WHITE v. COLVIN

Filing 21

ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW: As set forth above, the ALJ in this case satisfied his obligation to articulate the reasons for his decision, and that decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED ***SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 5/1/2015.(DW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MICHAEL W. WHITE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

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ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Plaintiff Michael W. White requests judicial review of the final decision of Defendant,
Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”),
denying Mr. White’s application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the
Social Security Act (“the Act”). The Court, having reviewed the record and the briefs of the
parties, now rules as follows.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. White protectively filed for SSI on March 28, 2011, alleging he became disabled on
February 15, 2011. Mr. White’s application was denied initially on July 5, 2011, and again upon
reconsideration on September 15, 2011. Following the denial upon reconsideration, Mr. White
requested and received a hearing in front of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A hearing,
during which Mr. White was represented by counsel, was held before ALJ Daniel J. Mages on
January 22, 2013. 1 The ALJ issued his decision denying Mr. White’s claim on February 11,

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A hearing was also held on September 18, 2012. Because Mr. White was incarcerated
and had no representative at the time, the hearing was postponed at Mr. White’s request.

2013, and the Appeals Council denied his request for review on February 12, 2014. After the
Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, Mr. White filed this timely appeal.
II.

APPLICABLE STANDARD

Disability is defined as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of a medically determinable mental or physical impairment which can be expected to
result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least
twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In order to be found disabled, a claimant must
demonstrate that his physical or mental limitations prevent him from doing not only his previous
work, but any other kind of gainful employment which exists in the national economy,
considering his age, education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner employs a five-step
sequential analysis. At step one, if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity he is
not disabled, despite his medical condition and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). At
step two, if the claimant does not have a “severe” impairment (i.e., one that significantly limits
his ability to perform basic work activities), he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At
step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments meets or medically equals any impairment that appears in the Listing of
Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, and whether the impairment meets the twelvemonth duration requirement; if so, the claimant is deemed disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(iii). At step four, if the claimant is able to perform his past relevant work, he is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five, if the claimant can perform any other
work in the national economy, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).

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In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s findings of fact are conclusive and must be
upheld by this court “so long as substantial evidence supports them and no error of law
occurred.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,” id., and this court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that
of the ALJ. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 1997). The ALJ is required to
articulate only a minimal, but legitimate, justification for his acceptance or rejection of specific
evidence of disability. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2004). In order to be
affirmed, the ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence in her decision; while he “is not
required to address every piece of evidence or testimony,” he must “provide some glimpse into
[his] reasoning . . . [and] build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [his]
conclusion.” Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176.
III.

THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ determined at step one that Mr. White had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since March 28, 2011, the application date. At steps two and three, the ALJ concluded
that Mr. White had the severe impairments of “cirrhosis of the liver, an adjustment disorder,
anxiety, an intermittent explosive disorder, and substance abuse,” R. at 12, but that his
impairments, singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. At
step four, the ALJ determined that Mr. White had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform light work defined as follows:
Sitting six hours during an eight-hour workday; standing and walking four hours
during an eight-hour workday; lifting, carrying, pushing and pulling twenty pounds
occasionally and ten pounds frequently; occasionally climbing ramps and stairs;
balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling; no climbing ladders, ropes
or scaffolds; simple routine tasks with the ability to attend, concentrate and persist

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for two hours at a time; and no more than superficial interaction with the public,
coworkers or supervisors.
Id. at 19. Given that RFC, the ALJ determined that he could not perform any of his past relevant
work. Finally, at step five the ALJ determined that Mr. White could perform a range of work
that exists in the national economy, including work as a hand packer, equipment cleaner, and
stock clerk. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Mr. White was not disabled as defined by the
Act.
IV.

EVIDENCE OF RECORD

The medical evidence of record is aptly set forth in Mr. White’s brief (Dkt. No. 14) and
need not be recited here. Specific facts are set forth in the discussion section below where
relevant.
V.

DISCUSSION

In his brief in support of his Complaint, Mr. White argues that the ALJ: 1) erred at Step
Three in determining that he was not disabled due to his combined mental impairments; 2) erred
in failing to call a medical advisor to testify as to medical equivalency; 3) erred in his credibility
determination; and 4) erred at Step Five in determining that he was capable of performing some
jobs. His arguments are addressed below.
A. Listing 12.04
Mr. While first argues that the ALJ erred at Step Three 2 in finding that he did not meet or
medically equal Listing 12.04; he also argues that the ALJ should have called a medical advisor
to testify as to medical equivalency. The Court disagrees.

