GILLEY v. COLVIN
Filing
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ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION: Because she has not done so, the Court VACATES the ALJ's decision denying Ms. Gilley benefits and supplemental security income and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four). Final judgment will issue accordingly ***SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 11/13/2014.(DW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
VALERIE D. GILLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
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No. 1:14-cv-00202-JMS-TAB
ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Plaintiff Valerie Gilley applied for disability, disability insurance benefits, and
supplemental security income from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on November 2,
2010, alleging a disability onset date of November 15, 2007. Her applications were denied on
January 4, 2011, and denied again after reconsideration on April 4, 2011. A hearing was held on
June 11, 2012 in front of Administrative Law Judge Kimberly S. Cromer (the “ALJ”), who
determined that Ms. Gilley was not entitled to receive benefits. [Filing No. 13-2 at 15-28.] The
Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s “final decision”
subject to judicial review. Ms. Gilley has filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
asking the Court to review her denial of benefits. [Filing No. 1.]
I.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Gilley was forty-six years old as of her alleged onset date. [Filing No. 13-5 at 2.]
Previously, she had worked at a nursing home in food service and then as a Certified Nursing
Assistant. [Filing No. 13-2 at 39-40.] Ms. Gilley claims she has been disabled since November
1
15, 2007, because of a variety of physical and mental impairments that will be discussed as
necessary below. 1 [Filing No. 17-5 at 2.]
Using the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the SSA in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, the
ALJ issued an opinion on July 3, 2012. [Filing No. 13-2 at 15-28.] The ALJ found as follows:
·
At Step One of the analysis, the ALJ found that Ms. Gilley had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity 2 after the alleged disability onset date. [Filing No.
13-2 at 17.]
·
At Step Two, the ALJ found that Ms. Gilley suffered from the severe
impairments of degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome, sleep apnea, and obesity. 3 [Filing No. 13-2 at 17-19.]
·
At Step Three, the ALJ found that Ms. Gilley did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed
impairments. [Filing No. 13-2 at 19-20.] The ALJ concluded that Ms. Gilley
had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, except she
“could lift up to 20 pounds occasionally and frequently lift and/or carry up to
10 pounds. She can stand and/or walk up to six hours in an eight-hour workday
and sit up to six hours in an eight-hour workday. [She] can occasionally
1
Ms. Gilley detailed pertinent facts in her opening brief, and the Commissioner did not dispute
those facts. [Filing No. 16 at 2.] Because those facts implicate sensitive and otherwise confidential
medical information concerning Ms. Gilley, the Court will simply incorporate those facts by
reference herein. Specific facts will be articulated as needed.
2
Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity that is both substantial (i.e. involves
significant physical or mental activities) and gainful (i.e. work that is usually done for pay or profit,
whether or not a profit is realized). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a) and § 416.972(a).
3
Ms. Gilley only addresses her fibromyalgia and use of a cane in her appeal, so the Court will
focus only on those two impairments.
2
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, or climb ramps or stairs but never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She should avoid concentrated exposure to wetness
or hazards such [as] moving machinery or work at unprotected heights.” [Filing
No. 13-2 at 20-26.]
·
At Step Four, the ALJ found that Ms. Gilley was not able to perform her past
relevant work as a nurse’s aide and dietary aide because that work is categorized
as medium to very heavy in exertional demand. [Filing No. 13-2 at 26.]
·
At Step Five, the ALJ found that considering Ms. Gilley’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that she can perform. Specifically, the ALJ found Ms. Gilley
would be capable of working as an office helper, hand packager, or counter
clerk. [Filing No. 13-2 at 27.]
Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Gilley was not disabled and was not entitled
to disability benefits or supplemental security income. [Filing No. 13-2 at 28.] Ms. Gilley
requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision, but the Council denied that request
on December 17, 2013. [Filing No. 13-2 at 2-4.] That decision is the final decision of the
Commissioner for purposes of judicial review, and Ms. Gilley subsequently sought relief from this
Court. [Filing No. 1.]
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s role in this action is limited to ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and that substantial evidence exists for the ALJ’s decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381
F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For the purpose of judicial review, “[s]ubstantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
3
conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). Because the ALJ “is in the best position to determine the
credibility of witnesses,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008), this Court must afford
the ALJ’s credibility determination “considerable deference,” overturning it only if it is “patently
wrong.” Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
The ALJ must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),
evaluating the following, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has a
severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of
the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can
perform her past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work
in the national economy.
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). “If
a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, she will automatically be found disabled. If a
claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four. Once step four
is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.” Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by
evaluating all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are
not severe. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ may not
dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling. Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four to
determine whether the claimant can perform her own past relevant work and if not, at Step Five to
determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e), (g). The
burden of proof is on the claimant for Steps One through Four; only at Step Five does the burden
shift to the Commissioner.
4
If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s
decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When an ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the
appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An
award of benefits “is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the record
can yield but one supportable conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Gilley raises three main arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ erred at Steps 4 and 5
by improperly evaluating the severity of Ms. Gilley’s fibromyalgia; (2) that the ALJ improperly
relied upon misinformation contained in the consultative examiner’s report and later relied upon
by the state agency doctor; and (3) that the ALJ improperly found Ms. Gilley capable of performing
light work, despite the fact that she uses a walking cane. [Filing No. 16 at 3-10.] The Court will
address the first and second issues together as they both relate to the ALJ’s severity determination,
and will address the third issue separately.
A. The ALJ’s Severity Determination
Ms. Gilley argues that the ALJ was incorrect in finding that she could perform some types
of work with RFC limitations because the ALJ should have considered her subjective symptoms
of pain associated with fibromyalgia. [Filing No. 16 at 3-6.] Ms. Gilley also argues that the ALJ
improperly concluded that she was only “partially credible,” noting that “[a]ny disability case
premised upon the diagnosis of fibromyalgia necessarily entails a credibility finding,” and arguing
that the ALJ improperly relied upon her ability to undertake activities of daily living in reaching
an adverse credibility finding. [Filing No. 16 at 7.] Ms. Gilley also asserts that the ALJ improperly
relied upon the opinion of Dr. Nicole Caldwell, later incorporated by Dr. B. Whitley, that Ms.
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Gilley had “an 18 of 18 fibromyalgia points, which usually does not point towards fibromyalgia.” 4
[Filing No. 16 at 8.] She asserts that this is “misinformation,” that Dr. Whitley relied on it in
attacking her credibility, and that the ALJ then improperly gave Dr. Whitley’s opinion “great
weight.” [Filing No. 16 at 8-9.]
The Commissioner responds that “this case turns on whether the ALJ’s credibility finding
was ‘patently wrong,’” and argues that here it was not. [Filing No. 19 at 2-3.] The Commissioner
argues that the ALJ properly relied on the report of Dr. Caldwell and the opinion of Dr. Whitley
in finding that Ms. Gilley’s symptoms were not as limiting as she claimed. [Filing No. 19 at 3.]
The Commissioner cites to medical records indicating that both Dr. Caldwell and Dr. Whitley
questioned Ms. Gilley’s credibility, and notes that Ms. Gilley did not cite to any evidence
undermining their opinions. [Filing No. 19 at 4-5.] The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ did
not ignore objective medical evidence, but rather considered and rejected it based on the medical
opinions concluding that Ms. Gilley was exaggerating her symptoms. [Filing No. 19 at 5-6.] As
for her activities of daily living, the Commissioner argues that Ms. Gilley’s daily activities “far
exceeded simple housework” since they involved “car[ing] for her disabled husband and four
disabled or special-needs grandchildren.” [Filing No. 19 at 7.] The Commissioner contends that
the ALJ pointed to Ms. Gilley’s activities of daily living to show that she was not as physically
limited as she claimed, and not “as proof she was de facto not disabled and could hold a job.”
[Filing No. 19 at 7-8.] Further, the Commissioner argues that “the ALJ assessed [Ms.] Gilley’s
symptoms in light of the medical opinions, [her] other exaggerated claims, modest clinical
4
“Fibromyalgia is typically diagnosed by a showing of pain in 11 of 18 specified tender-point
sites. Pain is assessed on a four-point scale, with two points indicating moderate or greater pain.”
Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 421 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Frederick Wolfe, et al., The American
College of Rheumatology 1990 Criteria for the Classification of Fibromyalgia: Report of the
Multicenter Criteria Committee, 33 ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 160 (1990)).
6
findings, and a limited and conservative course of treatment, in addition to her daily activities.”
[Filing No. 19 at 8.] The Commissioner argues that Dr. Whitley questioned Ms. Gilley’s
credibility because she tested positive for 18 out of 18 fibromyalgia points, and that though Dr.
Whitley and Dr. Caldwell both agreed that Ms. Gilley had fibromyalgia, “they both thought it
unlikely that [Ms.] Gilley tested positive in 18 out of 18 tender points, particularly in light of other
evidence of [Ms.] Gilley’s exaggerated presentation.” [Filing No. 19 at 4-5.]
Fibromyalgia, which is a rheumatic disease, cannot be confirmed by objective laboratory
tests. See Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir.
2003) (citing Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1996)). But “[a] distinction
exists…between the amount of fatigue or pain an individual experiences, which as Hawkins notes
is entirely subjective, and how much an individual’s degree of pain or fatigue limits his functional
capabilities, which can be objectively measured.”
Holmstrom v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 615 F.3d 758, 770 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Williams v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 317, 322
(7th Cir. 2007)).
Accordingly, it is not enough that Ms. Gilley has been diagnosed with fibromyalgia. See
Hawkins, 326 F.3d at 916 (“‘Some people may have such a severe case of fibromyalgia as to be
totally disabled from working, but most do not and the question is whether [the claimant] is one
of the minority’”) (quoting Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306-07). The correct analysis is whether the
evidence regarding Ms. Gilley’s subjective pain limits her objective functional capabilities.
Holmstrom, 615 F.3d at 770 (“The district court correctly identified this distinction and focused
on it”); see also Manley v. Barnhart, 154 Fed. Appx. 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[C]laims of
disability based on amorphous pain disorders such as…fibromyalgia often must center around the
subjective complaints of the patient, since they have few objective indicators….But the severity
7
of these disorders varies, and the claimant’s subjective complaints need not be accepted insofar as
they clash with other evidence in the record”); Kurth v. Astrue, 568 F.Supp.2d 1020, 1032-33
(W.D. Wis. 2008) (“[S]ubjective complaints in [a fibromyalgia] case are more important than in
other cases because they are clinical indicators of the disease of fibromyalgia”); Estok v. Apfel,
152 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1998) (A fibromyalgia diagnosis is insufficient to show a person is
disabled – the fibromyalgia must also be severe). Thus, the credibility determination in a case
involving fibromyalgia is particularly important.
The ALJ’s credibility determination is typically entitled to special deference. Scheck, 357
F.3d at 703; see Sims v. Barnhart, 442 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Credibility determinations
can rarely be disturbed by a reviewing court, lacking as it does the opportunity to observe the
claimant testifying”). Although the absence of objective evidence cannot, standing alone, discredit
the presence of substantive complaints, Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922-23 (7th Cir. 2010),
when faced with evidence both supporting and detracting from claimant’s allegations, the Seventh
Circuit has recognized that “the resolution of competing arguments based on the record is for the
ALJ, not the court.” Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir. 2002). In “determining
the credibility of the individual’s statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire case record,”
and a credibility determination “must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility,
supported by the evidence in the case record.” Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir.
2006).
The ALJ summarized Ms. Gilley’s complaints, and noted that Dr. Steven Gatewood found
she “had weak grip, decreased head and neck movement, and shoulder pain with extension and
prescribed medication.” [Filing No. 13-2 at 21.] The ALJ also noted, however, that Ms. Gilley’s
x-rays showed only mild degeneration and that she had “full range of motion in her extremities”
8
and “good range of motion in her spine and shoulders….” [Filing No. 13-2 at 21.] The ALJ went
on to discuss Ms. Gilley’s credibility, but did not specifically tie it to her consideration of whether
Ms. Gilley’s fibromyalgia would prevent her from performing light work. She stated that she
found Ms. Gilley to be “partially credible,” and noted that Dr. Whitley opined that Ms. Gilley
could perform light work with some limitations and that Ms. Gilley was able to care for her
disabled spouse and young, disabled children, do occasional household chores, shop, attend
medical appointments, attend church, and visit with family and friends. [Filing No. 13-2 at 23.]
The ALJ must build a logical bridge from the record to her conclusion, Murphy v. Colvin,
759 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014), and she has not done so here. Her opinion contains many
conclusions, but very few explanations for those conclusions. And while the Commissioner has
detailed evidence from the record in arguing that the ALJ properly concluded that Ms. Gilley could
perform light work, this detail is completely lacking in the ALJ’s opinion. See Hanson v. Colvin,
760 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[Securities and Exchange Commission v.] Chenery [Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947)] requires that an agency’s discretionary order
be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself”) (citation
omitted). For example, the ALJ cited to certain medical records, but did not explain which parts
of those records support her conclusion that Ms. Gilley is only partially credible. [Filing No. 132 at 23.]
