HOWARD v. INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Filing 63

ORDER granting 36 Motion to Dismiss without prejudice as to Defendant Community Health Network. Plaintiff is granted 30 days from the date of this entry within which to file a second amended complaint addressing the deficiencies discussed herein. Because Defendant IPS has not moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against it, those claims shall proceed. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 6/16/2015 (dist made) (CBU)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
BILLIE J. HOWARD,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
COMMUNITY HEALTH
NETWORK/GALLAHUE MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES,

No. 1:13-cv-02039-SEB-TAB

Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT COMMUNITY HEALTH NETWORK’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Community Health Network’s
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, or in the Alternative, Motion for a More
Definite Statement [Docket No. 36], filed on December 9, 2014, pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(e). Plaintiff Billie J. Howard is proceeding pro
se. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Defendant
Community Health Network1.
Factual and Procedural Background

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We need not address the alternative motion for a more definite statement for the reasons set out below.

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Plaintiff filed her original complaint on December 26, 2013, pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. §
19812. Plaintiff originally identified Indianapolis Public Schools (“IPS”) as the sole
Defendant3. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint on June 30 adding a claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
(“ADEA”). The amended complaint named Community Health Network/ Gallahue
Mental Health Services as an additional defendant in this action. Defendant Community
Health Network filed the instant motion to dismiss on December 9, 2014, which is now
fully briefed and ready for a ruling by the Court.
Plaintiff alleges in her amended complaint that she was “treated differently from
similarly situated employees and suffered ‘unlawful’ employment discrimination due to
her race and age; resulting in retaliation, adverse action and disparate impact by
Defendants.” Am. Compl. at 3. The only fact averred by Plaintiff concerning specific
actions taken against her by Defendant Community Health Network is as follows:
“Employer (Gallahue) did not give any reason for Ms. Howard’s discharge other than her

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The original complaint alleged that Plaintiff was “treated differently from similarly situated employees
and suffered unlawful employment discrimination due to race, resulting in retaliation, adverse action and
disparate impact by/or in connection with entity/agency.” Dkt. No. 1. Under the “facts in support of
complaint” section of her employment discrimination complaint, she alleged: “Filed charge of
discrimination with EEOC on August 15, 2013.” Id.
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Plaintiff’s amended complaint appears to allege that IPS is filing a Counterclaim against Ms. Howard:
“IPS allegations of claims against Ms. Howard (which she DENIES). That Early in the 2013-2014 school
year, Ms. Howard left the school building with a special education student without signing the student out
or reporting to any administrator that she was removing the student from the IPS building.” Am. Compl.
at 3. To the Court’s knowledge, IPS has not asserted any claims against Ms. Howard. IPS listed
documents relating to this alleged incident as potential exhibits on its preliminary witness and exhibits list
[Dkt. No. 20], but there is no counterclaim filed against Ms. Howard.

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failure to return from administrative leave by an ambiguous date given by said
employer.” Id.
Applicable Rules of Law
The motion before us seeks dismissal of the claims in Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint relating to Defendant Community Health Network on grounds of its failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted, or in the alternative, a more definite
statement of the claims in the complaint; this motion thus invokes Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(e), respectively.
1. Rule 12(b)(6) motion:
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of claims for their “failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In determining the sufficiency of
a claim, the court considers all allegations in the complaint to be true and draws such
reasonable inferences as required in the plaintiff's favor. Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d
758, 765 (7th Cir. 2000). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) applies, with several
enumerated exceptions, to all civil claims, and it establishes a liberal pleading regime in
which a plaintiff must provide only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
[she] is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). This reflects the modern policy
judgment that claims should be “determined on their merits rather than through missteps
in pleading.” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir.
2007) (citing 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.04 (3d ed.

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2006)). A pleading satisfies the core requirement of fairness to the defendant so long as it
provides “enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir.
2008).
In its decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Supreme Court imposed a more
stringent formulation of the pleading requirements under Rule 8. In addition to providing
fair notice to a defendant, the Court clarified that a complaint must “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Instead, the factual allegations in the
complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. The
plausibility of a complaint depends upon the context in which the allegations are situated,
and turns on more than the pleadings’ level of factual specificity; the same factually
sparse pleading could be fantastic and unrealistic in one setting and entirely plausible in
another. See In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig., 566 F. Supp. 2d 363, 370
(M.D. Pa. 2008).
Although Twombly and Iqbal represent a new gloss on the standards governing the
sufficiency of pleadings, they do not overturn the fundamental principle of liberality
embodied in Rule 8. As this court has noted, “[N]otice pleading is still all that is required,
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and ‘a plaintiff still must provide only enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of
what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, and, through his allegations, show
that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he is entitled to relief.’” United
States v. City of Evansville, 2011 WL 52467, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2011) (quoting
Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1083). On a motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff receives the benefit of
imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint.” Sanjuan v.
Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994).
Moreover, whereas here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the
complaint liberally, however inartfully pleaded, and holds it to less stringent standards
than pleadings drafted with the assistance of counsel. Childress v. Walker, No. 14-1204,
2015 WL 2408070 at *8, n.1 (7th Cir. May 21, 2015) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Ambrose v. Roeckman, 749 F.3d 615, 618 (7th
Cir. 2014); Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013);
Anyaorah v. Indiana Univ.-Purdue Univ. at Indianapolis, No. 1:12-cv-00504-JMS-MJD,
2012 WL 2258848, at *1 (S.D. Ind. 2012).
2. Rule 12(e) motion:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(e), a party may move for a more
definite statement when a complaint is “so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot
reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). When considering whether to grant
a 12(e) motion, a court’s inquiry is guided by the federal pleading requirements. As
described above, a plaintiff’s complaint need only contain “a short plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Because of
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this liberal pleading standard, “Rule 12(e) motions are generally disfavored” and should
be granted “only when the pleading is so unintelligible that the movant cannot draft a
responsive pleading.” United States for Use of Argyle Cut Stone Co. v. Paschen
Contractors, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 298, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1987); see also MacNeil Auto. Prods.
v. Cannon Auto. Ltd., 715 F. Supp. 2d 786, 790 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Guess?, Inc. v. Chang,
912 F. Supp. 372, 381 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
Discussion
As previously noted, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Additionally, the complaint must state facts that
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 618
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was “treated
differently from similarly situated employees and suffered ‘unlawful’ employment
discrimination due to her race and age; resulting in retaliation, adverse action and
disparate impact by Defendants.” Am. Compl. at 3. The complaint lacks any factual
support for this conclusory assertion that would satisfy the plausibility standard. The only
allegation contained in the amended complaint referencing Defendant
Gallahue/Community Health states: “The said Employer (Gallahue) did not give any
reason for [Plaintiff’s] discharge other than her failure to return from administrative leave
by an ambiguous date given by said employer.” Am. Compl. at 3.

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This allegation fails to adequately inform Defendant (or the Court) of the factual
grounds upon which Plaintiff’s Title VII, Section 1981, and/or the ADEA claims against
it are based. Although Plaintiff alleges that Community’s reason for terminating her
employment was her failure to return from administrative leave, such action on its own is
not unlawful. Plaintiff’s amended complaint contains no other factual allegations relating
to discriminatory or retaliatory conduct on Community’s part that would transform her
meager factual assertion into a viable cause of action.
A complaint must provide “enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1083. Plaintiff’s
complaint falls well short of this requirement. It does not allege sufficient facts to provide
notice of the circumstances surrounding the alleged discrimination and retaliation, relying
instead entirely on “mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Even though we are obligated to construe pro se complaints
liberally, Plaintiff’s claim lacks sufficient facts to make it plausible, and to properly
notify Defendant of the grounds on which it is being sued. Accordingly, we conclude that
Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim against Community Health Network
upon which relief may be granted. As such, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED, without prejudice.4

4

Because this court is dismissing Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim, we need not
address Defendant’s request in the alternative for a more definite statement under 12(e). See, e.g., Griffin
v. Milwaukee Cnty., 369 F. App’x 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d
818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001)) (“It is often simpler to dismiss an unintelligible complaint with leave to file a
new a new one so that a plaintiff’s allegations are contained in only one document rather than two: the
complaint and the more definite statement.”).

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Conclusion
For the reasons detailed above, we GRANT Defendant Community Health
Network’s motion to dismiss, without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted 30 days from the date
of this entry within which to file a second amended complaint addressing the deficiencies
discussed herein. If she fails to do so, all claims against Defendant Community Health
Network will be dismissed with prejudice. Because Defendant IPS has not moved to
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it, those claims shall proceed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: __________________
06/16/2015

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Distribution:
BILLIE J. HOWARD
7244 Lakeside Woods Dr.
Indianapolis, IN 46278
Roberta Sabin Recker
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP - Indianapolis
[e-mail]
Ryann E. Ricchio
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP - Indianapolis
[e-mail]
Courtney R. King
ICE MILLER LLP
[e-mail]
Tami A. Earnhart
ICE MILLER LLP
[e-mail]

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