JOHNSON v. GEO GROUP et al

Filing 6

ENTRY Discussing Complaint and Directing Further Proceedings: Plaintiff Richard Keith Johnson is an inmate currently confined at the New Castle Correctional Facility. He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment. He names the following defendants: J. Randall, Unit Team Manager; Keith Butts, Superintendent; and the GEO Group. In summary, Count I against GEO Group regarding inadequate heat and excessive time between meals may proceed. Defendants J. Randall and Keith Bu tts are dismissed. The clerk is designated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c) (3) to issue process to the defendant in the manner specified by Rule 4(d)(1). Process shall consist of the compl aint, applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Entry (see Entry for additional information). Copy to Plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 6/23/2014.(SWM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
RICHARD KEITH JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
GEO GROUP, K. BUTTS,
J. RANDALL,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 1:14-cv-838-JMS-DML

Entry Discussing Complaint and Directing Further Proceedings
I.
Plaintiff Richard Keith Johnson is an inmate currently confined at the New Castle
Correctional Facility. He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of
the Eighth Amendment. He names the following defendants: J. Randall, Unit Team Manager;
Keith Butts, Superintendent; and the GEO Group. He is seeking injunctive relief.
Because Johnson is a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), the Court must
screen his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Pursuant to this statute, “[a]
complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show
that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 921 (2007). A complaint
falls within this category if it “alleg[es] facts that show there is no viable claim.” Pugh v. Tribune
Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008). To survive dismissal under federal pleadings standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints such as that filed by Johnson are
construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, “[p]ro se litigants are
masters of their own complaints and may choose who to sue-or not to sue,” Myles v. United
States, 416 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005), and the court may not rewrite a complaint to include
claims that were not presented. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A
complaint is sufficient only to the extent that it “‘contain[s] either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal
theory.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). “Factual allegations [in a complaint]
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 1965. That is, there
must be “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974.
II.
Johnson’s complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A cause of action is
provided by § 1983 against “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; instead, it is a means for
vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)
(citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). The initial step in any § 1983 analysis
is to identify the specific constitutional right which was allegedly violated. Id. at 394; Kernats v.
O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481,

489-90 (7th Cir. 1997). In this case, the complaint alleges that the conditions of confinement
amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against the imposition of cruel
and unusual punishment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993) (“It is undisputed that the
treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject
to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”). The Constitution does not mandate comfortable
prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). The
Court will address each of Johnson’s claims in turn.
First, Johnson names the GEO Group as a defendant and in Count I alleging that it is the
company’s policy or practice to provide inadequate heat to the cells such that ice forms on the
interior of the cell window and that he is forced to wait approximately fourteen (14) hours
between meals. The GEO Group is a private corporation and is named because it runs the New
Castle Correctional Facility. Because he is claiming these conditions exist based on the policy or
practice of GEO Group, his complaint as to it may proceed.
Next, Johnson names J. Randall and Keith Butts as defendants. He claims in Count I that
he wrote to Superintendent Butts about the erratic temperatures in the prison and that J. Randall
responded to his letter. He seeks injunctive relief in the form of fixing the heat and cooling
system in the range. Thus, it appears that these defendants were named because they responded
to a letter about the allegedly erratic temperatures on the range where Johnson is housed.
However, a letter is not sufficient to bring them into the zone of liability. If an official, who is
not otherwise responsible for allegedly unconstitutional conditions or actions, could be held
liable upon being notified by the plaintiff, then a plaintiff could choose to bring any and all
officials within the scope of liability simply by writing a series of letters. To allow liability to be
based upon “such a broad theory. . . [would be] inconsistent with the personal responsibility

requirement for assessing damages against public officials in a § 1983 action.” Crowder v. Lash,
687 F.2d 996, 1006 (7th Cir. 1982). Defendants J. Randall and Keith Butts are dismissed.
Finally, in Counts II and III, Johnson complains about his placement in the mental health
unit. There is no feature of Johnson’s allegations describing his confinement in the mental health
unit which suggests treatment or conditions of confinement of sufficient severity as to have
results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities or an Eighth
Amendment violation. “The conditions of imprisonment, whether of pretrial detainees or of
convicted criminals, do not reach even the threshold of constitutional concern until a showing is
make of ‘genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time.’” Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 542 (1979). Moreover, an inmate has no due process right to be placed in general
population. Lucien v. DeTella, 141 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Classifications of inmates
implicate neither liberty nor property interests . . . .”) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
484 ( 1995)). The claims in Counts II and III are dismissed without prejudice.
Alternatively, to the extent Johnson is asserting a claim pursuant to the American with
Disability Act (ADA) there is not sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. Further, if Johnson
intended to assert an ADA claim it is misjoined. Johnson’s different claims about the heat and
food and being placed in the mental health unit violate the joinder of claims limitation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in
different suits . . . .” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
III.
In summary, Count I against GEO Group regarding inadequate heat and excessive time
between meals may proceed. Defendants J. Randall and Keith Butts are dismissed. Counts II and
III are dismissed without prejudice, and to the extent Johnson intended to assert an ADA claim,

he is must do so through a separate action. The clerk is instructed to include a prisoner civil
rights complaint form along with plaintiff’s copy of this action.
IV.
The clerk is designated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3) to issue
process to the defendant in the manner specified by Rule 4(d)(1). Process shall consist of the
complaint, applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons
and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Entry.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

06/23/2014
Date:__________________

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Richard Keith Johnson, #926081
New Castle Correctional Facility
Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
New Castle, Indiana 47362

GEO Group
New Castle Correctional Facility
P.O. Box A
New Castle, Indiana 47362

NOTE TO CLERK: PROCESSING THIS DOCUMENT REQUIRES ACTIONS IN ADDITION TO DOCKETING AND DISTRIBUTION.