HOLLIMAN v. PENCE et al

Filing 48

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - The Defendants' 34 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. (See Order.) Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 7/28/2016. (GSO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

GREG A. HOLLIMAN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JOHN R. WERNERT in his official capacity )
as Secretary of the Indiana Family and
)
Social Services Administration, and
)
LANCE RHODES in his official capacity
)
as Director of Family Resources,
)
)
Defendants.
)

No. 1:14-cv-01603-LJM-TAB

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter pends before the Court on Defendants’, John R. Wernert and Lance
Rhodes’ (collectively, “Defendants’”) Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
These are the undisputed material facts. Plaintiff Greg A. Holliman (“Plaintiff”) had
been receiving food stamps prior to being charged with maintaining a common nuisance,
a felony offense. In 2005, he was convicted of the offense pursuant to a plea agreement.
After serving his sentence, he applied for and was approved for food stamps. No one
asked Plaintiff about his conviction and he did not volunteer the information. In 2014, the
Indiana Family and Social Service Administration notified Plaintiff that he was not eligible
for food stamps and had not been so eligible since his conviction. Plaintiff has sued
Defendants alleging that the denial of his eligibility to receive food stamps amounts to a
deprivation of his constitutional right to due process, subjects him to an unlawful bill of
attainder or ex post facto law.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). See also United Ass’n of Black Landscapers
v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267–68 (7th Cir. 1990). Motions for summary
judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), which provides in
relevant part:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the
opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit
evidentiary materials showing that a fact either is or cannot be genuinely disputed. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever “there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears
the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986);
Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc.. 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). It is not the duty
of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary
judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying applicable
evidence. See Goodman, 621 F.3d at 654; Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc.,
92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996).

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court should draw all
reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should
view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Estate
of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996). The mere existence of a factual
dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that
might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary
judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94
F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary
judgment, even when in dispute. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir.
1992). If the moving party does not have the ultimate burden of proof on a claim, it is
sufficient for the moving party to direct the court to the lack of evidence as to an element
of that claim. See Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1994).
“If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to [her]
case, one on which [she] would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must
be granted to the moving party.” Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir.
1996).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants administer the federal food stamp program. The federal law at 21
U.S.C. § 862a disqualifies individuals from participating in the food stamp program if they
have a drug related conviction.

Specifically, the disqualification applies to persons

convicted of “any offense which is classified as a felony by the law of the jurisdiction
involved [Indiana] and which has as an element the possession, use, or distribution of a

controlled substance . . . .” The parties do not dispute that in Indiana, the crime called
Maintaining a Common Nuisance has such an element.
Plaintiff asserts that in declaring him ineligible for food stamps, Defendants have
subjected him to the constitutionally prohibited bill of attainder. The United States
Supreme Court has opined that a law is a bill of attainder if it “legislatively determines
guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the
protections of a judicial trial.” Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977).
The Seventh Circuit has instructed that in order to be deemed a bill of attainder the
accused legislative or executive action must consist of “three elements: (1) specification
of the affected persons; (2) punishment; and (3) lack of a jury trial.” Dehainaut v. Pena,
32 F.3d 1066, 1070 (7th Cir. 1994).
The Seventh Circuit has determined that disqualification from the food stamp
program is not punishment for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. See Turner v.
Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 431 (7th Cir. 2000). The careful analysis of the congressional
intent in the Turner opinion clearly applies to this case. There being no punitive intent by
Congress for the disqualification of a food stamp recipient for a drug related criminal
conviction, there is no bill of attainder therein.
For the same reason the disqualification of a food stamp recipient upon a
conviction for a drug related offense cannot implicate ex post facto protection because
the consequence cannot be deemed criminal punishment. See Turner, 207 F.3d at 431.
It is this Court’s view that if losing food stamp privileges is not punishment for double
jeopardy purposes, that loss cannot be held to be punishment for ex post facto purposes.

Application of the Turner case disposes of Plaintiff’s third claim as well because
there is a rational connection between the probation of food stamps to those convicted of
drug related crimes and a legitimate government interest. The legitimate interests herein
are the same as those in Turner.

Specifically, the challenged governmental action’s

rational basis is to deter crime and to reduce instances of fraud in the food stamp program.
The deterrence sought is not only for Plaintiff, but for other food stamp recipients.
For these reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 34,
is GRANTED and Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of July, 2016.

Distribution:
Jay Meisenhelder
JAY MEISENHELDER EMPLOYMENT &
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGAL SERVICES PC
[e-mail]
David F. McNamar
MCNAMAR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
[e-mail]
Robert Joseph Opat
MEISENHELDER EMPLOYMENT &
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGAL SERVICES, P.C
[e-mail]
Benjamin J Legge
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]
David A. Arthur
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]

________________________________
LARRY J. McKINNEY, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana