hazardous to operate. “Unsafe
working conditions aboard a vessel have consistently been held to pose a potentially disruptive
impact upon maritime commerce. See, e.g., Alderman v. Pacific Northern Victor, Inc., 95 F.3d
1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1996).” Lambert v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 877, 884 (S.D.
Ind. 1999). “Moreover, asbestos-related illness could afflict other members of the crew, causing
a labor shortage.” Id. The general character of the activity giving rise to the incident—routine
maintenance of the Roosevelt, the ship overhaul, and testing—has a substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity. Maintaining and testing the ship’s main engine, boilers, turbines,
pumps, valves, pipes, blowers, and other equipment is vital to the operation of the ship and is a
substantial part of the ship’s ability to conduct traditional maritime activity.
Having determined that the location and connection tests are satisfied in this case, the Court
holds that maritime law applies to the Heddens’ claim for damages arising out of Mr. Hedden’s
exposure to asbestos during his Navy service on the Roosevelt.
B.

Choice-of-Law Considerations
In determining what choice-of-law provisions to follow, when a case is removed to federal

court based on diversity jurisdiction, the district court applies the forum state’s choice-of-law rules
to determine the applicable law. Jackson v. Bank of Am. Corp., 711 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2013);
Carlisle v. Deere & Co., 576 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2009). Although this case was removed
pursuant to the Federal Officer Removal Statute and not based on diversity jurisdiction, the parties

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agree that Indiana choice-of-law provisions govern in this matter. Therefore, the Court will follow
Indiana choice-of-law provisions to determine which states’ laws apply.
The Heddens assert that Kentucky substantive law applies to their non-maritime claims.
Defendants CBS Corporation, General Electric Company, and Link-Belt Construction Equipment
Company agree with the Heddens that Kentucky substantive law applies. However, Defendants
Crane Co., Gardner Denver, Inc., and John Crane Inc. assert that Indiana substantive law applies
to the Heddens’ claims. The parties point to differences in Kentucky’s and Indiana’s statutes of
repose, which would affect the outcome of the case, thereby necessitating a choice-of-law analysis.
To help determine what states’ laws apply, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted a two-step
choice-of-law analysis in Hubbard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987). If the
place of the tort has extensive connection with the legal action, the traditional rule of lex loci delecti
(“the law of the place of the wrong”) applies, in other words, the state where the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for the alleged wrong takes place. However, if the place of the
tort bears little connection to the legal action, the court may consider other factors such as: (1) the
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (2) the residence or place of business of the
parties; and (3) the place where the relationship is centered. Id. at 1073–74. The Indiana Supreme
Court noted that “[t]hese factors should be evaluated according to their relative importance to the
particular issues being litigated.” Id. at 1074.
The Defendants who urge the application of Indiana law focus on the first step of the test—
the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for the alleged wrong takes place.
They assert that Mr. Hedden’s diagnosis of mesothelioma is the last event necessary to make any
of the Defendants liable, his diagnosis occurred in Indiana, and, therefore, Indiana law should

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apply. Some of these Defendants also point to the fact that the Heddens are lifelong Indiana
residents.
On the other hand, the Heddens and the Defendants who urge the application of Kentucky
law explain that the simple act of diagnosing mesothelioma bears little connection to the legal
action. Thus, they argue, this Court should consider the additional factors to determine that
Kentucky law is the appropriate law to apply. They explain that Mr. Hedden’s exposure to asbestos
occurred over a thirty-year period while working in Kentucky. It was his exposure to asbestos that
led to his mesothelioma. He was employed by a Kentucky company during his exposure. His
work took him to various facilities throughout Kentucky. The Court agrees with this analysis and
the conclusion that it is appropriate to apply Kentucky substantive law. Therefore, the Court
applies Kentucky substantive law to the Heddens’ non-maritime claims.
C.

One-Disease v. Two-Disease Rule
The “one-disease” rule is based on the equitable rule against splitting of causes of action

and requires a party to assert all causes of action which may arise from a single transaction in a
single lawsuit rather than proceeding piecemeal in multiple actions. Capital Holding Corp. v.
Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 193–95 (Ky. 1994). Therefore, “suits for asbestos-related claims [] may
be brought only once and may encompass all current or future damages, because a claim made
early can take into account damages which may occur in the future.” Carroll v. Owens Fiberglas
Corp., 37 S.W.3d 699, 701 (Ky. 2000).
Under the “two-disease” rule, “a person who brings an action based on a diagnosis of a
non-malignant asbestos-related condition may bring a subsequent action upon a later diagnosis of
a distinct malignant asbestos-related condition. The diagnosis of a malignant asbestos-related
condition creates a new cause of action.” Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 601 N.W.2d

