LEWIS v. COLVIN
Filing
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ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW. The ALJ in this case satisfied his obligation to articulate reasons for his decision, and the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The decision of the Commissioner is therefore AFFIRMED. SEE ORDER. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 6/17/2015. (BGT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
TIMMY A. LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
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) Cause No. 1:14-cv-965-WTL-DML
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ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Plaintiff Timmy A. Lewis requests judicial review of the final decision of Defendant,
Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”),
denying Mr. Lewis’ application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act (“the Act”). The Court, having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties,
now rules as follows.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Lewis protectively filed for SSI on August 10, 2009, alleging he became disabled on
February 1, 2001. Mr. Lewis’ application was denied initially on November 17, 2009, and again
upon reconsideration on January 11, 2010. Following the denial upon reconsideration, Mr.
Lewis requested and received a hearing in front of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A
hearing, during which Mr. Lewis was represented by counsel, was held before ALJ Stephen E.
Davis on June 9, 2011. The ALJ issued his decision denying Mr. Lewis’ claim on July 11, 2011.
Mr. Lewis requested review by the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council remanded the
decision on May 15, 2012. 1
A second hearing was thus held before ALJ Ronald T. Jordan on October 4, 2012. ALJ
Jordan issued his decision denying Mr. Lewis’ claim on February 20, 2013, and the Appeals
Council denied his request for review on May 12, 2014. After the Appeals Council denied
review of the ALJ’s decision, Mr. Lewis filed this timely appeal.
II.
APPLICABLE STANDARD
Disability is defined as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of a medically determinable mental or physical impairment which can be expected to
result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least
twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In order to be found disabled, a claimant must
demonstrate that his physical or mental limitations prevent him from doing not only his previous
work, but any other kind of gainful employment which exists in the national economy,
considering his age, education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner employs a five-step
sequential analysis. At step one, if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity he is
not disabled, despite his medical condition and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). At
step two, if the claimant does not have a “severe” impairment (i.e., one that significantly limits
his ability to perform basic work activities), he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At
step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments meets or medically equals any impairment that appears in the Listing of
1
The Appeals Council found that ALJ Davis failed to accurately evaluate Mr. Lewis’
mental impairments. See R. at 21, 39.
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Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, and whether the impairment meets the twelvemonth duration requirement; if so, the claimant is deemed disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(iii). At step four, if the claimant is able to perform his past relevant work, he is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five, if the claimant can perform any other
work in the national economy, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s findings of fact are conclusive and must be
upheld by this court “so long as substantial evidence supports them and no error of law
occurred.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,” id., and this court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that
of the ALJ. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 1997). The ALJ is required to
articulate only a minimal, but legitimate, justification for his acceptance or rejection of specific
evidence of disability. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2004). In order to be
affirmed, the ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence in her decision; while he “is not
required to address every piece of evidence or testimony,” he must “provide some glimpse into
[his] reasoning . . . [and] build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [his]
conclusion.” Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176.
III.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ determined at step one that Mr. Lewis had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since August 10, 2009, the application date. At steps two and three, the ALJ concluded
that Mr. Lewis had the severe impairments of “a Bipolar Disorder, Depression, an Antisocial
Personality Disorder, and a Substance Abuse Disorder,” R. at 24, but that his impairments, singly
or in combination, did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. At step four, the ALJ
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determined that Mr. Lewis had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform “a full range
of work at all exertional levels,” but that Mr. Lewis was
limited to the performance of simple, repetitive tasks that do not require
independent judgment regarding primary work processes. Work goals from day to
day should be static and predicable. He should have no contact with the general
public necessary to perform the functions of the job and only occasional, superficial
contact with coworkers.
Id. at 27. At step five, the ALJ noted that Mr. Lewis had no past relevant work; however, given
Mr. Lewis’ RFC, and considering Mr. Lewis’ age, education, and work experience, the ALJ
determined that Mr. Lewis could perform a range of work that exists in the national economy,
including work as a packer, laundry bundler, and packing line worker. Accordingly, the ALJ
concluded that Mr. Lewis was not disabled as defined by the Act.
IV.
EVIDENCE OF RECORD
The medical evidence of record is aptly set forth in Mr. Lewis’ brief (Dkt. No. 18) and
need not be recited here. Specific facts are set forth in the discussion section below where
relevant.
V.
