STURM v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS et al

Filing 64

ORDER denying 45 Motion for Leave to File second amended complaint. Existing claims may be dismissed by stipulation. Parties have until 10/19/2015, to file dispositive motions. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tim A. Baker on 9/21/2015. (CBU)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JOHN STURM,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS,
OFFICER CATHERINE HEDGES in her
individual and official capacities, and
OFFICER GREGORY STEWART in his
individual and official capacities,
Defendants.

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No. 1:14-cv-00848-RLY-TAB

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff John Strum seeks to file a second amended complaint. Defendants object,
arguing they would be subject to undue prejudice if the motion were granted and that Plaintiff
should not be allowed to amend his complaint after the expired deadline. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion. [Filing No. 45.]
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that when a party can no longer amend
its pleadings as a matter of course, a party may amend with the opposing party’s written consent
or the court’s leave. Leave to amend is not automatic and courts “have broad discretion to deny
leave to amend where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or where the amendment would be futile.”
Standard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2011). Although a court may deny a motion for
leave to amend a complaint, doing so is disfavored. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 562

(7th Cir. 2010). The “court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2).
However, a plaintiff faces additional hurdles when seeking to amend the complaint after
the scheduling order deadline has passed. A plaintiff must show good cause to modify a
scheduling order deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). A plaintiff must also show excusable
neglect for failing to comply with the deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B); Brosted v. Unum Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 421 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 2005). A court may refuse to grant relief from a
lapsed deadline absent a showing of good cause and excusable neglect. Brosted, 421 F.3d at
464; see also Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 734 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding denial
of a plaintiff’s second motion for leave to amend that was filed six months after the deadline). 1
Plaintiff filed his proposed second amended complaint more than nine months after the
agreed upon and Court-ordered deadline. The proposed complaint includes a revised factual
background, adds a new defendant to the battery claim against Defendant Gregory Stewart, and
adds a Monell claim against the city of Indianapolis. While there are no other pending motions
in this case and it has not been set for trial, Defendants were granted an extension of the
dispositive motion deadline pending resolution of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. [Filing
No. 56.]
Plaintiff argues there is good cause for another amendment to his complaint even though
the scheduling order deadline has passed. Plaintiff justifies these late changes by asserting they
are a result of information gained during depositions taken in June 2015. But Defendants

Plaintiff does not argue excusable neglect exists, and Defendants do not press the issue.
Instead, the parties focus only on whether good cause exists for the proposed amendment.
Because Plaintiff cannot even satisfy the good cause standard, the Court need not consider the
issue of excusable neglect.
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undermine this assertion by showing that Plaintiff had this information well before the
depositions. Defendants’ initial disclosures to Plaintiff on September 5, 2014, included several
references to Officer Hatch’s removal of taser probes [Filing No. 58-2, at ECF p. 5, 8, 11, 14] as
well as a six-page policy order from the police department discussing the use of tasers. [Filing
No. 58-2, at ECF p. 16-21.] The timing and content of this information compels a critical
conclusion: when Plaintiff first amended his complaint on November 4, 2014, he had enough
information to assert a battery claim against Officer Hatch for removing the taser probes along
with a Monell claim against the city of Indianapolis concerning its taser policy. Yet
inexplicably, Plaintiff failed to do so, and then failed to request a second amendment before the
expiration of the deadline. Moreover, adding the new legal theories would prejudice Defendants.
These claims would undoubtedly generate more discovery and thus further delay the deadline for
dispositive motions, which has been stayed pending resolution of Plaintiff’s motion to amend.
For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint. [Filing No. 45.] Existing claims may be dismissed by stipulation. Parties have until
October 19, 2015, to file dispositive motions. [Filing No. 56.]
Date: 9/21/2015
___________________________
Tim A. Baker
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

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Distribution:
Scott Leroy Barnhart
ATTORNEY AT LAW
[e-mail]
Brooke Smith
KEFFER BARNHART LLP
[e-mail]
Tom Franklin Hirschauer
KEFFER BARNHART LLP
[e-mail]
Pamela G. Schneeman
OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL
[e-mail]
Amanda J. Dinges
OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL
[e-mail]
Andrew R. Duncan
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS & HASBROOK
[e-mail]
Edward J. Merchant
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS & HASBROOK
[e-mail]
John F. Kautzman
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS & HASBROOK
[e-mail]

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