DAVIS v. UNITED RECOVERY SYSTEMS, LP

Filing 36

ENTRY - denying 33 Motion for Reconsideration re 33 MOTION for Reconsideration re 31 Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by CATHERINE M. DAVIS. (See Entry.) Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 1/7/2015. (RSF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
CATHERINE M. DAVIS, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED RECOVERY SYSTEMS, LP, a
Texas limited partnership,
Defendant.

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Cause No. 1:14-cv-657-WTL-DML

ENTRY ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
This cause is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (dkt. no. 33).
Plaintiff Catherine M. Davis requests that the Court reconsider its decision to grant the
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (dkt. no. 31). The motion is fully briefed, and
the Court, being duly advised, DENIES the motion for the reasons set forth below.
In granting Defendant United Recovery Systems’ (“URS”) motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the Court noted as follows in a footnote:
Although, in light of the case law discussed later in this entry, Davis’ waiver
argument has some traction, under the facts of this case, there is currently no way
around Taylor’s holding. Additionally, the “if applicable” language is not necessary
where, as here, there is no dispute as to whether Capital One was entitled to seek
interest from Davis.
Dkt. No. 21 at 4, n. 2 (emphasis added). Davis argues that the foregoing passage contains a
“clear mistake of fact”; that is, Davis “does dispute that Capital One was entitled to seek interest,
late fees or other charges after it charged off [her] account.” Davis’ Mot. at ¶ 4. Davis, however,
takes the footnote out of context. The entire footnote reads as follows:
Davis argues that Taylor is “inapposite” for two reasons: First, it is based “on the
assumption that the creditor still had [the] ability to charge interest,” Davis’ Resp.

at 7,—in other words, the Taylor court “never considered whether the original
creditor had [officially] waived interest.” Id. at 6. Second, Davis argues that URS’s
interest statement did not contain the qualifying terms “if applicable,” which terms
were found in the interest statement analyzed in Taylor, and which terms inform
consumers that interest may only accrue “if the debtor’s original debt agreement
provided for such interest.” Id. at 7. Both arguments are without merit. Although,
in light of the case law discussed later in this entry, Davis’ waiver argument has
some traction, under the facts of this case, there is currently no way around Taylor’s
holding. Additionally, the “if applicable” language is not necessary where, as here,
there is no dispute as to whether Capital One was entitled to seek interest from
Davis.
Dkt. No. 21 at 4, n. 2 (emphasis added). When read in context, it is clear that the Court’s
reference to “whether Capital One was entitled to seek interest from Davis” refers to “the
debtor’s original debt agreement” and Capital One’s ability to seek interest on Davis’ unpaid
account in the first place—not Capital One’s ability to seek interest after it closed Davis’
account. Again, Davis does not dispute that Capital One was entitled to seek interest on Davis’
unpaid account before it allegedly closed her account. Thus, the Court was not mistaken
regarding the facts or the arguments at issue in this case.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court is still unconvinced that Taylor v. Cavalry Inv.,
LLC, 365 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2004) does not control the present case. Thus, the Plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED: 1/07/15
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Copies to all counsel of record via electronic communication.

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