JORDAN v. BARTHOLOMEW COUNTY COURT SERVICES

Filing 67

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE. In advance of trial, Plaintiff John Jordan filed a Motion in Limine seeking to preclude Defendant Bartholomew County Court Services ("Bartholomew") from introducing or referring to any lawsuit, charge, and/or complaint filed by Mr. Jordan against another employer. [Filing No. 53 at 1.] On February 18, 2016, the Court held a final pre-trial conference where it took under advisement Mr. Jordan's Motion in Limine. [Filing No. 63 at 3.] For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Mr. Jordan's Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 3/7/2016. (BGT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JOHN JORDAN,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
BARTHOLOMEW COUNTY COURT
SERVICES,
Defendant.

No. 1:14-cv-00665-JMS-DML

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE
In advance of trial, Plaintiff John Jordan filed a Motion in Limine seeking to preclude
Defendant Bartholomew County Court Services (“Bartholomew”) from introducing or referring
to any lawsuit, charge, and/or complaint filed by Mr. Jordan against another employer. [Filing
No. 53 at 1.] On February 18, 2016, the Court held a final pre-trial conference where it took under
advisement Mr. Jordan’s Motion in Limine. 1 [Filing No. 63 at 3.] For the reasons that follow, the
Court GRANTS Mr. Jordan’s Motion in Limine.
Mr. Jordan seeks to prevent the introduction of evidence related to a lawsuit against his
former employer. [Filing No. 54 at 5.] He argues that this information is neither admissible nor
relevant, and that the introduction of this evidence does not make the existence of any pertinent
fact more or less probable. [Filing No. 54 at 5.] He claims that even if it is relevant, the minimal
probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and that it would confuse or
mislead the jury. [Filing No. 54 at 5-6.] He contends that the introduction of this evidence would

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In addition to the Motion in Limine at issue, Mr. Jordan also filed three other Motions in Limine.
[Filing No. 53 at 1.] During the final pre-trial conference, Bartholomew did not object to and the
Court granted two of Mr. Jordan’s Motions in Limine. [Filing No. 63 at 3.] The Court denied a
third Motion in Limine without prejudice. [Filing No. 63 at 3.]
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make him appear litigious and would divert the jury’s focus from the real issue in the case –
whether Bartholomew created a racially-hostile work environment for Mr. Jordan or retaliated
against him for complaining about race harassment. [Filing No. 54 at 6.]
Bartholomew objects to Mr. Jordan’s Motion in Limine and argues that the previous charge
of race discrimination against his former employer, which settled in 2009, is relevant since the
claims are similar to this case. [Filing No. 62 at 1.] Bartholomew argues that Mr. Jordan began
having disciplinary problems at work in 2013, and thus began making assertions of race
discrimination in 2013. [Filing No. 62 at 2.] In one instance, Bartholomew claims that Mr. Jordan
was heard saying that he could not be fired because he was the “black quota,” and that he was
aware of issues relating to discrimination. [Filing No. 62 at 2.] Bartholomew further asserts that
this would be relevant to show that Mr. Jordan knew how to create a documented trail based on
his past experience with discrimination cases and that he has knowledge of the procedures. [Filing
No. 62 at 2.] Bartholomew also argues that it is relevant to show whether he was creating a record
for another lawsuit in case his employment was terminated. [Filing No. 62 at 3.]
Evidence of prior acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith, but it may be admissible for other purposes, including but not
limited to proof of intent, preparation, plan, or knowledge. Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp.,
137 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Ev. 404(b)). The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals provides a four-part test that, if met, allows evidence of prior acts to be admitted: 1) the
evidence must be directed toward establishing something at issue other than a party’s propensity
to commit the act charged; 2) the other act must be similar enough and close enough in time to be
relevant to the matter at issue; 3) the evidence must be such that the jury could find the act occurred
and the party in question committed it; and 4) the prejudicial effect of the evidence must not

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substantially outweigh its probative value. Mathis v. Phillips Chevrolet, Inc., 269 F.3d 771, 77576 (7th Cir. 2001); Gastineau, 137 F.3d at 494-495.
The Court acknowledges that the first three factors are met. First, Bartholomew claims the
evidence would show that because Mr. Jordan feared losing his job, he started making a record for
a race discrimination or hostile work environment lawsuit, and that he had knowledge of the
procedures based on his past experience. Second, Mr. Jordan’s previous lawsuit against his former
employer is similar because, like the current case, it involved a race discrimination claim against
another employer, and since it settled in 2009, it is arguably close enough in time. 2 As to the third
factor, the jury could conclude that because the case settled, Mr. Jordan’s previous lawsuit had
some merit and was not frivolous.
The Court finds, however, that the prejudicial effect of evidence related to Mr. Jordan’s
previous lawsuit may, depending on the context in which it is admitted, outweigh its probative
value. As a general matter, a plaintiff’s litigiousness may have some slight probative value, but
that value is outweighed by the substantial danger of jury bias against the chronic litigant. Nelson
v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 2016); Mathis, 269 F.3d at 776. There are rare
exceptions when the evidence is admitted for reasons other than to show the plaintiff’s litigious
character and it is sufficiently probative to survive Fed. R. Ev. 403 balancing. Nelson, 810 F.3d
at 1071. Given Bartholomew’s reasons, such rare exceptions may not exist here. Seventh Circuit
precedent has shown that the introduction of this evidence depends on the factual context of the
case and the manner in which it is introduced. The parties disagreed at the final pre-trial conference
as to the relative timing of Mr. Jordan’s complaints of racial harassment and any discipline he may

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Details regarding Mr. Jordan’s lawsuit against his former employer are not available since the
settlement agreement contains a non-disclosure provision, and Bartholomew did not seek a Court
order to gain access to the settlement agreement.
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have incurred. For Bartholomew’s theory of admissibility to succeed, the discipline must have
proceeded the complaints. Given the uncertainty, there is some risk of presenting Mr. Jordan as a
litigious plaintiff, and of distracting the jury from the merits of the case. See id. (Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the district court’s decision where the defendants’ “repeated references to
[plaintiff’s] other lawsuits during closing argument were clearly intended to undermine
[plaintiff’s] credibility and stir juror bias against him as a chronic litigant”); Mathis, 269 F.3d at
776-777 (“[T]he district court was faced with an offer of evidence that had some permissible uses
but that could also have given rise to the impermissible inference that, because [plaintiff] was
given to filing frivolous lawsuits, the jury should not credit his claims in this suit. When ‘the same
evidence has legitimate and forbidden uses, when the introduction is valuable yet dangerous,’ the
district court has great discretion in determining whether to admit the evidence.”) (citation
omitted). If evidence establishes that the discipline preceded the complaints, the balance may well
shift.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Mr. Jordan’s Motion in Limine.

If at any time

Bartholomew believes the evidence as admitted warrants relief from this order, it may seek relief
from this order outside the presence of the jury.

March 7, 2016
Date: _____________

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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Distribution:
Raymond J. Hafsten, Jr.
[e-mail]
Natalie R. Dickey
EMPLOYMENT LAW OFFICE OF JOHN H. HASKIN & ASSOCIATES, LLC
[e-mail]
Ryan C. Fox
FOX WILLIAMS & SINK LLC
[e-mail]
Jonathan Paul Nagy
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]
Laura Ann Turner
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]
Bradley L. Wilson
JOHN H. HASKIN & ASSOCIATES
[e-mail]
John H. Haskin
JOHN H. HASKIN & ASSOCIATES
[e-mail]
Meghan Uzzi Lehner
JOHN H. HASKIN & ASSOCIATES
[e-mail]
David A. Arthur
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]

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