COLEMAN v. SUPT. LANGHAMMER

Filing 13

ENTRY Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus: "The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbit rary action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceedings. Accordingly, Coleman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed (see Entry for additional information). Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Copy to Petitioner via US Mail. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 5/13/2015.(SWM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JERMAINE COLEMAN

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Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT, Plainfield
Correctional Facility,
Respondent.

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
The petition of Jermaine Coleman for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison
disciplinary proceeding identified as No. XAF 13-11-0037. For the reasons explained in this Entry,
Coleman’s habeas petition must be denied.
Discussion
A. Standard
Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process. The due process requirement
is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited opportunity to
present evidence to an impartial decision maker, a written statement articulating the reasons for
the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record” to support
the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974).

B. The Disciplinary Hearing
On November 26, 2013, Program Specialist Inabnitt wrote a Report of Conduct in case
XAF 13-11-0037 charging Coleman with termination of work. The Report of Conduct states:
On 11/25/13 I Program Specialist Inabnitt spoke with Aurora from Forge Staffing
who advised that Resident Coleman was terminated due to lack of Job Performance.
On November 27, 2013, Coleman was notified of the charge of termination of work and served
with the Report of Conduct and the Notice of Disciplinary Hearing (“Screening Report”). Coleman
was notified of his rights, pled not guilty and requested the appointment of a lay advocate. He
requested a witness, Alex at Forge Staffing, but did not request any physical evidence.
The hearing officer conducted a disciplinary hearing in XAF 13-11-0037 on December 2,
2013, and found Coleman guilty of the charge of termination of work. In making this
determination, the hearing officer considered staff reports. The hearing officer recommended and
approved the following sanctions: 30 day loss of work related privileges, and a 30 day deprivation
of earned credit time. Coleman appealed to the Facility Head, and the Facility Head denied his
appeal on December 12, 2014. Coleman’s appeal to the Appeal Review Officer was denied on
November 29, 2013.
C. Analysis
In support of his claim for habeas relief, Coleman alleges the following grounds: 1) that
the evidence was insufficient to support his disciplinary charge; and 2) that the hearing officer was
not impartial.
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Coleman argues that he was never in violation of his work release assignment and that he
presented documented evidence of his innocence. These arguments amount to a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence against him.

With regard to Coleman’s allegation of insufficient evidence, due process requires only
that the Hearing Officer’s decision be supported by “some evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 570-71; Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003). “[T]he
relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. A conduct report alone may provide
“some evidence” of guilt, notwithstanding its brevity or the presence of conflicting evidence.
McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). Although the evidence before the
hearing officer must “point to the accused’s guilt,” Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir.
1989), the standard of ‘some’ evidence “does not require evidence that logically precludes any
conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. The determination
should be upheld if “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached.”
Id. Even “meager” proof will suffice so long as “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the
findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Id. This is a
“lenient” standard, requiring no more than “a modicum of evidence.” Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d
649.
Here, the Report of Conduct states that Coleman was terminated from his employment for
lack of job performance. On November 25, 2013, Program Specialist Inabnitt spoke with Forge
Staffing who reported that Coleman had been terminated from his specific employer due to lack
of job performance. This is some evidence to support the guilty finding. To the extent that Coleman
submits letters by Forge Staffing stating that he continued to be in good standing with Forge
Staffing, he is requesting that this Court reweigh the evidence and believe his account of events,
something the Court cannot do. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. Accordingly, Coleman has failed to show
that the evidence was insufficient to support his disciplinary conviction.

2. Impartial Decision-Maker
Coleman also argues that he was denied an impartial decision-maker because the hearing
officer had made up its mind before the hearing. It is true that due process requires an impartial
decision-maker. See Wolff 418 U.S. at 570-71. However, due process requires recusal only where
the decision-maker has a direct or otherwise substantial involvement in the circumstances
underlying the charges against the offender. Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1113 (7th Cir.
1983). There is no evidence that the decision-maker was involved in the facts surrounding the
charges against Coleman or in the investigation of those charges. Coleman therefore has not shown
that he was denied an impartial decision-maker.
D. Conclusion
“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge,
disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there
was no constitutional infirmity in the proceedings. Accordingly, Coleman’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall
now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 5/13/15

_______________________________

Distribution:

Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Jermaine Coleman
DOC # 996196
Plainfield Correctional Facility
727 Moon Road
Plainfield, IN 46168
All electronically registered counsel