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Mr. White also asserts a host of other reasons the ALJ’s Step Three decision must be
reversed—the ALJ refused to consider evidence proving his case, the ALJ failed to build an
accurate bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, the ALJ mischaracterized evidence, etc. See
Pl.’s Br. at 13-14. These arguments are undeveloped and amount to nothing more than rote
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Listing 12.04, affective disorders, require the satisfaction of paragraphs A and B or that
the requirements in paragraph C are met. 3 The ALJ found that Mr. While did not meet or equal
the requirements in paragraph B, which require at least two of the following: 1) marked
restrictions of activities of daily living; 2) marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning;
3) marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or 4) repeated episodes
of decompensation, each of extended duration. 20 C.F.R. § 404, app. 1. A marked restriction
means “more than moderate but less than extreme” and “may arise when several activities or
functions are impaired, or even when only one is impaired, as long as the degree of limitation is
such as to interfere seriously with [the claimant’s] ability to function independently,
appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.” Id.
In his decision, the ALJ found that Mr. White had moderate restrictions of daily living,
noting that Mr. White could make simple meals, had appropriate grooming and hygiene, and
engaged in recreational activities; the ALJ did note, however, that Mr. White lived with his
mother, did not perform household chores, and had difficulties understanding recipes. R. at 16.
The ALJ next found that Mr. White had moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning,
noting that he was cooperative, attended church intermittently, and had his friends drive him to
his appointments; however, the ALJ noted that Mr. White reported difficulties getting along with
other and did not handle stress well. Id. at 17. The ALJ found that Mr. White also had moderate
difficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace, noting that he reported difficulties
concentrating and completing tasks and did not manage his own finances. Id. at 17-18. Finally,

assertions supported by a string of case citations. The Court will not address such skeletal
arguments. See United States v. Elst, 579 F.3d 740, 747 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Perfunctory and
undeveloped arguments as well as arguments unsupported by pertinent authority are waived.”).
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Mr. White does not argue that he meets the requirements of paragraph C for Listing
12.04.
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the ALJ noted that Mr. White experienced no episodes of decompensation of extended duration.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Mr. White did not meet or equal the requirements of paragraph
B for Listing 12.04.
Turning now to Mr. White’s arguments, he first argues that his Global Assessment of
Functioning (“GAF”) score of 45 4 proves he satisfies the requirements of paragraph B, as it
indicates that he “was unable to keep a job and thus was totally disabled.” Pl.’s Br. at 10. As this
Court has previously noted, GAF scores, standing alone, do not automatically warrant a finding
of disability or that a claimant equals a Listing. See Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir.
2010) (“[N]owhere do the Social Security regulations or case law require an ALJ to determine
the extent of an individual’s disability based entirely on his GAF score.”) (quoting Wilkins v.
Barnhart, 69 Fed. Appx. 775, 780 (7th Cir. 2003)). The ALJ noted Mr. White’s GAF score of
45, see R. at 21, and considered it as one piece of evidence. In so doing, the ALJ did not err.
Next, Mr. White argues that the ALJ “arbitrarily and erroneously rejected the 6-14-11
Psychiatric Review Technique evaluation prepared for Social Security by Dr. Johnson PhD.”
Pl.’s Br. at 11. Dr. Amy S. Johnson performed a Psychiatric Review Technique on June 14,
2011, opining that Mr. White had “Marked” limitations in activities of daily living and in
maintaining social functioning. See R. at 291. She went on to note that Mr. White’s “severity in
functioning appears due to da/a [drug abuse and alcoholism].” Id. at 293. Dr. Johnson’s findings
were affirmed by Dr. Joseph A. Pressner on September 12, 2011. Id. at 309. The ALJ disagreed
with these findings, as noted above, finding that the evidence only supported “Moderate”
limitations in these two areas. The ALJ also correctly noted that the “Marked” findings made by

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Mr. White also notes that the ALJ arbitrarily and erroneously refused to accept his GAF
scores of 37 and 50. See Pl.’s Br. at 10. The Court concurs with the Commissioner that the
Record is void of these GAF scores; indeed, Mr. White provides no Record citation to them.
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Dr. Johnson were “based on ongoing substance abuse, whereas the claimant insists he has not
abused substances after March 2011. No objective evidence contradicts the claimant’s
allegations regarding his substance abuse.” Id. at 22.
Mr. White argues that this rejection was erroneous because Dr. Johnson’s evaluation
occurred three months after he claims to have ceased his substance abuse. This argument is
without merit, however, as Dr. Johnson explicitly stated that her findings were due to his drug
abuse and alcoholism. Regardless, the ALJ clearly articulated the evidence that supported only
“Moderate” limitations in these two areas, see R. at 16-18; the Court disagrees that the ALJ cited
no “evidence to support his rejection of Dr. Johnson’s findings.” Pl.’s Reply at 4. The ALJ
thoroughly explained his reasons for finding only “Moderate” limitations in activities of daily
living and in maintaining social functioning, and those findings are supported by substantial
evidence in the record. See, e.g., Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-6p (noting that
“Administrative law judges and the Appeals Council are not bound by findings made by State
agency or other program physicians and psychologists . . .”).
Finally, Mr. White argues that the ALJ erred in failing to obtain a medical advisor to
testify whether his impairments medically equaled Listing 12.04. In failing to do so, Mr. White
argues that the ALJ improperly relied on his own layperson’s opinion regarding the issue of
medical equivalence. Again, the Court disagrees.
SSR 96-6p notes that “longstanding policy requires that the judgment of a physician (or
psychologist) designated by the Commissioner on the issue of equivalence on the evidence
before the administrative law judge or the Appeals Council must be received into the record as
expert opinion evidence and given appropriate weight.” The Seventh Circuit has noted that
compliance with SSR 96-6p can be met with the Disability Determination and Transmittal Forms

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(“the Forms”) and that the ALJ need not summon a medical expert to testify at the hearing if a
medical expert has signed the Forms that address medical equivalency. See Farrell v. Sullivan,
878 F.2d 985, 990 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that the requirements were satisfied with regard to
medical equivalency because two physicians signed the Forms and substantial evidence in the
record supported the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not medically equal a listing); see
also Scheck, 357 F.3d at 700 (“These forms conclusively establish that consideration by a
physician . . . designated by the Commissioner has been given to the question of medical
equivalence at the initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review. The ALJ may
properly rely upon the opinion of these medical experts.”) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
As the Commissioner correctly notes, the two Forms in the record indicate that Mr. White
did not meet or medically equal any Listing because of his drug addiction and alcoholism. See R.
at 58-60; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(J) (“[A]n individual shall not be considered to be
disabled for purposes of this subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this
subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s determination that the
individual is disabled.”). This is consistent with Dr. Johnson’s finding that “da/a [drug abuse and
alcoholism] is material[.]” R. at 293. The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s failure to call a
separate medical expert to testify at the hearing regarding medical equivalency.
B. Credibility
Mr. White next argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination was “patently erroneous”
and “contrary to Social Security Ruling 96-7p.” Pl.’s Br. at 17. 5 The Court disagrees. The

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Mr. White also argues, again, that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Johnson’s findings and
in his consideration of his GAF score. These arguments have been addressed above.
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ALJ’s assessment addressed all of the following: Mr. White’s symptoms, his daily activities, his
purported functional limitations, the medications he took and other treatments he had received,
the opinion evidence of State Agency doctors, and Mr. White’s own statements. See R. at 19-22.
The ALJ’s credibility assessment fully complies with SSR 96-7p; it spans almost four pages and
contains a thorough, detailed analysis of all relevant factors and opinions.
C. Step Five
Finally, Mr. White argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment—which limited him to “simple
routine tasks” fails to account for his mental impairments. The Court disagrees and finds that the
RFC assessment and the hypothetical given to the Vocational Expert (“VE”) fully account for
Mr. White’s mental limitations.
On June 2, 2011, Mr. White underwent a psychological evaluation performed by Dr.
Andrew S. Davis. Dr. Davis offered the following opinions:
·

The claimant may have some difficulty with [attending to a simple, repetitive task
continuously for a two-hour period] secondary to reported difficulty with low energy
and concentration as well as some difficulty with sustained attention;

·

Psychological and cognitive functioning indicate that the claimant should be able to
work at an appropriate pace;

·

The claimant likely maintains the cognitive and psychological abilities to complete
most simple job requirements.

R. at 279. At the January 22, 2013, hearing, therefore, the ALJ’s hypothetical given to the VE
included the following limitations: “this individual [is] limited to simple, routine tasks with the
ability to attend, concentrate and persist for two hours at a time and no more than superficial
interaction with the public, co-workers or supervisors[.]” Id. at 66. The VE then identified jobs
that Mr. White could perform.

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Thus, the hypothetical given to the VE and the RFC assessment accurately encompassed
Mr. White’s limitations. It is not analogous to the “unskilled work” limitation that the Seventh
Circuit has cautioned does not fully address certain mental limitations. See, e.g., Jelinek v.
Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 813-14 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that limiting the plaintiff to “unskilled
work” did not fully address her difficulties in “maintain[ing] regular work attendance, [carrying]
out instructions, and [dealing] with the stresses of full-time employment”). Here, the ALJ went
beyond limiting Mr. White to “simple routine tasks” and imposed other restrictions, fully
compatible with his mental limitations. See Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 289 (7th Cir.
2002) (upholding an ALJ’s RFC assessment because he relied on a doctor who “went further and
translated those findings into a specific RFC assessment, concluding that [the claimant] could
still perform low-stress, repetitive work”). In all, the Court finds no reversible error with the
ALJ’s RFC assessment or the hypothetical given to the VE.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, the ALJ in this case satisfied his obligation to articulate the reasons
for his decision, and that decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED: 5/1/15

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Copies to all counsel of record via electronic notification

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