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627, 630 (Wis. 1999). Thus, a single transaction of a series of exposures to asbestos that results
in multiple asbestos-related diseases may lead to multiple lawsuits based on multiple diagnoses.
The Court first addresses whether the one-disease or two-disease rule is procedural or
substantive. The Court addresses this issue because the Heddens have explained that Indiana
procedural rules apply in this case. They claim that the one-disease or two-disease rule is
procedural and then explain that Indiana applies the two-disease rule. The Heddens argue that,
because the rule is procedural and Indiana uses the two-disease rule, their claims survive these
summary judgment motions. Indeed, the Heddens have conceded that,
In the context of this matter, the Heddens’ claims based upon Kim’s mesothelioma
would be barred in a one-disease jurisdiction because of his 1985 asbestosis
diagnosis, while in a two-disease jurisdiction Kim’s asbestosis and mesothelioma
claims would each have their own, independent statute of limitations, and the
Heddens’ mesothelioma claims would be timely because they were filed less than
one year after Kim’s mesothelioma diagnosis.
(Filing No. 270 at 24.)
Substantive law is “[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights,
duties, and powers of parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Procedural law is “[t]he
rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law
that defines the specific rights or duties themselves.” Id.
While the Heddens assert that the one-disease or two-disease rule is procedural, the
Defendants explain that it is substantive. The Heddens equate this rule to a statute of limitations,
which courts have determined is procedural, and indeed, the Heddens call it a two-disease statute
of limitations. The Heddens explain that the one-disease or two-disease rule operates as a timebar to filing a cause of action and should thus be treated as a procedural rule.
The Defendants counter the Heddens’ argument by explaining that, while the one-disease
or two-disease rule may relate to statutes of limitations and the “date of discovery” rule, the one12

disease or two-disease rule truly is a substantive law because it defines the parties’ rights and
obligations. Under the one-disease rule, a plaintiff has one cause of action arising out of asbestos
exposure even if that exposure leads to multiple diseases. Under the two-disease rule, a plaintiff
has more than one cause of action arising out of asbestos exposure if that exposure leads to multiple
diseases. The rule provides a substantive right—a cause of action. As one defendant explains,
“the one-disease rule itself is not a procedural bar to a remedy where the claimant fails to
commence a lawsuit within a specific period of time.” (Filing No. 302 at 5.) And another
Defendant asserts, “[t]he rule is not simply an application of [a state’s] statute of limitations -indeed, the rule would still apply to bar a second, later claim even if it was timely asserted.” (Filing
No. 307 at 7.)
To this point, the Court notes that Indiana has a two-year statute of limitations for product
liability actions. Indiana also has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.
Further, Indiana has a two-year statute of limitations for certain asbestos-related product liability
actions. Kentucky, on the other hand, has a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury
actions. Under maritime law, a three-year statute of limitations applies to personal injury actions.
These procedural statutes of limitations give parties guidance on when they can assert their
substantive rights. They are not the substantive right itself.
That the one-disease or two-disease rule is related to but distinct from procedural statutes
of limitations is highlighted in the Carroll case. In that case, the Kentucky Supreme Court
considered whether a plaintiff could bring an action for lung cancer resulting from exposure to
asbestos when he had been diagnosed with asbestosis many years earlier. The court reviewed
Kentucky’s case law concerning the one-disease rule and then determined that the one-disease rule
was not at issue in the case because the plaintiff had not filed an earlier action based on the

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asbestosis diagnosis. Holding to Kentucky’s one-disease rule, the court explained, “[s]plitting
causes of action inherently implies more than one action; nothing is split when only one action is
brought.” Carroll, 37 S.W.3d at 700. The court went on, “[t]his case does not turn so much on
the rule against splitting causes of action, but more on pinpointing when a cause of action accrues
in cases involving multiple diseases brought on by the same toxic agent.” Id. The court’s analysis
and holding recognized the distinction between the procedural statute of limitations and the
substantive one-disease rule.
The Heddens explain in their response brief that statutes of repose, unlike statutes of
limitations, are substantive. A statute of limitation bars the filing of a cause of action when a
plaintiff tries to untimely file suit. However, a statute of repose extinguishes the cause of action
after passage of time thereby making the cause of action nonexistent. See Hinkle by Hinkle v.
Henderson, 85 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1996); Boggs v. Adams, 45 F.3d 1056, 1060 (7th Cir. 1995).
The one-disease rule more closely resembles a statute of repose where a plaintiff’s subsequent
cause of action no longer exists if it was not brought in his first lawsuit. Under the two-disease
rule, a plaintiff’s subsequent cause of action will not be extinguished by a failure to bring it in the
first lawsuit.
Based on these points, the Court agrees with the Defendants that the one-disease or twodisease rule is a substantive, not procedural, law. The Court now turns to the controlling
substantive laws in this matter to determine whether the one-disease rule or the two-disease rule
applies.
Case law concerning the one-disease or two-disease rule under maritime law is very sparse.
However, the Heddens direct the Court to the case of Nelson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., a relatively

