POLYMER TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS, INC. v. JANT PHARMACAL CORPORATION et al
Filing
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ORDER granting Defendants' 22 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Venue and GRANTS Defendants' alternative Motion to Transfer to the Central District of California. The Clerk is ORDERED to transfer this action to the Central District of California. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 4/3/2015. (TMD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
POLYMER TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS,
INC.,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
JANT PHARMACAL CORPORATION,
et al.
Defendants.
1:14-cv-01317-RLY-DKL
UNDER SEAL
ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Plaintiff, Polymer Technology Systems, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or PTS”), produces a
hand-held, point-of-care testing system that can test for total cholesterol, high-density
lipoproteins (HDL), and triglycerides with a single drop of blood. This product, branded
CardioChek®, is Plaintiff’s flagship product. The test strip used in CardioChek® is
protected by United States Patent No. 7,087,397, of which Plaintiff is the assignee.
Defendants, Jant Pharmacal Corporation, Infopia American LLC, and Infopia Co., Ltd.
(“Infopia Korea”) (collectively, “Defendants”), sell similar testing products in the United
States under the trade name “LipidPlus®” (the “Accused Products”). Plaintiff alleges the
Accused Products infringe its patent and infringe its trade dress in violation of the
Lanham Act. Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction because they are not residents of Indiana, they have never sold the Accused
Products in Indiana, and they have not purposefully directed their business activities to
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consumers of Indiana. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Venue is GRANTED, and Defendants’ alternative
Motion to Transfer to the Central District of California is GRANTED.
I.
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a court is required to dismiss
an action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court’s analysis with respect to Count I
for patent infringement is governed by Federal Circuit law because the jurisdictional
issue is “intimately involved with the substance of the patent laws.” Autogenomics, Inc.
v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). However, Count II for trade dress infringement is not
intimately related to patent law; therefore, the court applies the law of the regional circuit,
here the Seventh Circuit. Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1201
(Fed. Cir. 2003). As applied, these standards are largely the same. Compare Purdue
Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 780-83 (7th Cir. 2003), with
Silent Drive, Inc., 326 F.3d, 1201-02.
A plaintiff=s complaint need not include facts alleging personal jurisdiction. Steel
Warehouse of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Leach, 154 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing
Turnock v. Cope, 816 F.2d 332, 333 (7th Cir. 1987)). However, once a defendant raises
lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that
jurisdiction is proper. Purdue, 338 F.3d at 782 (citations omitted). The precise nature of
the plaintiff=s burden depends on whether the court’s ruling is based on an evidentiary
hearing or the submission of written materials. Id.
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In the instant case, the court relies entirely on the submission of written materials.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs “need only make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.”
AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Silent
Drive, 326 F.3d at 1201; Hyatt Int=l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2002). In
evaluating whether the prima facie standard has been satisfied, the court accepts the
uncontroverted allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true and resolves any factual
disputes regarding relevant facts in Plaintiff’s favor. AFTG-TG, 689 F.3d at 1360;
Purdue, 338 F.3d at 782.
II.
Facts
The court accepts the following facts as true for purposes of the present motion.
Plaintiff is an Indiana corporation having its principal place of business in
Indianapolis, Indiana. (Filing No. 1, Complaint ¶ 1). Defendant, Infopia Korea, is a
foreign corporation organized under the laws of Korea having its principal place of
business in Anyang-si, Kyeonggi-do, South Korea; defendant, Infopia America, is a
Florida Limited Liability Company having a principal place of business in Titusville,
Florida; and defendant, Jant Pharmacal, is a California corporation having its principal
place of business in Encino, California. (Id. ¶¶ 2-4).
Plaintiff’s first dealing with Infopia Korea occurred in an October 15, 2009 ceaseand-desist letter, wherein Plaintiff informed Infopia Korea that it had become aware of
Infopia Korea’s brochures advertising products similar to Plaintiff’s, and informed
Infopia Korea that its products may infringe Plaintiff’s ‘397 patent. (Filing No. 27-2,
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Cease-and-Desist Letter). In a letter dated October 20, 2009, Infopia Korea denied
infringement. (Filing No. 27-3, Reply Letter).
In December 2011, Infopia Korea expressed an interest in establishing an original
equipment manufacturer (“OEM”) partnership with PTS for a blood-glucose monitoring
system. (Filing No. 27-38, Email re: interest in OEM; see also Filing No. 35-2, Second
Declaration of Suk Jin Lee (“S.J. Lee Dec.”) ¶ 5 (“All discussions and meeting between
Infopia Korea and PTS concerned the potential supply of Infopia Korea’s glucose
measuring technology to PTS.”)). Accordingly, on January 24, 2012, a representative of
Infopia Korea visited PTS headquarters in Indianapolis to discuss the possibility of a
partnership. (Filing No. 27-7, Email exchange). As part of that meeting, the parties
signed a non-disclosure agreement. (Filing No. 27-14, Non-Disclosure Agreement).
On February 29, 2012, three representatives from Infopia Korea visited Plaintiff’s
headquarters again to discuss collaborating on a “cholesterol & blood glucose 2-in-1
meter” involving “Infopia’s blood-glucose monitoring device mounted on PTS’
cholesterol meter.” (Filing No. 27-8, Email reporting meeting with PTS). During this
visit to the United States, representatives of Infopia Korea also met with Infopia America
at its Florida office. (Filing No. 27-9, Report on U.S. Tour).
By May 2012, Plaintiff agreed to move forward with an OEM partnership to
produce a blood-glucose monitoring system with Infopia Korea and in June, the parties
signed a second non-disclosure agreement. (Filing No. 27-12, Email re: OEM; Filing No.
27-15, Non-Disclosure Agreement). In July 2012, the parties met again at Plaintiff’s
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headquarters in Indianapolis, but for reasons unknown, the partnership stalled soon
thereafter. (Filing No. 27-11, Email re: meetings).
In mid-November 2012, Infopia Korea, Infopia America, and Jant began
discussions regarding the design of a cholesterol test system. (Filing No. 27-19, Email
re: product certifications). In February 2013, Infopia Korea signed an Operating
Agreement with Infopia America, which established Infopia America as the exclusive
importer of Infopia Korea products, including the Accused Products. (Filing No. 27-16,
Amended Operating Agreement; Filing No. 23-1, S.J. Lee Dec. ¶ 21). Infopia America
receives orders for the Accused Products and places them with Infopia Korea, and Infopia
Korea ships the Accused Products directly to Los Angeles, California. (Filing No. 23-2,
Declaration of Sungho Lee (“S. Lee Dec.”) ¶ 21). After clearing customs in Los Angeles,
the Accused Products are forwarded to Jant’s facility in Encino, California. (Id.). Jant
stores the products in its Encino location and ships the Accused Products directly to end
users and distributors directly from Encino. (Filing No. 23-3, Declaration of Samuel
Elkin (“Elkin Dec.”) ¶¶ 19-20).
On February 12, 2014, Jant began to ship free demos and samples of the Accused
Products to distributors in Kansas, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Minnesota, Texas, Alabama, New
York, Florida, North Carolina, California, Mississippi, Missouri, Wisconsin, Louisiana,
Kentucky, and Indiana. (Filing No. 27-25, Jant’s LipidPlus Demos and Samples by
Customer Detail). The shipments to Indiana occurred on July 10 (four demos) and July
25 (two demos) and were sent to sales representatives for STAT Technologies in Fishers,
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Indiana. (Id. at JANT0000045). There is no evidence, however, of an actual sale of an
Accused Product in Indiana. (Elkin Dec. at ¶¶ 21-23).
In addition, in 2014, Defendants advertised the Accused Products in national print
magazines and publications for the medical industry. (Filing No. 27-26, American
Pharmacists Association “Showcase” feature, April 2014); Filing No. 27-27, Physician’s
Office Resource (May 2014); Filing No. 27-28, Physician’s Office Resource (June 2014);
Filing No. 27-29, Medical Laboratory Observer, “New Products” section (May 2014);
Filing No. 27-30, Repertoire Magazine, “Products” section (June 2014); Filing No. 2731, Drug Topics, “New Products for Pharmacists” (June 2014); Filing No. 27-32, The
Diabetes EDUCATOR, “Industry Update” (November/December 2014)).
On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed the present action in the Southern District of
Indiana.
III.
Discussion
Under the Federal Circuit, personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper so long
as: (1) it is permitted by the forum state’s long-arm statute; and (2) it satisfies the Due
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. Silent Drive, 326 F.3d 1119, 1201 (Fed. Cir.
2003). This same standard also applies in the Seventh Circuit. Purdue, 338 F.3d at 782.
Because Indiana=s long-arm statute, Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 4.4(a), expands
personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause, LinkAmerica
Corp. v. Albert, 857 N.E.2d 961, 966-67 (Ind. 2006), the sole inquiry before the court is
whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants would offend due process.