DISCUSSION
In his brief in support of his Complaint, Mr. Lewis only argues that the ALJ did not
conduct a proper credibility analysis. In determining credibility, an ALJ must consider several
factors, including the claimant’s daily activities, level of pain or symptoms, aggravating factors,
medication, treatment, and limitations, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); S.S.R. 96–7p, and justify his
finding with specific reasons. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009).
“Furthermore, the ALJ may not discredit a claimant’s testimony about his pain and limitations
solely because there is no objective medical evidence supporting it.” Id. (citations omitted). Of
course, district courts “afford a credibility finding ‘considerable deference,’ and overturn [a
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finding] only if ‘patently wrong.’” Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Carradine v. Barnhart, 36 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2004)).
Mr. Lewis testified, in relevant part, that he: 1) could not be reliable to show up at a job
on time every day, R. at 58; 2) gets aggravated when given instructions from superiors, id.; 3)
has difficulties remembering what to do while on the job, id. at 59; and 4) has never been able to
sustain a full time job, id. The ALJ noted that Mr. Lewis “stated that [his] conditions cause him
to become irritable and fatigued. In addition, the claimant reported that he has difficulty
concentrating and getting along with others.” Id. at 28.
Mr. Lewis first argues that “[w]hile the ALJ clearly acknowledges he is supposed to
make a finding on Mr. Lewis’s credibility, he never actually makes that finding.” Pl.’s Br. at 8.
Mr. Lewis is correct that the ALJ did not explicitly state whether he found Mr. Lewis’ testimony
to be credible, not credible, or partially credible. However, the Court disagrees that this requires
remand. See R.J. ex rel. Taylor v. Colvin, No. 1:11-cv-01001-SEB, 2014 WL 1328166, at *5
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2014) (“Remanding this case in order for the ALJ to include a ‘rote
conclusory’ sentence expressly stating the obvious would be a waste of time and resources.”);
Melton v. Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-01712-SEB, 2015 WL 1279966, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2015)
(“The absence of a credibility template statement does not persuade us that there is a sound basis
to remand the ALJ’s decision.”). It is clear that the ALJ did not find Mr. Lewis to be fully
credible, as he concluded that Mr. Lewis could sustain full-time employment. That said,
however, many of Mr. Lewis’ above complaints were accounted for in the ALJ’s RFC
assessment. See, e.g. R. at 27 (noting that Mr. Lewis should only have occasional and superficial
contact with others and is limited to simple and repetitive tasks).
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Mr. Lewis also notes that an ALJ must provide “specific reasons” for a credibility
determination. Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “the
ALJ must specify the reasons for his [credibility] finding”); see also Brindisi ex rel. Brindisi v.
Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “conclusory” credibility
determinations are prohibited). In this vein, he argues that the ALJ did not provide specific
reasons for his credibility determination and erred in failing to discuss the factors listed in Social
Security Ruling 96-7p. The Court disagrees and finds that the ALJ provided sufficient evidence
to support his decision; moreover, the ALJ discussed all of the following:
·
Location, duration, frequency, and intensity of symptoms: The ALJ noted that Mr.
Lewis experienced irritability, fatigue, difficulties with concentration, and difficulties
getting along with others, especially supervisors. R. at 28-29.
·
Factors that precipitate and aggravate symptoms: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lewis had
been homeless for a period of time, that he had been in and out of prison, and that he
had a history of substance abuse. Id.
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Type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication: The ALJ noted that Mr.
Lewis was prescribed Seroquel, which has helped him sleep and decreased his
irritability and agitation. Id.
·
Treatment other than medication: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lewis completed both
anger management and substance abuse treatment. He also attended mental health
therapy at Midtown Mental Health. Id. at 28.
·
Other factors: The ALJ credited Dr. Olive and the State Agency doctor’s assessment
regarding Mr. Lewis’ ability to work. Id. at 30.
In all, the Court is satisfied with the ALJ’s credibility determination. 2
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Mr. Lewis also argues that the ALJ “failed to mention, let alone properly discuss,
treatment records from Dr. Smith, Dr. Dalsing, Wishard Memorial Hospital, Midtown Mental
Health, Putnamville Correctional Facility, and the Marion County Jail (see Exhibits 1F, 2F, 5F,
14F-17F).” Pl.’s Br. at 10. He has, however, failed to explain the relevancy of these records or
how they may have affected the ALJ’s credibility or disability determinations.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
As set forth above, the ALJ in this case satisfied his obligation to articulate reasons for
his decision, and the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The decision of
the Commissioner is therefore AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED: 6/17/15
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Copies to all counsel of record via electronic communication
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