As for the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Whitley’s opinion, which references the 18 out of 18
fibromyalgia score, the Commissioner again provides far more detail in her response brief than the
ALJ did in her opinion. The ALJ merely stated that she gave Dr. Whitley’s opinion “great weight,”
but did not specifically explain why she did so, only generically stating that “the evidence received
into the record, after the initial determination, did not provide any new or material information that
9
would alter any findings about the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” [Filing No. 13-2 at
24.] She did not explain whether she interpreted Dr. Caldwell’s notation that Ms. Gilley “had an
18 out of 18 fibromyalgia points, which usually does not point towards fibromyalgia” to mean that
Ms. Gilley must have been malingering because, for example, it is very rare for someone to score
an 18 and indicates that she was exaggerating her symptoms. Indeed, the ALJ did not mention the
18 out of 18 score at all.
The Court notes that even with an 18 out of 18 score, it is entirely possible that the ALJ
still could have properly found that Ms. Gilley was not disabled. See, e.g., Thompson v. Colvin,
575 Fed. Appx. 668, 677 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of benefits where claimant scored a 17
out of 18 on fibromyalgia test but had no other pain issues and ALJ concluded that claimant had
fibromyalgia, but that it was not debilitating and would not preclude sedentary work); Castile v.
Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 929-30 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of benefits where claimant had 18
out of 18 tender points on fibromyalgia test and “ALJ reasonably concluded that [claimant’s] litany
of alleged pain and other symptoms were ‘not entirely credible’ insofar as establishing proof of
her inability to work,” and noted that no doctor had found she could not work). But the ALJ’s
failure to discuss the 18 out of 18 score further highlights the lack of detail in the ALJ’s opinion
and, thus, the lack of a logical bridge from the evidence to the ALJ’s conclusion.
The Court’s own review of the evidence indicates that there is significant evidence of
malingering by Ms. Gilley which could support a denial of benefits, but it is not the Court’s role
to assess the records on its own. Rather, the Court must determine whether the ALJ has built a
logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusion – she has not here. Accordingly, this matter
must be remanded for further explanation from the ALJ.
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The Court does find, however, that the ALJ’s reliance on Ms. Gilley’s ability to perform
certain activities of daily living was not per se improper. The ALJ noted that Ms. Gilley is “able
to care for young disabled children at home as well as a disabled spouse,” and that she can do
occasional household chores, and can shop, attend medical appointments, attend church, and visit
with family and friends.” [Filing No. 13-2 at 23.] These abilities – particularly the ability to care
for her disabled husband and grandchildren – support the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Gilley’s
symptoms were not as severe as she claimed, and the ALJ’s reliance on those abilities as part of
her credibility analysis was not improper. The ALJ must ensure on remand, though, that she does
not rely too heavily on Ms. Gilley’s activities of daily living in conducting her credibility analysis.
See Flint v. Colvin, 543 Fed. Appx. 598, 599 (7th Cir. 2013) (ALJ “properly noted the
inconsistency between, on the one hand, [the claimant’s] testimony that she was able to care fulltime for her husband and perform some household chores and, on the other hand, her claim that
her pain and other symptoms prevented her from working”); Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 639
(7th Cir. 2013) (“it is appropriate for an ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily activities when
evaluating their credibility[, but] this must be done with care”); Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640,
647 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The critical differences between activities of daily living and activities in a
full-time job are that a person has more flexibility in scheduling the former than the latter, can get
help from other persons…, and is not held to a minimum standard of performance, as she would
be by an employer”).
In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ did not adequately explain her conclusion that Ms.
Gilley is able to perform light work despite her fibromyalgia diagnosis. Specifically, she did not
detail her conclusion that Ms. Gilley was only “partially credible.” As noted above, there appears
to be evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that Ms. Gilley’s complaints
11
regarding the severity of her fibromyalgia symptoms were not entirely credible. If the ALJ had
cited and discussed that evidence, her conclusion might very well have been justified. However,
her opinion leaves the Court to guess regarding how she reached her conclusion, which the Court
will not and cannot do. Accordingly, this case must be remanded for the ALJ to sufficiently
explain her conclusion regarding Ms. Gilley’s credibility.
B. Ms. Gilley’s Use of a Cane
Ms. Gilley argues that the vocational expert testified that Ms. Gilley “would grid out at age
50 [and automatically be considered disabled] if she required the use of a cane,” and that she turned
50 a few months before the date she was last insured. [Filing No. 16 at 9-10.] She asserts that
“[e]ven if the ALJ was justified in concluding that the plaintiff was not disabled prior to the
plaintiff’s 50th birthday, the fact that she was prescribed and used a cane before her 50th birthday
combined with the testimony of the vocational expert clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff was
incapable of doing light work and should have been found disabled at least as of her 50th birthday.”
[Filing No. 16 at 10.]
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ reasonably found that Ms. Gilley did not need a
cane to work, and properly relied upon Dr. Whitley’s opinion which “ultimately concluded that
[Ms. Gilley] could work without using [a cane].” [Filing No. 19 at 9.]
There is a fundamental problem with the Commissioner’s response: the ALJ never
concluded that Ms. Gilley did not need a cane to work. Rather, she simply noted that Dr. Caldwell
found “positive malingering with normal gait and ability to squat with use of a cane.” [Filing No.
13-2 at 22; Filing No. 13-2 at 24.] Indeed, Dr. Whitley never even concluded that Ms. Gilley could
work without a cane. She noted that Dr. Frappier had prescribed “a straight cane to prevent falls,”
that Ms. Gilley “walks w/ rt-sided limp and uses cane,” that she “had a normal pace w/out use of
12
[cane] outside of exam room,” and that “[t]here is medical evidence from treating sources that
substantiate the clmt’s use of a cane.” [Filing No. 14-4 at 109-110; Filing No. 14-4 at 113.] But
Dr. Whitley did not ever state that Ms. Gilley does not need a cane. While her conclusion that Ms.
Gilley can perform light work and is able to occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl
may imply that Ms. Gilley does not need a cane, [see Filing No. 14-4 at 110], Dr. Whitley did not
ever explicitly say so. Similarly, the ALJ never concluded that Ms. Gilley did not need a cane to
work. To the extent the ALJ had concluded that Ms. Gilley did not need a cane in determining
that Ms. Gilley could perform light work, she was required to explain that conclusion. And to the
extent the ALJ believed Ms. Gilley could still perform light work with a cane, she was required to
expound on that as well. Like her discussion of Ms. Gilley’s fibromyalgia, the ALJ’s consideration
of Ms. Gilley’s use of a cane is missing important details. While evidence may exist in the record
to properly conclude that Ms. Gilley does not need a cane to work, or can perform light work with
a cane, the ALJ must discuss that evidence and more clearly set forth her conclusion.
Ms. Gilley also argues that the vocational expert testified that Ms. Gilley would “grid out
at age 50 if she required the use of a cane.” [Filing No. 16 at 10.] The Commissioner did not
specifically respond to this argument. The vocational expert testified that if Ms. Gilley used a cane
she would qualify only for sedentary work, and that even sedentary positions would not be
available to her as of her fiftieth birthday. [Filing No. 13-2 at 68-69.] Accordingly, to the extent
that the ALJ did not conclude that Ms. Gilley could work without her cane, she should have
explained why Ms. Gilley qualified for light work instead of sedentary work, and what effect, if
13
any, attaining the age of fifty would have on the disability analysis. 5
IV.
CONCLUSION
The ALJ’s opinion lacks the specificity required, and the Court cannot tell why she
discounted Ms. Gilley’s fibromyalgia symptoms, and whether she concluded that Ms. Gilley did
not need a cane to work. Again, there is evidence in the record regarding Ms. Gilley’s credibility
that may well justify the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that Ms. Gilley is not entitled to benefits. But
the ALJ must build a logical bridge between that evidence and her conclusion. Because she has
not done so, the Court VACATES the ALJ’s decision denying Ms. Gilley benefits and
supplemental security income and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four). Final judgment will issue accordingly.
_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
November 13, 2014
Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record
5
As Ms. Gilley notes, SSR 12-2p became effective shortly after the ALJ’s decision at issue here.
[Filing No. 16 at 3.] SSR 12-2p primarily “provides guidance on how [to] develop evidence to
establish that a person has a medically determinable impairment of fibromyalgia.” SSR 12-2p. To
the extent it also addresses determining the RFC of an individual suffering from fibromyalgia, the
ALJ should consider SSR 12-2p on remand.
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