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recent federal multi-district litigation concerning asbestos exposure, to explain that the two-disease
rule applies under maritime law. That court noted:
After a careful review of all the growing trend among the States to apply the twodisease rule, as well as the state and federal court decisions that have applied the
two-disease rule to federal causes of action in the asbestos context, and in light of
the policies served by adopting the two-disease rule, the Court concludes that the
two-disease rule is the better rule. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the twodisease rule as the applicable rule under maritime law.
Nelson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142970, at *11–12 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2011).
After reviewing that court’s review of case law, its rationale, and its decision, this Court is
persuaded that the proper rule to apply under federal maritime law is the two-disease rule.
Therefore, under maritime law, a plaintiff may bring an action based on a diagnosis of an asbestosrelated condition and then may bring a subsequent action upon a later diagnosis of a second,
distinct asbestos-related condition. The diagnosis of the second, distinct asbestos-related condition
creates a new cause of action.
Under Kentucky law, when considering a plaintiff’s claims for injuries resulting from
asbestos exposure, courts apply the one-disease rule. “Kentucky has never been a ‘two disease’
state.” Carroll, 37 S.W.3d at 700. Thus, “suits for asbestos-related claims in Kentucky may be
brought only once and may encompass all current or future damages, because a claim made early
can take into account damages which may occur in the future.” Id. at 701.
[A] plaintiff who has been injured from asbestos exposure must make an election
of how to proceed. He may follow the Capital Holding Corp. path: filing suit
within one year of diagnosis of his first asbestos-related disease or injury, in which
case he must include any and all present and future damages from asbestos exposure
or risk losing the right to pursue these damages due to the statute of limitations.
Alternatively, if his first asbestos-related injury is non-disabling and he has no
reason to believe that he is likely to develop a more serious disease or injury, he
may follow the Carroll path: waiting to sue until he develops a more serious
asbestos-related disease or injury and then filing within a year of being diagnosed
with this more serious disease.

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Combs v. Albert Kahn & Assocs., 183 S.W.3d 190, 198 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
As noted above, Mr. Hedden was diagnosed with asbestosis in June 1985. Mr. Hedden
then filed a complaint in Kentucky state court in 1986 against numerous defendants. Mr. Hedden
alleged that, as a result of working with asbestos products while employed by Louisville Gas &
Electric, he contracted “diseases and injuries to his body system, lungs, and respiratory disorders,
and the risk of mesothelioma and other cancers and injuries causing him pain, suffering and mental
anguish.” (Filing No. 204-1 at 23.) Then approximately twenty-seven years later, on August 16,
2013, Mr. Hedden was diagnosed with mesothelioma, resulting from his exposure to asbestos. As
the Heddens have conceded in their response brief,
In the context of this matter, the Heddens’ claims based upon Kim’s mesothelioma
would be barred in a one-disease jurisdiction because of his 1985 asbestosis
diagnosis, while in a two-disease jurisdiction Kim’s asbestosis and mesothelioma
claims would each have their own, independent statute of limitations, and the
Heddens’ mesothelioma claims would be timely because they were filed less than
one year after Kim’s mesothelioma diagnosis.
(Filing No. 270 at 24).
Because Kentucky law applies to the Heddens’ non-maritime claims and Kentucky follows
the one-disease rule, the Heddens’ claims for asbestos-related injuries arising out of Mr. Hedden’s
work at Louisville Gas & Electric are barred by the one-disease rule and the fact that Mr. Hedden
brought his Kentucky state court action in 1986 for his asbestos-related injuries. Therefore, the
Defendants are GRANTED summary judgment on the Heddens’ non-maritime, state law claims.
The remainder of this Order addresses the Heddens’ maritime claims.
D.

Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. (Filing No. 174)
Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. (“Crown”) filed its Motion for Summary Judgment,

explaining that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine dispute regarding
the fact that no product or conduct of Crown was a proximate cause of Mr. Hedden’s alleged
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damages. The alleged basis of Crown’s liability stems from Mundet Cork Corporation’s pipe and
block insulation, which contained asbestos fibers. However, Crown explains that there is no
evidence that Mr. Hedden ever worked with, let alone was ever exposed to, asbestos fibers released
from any Mundet product.
Crown points out that Mr. Hedden served in the Navy from April 1968 through the end of
December 1969. Crown also points out that Mr. Hedden worked at Louisville Gas & Electric for
about a half a year before his service in the Navy and then from 1970 to 2001 and from 2007 to
2014. Crown then explains its manufacturing and corporate history: Crown invented the bottle
cap in 1892. In 1963, Crown purchased the majority of the stock of Mundet, which at that time
had a bottle cap division and an insulation division. When Crown purchased Mundet’s stock, it
had no interest in continuing Mundet’s insulation division, and just three months after the stock
purchase, Crown sold the entire Mundet insulation division to Baldwin-Ehret-Hill, Inc. At the
time that Mundet merged with Crown, Mundet had ceased all insulation operations, and Crown
never engaged in any manufacturing or operations associated with asbestos. Because Crown (and
its connection with Mundet) had no involvement in the asbestos industry, Crown asserts that there
can be no evidence of any causation of Mr. Hedden’s alleged damages attributable to Crown.
In their consolidated response brief to the summary judgment motions, the Heddens explain
that “[t]he Heddens have no response to the motions filed by Crown, Cork & Seal (Doc #175) and
Riley Power (Doc #203).” (Filing No. 270 at 5.) Because Mr. Hedden concedes to Crown’s
argument and he has designated no evidence regarding causation of his damages, the Court
GRANTS Crown’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

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E.

CBS Corporation (Filing No. 179)
Defendant CBS Corporation (“CBS”) explains in its summary judgment motion that there

is no evidence that Mr. Hedden was exposed to asbestos attributable to CBS during his service in
the Navy, and thus, the maritime claims do not pertain to CBS. In their response brief, the Heddens
explain that they “allege Westinghouse (now known as CBS Corp.) manufactured an asbestoscontaining turbine used at LG&E, and Kim was exposed to this asbestos during turnaround work
there.” (Filing No. 270 at 96.) They then argue their state law claims against CBS and assert facts
relevant to Mr. Hedden’s employment at Louisville Gas & Electric. The Heddens do not argue
that CBS is liable for the maritime claims. Because of the Court’s ruling on the state law claims
under Kentucky’s one-disease rule and because the Heddens are not asserting maritime claims
against CBS, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of CBS.
F.

General Electric Company (Filing No. 180)
Concerning the Heddens’ claims against General Electric Company (“GE”), in their

summary judgment response brief, “[t]he Heddens allege General Electric (“GE”) manufactured
asbestos containing turbines used on board the USS Roosevelt and at LG&E, and that Kim was
exposed to asbestos when the turbines were overhauled during his Navy service and during
turnarounds at LG&E.” (Filing No. 270 at 67.) GE responds that the Heddens have not designated
any evidence to support their assertions that GE manufactured and provided asbestos-containing
products on the Roosevelt. GE also explains that its turbines were provided to the Navy without
insulation, so it cannot be held liable for any asbestos-containing insulation that was added to the
turbines by another entity.

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In the relatively recent federal multi-district litigation concerning asbestos exposure, Judge
Eduardo Robreno explained the standard for causation to establish liability in maritime asbestos
cases:
In order to establish causation for an asbestos claim under maritime law, a plaintiff
must show, for each defendant, that “(1) he was exposed to the defendant’s product,
and (2) the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury he suffered.”
Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2005); citing Stark
v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 21 Fed. App’x 371, 375 (6th Cir. 2001).
Substantial factor causation is determined with respect to each defendant
separately. Stark, 21 Fed. Appx. at 375.
Accordingly, a mere “minimal exposure” to a defendant’s product is insufficient to
establish causation. Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492. “Likewise, a mere showing that
defendant’s product was present somewhere at plaintiff’s place of work is
insufficient.” Id. Rather, the plaintiff must show “‘a high enough level of exposure
that an inference that the asbestos was a substantial factor in the injury is more than
conjectural.’” Id. (quoting Harbour v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 90-1414,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10867, 1991 WL 65201, at *4 (6th Cir. April 25, 1991)).
The exposure must have been “actual” or “real”, but the question of “substantiality”
is one of degree normally best left to the factfinder.
Nelson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142970, at *12–13.
After considering state and federal case law from around the country, and based upon that
case law, Judge Robreno more recently explained that “under maritime law, a manufacturer is not
liable for harm caused by, and owes no duty to warn of the hazards inherent in, asbestos products
that the manufacturer did not manufacture or distribute.” Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 842 F. Supp.
2d 791, 801 (E.D. Pa. 2012). This Court notes that the Connor decision included “distribute” as a
potential source of liability.
A district court in the Northern District of Illinois decided a manufacturer’s liability in an
asbestos action after reviewing case law from other districts. See Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.,
17 F. Supp. 3d 760 (N.D. Ill. 2014). The court considered Judge Robreno’s orders as well as other
cases that held a manufacturer is not liable for materials it did not supply. The court also noted

