USA et al v. E-BIOFUELS, LLC et al

Filing 301

ENTRY ON PENDING MOTIONS - In this district, the Court simply does not have enough lawyers willing and qualified to accept a pro bono assignment in every pro se case. The Court recognizes Furando's frustration with self- representation and hi s difficulty in acquiring documents and accessing to legal research material. However, thus far, his efforts in self-representation are clearly competent and sufficient. The Court again affirms that it will be alert to the possibility of recruitin g counsel if in fact this matter proceeds to trial or at other points in the case where Furando's incarceration and pro se status would make it particularly difficult for him to proceed without representation and where the assistance of couns el would be a benefit to both Furando and the Court. For these reasons, the Motion to Appoint Counsel, dkt. 299 is denied. The Court acknowledges Furando's pro se status and finds good cause exists for granting the motion. Accordingly, the Motion for Extension of time, dkt. 300 is granted. Furando shall have until December 10, 2018 to file his response to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at Dkt. 290 . Copies per distribution list. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 9/24/2018. (NAD) Modified on 9/25/2018 - Edited for administrative purposes (NAD).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH FURANDO
Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-0377-TWP-MJD

ENTRY ON PENDING MOTIONS
This matter is before the Court on Defendant, Joseph Furando’s (“Furando”), Motion for
Appointment of Counsel [Dkt. 299] and Motion for Extension of Time [Dkt. 300]. For the
following reasons, the Court denies Furando’s fourth request for appointment of counsel and grants
his request for an extension of time.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Unlike in criminal cases, there is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal
civil cases. Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010)28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
Litigants requesting that counsel be recruited must first show that they made a reasonable attempt
to secure private counsel. Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2004). Next, the judge is required
to consider whether “given the difficulty of the case, does the party appear competent to litigate it
himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-655 (7th Cir. 2007).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Appointment of Counsel
The instant motion is Furando’s fifth request for appointment of counsel. See Dkts, 198,
220, 262, 281 and 285. His prior request have all been denied. As stated in his prior motions,

Furando, an incarcerated person, asserts that he is unable to afford counsel, the issues involved in
his case are complex, he has limited access to the prison library, and limited knowledge of the law.
Furando’s prior motions for appointment of counsel have been denied for two reason. First, the
court has rejected Furando’s arguments that this case is complex, and the court has determined that
Furando is competent, at this stage of the proceedings, to litigate this matter himself.
Furnado’s current motion provides no information that has not previously been considered.
The Court has previously noted that “Furando is intimately aware of the subject matter of this
litigation, which arises from his role in falsifying Renewable Identification Numbers to the United
States government. Moreover, the civil litigation in this case stems from Furnando’s own
transactions that resulted in his incarceration”. [Dkt. 253 at 2-3.] Furando’s personal
characteristics, including literacy, communication ability, and extensive post-secondary education
have been considered by the court. Id.
Currently pending in this action is a partial motion for summary judgment. The purpose
of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether
there is a genuine need for trial. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). Pro se litigants are frequently required to respond to this type of
motion. As required, the Plaintiff has complied with Local Rule 56-1(k) which requires that a party
seeking summary judgment against an unrepresented party file and serve a specific notice and
instructions to a pro se litigant. See Dkt, 290-1. Moreover, pro se pleadings are liberally construed.
(A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and …however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). The Court will take these factors into consideration in ruling on the summary
judgment motion.

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In this district, the Court simply does not have enough lawyers willing and qualified to
accept a pro bono assignment in every pro se case. The Court recognizes Furando’s frustration
with self-representation and his difficulty in acquiring documents and accessing to legal research
material. However, thus far, his efforts in self-representation are clearly competent and sufficient.
Because of these factors, the Court again determines that Furando is competent to respond to the
pending motion. The Court again affirms that it will be alert to the possibility of recruiting counsel
if in fact this matter proceeds to trial or at other points in the case where Furando’s incarceration
and pro se status would make it particularly difficult for him to proceed without representation and
where the assistance of counsel would be a benefit to both Furando and the Court.
For these reasons, the Motion to Appoint Counsel, dkt. 299 is denied.
B. Motion for Extension of Time
Furando has also filed a motion requesting an additional sixty (60) day extension of time
in which to respond to the pending summary judgment motion. He writes that his response to the
motion is due on or before October 9, 2018. Furando is in need of additional to do his own research
and legal writing and because the facility where he is housed has experienced numerous “lockdowns” impeding his ability to complete research. The Court acknowledges Furando’s pro se
status and finds good cause exists for granting the motion. Accordingly, the Motion for Extension
of time, dkt. 300 is granted. Furando shall have until December 10, 2018 to file his response to
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at Dkt. 290.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Furando’s Motion to Appoint counsel [Dtk. 299] is DENIED
and his Motion for Extension of Time [Dkt. 300] is GRANTED.

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SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/24/2018

DISTRIBUTION:
Distribution:
JOSEPH FURANDO
65853-050
FORT DIX - FCI
FORT DIX FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
Inmate Mail/Parcels
P.O. BOX 2000
Joint Base MDL, NJ 08640
CHAD DUCEY
11801-028
TERRE HAUTE - FCI
TERRE HAUTE FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
Inmate Mail/Parcels
P.O. BOX 33
TERRE HAUTE, IN 47808
Joyce R Branda
US Attorney's Office
Commercial Litigation Branch
PO Box 261 Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
David K. Colapinto
KOHN KOHN & COLAPINTO
[e-mail]
John Andrew Goodridge
JOHN ANDREW GOODRIDGE LAW OFFICE
[e-mail]
Tracy Lyle Hilmer
US Department of Justice - Civil Division
PO Box 261
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
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Stephen Martin Kohn
KOHN KOHN & COLAPINTO LLP
[e-mail]
Stephen M. Komie
KOMIE AND ASSOCIATES
[e-mail]
Brian J. McCabe
US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-CIVIL DIVISION
[e-mail]
Theodore J. Minch
SOVICH MINCH LLP
[e-mail]
Shelese M. Woods
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
[e-mail]

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