BOYD v. COLVIN

Filing 23

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION. The Court VACATES the ALJ's decision denying Ms. Boyd benefits and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four). Final judgment shall issue accordingly. SEE ORDER. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 6/30/2015. (BGT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
CYNTHIA L. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

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No. 1:14-cv-01354-JMS-DML

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Plaintiff Cynthia Boyd applied for disability and disability insurance benefits from the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) in August 2011, alleging a disability onset date of
September 1, 2009. [Filing No. 12-5 at 2.] Her application was denied initially on January 4, 2012
and after reconsideration on March 6, 2012. [Filing No. 12-2 at 13.] Administrative Law Judge
Ronald T. Jordan (the “ALJ”) held a hearing on February 7, 2013, and issued a decision on March
13, 2013, concluding that Ms. Boyd was not entitled to receive benefits. [Filing No 12-2 at 2128.] The Appeals Council denied review on June 26, 2014. [Filing No. 12-2 at 2-4.] Ms. Boyd
then filed this action, asking the Court to review the denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). [Filing No. 1.]
I.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Boyd was forty-four years old when she applied for disability benefits in August 2011.
[Filing No. 12-5 at 2.] 1 Ms. Boyd previously worked as a bank teller and a ledger/bookkeeper.

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Ms. Boyd detailed pertinent facts in her opening brief, and the Commissioner did not dispute
those facts. Because those facts implicate sensitive and otherwise confidential medical
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[Filing No. 12-2 at 45.] She alleges a disability onset date of September 1, 2009. [Filing No. 125 at 2.] Ms. Boyd claims that she is disabled based on a variety of conditions, which will be
discussed as necessary below. Ms. Boyd met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act through December 31, 2014. [Filing No. 12-2 at 13.]
Using the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the SSA in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ issued an opinion on March 13, 2013, determining that Ms. Boyd was not
entitled to receive disability benefits. [Filing No. 12-2 at 13-21.] The ALJ found as follows:
·

At Step One of the analysis, the ALJ found that Ms. Boyd had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity2 since the alleged onset date. [Filing No. 12-2 at
15.]

·

At Step Two of the analysis, the ALJ found that Ms. Boyd suffered from the
severe impairments of migraines and high blood pressure. [Filing No. 12-2 at
15-16.]

·

At Step Three of the analysis, the ALJ found that Ms. Boyd did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medical equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments. [Filing No. 12-2 at 16.]

·

After Step Three but before Step Four, the ALJ found that Ms. Boyd had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to: “lift, carry, push, or pull 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She can stand or walk for a total of 6

information concerning Ms. Boyd, the Court will simply incorporate those facts by reference
herein. Specific facts will be articulated as needed.
2

Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity that is both substantial (i.e., involves
significant physical or mental activities) and gainful (i.e., work that is usually done for pay or
profit, whether or not a profit is realized). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a).
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hours in an 8-hour day and sit for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour day. She can
occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, crawl, kneel, and climb stairs or ramps.
She cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Additionally, the claimant cannot
work around hazards, loud background noises, or flashing lights. She also
cannot endure concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, gases, strong odors, or
poor ventilation.” [Filing No. 12-2 at 16-21.]
·

At Step Four of the analysis, the ALJ found that Ms. Boyd was capable of
performing her past relevant work as a bank teller and ledger/bookkeeper.
[Filing No. 12-2 at 21.]

·

The ALJ did not reach Step Five of the analysis due to his finding at Step Four
that Ms. Boyd could perform her past relevant work. [Filing No. 12-2 at 21.]

Ms. Boyd sought review of the ALJ’s decision from the Appeals Council, but that request
was denied on June 26, 2014, [Filing No. 12-2 at 2-4], making the ALJ’s decision the
Commissioner’s final decision subject to judicial review. Ms. Boyd then filed this action, asking
that the Commissioner’s decision be reversed and requesting an award of benefits, or in the
alternative, that the case be remanded for further proceedings. [Filing No. 1.]
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits and
Supplemental Security Income to individuals with disabilities.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
214 (2002). “The statutory definition of ‘disability’ has two parts. First, it requires a certain kind
of inability, namely, an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Second it requires
an impairment, namely, a physical or mental impairment, which provides reason for the inability.

