COFFMAN v. KNIGHT et al

Filing 16

Entry Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and even if there was, any such error was harmless. Accordingly, Mr. Coffman' petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Copy to Petitioner via U.S. Mail. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 7/5/2016.(JLS) Modified on 7/5/2016 (JLS).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
PAUL COFFMAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
WENDY KNIGHT,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 1:14-cv-01161-TWP-DML

Entry Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
This matter is before the Court on the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by
Petitioner Paul Coffman, challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. CIC 1311-0105. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr. Coffman’s habeas petition must be denied.
A.

Overview

Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process. The due process requirement
is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited opportunity to
present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the reasons for
the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record” to support
the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003);
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).

B.

The Disciplinary Proceeding

On September 25, 2013, a Conduct Report was issued charging Mr. Coffman with a Code
No. 100 violation for alleged possession of methamphetamine. The conduct report states:
On September 25, 2013 a shakedown was performed on cell 20-2D by Officer J.
Pardue and Investigator Mavis Grady, during the shakedown one cell phone, one
cell phone charger, less than a gram of Crystal Methamphetamine, half a strip of
Suboxone was discovered in two jars of coffee. Also during the shakedown less
than an OZ of Marijuana and a tattoo motor were discovered. When questioned
Offender Coffman, Paul 206250 admitted the items found in the coffee and the
Marijuana were his. On October 1, 2013 Offender Coffman was interviewed he
again stated all items found during the shakedown of cell 20-2D belonged to him.
Offender Coffman is in clear violation of I.C. 35-48-4-6.1 Possession of
Methamphetamine.
Filing No. 7-1 at 1.
On November 9, 2013, Mr. Coffman was notified of the charge when he received the
Notice of Disciplinary Hearing (Screening Report). He was charged with a Code 100 violation,
which is the charge for a violation of federal, state, or local law—specifically, Indiana Code 3548-4-6.1, Possession of Methamphetamine. Mr. Coffman plead not guilty to the charge. He
requested the items confiscated from his cell as physical evidence for the hearing.
A hearing officer conducted a disciplinary hearing on November 20, 2013. Mr. Coffman
said that he did not feel his charge should be a Code 100 violation, that the times given in the
evidence were incorrect, and that he feels as though all of the offenses are being charged as “one
big thing,” when they should not be. Based on the Conduct Report, IA Investigation Report, and
Mr. Coffman’s statement, the hearing officer found Mr. Coffman guilty. The hearing officer’s
recommended and approved sanctions included a 120 deprivation of earned time credit and a
demotion of credit class.
Mr. Coffman administratively appealed his conviction. Although his initial appeal was
denied, he appealed that decision to the IDOC central office. See Filing No. 7-4. He argued that

he was told the Code 100 violation charge stemmed from the possession of methamphetamine, but
that the confiscated substance was not methamphetamine. He did, however, admit that he
possessed the suboxone and marijuana. He asked that his Code 100 violation charge be reversed
and he instead be charged with a class B violation.
Mr. Coffman’s appeal was granted in part. His disciplinary conviction was modified from
a Code 100 violation conviction to a Code B202 violation, “Use or Possession of a Controlled
Substance,” and his earned time credit deprivation was reduced to ninety days. The parties agree
that Mr. Coffman fully exhausted his available administrative remedies.
C.

Analysis

Mr. Coffman contends that his due process rights were violated during his disciplinary
hearing in three ways, the first two of which overlap: (1) the hearing officer had no physical
evidence demonstrating that the substance at issue was methamphetamine rather than, as Mr.
Coffman now claims, laundry soap; (2) he was denied his right to present documentary evidence
because when he requested the result of any tests done on the confiscated substances, he was told
that there were no tests performed; and (3) in violation of Indiana Department of Correction
(“IDOC”) policy, Mr. Coffman was not presented with a written statement describing the
photographs of the confiscated substances that were withheld from him due to security concerns.
The Court ordered additional briefing on the first two issues and permitted the Respondent
to supplement the record. The Respondent filed a supplemental brief and additional evidence, and
Mr. Coffman elected not to file a reply brief. The habeas petition is now ripe for a decision.
Mr. Coffman’s first two claims relate to his contention that his due process rights were
violated because there was no physical evidence or lab reports showing that the substance in
question was in fact methamphetamine, and, when he requested them, he was told there were none.