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that “[s]ome courts have concluded that a defendant is liable whenever the use of asbestos in
connection with its product is foreseeable.” Id. at 769. The court then took a middle approach:
[Generally, a] manufacturer is not liable for materials it did not supply. But a duty
may attach where the defendant manufactured a product that, by necessity,
contained asbestos components, where the asbestos-containing material was
essential to the proper functioning of the defendant’s product, and where the
asbestos-containing material would necessarily be replaced by other asbestoscontaining material, whether supplied by the original manufacturer or someone
else.
Id. at 769–70.
Based upon these varying standards, the Court determines that the Heddens still must show
that Mr. Hedden was exposed to asbestos that in some way is attributable to GE, and GE’s asbestos
was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Hedden’s mesothelioma. The Heddens’ argument and
evidence concerning Mr. Hedden’s asbestos exposure during his service in the Navy is limited to
GE’s turbines and the insulation that was added to those turbines. There is no evidence that the
turbines were made of anything other than metal.
Regarding the turbine insulation, the Heddens point to deposition testimony of Mr. Hedden
to assert that GE required asbestos-containing insulation for its turbines and often provided that
insulation with its turbines. However, upon review of the deposition testimony designated by the
Heddens and by GE, it appears that the Heddens compiled a patchwork of testimony that amounts
to conjecture, guesswork, speculation, and assumptions about the insulation on GE’s turbines.
While some of the testimony provides greater detail based upon knowledge and not speculation,
that testimony relates to Mr. Hedden’s work at Louisville Gas & Electric, not his work with the
Navy. GE points to many statements by Mr. Hedden where he admits that he did not know who
manufactured the insulation that was being removed from or added to the turbines. Mr. Hedden
was not able to connect GE to the manufacturer or supplier of the insulation. GE on the other hand

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produced evidence, such as its interrogatory answers, that shows GE did not provide the insulation
for the turbines, did not require the Navy to use particular insulation, and did not provide to the
Navy any other products that contained asbestos.
The Heddens also rely on expert reports for their argument that GE should be held liable
(see Exhibit 3, “Ewing report,” and Exhibit 7 “Strauchen report”). These reports support the
propositions that Mr. Hedden had significant exposure to asbestos during his long career with
LG&E and during his service in the Navy, and that his exposure to asbestos led to his
mesothelioma. However, there is nothing in the reports that would suggest a causal connection
between GE and Mr. Hedden’s asbestos exposure.
The evidence in the record shows that GE’s product—a number of turbines on the
Roosevelt—was not a substantial factor in causing Mr. Hedden’s injury. Because the Heddens
cannot show that GE’s turbines were a substantial factor in causing the injury, summary judgment
is appropriate because of a lack of causation. Therefore, the Court GRANTS GE’s motion for
summary judgment.
G.

Crane Co. (Filing No. 181)
The Heddens assert that “Crane Co. manufactured and sold asbestos containing globe and

gate valves and packing to which the Heddens allege Kim was exposed while working in the Navy
and at LG&E.” (Filing No. 270 at 52.)
Crane Co. counters the Heddens’ allegations with deposition testimony from Mr. Hedden.
Crane Co. explains that Mr. Hedden testified to seeing Crane Co. valves while aboard the
Roosevelt and that he described these valves as gate and globe valves made of bronze, brass, and
steel, and varying in size from half an inch to eight inches. He did not personally work on any
valves, but he was in close proximity of others who were repairing and repacking the valves. Crane