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The statute adds that the impairment must be one that has lasted or can be expected to last…not
less than 12 months.” Id. at 217.
When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court’s role is limited to
ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists for
the ALJ’s decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For
the purpose of judicial review, “[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). Because the ALJ
“is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668,
678 (7th Cir. 2008), this Court must afford the ALJ’s credibility determination “considerable
deference,” overturning it only if it is “patently wrong,” Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738
(7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
The ALJ must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),
evaluating the following, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has
a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one
of the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can
perform [her] past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). “If
a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, she will automatically be found disabled. If a
claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four. Once step four
is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.” Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by
evaluating “all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are

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not severe.” Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ “may not
dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling.” Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four to
determine whether the claimant can perform her own past relevant work and if not, at Step Five to
determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e), (g). The
burden of proof is on the claimant for Steps One through Four; only at Step Five does the burden
shift to the Commissioner. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s
decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When an ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the
appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An
award of benefits “is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the record
can yield but one supportable conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Boyd makes four arguments in support of her appeal: (1) that the ALJ erred in not
finding Ms. Boyd’s lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, back pain, obesity, and kidney failure to be severe,
and in not considering the combined effect of her non-severe impairments in formulating her RFC;
(2) that the ALJ erred in rejecting Ms. Boyd’s treating source opinion without engaging in the
proper deferential analysis; (3) that the ALJ failed to fully question the claimant and develop the
record regarding the physical demands of Ms. Boyd’s past relevant work; and (4) that the ALJ
failed to properly consider whether Ms. Boyd’s headaches met or medically equaled a listed
impairment. [Filing No. 18 at 8.] Because the Court has determined that the third issue requires
remand, it will address that issue first.

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A. Determination of Physical Demands of Past Relevant Work
Ms. Boyd argues that the ALJ’s conclusion that she can return to past relevant work was
not supported by specific findings or analysis regarding the physical demands of the work. [Filing
No. 18 at 16.] She contends that two of the three express findings required by SSR 82-62 for a
Step-Four determination were not sufficiently developed – specifically, the required finding of the
demands of past relevant work, and the required comparison of the RFC with demands of past
relevant work. [Filing No. 18 at 16-18.] She asserts that “the ALJ did not take into consideration
any physical demands of her past work. He simply stated her prior job and determined she can
return to it.” [Filing No. 18 at 18.] Ms. Boyd also argues that her former job conflicts with her
RFC limitations, in that it “could require exposure to flashing lights and loud noises as she accepts
large scale bank deliveries.” [Filing No 18 at 18.]
In response, the Commissioner argues that Ms. Boyd did not meet her burden of showing
that she could not perform her past relevant work. [Filing No. 21 at 18-19.] The Commissioner
states that the ALJ satisfied the regulations by presenting a hypothetical to the vocational expert
that encompassed all of the limitations in the RFC, and relied on his answer that someone with
Ms. Boyd’s limitations could work as a bank teller or ledger/bookkeeper. [Filing No. 21 at 19.]
The Commissioner asserts that the comparison of the RFC to the demands of past work was
correctly drawn, because the testimony of the vocational expert was made after hearing Ms. Boyd’s
testimony about her work. [Filing No. 21 at 20.] The Commissioner also points to the consistency
with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) noise level classifications of the jobs, and the

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fact that the loud noises and flashing lights did not cause Ms. Boyd to leave her previous jobs.
[Filing No. 21 at 20-21.]
On reply, Ms. Boyd argues that the timing of the vocational expert’s testimony after Ms.
Boyd’s testimony is not sufficient to meet the SSR 82-62 requirements, absent an explicit
comparison by the ALJ between the RFC and demands of past work. [Filing No. 22 at 4]. She
contends that the ALJ only described her past work in a generic way, making the RFC comparison
based on “mere categorization” of the work, rather than on particular physical demands. [Filing
No. 22 at 4.]
At Step Four of the disability claim analysis, if the claimant can still perform her past
relevant work given her RFC, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). In finding that
an individual can perform past relevant work, the decision must contain three specific findings of
fact:
1) A finding of fact as to the individual’s RFC;
2) A finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the past job; and
3) A finding of fact that the individual’s RFC would permit a return to the past job.
SSR 82-62 (S.S.A.), 1982 WL 31386, *4.
The ALJ’s finding that a claimant can perform past relevant work has “far-reaching
implications and must be developed and explained fully in the disability decision.” Welch v.
Colvin, 2014 WL 1413538, *3 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly,
“every effort must be made to secure evidence that resolves the issue as clearly and explicitly as
circumstances permit,” and “[w]hen an ALJ fails to make this determination, remand is
appropriate.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Interpreting SSR 82-62, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that “the ALJ cannot describe a claimant's job in a generic way – [such

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as], ‘sedentary’ – and conclude, on the basis of the claimant's residual capacity, that she can return
to her previous work. Instead, the ALJ must list the specific physical requirements of the previous
job and assess, in light of the available evidence, the claimant’s ability to perform these tasks.”
Nolen v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1991).
In this case, the ALJ notes two reasons to support his finding that Ms. Boyd is capable of
performing past work as a bank teller and ledger/bookkeeper. First, he identifies the DOT titles
and categorizations for each job – bank teller is light and skilled (SVP of 5), and ledger/bookkeeper
is sedentary and skilled (SVP of 5). [Filing No. 12-2 at 21.] Second, he cites the vocational
expert’s testimony regarding the posed hypothetical. [Filing No. 12-2 at 21.] The ALJ’s reliance
on the DOT titles is insufficient under SSR 82-62, as the ALJ only noted the categorization for
each job without setting forth their specific physical requirements. See Nolen, 939 F.2d at 518.
Additionally, the ALJ’s citation to the vocational expert’s testimony is unhelpful because,
while the vocational expert did hear Ms. Boyd’s testimony regarding the bank teller and
ledger/bookkeeper jobs, that testimony was vague. And while the ALJ did pose some questions
to Ms. Boyd about the demands of her past relevant work, such testimony failed to establish
specific physical requirements of the work. Regarding the bank teller job, Ms. Boyd’s testimony
reveals only that she had to lift bags of coins and stand for long periods of time. [Filing No. 12-2
at 32.] The vocational expert’s description of the job was limited to light and skilled, with an SVP
of 5. [Filing No. 12-2 at 45-49.] The only information gleaned from Ms. Boyd’s testimony about
her ledger/bookkeeper job is that it was a desk job, it involved balancing ledgers and transactions,
and Ms. Boyd did not consider it complicated. [Filing No. 12-2 at 30.] The vocational expert’s
description of the job was limited to sedentary and skilled, with an SVP of 5. [Filing No. 12-2 at
45-49.] This is the extent of the information provided from the hearing and the ALJ’s decision,

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and does not adequately set forth the physical and mental demands of the past job, nor a
comparison of the RFC and the job requirements.
While the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert about the ability of someone
with Ms. Boyd’s RFC to perform the jobs in question is relevant, it is not a sufficient basis for the
ALJ’s determination without more detailed facts. Additional detail that could have been explored
are facts such as how much time is spent sitting versus standing, if breaks can be taken from
continuous sitting and standing, how much weight is required to be lifted, and how often it must
be lifted. See Banks v. Barnhart, 63 Fed. Appx. 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2003) (ALJ “should have
compared the specific, physical demands of [the claimant’s] past job with his present
capabilities”).
A list of specific physical requirements or demands, or a description of the tasks the past
work entailed, is a requirement in a Step-Four disability claim analysis. Nolen, 939 F.2d at 518519; see also Kuykendall v. Astrue, 2009 WL 3872040, * 4-5 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (lack of specific
and consistent information regarding actual length of time spent walking and standing in previous
job required remand); cf. Tolbert v. Astrue, 2011 WL 883927, * 14 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (information
that “[t]ypically the job consists of being at a station where one can sit and stand at will, but they
do have to make rounds … for five minutes in every one hour [and t]he only lifting required is a
key clack, which weighs less than five pounds,” was sufficient for ALJ to explain conclusion that
claimant could perform past relevant work) (emphasis omitted).
In this case, the information on job demands does not rise to the level needed for the ALJ
to adequately explain his finding that Ms. Boyd could perform her past relevant work. Though
Ms. Boyd referred to lifting “bags of coin” while performing the teller job, there is no information
about how often she lifted those bags or how much they weighed. Ms. Boyd also referred to not

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being able to stand “for very long periods of time” as a reason why she ceased working at the teller
job, [Filing No. 12-2 at 32], but there is no information – and the ALJ did not inquire – as to how
long the standing periods lasted, and if they could be alternated with sitting.

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ledger/bookkeeper job was a “desk job”, but there is no information about how long that job
required sitting, and whether it was possible to alternate sitting with standing.
One reason for the findings of fact requirement is to facilitate meaningful appellate review.
Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 2008). This reason is highlighted in this case by the
conflict in the parties’ arguments regarding flashing lights and loud noises. Ms. Boyd argues that
the ALJ did not correctly compare the RFC to the functional demands of past relevant work,
because the RFC requires no exposure to flashing lights and noises, and her former job “could
require exposure to flashing lights and loud noises as she accepts large scale bank deliveries.”
[Filing No. 18 at 18.] Based on the citation to the record, this assertion appears to relate to Ms.
Boyd’s testimony regarding “Brink’s trucks that take money to the bank” and “shipp[ing]
money…from different states.” [Filing No. 12-2 at 30.] Her testimony is that she balanced these
transactions. [Filing No. 12-2 at 30.] The Commissioner argues that the noise levels for the past
jobs are quiet and moderate, and thus the RFC limitation is satisfied, and also points to Ms. Boyd’s
testimony that the bank teller and ledger/bookkeeper jobs were desk job that involved “balancing
ledgers.” [Filing No. 21 at 20.]
The failure to develop the record regarding the physical demands of Ms. Boyd’s past
relevant work makes it impossible for the Court to meaningfully review this aspect of the StepFour analysis. See Wadsworth v. Astrue, 2008 WL 2857326, *9 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (“The three
sentences the ALJ devoted to discussion of whether [the claimant] could perform his past
work…do not meet the requirements outlined in Ruling 82-62. It is not clear from these brief

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sentences that the ALJ considered carefully [the claimant’s] testimony or the medical evidence
about how his impairments would affect his ability to work [in his former job], or whether the ALJ
consulted any supplemental sources regarding how the job…is generally performed”). It is
possible that Ms. Boyd’s testimony did not imply that she was actually exposed to Brinks trucks
and shipping docks, but that she handled paperwork that resulted from those transactions.
However, given the lack of clarity in the record, the Court cannot make this assumption. Due to
the record’s lack of development regarding the physical demands of Ms. Boyd’s past relevant work
– relating both to lights and noises as well as to lifting, standing, and sitting – the Court must
remand this case for further consideration.
B. Additional Arguments
Given that the Court has already determined that this case must be remanded, it will not
address Ms. Boyd’s remaining arguments in detail. That said, on remand the ALJ should be careful
to correctly consider the combined effect of Ms. Boyd’s non-severe impairments in her RFC. The
Court notes, however, that the ALJ stated that he had given “careful consideration of the entire
record” and “considered all symptoms.” [Filing No. 12-2 at 16-17.] Ms. Boyd provides no reason
for the Court to second-guess the ALJ’s representations that he did, in fact, consider the effects of
Ms. Boyd’s impairments in combination. See Richison v. Astrue, 462 Fed. Appx. 622, 626 (7th
Cir.2012) (concluding that an ALJ who “wrote that he gave ‘careful consideration’ to ‘the entire
record’ and ‘considered all symptoms’” adequately considered the cumulative effects of the
claimant’s impairments in the absence of contrary evidence).
Additionally, as to Ms. Boyd’s argument that the ALJ erroneously rejected her treating
physician’s opinion without engaging in the proper deferential analysis, [Filing No. 18 at 14-16],
the Court notes that the treating physician rule “directs the administrative law judge to give

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controlling weight to the medical opinion of a treating physician if it is ‘well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques’ and ‘not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence.’” Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2)). The Court also notes, however, that the ALJ provided his rationale for
considering, but giving little weight to, Ms. Boyd’s treating physician’s opinion. [See Filing No.
12-2 at 18-20.]
Finally, Ms. Boyd argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider whether Ms. Boyd’s
headaches met or equaled a listed impairment – specifically, Listing 11.03 for Epilepsy. [Filing
No. 18 at 19-20.] The Court notes that there is no listing for headaches or migraines, and that the
ALJ considered whether Ms. Boyd met or medically equaled “any listing section in Neurological,
section 11.00, et seq.” [Filing No. 12-2 at 16 (emphasis in original).] On remand, however, the
ALJ should take care to specifically address Listing 11.03, and explain why Ms. Boyd does not
meet that listing.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed herein, the Court VACATES the ALJ’s decision denying Ms.
Boyd benefits and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(sentence four). Final judgment shall issue accordingly.

_______________________________

DATE: June 30, 2015

Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record

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