The Court need not determine whether these two claims establish due process violations because,
even if they do, any such error is harmless.
Mr. Coffman’s disciplinary conviction was changed from a Code 100 violation conviction
for violating Indiana Code § 35-48-4-6.1, “Possession of methamphetamine,” to a Code B202
violation, “Use or Possession of a Controlled Substance,” on appeal. Thus the conviction
challenged in this habeas petition is not a Code 100 vi9olation conviction, but a Code B202
violation conviction. Nevertheless, Mr. Coffman’s first two claims focus on whether there was
sufficient evidence that Mr. Coffman possessed methamphetamine. Given the change in the
conviction, whether there is sufficient evidence that he possessed methamphetamine is irrelevant.
Mr. Coffman admitted to possessing marijuana and suboxone both to the correctional officers and
in his administrative appeal. See Filing No. 7-1 at 1; Filing No. 7-4 at 1. Such an admission is
sufficient to convict Mr. Coffman of Code B202 violation for possession of a controlled substance,
which is the only conviction left to challenge. See Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir.
2007).

Therefore, even if there was error with respect to the identification of the

methamphetamine, any such error is harmless. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 846-47 (7th Cir.
2011) (holding that absent prejudice, due process violation in the prison disciplinary context are
harmless).
Mr. Coffman’s third and final contention is that it was improper for him to not be given a
written description of the photographs of the confiscated items since security concerns prevented
him from having the photographs themselves. Mr. Coffman discusses this purported violation
primarily as a violation of IDOC policy, rather than a violation of his due process rights. However,
relief pursuant to § 2254 is available only on the ground that a prisoner “is being held in violation
of federal law or the U.S. Constitution.” Caffey v. Butler, 802 F.3d 884, 894 (7th Cir. 2015). Prison

policies, regulations, or guidelines do not constitute federal law; instead, they are “primarily
designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison . . . not . . . to confer rights
on inmates.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995). Therefore, claims based on prison
policy, such as the one at issue here, are not cognizable and do not form a basis for habeas relief.
See Keller v. Donahue, 271 Fed. Appx. 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting challenges to a prison
disciplinary proceeding because, “[i]nstead of addressing any potential constitutional defect, all of
[the petitioner’s] arguments relate to alleged departures from procedures outlined in the prison
handbook that have no bearing on his right to due process”); Rivera v. Davis, 50 Fed. Appx. 779,
780 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A prison’s noncompliance with its internal regulations has no constitutional
import—and nothing less warrants habeas corpus review.”); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.
62, 68 at n.2 (1991) (“[S]tate-law violations provide no basis for federal habeas review.”).
Even if construed as a due process claim, however, this claim lacks merit. First, there is
no evidence that Mr. Coffman made a request the photographs of the items or a written description
of them, and thus it was not a violation of his due process rights to withhold them. See Sweeney
v. Parke, 113 F.3d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the petitioner’s due process right to
present documentary evidence was not violated when he was not given the chance to present a
logbook because he “had the chance to request access to the logbook, and it appears from the
record that he failed to make such a request”), overruled on other grounds by White v. Ind. Parole
Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir. 2001).
Second, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to Mr. Coffman’s first two
claims, any error is harmless. Mr. Coffman does not dispute that he admitted to possessing
marijuana and suboxone. This is sufficient to convict him of a Code B202 violation for possession

of a controlled substance, and thus any error with respect to the photographs or written descriptions
thereof is harmless. See Jones, 637 F.3d at 846-47.
All of Mr. Coffman’s claims focus on whether or not he possessed methamphetamine. But
his conviction was altered during the administrative process such that it does not depend on his
possession of methamphetamine; instead, it only requires that he possessed any controlled
substance, which he admits he did. Accordingly, Mr. Coffman is not entitled to habeas relief.
D.

Conclusion

“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge,
disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and even if
there was, any such error was harmless. Accordingly, Mr. Coffman’ petition for a writ of habeas
corpus must be denied and the action dismissed.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/5/2016

Distribution:
Paul Coffman, No. 206250
Pendleton-Correctional Industrial Facility
5124 West Reformatory Road
Pendleton, IN 46064
Kristin Garn
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]
Kyle Hunter
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]