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Co. asserts that Mr. Hedden could not present testimony or evidence that Crane Co. manufactured
or supplied any of the asbestos-containing gaskets, packing, or insulation that he may have
encountered while being present during work on Crane Co. valves aboard the Roosevelt. Crane
Co. also points out that the Navy often utilized gasket and packing sealing products to seal the
connection points inside and between valves and piping, and these products may or may not have
contained asbestos. The Navy also insulated certain valves on its ships, and this insulation material
may or may not have contained asbestos.
During his deposition, Mr. Hedden testified about Crane Co. valves and their packing
found on the Roosevelt.
Q. Was a Crane valve installed or did you see the Crane valve being removed?
A. Well, the valves that were being packing replaced, I do recall those being Crane
valves.
...
Q. And do you know who manufactured the packing that was removed?
A. I would have no way of knowing what was removed, no.
Q. Do you know the manufacturer, brand name or trade name, of any of the packing
that was replaced and installed on those valves?
A. Some of the packaging I can remember would have been the Chesterton packing,
John Crane. Well, like, Flexitallic gaskets was what I was told they were on the
replaceable valves. I don’t recall any others.
(Filing No. 183-1 at 40.)
Crane Co.’s corporate representative testified in his deposition that Crane Co.’s valves
utilized component parts that contained asbestos, which were then in turn sold to the Navy.
Q. In the 1960s Crane Co. sold valves to the United States Navy which contained
asbestos gaskets and packing. That happened, right?
A. If in fact the Navy specified it, yes.
Q. But you know that it happened in the 1960s, for example?
A. Yes.
(Filing No. 307-1 at 7.) In Crane Co.’s discovery responses, it admits that “Crane Co. supplied
valve-related parts to the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42). Industrial valves manufactured

22

by Crane Co. were made of steel, bronze, and other metals; the valves themselves were not
composed of asbestos.” (Filing No. 271-20 at 3.) Crane Co. continues, “Certain of the valves may
have had enclosed within their metal structure gaskets, packing, or discs, which may have
contained some asbestos as part of their composition. Crane Co. did not manufacture the asbestoscontaining components that may have been encapsulated within the valves, but purchased them
from other companies.” Id. at 3–4.
Mr. Hedden designated deposition testimony, explaining that he worked in close proximity
to other individuals while they removed and replaced packing in Crane Co. valves and performed
other work on those valves. There was a visible, gray/off-white dust in the air when this work was
performed, and Mr. Hedden inhaled this air.
As the Court noted above, a manufacturer cannot be liable for asbestos products that it did
not manufacture or distribute. Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 801. However, “where the defendant
manufactured a product that, by necessity, contained asbestos components, where the asbestoscontaining material was essential to the proper functioning of the defendant’s product, and where
the asbestos-containing material would necessarily be replaced by other asbestos-containing
material, whether supplied by the original manufacturer or someone else,” the defendant may be
liable for asbestos injuries. Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 769–70.
At the summary judgment stage, the Court must view the evidence in a light favorable to
the Heddens as the non-moving party. Based upon the discovery responses and corporate
deposition testimony of Crane Co. and the evidence designated by Mr. Hedden concerning his
work experience on the Roosevelt, there is a material factual dispute about the extent and origin
of the asbestos-containing packing material within Crane Co.’s valves, which Crane Co.
distributed to the Navy and to which Mr. Hedden was exposed. The Court cannot conclude at this

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stage that Crane Co. is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court DENIES
Crane Co.’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
H.

Gardner Denver, Inc. (Filing No. 196)
The Heddens allege that Mr. Hedden was exposed to asbestos from Gardner Denver pumps

on the Roosevelt and during his employment with LG&E. They allege that Gardner Denver pumps
utilized asbestos containing gaskets and packing.
Gardner Denver responds to the Heddens’ allegation by explaining that there is no evidence
that Mr. Hedden ever worked with or around any original component parts (gaskets and packing)
of Gardner Denver pumps, which could be attributable to Gardner Denver. Mr. Hedden generally
identified Gardner Denver as one of many manufacturers of pumps on the Roosevelt. He also
testified that he did not personally do any hands-on work on any pumps on the ship. Further, Mr.
Hedden testified that he believed the pumps aboard the ship were installed when the ship was
constructed in the 1940s and that the component packing in the pumps would have been replaced
fairly often since the time of installation. Gardner Denver asserts that based on this testimony, the
original components at issue (gaskets and packing) would have been replaced on several occasions
before Mr. Hedden boarded the Roosevelt in May 1968. Thus, Gardner Denver explains, the
Heddens have produced no evidence to show that Mr. Hedden was exposed to original component
parts associated with Gardner Denver pumps during his time in the Navy.
The Heddens point to deposition testimony to counter Gardner Denver’s argument.
However, each portion of deposition testimony either relates to Mr. Hedden’s work at LG&E or
discusses DeLaval pumps, not Gardner Denver pumps. While other deposition testimony broadly
claims that answers would be similar as they relate to other pumps on the ship, none of the
testimony specifies Gardner Denver. Additionally, the deposition testimony does not connect any

24

specific asbestos-containing component parts with Gardner Denver pumps.

The Heddens’

response to Gardner Denver is similar to its response to GE; they fail to establish a causal
connection between Mr. Hedden’s injuries and any product that can attributable to Gardner
Denver. The bare fact that Gardner Denver pumps were present somewhere on the Roosevelt is
insufficient.
The evidence in the record shows that Gardner Denver’s product—unidentified pumps on
the Roosevelt—was not a substantial factor in causing Mr. Hedden’s injury. Because the Heddens
cannot show that Gardner Denver’s pumps were a substantial factor in causing the injury, summary
judgment is appropriate because of a lack of causation. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Gardner
Denver’s motion for summary judgment.
I.

John Crane Inc. (Filing No. 198)
The Heddens assert that Mr. Hedden was “exposed to asbestos from John Crane, Inc. (not

to be confused with Crane Co., a separate entity) gaskets and packing used while he was in the
Navy and working at LG&E.” (Filing No. 270 at 80.) John Crane, Inc. asserts that it is entitled to
summary judgment because there is insufficient evidence to show that Mr. Hedden was exposed
to John Crane products with asbestos, leading to Mr. Hedden’s mesothelioma. John Crane asserts
that the evidence shows there were many gaskets and packing onboard the Roosevelt, and these
gaskets and packing were manufactured by many companies, including John Crane. It claims that
the Heddens cannot distinguish among the various companies that provided gaskets and packing
for the Roosevelt which of those companies’ products caused Mr. Hedden’s injuries. John Crane
also points out that Mr. Hedden did not personally perform any hands-on work with gaskets and
packing on the Roosevelt. John Crane notes that Mr. Hedden’s expert reports do not identify John
Crane as a cause of his mesothelioma.

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Responding to John Crane’s summary judgment motion, the Heddens point to various
expert reports, not to tie John Crane specifically to the injuries, but rather to show that Mr.
Hedden’s asbestos exposure from gaskets and packing was significant, and his asbestos exposure
caused his mesothelioma. It appears the very purpose of the expert reports is to show that Mr.
Hedden had significant exposure to asbestos during his career with the Navy and LG&E and that
his exposure to asbestos led to his mesothelioma, not to establish a causal connection between any
particular defendant and Mr. Hedden’s asbestos exposure.
The Heddens also direct the Court to deposition testimony that indicates Mr. Hedden
worked in close proximity to other individuals as they removed and replaced John Crane gaskets
on the Roosevelt. Mr. Hedden described the packaging of the John Crane gaskets, and he recalled
John Crane’s name printed on the gasket material. He recalled associating the greyish color of the
gaskets with its asbestos nature. The Heddens designated testimony showing Mr. Hedden was
working in areas of the ship while others were scraping and chipping away gaskets. This work
created dust, which Mr. Hedden inhaled.
The Court must view the evidence in a light favorable to the Heddens as the non-moving
party when deciding this summary judgment motion. Based upon the designated evidence of Mr.
Hedden’s work experience on the Roosevelt, there is a material factual dispute about the extent of
Mr. Hedden’s asbestos exposure from John Crane’s gaskets. The Court cannot conclude at this
stage of the litigation that John Crane is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the
Court DENIES John Crane’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
J.

Link-Belt Construction Equipment Company (Filing No. 200)
The Heddens’ claims against Link-Belt Construction Equipment Company (“Link-Belt”)

relate solely to Mr. Hedden’s exposure to asbestos during his employment with Louisville Gas &

26

Electric. The Heddens did not assert maritime claims against Link-Belt. Because of the Court’s
ruling on the state law claims under Kentucky’s one-disease rule and because the Heddens did not
assert maritime claims against Link-Belt, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Link-Belt.
K.

Riley Power, Inc. (Filing No. 202)
Riley Power, Inc. (“Riley”) filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, explaining that it is

entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine dispute that no Riley product was a
proximate cause of Mr. Hedden’s alleged damages.
Riley explains that Mr. Hedden worked at Louisville Gas & Electric for about a half a year
before his service in the Navy and then from 1970 to 2001 and from 2007 to 2014. Riley’s only
connection to Louisville Gas & Electric is a boiler it provided to Louisville Gas & Electric at the
Cane Run facility. There were six boilers at the Cane Run facility. All six boilers were located in
one building, and only Unit Five was provided by Riley. The evidence shows that Mr. Hedden
worked on Unit Five sometime in the early 1970s while he was employed as an insulator helper
and an insulator. He worked on Unit Five more than two times but less than ten times.
Pursuant to a contract, Riley designed and engineered the boiler that was constructed as
Unit Five at LG&E’s Cane Run facility in 1964. After the contract had been entered, Riley’s
contractual obligation to supply insulation for Unit Five was expressly withdrawn from the
contract by LG&E. Furthermore, Riley’s contract with LG&E did not specify or require the use
of asbestos-containing insulation on its boiler. Because of the contract modification, Riley did not
supply or install the insulation that was used in the construction of Unit Five at Cane Run.
Consequently, Riley asserts, Mr. Hedden cannot establish that he was exposed to any asbestoscontaining products for which Riley can be held liable. Riley further asserts that Mr. Hedden
cannot provide any evidence as to the manufacturer of any insulation that was used with the Riley

27

boiler at Cane Run or the actual composition of any such insulation, including whether it actually
contained asbestos. Because Riley did not supply or install the insulation used on its boiler at
LG&E and it cannot be held liable for another manufacturer’s product applied to its boiler without
Riley’s involvement, summary judgment should be granted to Riley.
Like Mr. Hedden’s response to Crown’s summary judgment motion, in the consolidated
response brief, the Heddens explain that “[t]he Heddens have no response to the motions filed by
Crown, Cork & Seal (Doc #175) and Riley Power (Doc #203).” (Filing No. 270 at 5.) Because Mr.
Hedden concedes to Riley’s argument and evidence regarding a complete lack of any evidence of
causation of Mr. Hedden’s damages, the Court GRANTS Riley’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
L.

Mrs. Hedden’s Loss of Consortium Claim
“[L]oss of consortium claims are derivative from the spouse’s underlying claim, in that, if

the underlying claim cannot be proven, then the loss of consortium claim fails.” Remmers v.
Remington Hotel Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1058 (S.D. Ind. 1999). Therefore, to the extent this
Order dismisses claims against certain defendants, Mrs. Hedden’s loss of consortium claim fails.
To the extent that claims against certain defendants remain pending, so too Mrs. Hedden’s loss of
consortium claim remains.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. (Filing No.
174), CBS Corporation (Filing No. 179), General Electric Company (Filing No. 180), Gardner
Denver, Inc. (Filing No. 196), Link-Belt Construction Equipment Company (Filing No. 200), and
Riley Power, Inc’s. (Filing No. 202) Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED.

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Defendants Crane Co. (Filing No. 181) and John Crane, Inc’s. (Filing No. 198) Motions
for Summary Judgment are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The maritime claims
associated with asbestos exposure during Mr. Hedden’s service in the Navy, and Mrs. Hedden’s
derivative claim for loss of consortium, remain pending for trial against Crane Co. and John Crane,
Inc. The non-maritime claims associated with asbestos exposure during Mr. Hedden’s employment
at Louisville Gas & Electric are dismissed.
The new trial date will be scheduled in a separate Entry. The parties are instructed to
contact the Magistrate Judge regarding revised case management deadlines.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/30/2015

DISTRIBUTION:
Ashleigh M. Resetarits
GEORGE & FARINAS, LLP
[e-mail]

Christopher N. Wahl
HILL FULWIDER, P.C.
[e-mail]

Kathleen A. Musgrave Farinas
GEORGE & FARINAS, LLP
[e-mail]

David J. Saferight
HILL FULWIDER, P.C.
[e-mail]

Linda S. George
GEORGE & FARINAS, LLP
[e-mail]

Douglas B. King
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
[e-mail]

Todd Christopher Barnes
GEORGE & FARINAS, LLP
[e-mail]

Erica Kay Drew
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
[e-mail]

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Kip S.M. McDonald
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
[e-mail]

Jason Lorne Kennedy
MCCAMBRIDGE SINGER & MAHONEY
[e-mail]

Travis R. Smith
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
[e-mail]

McRay Judge, II
SWANSON MARTIN & BELL, LLP
[e-mail]
Michelle M. Wahl
SWANSON MARTIN & BELL, LLP
[e-mail]

Jill Marie Felkins
SEGAL MCCAMBRIDGE SINGER &
MAHONEY
[e-mail]

Reginald B. Bishop
ROBERTS & BISHOP
[e-mail]

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