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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits when a court may
assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd.,
107 F.3d 1272, 1277 (7th Cir. 1997). A nonresident defendant must “have certain
minimum contacts with the [forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int=l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). The crucial inquiry is whether a defendant=s contacts with the forum state are
such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Int’l Med. Group,
312 F.3d at 846 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985);
Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d
934, 943 (7th Cir. 2000)). “This . . . ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a
jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts . . . .”
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (citations omitted).
What the “minimum contacts” standard means in a particular case depends on
whether “general” or “specific” jurisdiction is asserted. RAR, 107 F.3d at 1277. General
jurisdiction over a defendant exists where the defendant has continuous and systemic
business contacts with the state, even where those contacts do not relate to the action at
issue. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16
(1984) (discussing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)).
Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, “exists for controversies that arise out of or are
related to the defendant’s forum contacts.” Hyatt Int=l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713
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(7th Cir. 2002) (citing Steel Warehouse of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Leach, 154 F.3d 712, 714
(7th Cir. 1998)).
The parties focus their arguments on specific, rather than general, jurisdiction.
Plaintiff maintains the court has specific personal jurisdiction under the stream of
commerce theory, and under the Calder effects test.
A.
Stream of Commerce
Plaintiff argues the court has specific jurisdiction over the Defendants through the
stream of commerce theory. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 298 (1980). The stream of commerce theory “refers to the movement of goods from
manufacturers through distributors to consumers. . . .” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court
held that “the forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it
asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
state.” Id. at 297-98 (emphasis added).
In Asahi Metal Indust. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987),
the Justices split over the exact requirements for an application of the theory. Four
Justices were of the view that “[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
state.” Id. at 112. As Justice O’Connor expressed it, there must be “additional conduct”
indicating “an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum state.” Id. Four
Justices, however, found this additional conduct unnecessary. According to Justice
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Brennan, a court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the products will be
purchased by consumers in the forum state. See id. at 117.
In 2011, the Supreme Court revisited the stream of commerce theory in J.
McIntyre Machin. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011). In that case, Nicastro brought
a products liability action against a British manufacturer (J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.),
after he seriously injured his hand while using a machine manufactured by it. See 131
S.Ct. at 2786. The manufacturer argued the New Jersey state court lacked personal
jurisdiction over it because it neither marketed goods in the state nor shipped them there.
See id. Instead, it sent the goods to a U.S. distributor, not under the manufacturer’s
control, who marketed the goods at several conventions – none in New Jersey. See id. In
addition, no more than four machines ended up in New Jersey. See id.
In a split decision, the Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court,
and held the British manufacturer was not subject to jurisdiction under a stream of
commerce theory. See id. Justice Kennedy’s lead opinion rejected Justice Brennan’s
pure stream of commerce approach and found that “the defendant’s transmission of goods
permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted
the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that
its goods will reach the forum State.” Id. at 2788.
With these decisions in mind, the court now turns to Plaintiff’s argument,
predicated on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign
Corp., 21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994), decided after Asahi Metal but before J. McIntyre.
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In that case, the owner of a design patent for a ceiling fan (Beverly Hills Fan) brought an
action for patent infringement against Ultec Enterprises Company, Ltd., and Royal
Sovereign Corporation, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. Ultec, a Chinese corporation, manufactured the accused fan in Taiwan, and
Royal, a New Jersey corporation, imported and distributed the accused fan into the
United States. Id. at 1560. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Ultec and Royal were
selling the accused fan to customers in the Eastern District of Virginia through an
intermediary; plaintiff submitted evidence that the intermediary was Builder’s Square, a
Virginia retailer; and plaintiff submitted evidence reflecting that fifty-two Ultec fans
were present in Builder’s Square bearing Royal’s warranty. Id. at 1563-64. The district
court concluded that the defendants’ contacts with Virginia were not sufficiently
purposeful such that litigation in the forum could reasonably be foreseen. Id. at 1560-61.
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that under either version of the stream of commerce
theory articulated in Asahi Metal, Beverly made the required jurisdictional showing
because the allegations and evidence submitted by the plaintiff established that the
accused fans arrived in Virginia through defendants’ purposeful shipment of the fans
through an established distribution channel:
[D]efendants, acting in consort, placed the accused fan in the stream of
commerce, they knew the likely destination of the products, and their
conduct and connections with the forum state were such that they should
reasonably have anticipated being brought into court there.
Id. at 1566.
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Like the defendants in Beverly Hills Fan, Plaintiff argues the Defendants shipped
the Accused Products into Indiana through an established distribution channel. Plaintiff
is correct that Defendants have a contractual relationship to ship the Accused Products
from South Korea into the United States for the purpose of selling the Accused Products
to United States consumers. Plaintiff, however, fails to establish that Defendants
purposefully directed their distribution channel toward the forum state of Indiana. See id.
at 1565 (noting the facts in World-Wide Volkswagen were distinguishable because “the
allegations are that the accused fan arrived in Virginia through defendants’ purposeful
shipment of the fans through an established distribution channel”). First, unlike the facts
in Beverly Hills Fan, there is no evidence of sales of the Accused Product in Indiana.
Indeed, even Justice Brennan’s more permissive view of the stream of commerce theory
in Asahi Metal contemplates sales in the forum state. 480 U.S. at 117 (“A defendant who
has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of
the final product in the forum State . . . .”). Second, although Plaintiff submits evidence
that Jant shipped six demos of the Accused Product to Indiana, the exhibit supporting that
fact reflects that they were shipped to one sales representative of STAT Technologies in
Fishers, Indiana, in July 2014. (See Filing No. 27-25, Jant LipidPlus Demos and Samples
by Customer Detail January 1, 2014 through November 21, 2014). Beyond that, there is
no evidence that the Indiana sales representative shared these demos with anyone in
Indiana. See QR Spex, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 507 F.Supp.2d 650, 660 (E.D. Tex. 2007)
(finding that samples sent to “four independent sales representatives” in the forum “were
merely for demonstrative purposes and is insufficient to subject Oakley to jurisdiction”
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because, inter alia, “there was no sale arising” from these samples). But even if the sales
representative had shared them, the number of demos in Indiana only totals six. Much
like the six machines in J. McIntyre, that simply is not enough to show purposeful or
targeted conduct in Indiana. Third, Jant’s limited advertising in national trade magazines
and the like is insufficient to confer jurisdiction, as there is no evidence that the
advertising campaign was seen by anyone in Indiana nor targeted to consumers in
Indiana. Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Advertisng
in a trade publication that reaches the forum generally does not, without more, provide a
sufficient basis for exercising specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.”); Quick
Tech., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 345 (5th Cir. 2002) (In a trademark case,
“generally, advertisements are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction”); Seitz v.
Envirotech Sys. Worldwide, Inc., 513 F.Supp.2d 855, 864 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (In a patent
case, “national advertising that may include circulation in the forum state is generally
insufficient to show jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in that state.”). Because
there is no evidence that the Accused Products were distributed “into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in [Indiana],”
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98, the court finds it does not have specific
jurisdiction over the Defendants under the stream of commerce theory.
B.
Calder Effects Test
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants can be subject to specific personal
jurisdiction in this court based on the “effects test,” first articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In Calder, a California actress
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brought an action in California state court against two National Enquirer employees for
their involvement with an allegedly libelous article written about plaintiff. The
defendants, both residents of Florida, challenged personal jurisdiction in the California
court. Although the article was written in Florida, “the brunt of the harm, in terms both
of [plaintiff=s] emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was
suffered in California.” Id. at 788-89. The Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction
over the defendants was proper in California based on the “effects” of their Florida
conduct in California. Id. at 789. In its analysis, the Court specifically noted that the
defendants were “not charged with mere untargeted negligence,” but rather with
undertaking intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions “expressly aimed at California.”
Id. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that defendants “must ‘reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there’ to answer for the truth of the statements made in
their article.” Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff argues the court has specific jurisdiction under Calder because, at
the time Defendants began marketing and selling the Accused Products in 2014, they
each had actual knowledge of (1) the existence of Plaintiff’s ‘397 patent and (2)
Plaintiff’s residency in Indiana. In Walden v. Fiore, the Supreme Court specifically
rejected this interpretation of Calder. 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014) (“Calder made clear
that mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum.”).
The Walden plaintiffs brought a Fourth Amendment Bivens’ action against an
agent with the Drug Enforcement Agency after the officer searched them and their carryon luggage, seized a substantial sum of cash at an Airport in Atlanta, Georgia, and filed
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an allegedly false and misleading probable cause affidavit in support of the forfeiture. Id.
at 119-20. Plaintiffs, residents of Nevada, brought the action in the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada. Id. at 1120. Relying on Calder, the Ninth Circuit found
that the Nevada district court had jurisdiction over the “‘false probable cause affidavit
aspect of the case.’” Id. (quoting Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 577 (9th Cir. 2012)).
The Court held that the agent knew the plaintiffs were Nevada residents and “expressly
aimed his submission of the allegedly false affidavit at Nevada by submitting the
affidavit with knowledge that it would affect persons with a significant connection to
Nevada.” Id. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the Circuit Court improperly shifted
“the analytical focus from [the defendant’s] contacts with the forum to his contacts with
[the plaintiffs].” Id. at 1124. The proper jurisdictional inquiry “is not where the plaintiff
experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects
him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Id. at 1125.
In so holding, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s finding that a
defendant’s “knowledge of [plaintiff’s] strong forum connections . . . combined with its
conclusion that respondents suffered foreseeable harm in Nevada, satisfied the ‘minimum
contacts’ inquiry.” The Supreme Court explained:
This approach to the “minimum contacts” analysis impermissibly allows a
plaintiff’s contacts with the defendant and forum to drive the jurisdictional
analysis. Petitioner’s actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts
with Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at plaintiffs
whom he knew had Nevada connections to the defendants.
Id. at 1125 (internal citation omitted).
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Just as in Walden, the fact that the Defendants may have had knowledge of
Plaintiff’s patent and products cannot serve as the proper basis for a finding of personal
jurisdiction as to any of the Defendants. Plaintiff’s argument inappropriately shifts the
jurisdictional inquiry from Defendants’ suit-related contacts with the forum to
Defendants’ contacts with Plaintiff. In the absence of any evidence that Defendants’
intentional conduct connects them to the forum in a meaningful way, the Calder effects
test does not provide the means for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the
Defendants.
C.
Contract Negotiations
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ physical presence in Indiana in 2012
amounts to purposeful contacts with Indiana. Specific jurisdiction is not appropriate
“‘merely because a plaintiff’s cause of action arose out of the general relationship
between the parties; rather, the action must directly arise out of the specific contacts
between the defendant and the forum state.’” RAR, 107 F.3d at 1278 (quoting Sawtelle v.
Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1389 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasis added)). Here, the contacts at
issue relate to Infopia Korea’s prior meetings with Plaintiff regarding the manufacture of
a blood-glucose monitoring system. Although the parties signed two non-disclosure
agreements regarding the same, Plaintiff’s cause of action for patent infringement and
trade dress infringement do not directly arise out of these contacts. The patent and trade
dress claims in this case arise out of Infopia Korea’s LipidPlus® cholesterol monitoring
system, not a blood-glucose monitoring system. Accordingly, the court finds Infopia
Korea’s contacts with Indiana arising out of a failed business relationship regarding a
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product that is not at issue in this lawsuit are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction
over Infopia Korea, nor to any other Defendant.
D.
Motion to Transfer
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides. . . .” Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c), a corporation resides in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction at
the time the action commenced. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Applicance Co.,
917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) applies for purposes of
determining residence of a corporation under § 1400(b)). Thus, venue in the Southern
District of Indiana is inappropriate as well. Defendants request, in the alternative, that if
the court concludes that transfer, as opposed to dismissal, of this case is in the interests of
justice, that the court transfer this case to the Central District of California.
The court finds the Central District of California is an appropriate venue for this
case, and that transfer to the Central District of California is in the interests of justice. As
discussed previously, the Accused Products are shipped from South Korea to Los
Angeles, are imported into this country in Los Angeles, and stored in Jant’s facility in
Encino for distribution into the United States. Both Los Angeles and Encino are located
in Los Angeles County which, in turn, is located in the Central District of California. See
www.cacd.uscourts.gov. Thus, the Central District of California has a strong nexus to
this case. In addition, California is a more convenient venue for the Defendants.
Witnesses for Infopia Korea can fly direct from Seoul to Los Angeles, Jant resides in Los
Angeles County, and the distance between Infopia Korea’s Florida office and Indiana and
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California is largely the same. Finally and significantly, the parties agreed that if the
court should rule that personal jurisdiction does not properly lie in the Southern District
of Indiana, then in lieu of dismissal, the case should be transferred to the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. (Filing No. 24, Joint Motion to Stay
Proceedings ¶ 9). Defendants’ alternative motion to transfer is therefore GRANTED.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has not met its burden of establishing that
the court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Accordingly, the
court GRANTS Defendants= Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and
Venue (Filing No. 22) and GRANTS Defendants’ alternative Motion to Transfer to the
Central District of California. The Clerk is ORDERED to transfer this action to the
Central District of California.
SO ORDERED this 3rd day of April 2015.
_________________________________
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record.
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